Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 2 Seiten: 167-182.

About one and a half decades ago, two prominent reports were published in the United States which strongly influenced subsequent international discussions on the topic of human enhancement: a 2002 report on “converging technologies for improving human performance”, based on a workshop which was organised by the US National Science Foundation and the US Department of Commerce in December 2001, and the first report of US President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics, published in October 2003 with the title Beyond (...) Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. The 2002 report included a wide variety of contributions from academics in various fields of research, from representatives of US institutions, and from companies. Due primarily to the influence of the two NSF staff editing the report, it can be regarded as the first major instance of the influence of transhumanism, a techno-futurist ideology and movement, on the US technology and innovation discourse. The PCBE report, on the other hand, is a prime example of a conservative critique of the transhumanist notion of human enhancement. In this invited contribution, these two crucial publications are analysed mainly in order to point out the relevance of philosophical anthropology as developed since the 1920s by Helmuth Plessner and others. This remarkable school of thought is experiencing a revival in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and, to some extent, in the English-speaking world. In this article, it is argued that philosophical anthropology provides us with an important alternative to both anthropological essentialism and scientism, two approaches that are still highly relevant in current discourse on human enhancement. (shrink)

If one looks at the controversial premises of analytical approaches to fascism according to Roger Griffin, it is not surprising that a yawning distance has opened up between Marxist and non-Marxist schools of interpretation. In this situation whereby two camps are mutually ignorant of one another, it is certainly suggestive that the liberal British theoretician of fascism should put himself forward to play the role of a ‘mediator’, even if he faces the danger of significant criticism from both schools of (...) interpretation. But Griffin’s attempt takes place on a predominantly theoretical level. The author of this essay instead places the notion of revolution in historical-empirical perspective, in order to distinguish it from the account associated with (liberal) representatives of the ‘new consensus’. He then examines, in particular, whether National Socialism represented a utopia which satisfied revolutionary aspirations. The author further asks whether fascism could separate itself from its (early) conservative support to an extent that would permit commentators to meaningfully identify a revolutionary breakthrough. And finally he clarifies what the modernizing achievements of fascism during its time in power actually were. Against this background, there does seem at least the possibility of a dialogue between the two approaches that would advance each of them. (shrink)