Previous research showed that fear-inducing graphic warning labels can lead to cognitive dissonance and defensive responses. Less threatening, social-related warning labels do not elicit these defensive responses, making them more effective in preventing smoking in adults. Given that smoking numbers are still too high among youngsters, it is crucial to investigate how warning labels should be designed to prevent teenagers from starting smoking in the first place. In two studies, we investigated whether comparable effects of social-related warning labels could be (...) observed in a group of teenagers (14-17 years) who are not yet legally allowed to smoke. In addition, we tried to replicate earlier findings with smoking and non-smoking adults. Participants were presented with either health warning labels, social warning labels, or no warning labels. Subsequently, their explicit cognitions (i.e., risk perception, attitude towards smoking) and their implicit associations of smoking with healthiness/unhealthiness (Study 1a and Study 1b) and with positivity/negativity (Study 2a and Study 2b) were assessed. Results showed that in both studies, adult smokers had a higher risk perception and a more positive attitude towards smoking than adult non-smokers. Additionally, social warning labels lead to stronger implicit associations between smoking and negativity in Study 2 in the adult groups. In the teenage group, social warning labels lead to more positive attitudes than health warning labels in Study 2. No further effects on risk perception or implicit associations were found in the teenage group. Possible explanations are discussed. (shrink)

Si l'on reconnaît que la métaphore n'est pas un simple ornement du langage et que l'histoire de la pensée philosophique et scientifique s'est nouée autour de certaines "métaphores directrices" et de leurs changements de sens, il faut réviser notre image habituelle des rapports entre rhétorique et pensée conceptuelle, parcourir à nouveaux frais k cours de notre tradition et envisager autrement la succession des grandes métaphysiques. À cet égard, la pensée de Hans Blumenberg offre des instruments essentiels. Anselm Haverkamp et (...) Jean-Claude Monod se sont attachés tout à la fois à éditer, situer et commenter les travaux de Blumenberg, tout en leur donnant des prolongements personnels. Ces prolongements et développements ne concernent pas seulement la réflexion sur la "métaphore absolue", telle que la "métaphorologie" de Blumenberg l'a illustrée, mais aussi l'histoire de la rhétorique et de la poétique, les moyens d'expression de la philosophie, les limites de la phénoménologie et les impasses de "l'histoire de l'être" heideggérienne, la portée anthropologique du mythe, les transformations de la mimèsis. Sont ici rassemblées des contributions de deux philosophes qui, l'un et l'autre, ont "pensé avec" Blumenberg."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Aide-Mémoire (Theorie I) : Saussure, der Text, die Bilder -- Raum- und Latenzgeschichten (Illustration) -- Pars pro toto (Theorie II) : Das Sein im Ganzen, Eine Latenzfigur -- Negativität -- Anagramm und Prosa : Der Maulwurf als Theorie.

Whereas theories on health generally argue in favor of one specific concept, we argue that, given the variety of health practices, we need different concepts of health. We thus approach health concepts as a Wittgensteinian family of thick concepts. By discussing five concepts of health offered by theory, we argue that all capture something that seems relevant when we talk and think about health. Classifying these concepts reveals their family resemblances: each of these concepts differs from the others in at (...) least one respect and resembles the others in several respects. Moreover, our classification shows that “health” always both describes a condition and evaluates that condition at the same time. Having both descriptive and evaluative dimensions, we can see health concepts as “thick concepts.” It is because of this evaluative dimension that it is important to reflect on the question of what understanding of health guides specific practices. We show that the distinctions revealed by our classification can serve as a conceptual toolbox for reflection on the assumptions and purposes of particular health practices. Finally, we illustrate how such reflection could work out by briefly exploring three specific health practices. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that apart from evaluating the causes and the social determinants of health inequalities, an evaluation of the effects of health inequalities is due. For this, we propose the ideal of relational equality as an evaluative framework, and test to what extent health inequalities threaten this ideal of a society of equals. We identify three ways in which they do and argue that these risks are especially great for those lower down the socio-economic strata. We thus (...) conclude that equality in health is instrumental to social justice, and that socio-economic inequalities in health are not only unjust due to their causes but also due to their consequences. We continue to argue that our instrumental approach opens a perspective to mitigate the identified injustices by changing society, rather than reducing inequalities in health, and argue that this is an advantage in the light of the realistic assumption that of the socio-economic health inequalities will persist. The article thus offers a complementary approach to both the evaluation and the mitigation of the injustice of socio-economic inequalities in health. (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that the information problem poses a foundational challenge to mainstream semantics. It proposes, second, to address this problem by drawing on notions from Kit Fine’s essentialist framework. More specifically, it claims that the information problem can be avoided by strengthening standard truth theories, employing an operator expressing the notion of a relative constitutive semantic requirement. As a result, the paper proposes to construe semantic theories as theories of semantic requirements, and semantic knowledge as knowledge of such (...) requirements. (shrink)

