40 found
Order:
See also
  1.  16
    Peirce and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment and Instinct in Ethics and Religion.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - [New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Charles Sanders Peirce is regarded as the founding father of pragmatism and a key figure in the development of American philosophy, yet his practical philosophy remains under-acknowledged and misinterpreted. In this book, Richard Atkins argues that Peirce did in fact have developed and systematic views on ethics, on religion, and on how to live, and that these views are both plausible and relevant. Drawing on a controversial lecture that Peirce delivered in 1898 and related works, he examines Peirce's theories of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2.  22
    Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic.Kathleen A. Hull & Richard Kenneth Atkins (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    The founder of both American pragmatism and semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce is widely regarded as an enormously important and pioneering theorist. In this book, scholars from around the world examine the nature and significance of Peirce’s work on perception, iconicity, and diagrammatic thinking. Abjuring any strict dichotomy between presentational and representational mental activity, Peirce’s theories transform the Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian paradigms that continue to hold sway today and, in so doing, forge a new path for understanding the centrality of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. Restructuring the sciences: Peirce's categories and his classifications of the sciences.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (4):483-500.
    : This essay shows that Peirce's (more or less) final classification of the sciences arises from the systematic application of his Categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness to the classification of the sciences themselves and that he does not do so until his 1903's "An Outline Classification of the Sciences." The essay proceeds by: First, making some preliminary comments regarding Peirce's notion of an architectonic, or classification of the sciences; Second, briefly explaining Peirce's Categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; Third, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  4.  23
    Peirce on facts and true propositions.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1176-1192.
    Peirce maintains that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. When we understand how Peirce thinks they are isomorphic, we find that a common objection raised against epistemic conceptions of truth – that there are facts beyond the ken of discovery – holds no water against Peirce’s claim that truth is what would be believed after a sufficiently long and rigorous course of inquiry.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421.
    Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the Liar Paradox. Second, I will briefly (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6.  7
    Santayana, Commonsensism, and the Problem of Impervious Belief.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):37-56.
    Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  66
    Toward an objective phenomenological vocabulary: how seeing a scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet’s blare.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):837-858.
    Nagel’s challenge is to devise an objective phenomenological vocabulary that can describe the objective structural similarities between aural and visual perception. My contention is that Charles Sanders Peirce’s little studied and less understood phenomenological vocabulary makes a significant contribution to meeting this challenge. I employ Peirce’s phenomenology to identify the structural isomorphism between seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet’s blare. I begin by distinguishing between the vividness of an experience and the intensity of a quality. I proceed to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. An "Entirely Different Series of Categories": Peirce's Material Categories.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):94-110.
  9. The Pleasures of Goodness: Peircean Aesthetics in Light of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2008 - Cognitio 9 (1):13--25.
  10.  24
    Apology for an Average Believer: Wagered Belief and Information Environments.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (1):110-118.
    Some persons who believe provably false claims – such as that there were significant voter irregularities in the 2020 election – may nevertheless be evidentially rational for holding their false beliefs. I consider a person I call our average believer. In her daily life, she incidentally gathers evidence favoring the hypothesis that there were significant voter irregularities, but she does not investigate the matter. Her information environment, moreover, is such that it accidentally (through no fault of her own) excludes counterevidence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  60
    Peirce's “Paradoxical Irradiations” and James's The Will to Believe.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (2):173.
    In 1898, Peirce delivered a series of lectures titled Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Peirce scholars have found the first of those lectures—titled “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”—especially perplexing.Some scholars have a decidedly negative assessment of Peirce’s lecture. Cornelis de Waal, for example, maintains that Peirce’s claims in the lecture are doubtful. He states that “Peirce... takes a radical stance, arguing emphatically that science should stay away from ‘matters of vital importance,’ moral problems among them, thereby denying the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  21
    Peirce on facts, propositions, and the index.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2019 - Semiotica 2019 (228):17-28.
    Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  84
    Broadening Peirce’s Phaneroscopy: Part Two.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2013 - The Pluralist 8 (1):97-114.
    In the first part of this essay (The Pluralist 7.2, Summer 2012, pp. 1-29), I argued against the Narrow Conception of phaneroscopy by showing that it is not to be found in Peirce's writings and that several passages in Peirce's writings indicate the Narrow Conception is false. As a consequence, we must broaden our understanding of phaneroscopy's aim. In this part, I shall argue that we should broaden our understanding of phaneroscopy's method, that is, our understanding of phaneroscopic observation, description, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  53
    Broadening Peirce’s Phaneroscopy: Part One.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2012 - The Pluralist 7 (2):1-29.
  15.  32
    Peirce on Truth as the Predestinate Opinion.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):411-429.
    : In 1878's ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce states that truth is the predestinate opinion, or that which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate. Later in his life, though, he would claim both that truth is what would be believed if we could figure out the right method of inquiry and that, instead of affirming that truth is the predestinate opinion in 1878, he ought to have affirmed that truth is what would be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  41
    Restructuring the Sciences: Peirce's Categories and His Classifications of the Sciences.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (4):483-500.
