Cantor argued that absolute infinity is beyond mathematical comprehension. His arguments imply that the domain of mathematics cannot be grasped by mathematical means. We argue that this inability constitutes a foundational problem. For Cantor, however, the domain of mathematics does not belong to mathematics, but to theology. We thus discuss the theological significance of Cantor’s treatment of absolute infinity and show that it can be interpreted in terms of negative theology. Proceeding from this interpretation, we refer to the recent debate (...) on absolute generality and argue that the method of diagonalization constitutes a modern version of the vianegativa. On our reading, negative theology can evoke an attitude of humility with respect to the boundedness of the human condition. Along these lines, we think that the foundational problem of mathematics concerning its domain can be addressed through a methodological attitude of humility. (shrink)

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...) Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem that triggered (...) the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...) of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

Scepticism and negative theology are best understood not as theoretical positions, but rather as forms of philosophical practice that performatively undermine our knowledge claims or our seeming understanding of God. In particular, I am arguing that both scepticism and negative theology invoke the failure of the attempt to understand the absolute, be it God or the notion of absolute objectivity. However, with reference to L. A. Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience, I am arguing that we still understand something about (...) the absolute through the experience of failing to think it. This, of course, is a non-propositional form of understanding, and I am arguing that there is something about the finitude of the human condition that can only be understood through a transformative philosophical experience with respect to the absolute. (shrink)

Im Zentrum von Heideggers Denken steht eine quasireligiöse Umwendung des Menschen. Davon ausgehend entwickelt diese Arbeit das Konzept einer post-theistischen Religiosität, das nicht nur zum philosophischen Verständnis der religiösen Rede beiträgt, sondern auch eine neue Interpretation von Heideggers Spätwerk ermöglicht. In beiden Fällen geht es um die Unbegreiflichkeit der menschlichen Situation, die Religion wie Philosophie gleichermaßen herausfordert.

Mit dem Begriff der Theoriennachbarschaft und einer darauf aufbauenden neuen Definition von Reduktion ermöglicht diese Arbeit eine angemessene Beschreibung und Einteilung der vielen diffizilen Beziehungen zwischen physikalischen Theorien. Mithilfe dieser Konzepte wird in drei Fallstudien exemplarisch gezeigt, dass moderne physikalische Theorien zwar meist benachbart zueinander sind, aber nicht so aufeinander reduzierbar, dass eine reduzierte Theorie für die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung der Welt entbehrlich wäre. Die Einheit der Physik kann daher nicht auf eliminativen Reduktionen auf fundamentale Theorien beruhen, lässt sich aber dennoch (...) mit zahlreichen Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen begründen. (shrink)

The relation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to skepticism seems to be ambiguous, since he rejects radical skepticism but also highlights the groundlessness of our beliefs. In this paper, I am going to discuss Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions in this respect. Against the usual view, I will show that they do not function as a contextualist or foundationalist refutation of skepticism. What is more, they also do not confirm skepticism. In contrast, I will argue that following Wittgenstein skepticism is neither false nor (...) true, but still has a point, which can be elucidated with Stanley Cavell’s concept of a truth of skepticism. This concept roughly states that we can not know about the existence of the world and the others, but that we have to acknowledge them. With the help of Wittgenstein, I am going to clarify this position. The key idea is that the problem of skepticism can be understood as a metaphorical way of presenting the finiteness of the human condition and that vertiginous skeptical irritations lead to an adequate human self-understanding in this respect. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...) of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

This article explores Heidegger's later philosophy with regard to the problem of a philosophical interpretation of religious language. In what follows, I will draw upon the work of Wittgenstein and refer to the cosmological argument to read Heidegger in terms of a post-theistic understanding of religious language that avoids the shortcomings of both theistic realism and non-cognitivism. At the same time, I am proposing a new interpretation of Heidegger's later philosophy against this background. I will show that, in spite of (...) its hermeticism, Heidegger's later philosophy has a specific relevance to philosophy of religion that still needs to be explored. (shrink)

In this essay, Heidegger's theses on art, as he develops them in the text "On the Origin of the Work of Art," are reconstructed, interpreted, and critically evalua- ted. In doing so, we pursue a threefold goal. First, his theses on art are put in relation to the main theme of his philosophy: the question of being. Second, the different ways in which Heidegger takes art to be epistemically valuable are dif- ferentiated and reconstructed in detail. Third, Heidegger's theses are (...) related to the contemporary debate on the epistemic value of art and critically discussed. (shrink)