A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as regularity , is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural (...) weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition and with the essential feature of Williamson’s example. (shrink)

Metaphorologie ist eine Methode der Textanalyse und Textbehandlung, die im Wesentlichen von Hans Blumenberg angeregt und praktiziert wurde, aber keine nennenswerte Wirkung hatte. Sie besitzt eine größere Reichweite und deutet tiefere Konsequenzen an, als bisher erkannt und umgesetzt worden ist. Das liegt an technischen Aspekten, die es weiter zu entwickeln gilt. Metapher, Mythos und Halbzeug sind Blumenbergs Kernbegriffe, an denen die Weiterführung einer analytischen Ausarbeitung ansetzen kann und hier in einer Folge selbständig lesbarer Kapitel ausgeführt werden. Sie führen von den (...) ersten Ansätzen in der Philosophie Blumenbergs und ihrer technischen Ergänzung auf die exemplarischen Problemfelder von Lebenswelt, Politik und Ästhetik. Die Anordnung in Dreiergruppen entspricht den Ausgangsbegriffen des Titels. Sie differenziert nach historischen, politischen, ästhetischen Hinsichten, bevor diese in zwei Skizzen die Perspektive des Gesamtprojekts Metaphorologie eröffnen und in wissenschaftshistorischer und methodischer Hinsicht entwerfen. (shrink)

A cardinal characteristic can often be described as the smallest size of a family of sequences which has a given property. Instead of this traditional concern for a smallest realization of the given property, a basically new approach, taken in [4] and [5], asks for a realization whose members are sequences of labels that correspond to 1-way infinite paths in a labelled graph. We study this approach as such, establishing tools that are applicable to all these cardinal characteristics. As an (...) application, we demonstrate the power of the tools developed by presenting a short proof of the bounded graph conjecture [4]. (shrink)

Carina Fourie and Annette Rid, eds. What is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and Health. New York, Oxford University Press, 2017. 336 p.

Since its publication in 1960, Hans Blumenberg′s first book, Paradigmatic Instances towards a Metaphorology, has remained both an esoteric pamphlet for the initiated and a riddled challenge for the many. It offers an answer to the methodological problems left by Husserl′s diagnosis of the Crisis of European Sciences and Heidegger′s ‘History of Being’. Blumenberg′s project of a historically reflected phenomenology introduces the Aristotelian paleonym of ‘metaphor’ as a systematic instrument in the archeological investigation and analysis of philosophy′s coming to conceive (...) of itself in self-reflective conceptual thought. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 5, Page 597-604, June 2022.

Le projet métaphorologique de Hans Blumenberg correspond – répond et s’oppose, comme « la Mythologie blanche » de Jacques Derrida – à l’idée heideggérienne de «l’histoire de l’être ». Le concept de « l’inconceptuabilité » révise cette critique historiquement limitée du logocentrisme, en réduisant le concept d’Etre de Heidegger ad absurdum.

Le projet métaphorologique de Hans Blumenberg correspond – répond et s’oppose, comme « la Mythologie blanche » de Jacques Derrida – à l’idée heideggérienne de «l’histoire de l’être ». Le concept de « l’inconceptuabilité » révise cette critique historiquement limitée du logocentrisme, en réduisant le concept d’Etre de Heidegger ad absurdum.