    This essay shows that Peirce's (more or less) final classification of the sciences arises from the systematic application of his Categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness to the classification of the sciences themselves and that he does not do so until his 1903's "An Outline Classification of the Sciences." The essay proceeds by: First, making some preliminary comments regarding Peirce's notion of an architectonic, or classification of the sciences; Second, briefly explaining Peirce's Categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; Third, examining (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17.  80
    Pragmatic Scruples and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):365-380.
    ABSTRACT: Cheryl Misak has offered a pragmatic argument against a position she calls Scientific transcendentalists hold that truth is something different from what would be believed at the end of inquiry; more specifically, they adhere to a correspondence theory of truth. Misak thinks scientific transcendentalists thereby undermine the connection between truth and inquiry, for (a) pragmatically speaking, it adds nothing to truth and inquiry to ask whether what would be the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are really true and (b) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18.  30
    Sensation, Nominalism, and the Elements of Experience.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2017 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 31 (4):538-556.
    Curiously, Charles Sanders Peirce and Maurice Merleau-Ponty raise the same objection to British empiricism: its foundational tenet is nominalist. In his 1869 review of a new edition of James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, Peirce traces the foundational tenet of Mill's work back to Hume's Copy Principle—that all of our ideas are fainter copies of our impressions—and then remarks, If I compare a red book and a red cushion, there is, according to them [the "English psychologists," (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  14
    C. I. Lewis's Theory of Ideas: Royce's Problem and Lewis's Solution.Richard Kenneth Atkins - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-18.
    Implicit in C. I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is an account of how our ideas undergo a process of social development. Lewis's account of that process resolves a problem with Josiah Royce's theory of ideas. Royce holds that there are both sensuous and symbolic ideas. It is, however, possible for someone to have only a sensuous idea of how middle C sounds and for another person to have only the symbolic idea that middle C is 261.63 Hz. In what sense, if (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  45
    Direct Inspection and Phaneroscopic Analysis.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52 (1):1.
    Peirce repeatedly states that phaneroscopy involves analyzing the phaneron, or “the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not”.1 Here are three representative quotations from different periods of Peirce’s work, all supporting the claim that phaneroscopy involves analysis:[The business of phaneroscopy is] to unravel the tangled skein [of] all that in any sense appears and wind it into distinct forms; (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  43
    Peirce's Critique of Psychological Hedonism.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2):349-367.
    Psychological hedonism is the theory that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by a desire for our own pleasure or an aversion to our own pain. Peirce offers a unique critique of PH based on a descriptive analysis of self-controlled action. This essay examines Peirce's critique and his accounts of self-controlled action and of desire.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  12
    Reconstructing Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Classical Pragmatists by Chris Voparil (review).Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2023 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 61 (3):530-531.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reconstructing Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Classical Pragmatists by Chris VoparilRichard Kenneth AtkinsChris Voparil. Reconstructing Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Classical Pragmatists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xiv + 377. Hardback, $74.00.A house divided cannot stand, or so Jesus tells us. As far as I can ascertain, Jesus was right about many things (his followers perhaps less so). Accordingly, that the house early pragmatists built, with all (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  4
    Validity and Induction: Some Comments on T.L. Short's Charles Peirce and Modern Science.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2024 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 59 (4):404-415.
    Abstract:In Charles Peirce and Modern Science, T.L. Short encourages us to read Peirce’s oeuvre in the spirit of philosophical experimentalism. The result is a rewarding and refreshing book that clarifies longstanding controversies and stakes out novel positions in the debates. In these comments, I subject Short’s statements regarding the validity of induction to critical scrutiny. I argue that while much of what he states is correct, he errs in holding that induction is invalid in the short run of an individual’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Inferences That Never Were: Peirce, Perception, and Bernstein's The Pragmatic Turn.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2014 - In Judith Green (ed.), Richard J. Bernstein and the Pragmatist Turn in Contemporary Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. A Guess at the Other Riddle: The Peircean Material Categories.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (4):530-557.
    In “An ‘Entirely Different Series of Categories,’” I argue that aside from Peirce’s formal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Peirceans should acknowledge a second set of categories I call the material categories. I also argue that the material categories are irreducible to the formal categories. However, in that article I offer no account of what the material categories are. Moreover, Peirce himself never provides a clear and explicit account of them. The present essay attempts to provide an account of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  33
    A Peircean examination of Gettier’s two cases.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12945-12961.
    If we accept certain Peircean commitments, Gettier’s two cases are not cases of justified true belief because the beliefs are not true. On the Peircean view, propositions are sign substitutes, or “representamens.” In typical cases of thought about the world, propositions represent facts. In each of Gettier’s examples, we have a case in which a person S believes some proposition p, there is some fact F* such that were p to represent F* to S then p would be true, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  6
    Giving an Account of Oneself.Mitchell Aboulafia, Victor Kestenbaum, Jason Jordan, Jacoby Adeshei Carter, Sarah Louise Scott, Richard Kenneth Atkins, Christa Hodapp, John Kaag, Shane Ralston & Kipton E. Jensen - 2013 - The Pluralist 8 (1):115-118.