Heidegger’s philosophy of being and enowning contains many religious topics, such as the last god, the divinities within his concept of the fourfold or his so called hölderlintheology. In this paper, these aspects shall be illuminated by relating the overall concern of Heidegger’s later philosophy to the tension between philosophy and theology: It will be argued that on the one hand his rejection of ontotheology is justified, since god is not a causally operating entity, and that on the other hand (...) his concept of man being a part of an incomprehensible ongoing is not only an accurate criticism of reason in terms of a reflection on its limits, but also has a religious character, which can be seen as the starting point of an adequate and up to date philosophical theology. Against Heidegger’s exorbitant claim of uniqueness, his later philosophy can thus be placed in the context of traditional critique of religion and reason respectively. (shrink)

Nach dem vorherrschenden reduktionistischen Selbstverständnis der Physik sind höherstufige physikalische Theorien als Grenzfall in grundlegenderen Theorien enthalten und daher im Prinzip überflüssig. Höherstufige Theorien werden laut dieser Sichtweise nur aus dem pragmatischen Grund verwendet, für ihren jeweiligen Bereich besser anwendbar zu sein. Es gibt zwar verschiedene Modelle der Reduktion physikalischer Theorien, dieses Selbstverständnis lässt sich aber am besten mit dem Modell der eliminativen Reduktion auf den Begriff bringen, Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass dieses reduktionistische Verhältnis zwischen klassischer und Quantenmechanik nicht besteht.

This paper proposes a classification of the intertheoretic relations in physics by bringing out the conditions for a relation of reduction which is eliminative, so that a theory reduced in terms of reductionism is superfluous in principle, and by distinguishing such a relation from another one based on comparison, which will be called neighbourhood of theories; the latter is a neighbouring relation between theories and is not able to support claims of eliminative reductionism. In the first part, it will be (...) argued that this differentiation between neighbourhood and eliminative reduction permits an adequate classification of the intertheoretic relations in physics. By means of this differentiation, the second part discusses reductionism and shows that there are indeed some historical examples of reduction in the aforementioned sense, but that modern physical theories are typically only neighbouring. (shrink)

The relation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to skepticism seems to be ambiguous, since he rejects radical skepticism but also highlights the groundlessness of our beliefs. In this paper, I am going to discuss Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions in this respect. Against the usual view, I will show that they do not function as a contextualist or foundationalist refutation of skepticism. What is more, they also do not confirm skepticism. In contrast, I will argue that following Wittgenstein skepticism is neither false nor (...) true, but still has a point, which can be elucidated with Stanley Cavell’s concept of a truth of skepticism. This concept roughly states that we can not know about the existence of the world and the others, but that we have to acknowledge them. With the help of Wittgenstein, I am going to clarify this position. The key idea is that the problem of skepticism can be understood as a metaphorical way of presenting the finiteness of the human condition and that vertiginous skeptical irritations lead to an adequate human self-understanding in this respect. (shrink)

Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will then refer to (...) William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

Proceeding from a philosophical interpretation of negative theology as performatively undermining our seeming understanding of the absolute and thereby evoking a transformative experience, this paper emphasises the philosophical significance of negative theology by linking it to Karl Jaspers’ notion of the universal limit situation of existence. Against this background, an analysis of mystical and psychotic experiences shows how certain similarities between the two can be understood as constituting a particular mental state in which the universal limit situation is experienced personally. (...) Moreover, experiencing the limit situation, be it through this mental state or through certain moods or feelings, can be transformative and may lead to an attitude of groundless trust that acknowledges the incomprehensibility of the human condition. The paper argues that this reading of negative theology provides a better understanding of the parallels between mysticism and psychosis and may be fruitfully applied in therapy. (shrink)

Die Behauptung der Unerkennbarkeit Gottes hat eine lange Tradition, die vom biblischen Bilderverbot über die negative Theologie und Mystik bis zur spätmodernen Dekonstruktion reicht. Zu dieser Tradition gehört die zeitlose Frage, wie Gott zu denken ist, wenn er nicht als ein buchstäblich existierendes Wesen im Sinne des Theismus verstanden werden kann. Diesem Problem nähern sich die Texte des Bandes mit zahlreichen historischen wie systematischen Schwerpunkten. -/- Es geht um das Verhältnis der Transzendenzdimensionen zu den Grenzen der menschlichen Erkenntnis, damit verbunden (...) um die sprachliche Präzisierung der Grenzproblematik, wie sie sowohl in der Tradition der negativen Theologie wie auch in zentralen Ansätzen der modernen Philosophie angezielt wird. Weitere Schwerpunkte bilden das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Theologie sowie die theologischen Aspekte der Dekonstruktion. -/- Die Ansätze der Beiträge verfolgen stets die Frage nach dem Status der Rede von Gott im Horizont der Erkenntnisgrenzen. Sie zeigen so, dass und wie diese Frage mit dem Welt und Selbstverständnis des Menschen im Angesicht der Unbegreiflichkeit seiner Situation verbunden ist und bleibt. (shrink)