Examines allegory in H lderlin's later work, exploring subjects such as Freud and Derrida's views of mourning, and offering original readings of works including Impossible Ode, Mnemosyne, and The Churchyard .

The strong correlation between people’s socioeconomic position and health within high income countries is a well-documented fact. A person’s occupation, income and education level tell us a lot about that person’s prospects on a long and healthy life, such that we can speak of a ‘social gradient in health’, or a ‘socioeconomic health gap’. This association is often perceived to be unjust. Therefore, it is generally thought that governments should aim to reduce socioeconomic health inequalities. However, this idea needs ethical (...) justification, for it is not evident if and why exactly these inequalities are unjust. For instance, are inequalities in health unjust per se? Or because the underlying socioeconomic inequalities are unjust? And does justice require equal health levels, or a minimum level of health? What complicates the issue, is that the width of the health gap, or the steepness of the social gradient, depends on what health measures are used. Overall, the more subjective the measure, the greater the inequalities appear to be. But are all these measures equally morally relevant? This dissertation aims to give a better understanding of these philosophical questions. It does so by investigating the question of what we should understand by health in the first part, after which it addresses the question of how to evaluate socioeconomic health inequalities in the light of justice. The introduction begins with a description of the phenomenon of socioeconomic health inequalities, and how it has been addressed by politicians, epidemiologists and philosophers in the past and today. The chapter continues by formulating the central question of the dissertation – that of which health inequalities should be focused in the light of a concern with social justice. It explicates how this dissertation contributes to answering that question, by discussing the potential relation between the conceptualisation of health and justice evaluations, and by discussing which questions are addressed in each of the following chapters. The chapter 2 addresses the question of how health is conceptualised in the philosophical and public heath literature, and how theoretical concepts of health differ. It proposes to approach health concepts as a Wittgensteinian family of thick concepts and argues that while theories on health generally argue in favour of one specific concept, a comparison of concepts shows that we may need different concepts of health given the variety of health practices. By explicating the differences between five concepts of health, this chapter argues that each captures aspects of health that all seem relevant when we talk and think about health. Classifying these concepts based on their distinctions reveals them as members of a conceptual family: each of the discussed concepts differs from the others in at least one respect and resembles the others in several respects. Moreover, the discussion of the concepts shows that ‘health’ always both describes a condition and values that condition at the same time. Having both descriptive and evaluative dimensions, we can see health concepts as ‘thick concepts’. Given this evaluative dimension, it is important to reflect on the question of what understanding of health guides specific practices. Moreover, the distinctions revealed by the classification can serve as a conceptual toolbox for reflection on the assumptions and purposes of health practices. How such reflection could work is illustrated by a brief exploration of what health aspects are focused upon in three specific health practices. Chapter 3 presents a study into the question of how health is conceptualised by ordinary citizens and to what extent conceptualisations of health differ between socioeconomic groups. By making use of the method of concept mapping, this study analyses how different socioeconomic groups formulate their own answers regarding the question ‘what does health mean to you?’. It presents concept maps of health for three different socioeconomic groups living in the city of Utrecht that reveal that all groups have a multidimensional understanding of health. An interpretation of the concept maps reveals nuanced differences between groups. The multiple aspects of health were also ranked by importance. It appears that each group assigned most importance to mental health. All in all, the study shows that people in lower socioeconomic groups are more likely to show a conceptualisation of health that refers to 1) the absence of health threats, 2) a person within his/her circumstances, 3) the value of functional notions, and 4) an accepting attitude towards life. Chapter 4 addresses the question of what the theoretical and empirical study to concepts of health could imply for health equity practices. It does so by exploring further the suggestions made in chapters 2 and 3. Regarding the question of which health aspects should guide health equity policies, this chapter discusses the question of whether we should primarily look at subjective or objective health measures, and whether a universal or relative standard of health should be central. While justice-related concerns of impartiality and equal treatment may seem to favour an objective perspective and a universal health standard, it appears that we have good reason to account for the subjective perspective as well. It is also argued that a concern for recognition and participatory parity gives room for relative health standards. Th room for relative health standards confronts us with the question of how to deal with mechanisms like adaptive preferences that the concept maps reveal. It proposes a way out, by arguing for society-relative health standards. Chapter 5 examines the question of whether inequalities in health should be evaluated ‘directly’, thus independently of a distribution of their social determinants. It proposes a sufficientarian perspective, such that the central question of evaluation is that of whether everyone is – or can be – healthy enough. By discussing two sufficientarian approaches to health and social justice – by Powers & Faden and by Nussbaum – this chapter distinguishes two ways of setting a threshold level for health. Both approaches appear to provide an unsatisfactory basis for justice evaluations and lead us away from direct evaluation if we try to settle health minima that are less arbitrary. In anticipation to chapters 6 and 7, it is argued that the perspective of sufficient health for relational equality escapes this arbitrariness: compared to that of a decent human life, it better helps to answer both the question of what socioeconomic health inequalities a society is due to avoid, and the question of when socioeconomic health inequalities are unjust considering their consequences. Chapter 6 discusses to what extent Daniels’s theory of health justice provides a satisfactory answer to the question of what health inequalities a society is due to avoid. Daniels proposes an indirect evaluative approach by arguing that we should evaluate socioeconomic health inequalities in the light of Rawls’s principles of justice as fairness. That is, if socioeconomic inequalities are in accordance with fair equality of opportunity and with the difference principle, the corresponding health inequalities would be just. It is shown that the suggestion that Rawls’s principles regulate the social determinants of health neglects that not all social determinants of health belong to society’s basic structure as conceived of by Rawls and are thereby not subjected to the principles of justice. To acknowledge the social mechanisms leading to socioeconomic health inequalities in their full complexity, it is argued that we should broaden our understanding of society’s structure in accordance with Young’s notion of social structural processes. This renders the question of what health inequalities a society is due to avoid into a question of what we can expect from the side of the various actors that uphold the social structures that produce socioeconomic health inequalities. Lastly, it is discussed how a shift to Young’s theory completes the shift to non-ideal theorising that seem already initiated by Daniels, and that with this, the distinction between direct and indirect evaluation dissolves. Chapter 7 discusses to what extent equality in health is of instrumental value for a society of free and equals. It thus takes up the idea proposed in chapter 5, that an evaluation of the consequences of health inequalities is also due. Taking relational equality as an evaluative framework reveals three ways in which inequalities in life expectancy threaten this ideal. That is, via unequal risks to stigmatisation, unequal risks to unemployment and the risk of unequal pension enjoyments. It is thereby shown that these risks are especially great for those lower down the socioeconomic strata. It thus concludes that equality in health is of instrumental value to relational equality. The chapter continues to argue that our instrumental approach opens a new perspective: to mitigate the identified injustices by changing society, rather than by reducing inequalities in health. This is argued to be an advantage in the light of the realistic assumption that of the socioeconomic health inequalities will persist. The paper thus offers a complementary approach to both the evaluation and the mitigation of the injustice of socioeconomic inequalities in health. The discussion chapter summarises the central findings of the analyses of health concepts and discusses questions regarding the philosophical and practical merits of comparing theoretical health concepts, the need for developing new health measures or concepts and the importance or nonsense of studying citizen’s views on health. Repeating this for the dissertation’s second part, the central findings of the chapters on justice evaluation are summarised and followed by a discussion of questions and issues that have remained unaddressed so far. Here, central points of discussion are my take on rules of distribution, the distinction of direct and indirect evaluation, the role of ideal and non-ideal theory, the idea of relational equality, and personal responsibility for health. The chapter concludes by noting that also in the light of justice evaluations, all commonly used health measures are relevant for justice. Therefore, my recommendations for policy and further research entail that inequalities in each of these measures deserve attention by both policymakers and researchers. Specifically, policymakers and researchers should give attention to how exactly each of these health inequalities come about, in such a way that a discussion about the question of who can be assigned responsibility to alleviate them is well-informed; and both should give attention to the effects of health inequalities on the opportunities for people to live on equal standing, in such a way that when these opportunities are diminished, actions can be considered to aim to restore relational equality. (shrink)