  28. Comparing Ideas.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2014 - In Torkild Thellefsen & Bent Sorensen (eds.), The Peirce Quote Book. De Gruyter Mouton.
  29.  18
    Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2018 - New York: Oup Usa.
    John Locke and Thomas Nagel famously dismiss the claim that seeing the color scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet's blare, but Charles Sanders Peirce argues otherwise. Developing an objective phenomenological vocabulary based on formal logic, he contends that we can describe the similarities and differences among diverse experiences.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  5
    What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being.Richard Kenneth Atkins, Adam Glover, Katie Terezakis, Whitley Kaufman, Steven Levine, Seth Vannatta, Aaron Massecar, Robert Main & Jerome A. Stone - 2012 - The Pluralist 7 (2):91-94.
  31.  19
    On Three Levels of Abstractness in Peirce’s Beta Graphs.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2022 - History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (1):16-32.
    Peirce’s beta graphs are roughly equivalent to our first-order predicate logic. However, Bellucci and Pietarinen have recently argued that the beta graphs are not well-equipped to handle asymmetric relative terms. I survey four proposed solutions to the problem and find them all wanting. I offer a fifth solution according to which Peirce’s beta graphs function at three different levels of abstractness from natural language. I diagnose the problem of asymmetric relative terms as arising when we transition from the first to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  5
    Puzzled?!: An Introduction to Philosophizing.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2015 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
    _Puzzled?!_ seamlessly fuses two traditional approaches to the study of philosophy at the introductory level. It is thematic, examining fundamental issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and more. It is also historical, introducing major philosophical arguments that have arisen throughout the history of Western philosophy. But its real innovation lies elsewhere. Each of its twelve chapters begins with a traditional argument of a thoroughly puzzling kind: a valid philosophical argument with highly plausible premises but a surprising conclusion. The remainder (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  35
    Peirce, Muybridge, and the Moving Pictures of Thought.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2017 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (4):511.
    The System of Existential Graphs may be characterized with great truth as presenting before our eyes a moving picture of thought. Provided this characterization be taken not as a flatly literal statement, but as a simile, it will, I venture to predict, surprise you to find what a strain of detailed comparison it will bear without snapping.Peirce once called his graphical system of logic—the Existential Graphs or EGs—the moving pictures of thought. In this essay, I argue that Peirce meant that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  23
    Peirce's Modal Defense of Infant Baptism.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (4):546.
    Charles Sanders Peirce is not known for waxing theological. Certainly, he has various writings that may be classed under the head of natural theology or the philosophy of religion, among them "Evolutionary Love", a critique of Hume on miracles, and "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God". Numerous Peirce scholars have endeavored to give expression to Peirce's philosophy of religion. Other manuscripts are suggestive of his religious practices and of how he viewed his religious beliefs (viz., as heterodox if (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  21
    Peirce, Sentimentalism, and Prison Reform.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2021 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 57 (2):172-201.
  36.  8
    Peirce’s Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics by Francesco Bellucci.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (3):563-564.
    Peirce’s Speculative Grammar is a masterful chronological reconstruction of Peirce’s work on logic as semiotics, or the study of signs and the purposes to which we put them. Peirce’s writings on these topics span more than fifty years. Moreover, his manuscripts number well over 100,000 pages, many of which have yet to be published. Patently, gaining a comprehensive overview of Peirce’s writings on logic is no small feat, and Bellucci is to be celebrated for his efforts. Peirce wanted to be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  18
    Royce’s The Problem of Christianity and Peirce’s Epistemology.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2020 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 41 (2-3):39-55.
    The two concluding chapters of Josiah Royce's The Problem of Christianity pose significant interpretive challenges. The final chapter, "Summary and Conclusion," sets forward Charles S. Peirce's theory of scientific inquiry. Although Royce had earlier explained Peirce's theory of signs and interpretation, he had not examined Peirce's theory of scientific inquiry in detail, making its appearance in the summary and conclusion of the book peculiar. Moreover, it is not wholly evident how a theory of scientific inquiry is supposed to address the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  31
    Santayana on Propositions.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2018 - Overheard in Seville 36 (36):26-40.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  18
    The Peirce-Blake Correspondence.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2020 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 56 (2):222.
    On March 12, 2018, I received an email from André De Tienne, General Editor of the Peirce Edition Project. He recommended that I visit the Francis Blake archives at the Massachusetts Historical Society, remarking, Francis Blake was a cousin of Charles Peirce. I have not yet figured out how that cousinage works out genealogically. In any case, on 13 January 1893, the day CSP and Juliette returned from Boston to New York after the Lowell Lectures, they first took a trip (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  19
    The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists' Incomplete Revolution by Giovanni Maddalena.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52 (4):662-665.
    Rarely these days are philosophy books both bold and sweeping, but Maddalena’s The Philosophy of Gesture is both. Whether you think that is good will surely depend on your philosophical temperament. Personally, I consider it bad taste to criticize a philosopher for striking out on a new path. Philosophy, as any student of Peirce’s works will affirm, is an experimental science. Some of those experiments might well lead you to the hinterlands, but at least you will have a more detailed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark