Modern international law has an inseparable, yet uneasy connection to the analytical tradition in jurisprudence, yet the two have not been easy bedfellows. International lawyers have struggled to find a convincing account of the legality of the object of their study, largely retreating into pragmatism, whilst legal theorists have marginalised the study of international law as a result. In this article, however, I will consider recent hopes for a re-engagement between the two disciplines, brought about by a growing dissatisfaction with (...) the disciplinary scope and coherence of both fields. In particular, I draw on recent work by the international lawyer Patrick Capps, challenging post-Hartian conceptual theory and instead defending a more purposive, evaluative account of international law. Whilst I am sympathetic to this aim, I will show why Capps' aprioristic account of law as aimed at the protection of human dignity results in an account of legal practice which both distorts reality and, in any event, ends up subordinating the international legal order again as a deviant exception to a more perfect domestic paradigm. (shrink)