ZusammenfassungMenschen mit türkischem Migrationshintergrund zählen zu einer der größten Bevölkerungsgruppen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland. Im Vergleich zu Menschen ohne Migrationshintergrund leiden sie im Durchschnitt häufiger an einigen chronischen Erkrankungen, was teilweise auf ihren durchschnittlich niedrigeren sozioökonomischen Status zurückzuführen ist. Im Gesundheitssystem begegnen sie zudem unterschiedlichen Zugangs- und Wirksamkeitsbarrieren, da ihre Bedarfe und Erwartungen von Versorgungseinrichtungen oft nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt werden. Eine solche nicht nutzerorientierte Versorgung chronisch kranker Menschen kann der erfolgreichen Behandlung bzw. Krankheitsbewältigung im Weg stehen. Die Berücksichtigung von subjektiven (...) Krankheitsvorstellungen ist notwendiger Bestandteil einer nutzerorientierten Gesundheitsversorgung. Sie muss dabei sowohl die Sensibilisierung des Personals für die Krankheitsvorstellungen seiner Patientinnen und Patienten, als auch die gezielte Förderung von Krankheitsvorstellungen auf Seiten von Patientinnen und Patienten umfassen, die sich positiv auf die Krankheitsbewältigung auswirken. Gleichzeitig müssen Patientinnen und Patienten befähigt werden, sich kritisch mit eigenen Krankheitsvorstellungen auseinanderzusetzen, wenn diese eine erfolgreiche Krankheitsbewältigung behindern. Als Strategien kommen hierfür zum Beispiel Interventionen wie Storytelling in Frage, die auf dem Austausch von Wissen und Erfahrungen basieren. (shrink)
While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world. Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” and “exercise of virtue,” James Montmarquet has (...) offered, to my knowledge, the only solution to this problem. In this paper, I evaluate this solution by deriving from it an important implication and arguing that, if examined in the light of the recent work on self-control in philosophy and psychology, this implication proves problematic. I conclude by drawing a general lesson about the prospects of internalism and suggesting that in the absence of a satisfactory solution to the disconnection problem, externalism and mixed theories become more attractive. (shrink)
The primary aim of this study was to determine the role of psychometric intelligence, emotional intelligence, and emo-sensory intelligence in university students’ academic achievement. To this end, 212 university students at different academic levels, composed of 154 females and 58 males, were asked to complete the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory, and the Emo-Sensory Intelligence Scale. Data were then matched with students’ Grade Point Averages as a measure of their academic achievement. The results revealed that students’ level (...) of IQ and EQ could positively predict their academic achievement. In the case of their ESQ level, its auditory sub-component was found to be a positive predictor of academic success. Results were discussed, and possible implications and applications for increasing students’ chances for success were presented. (shrink)
Teacher identity has evolved from a core, inner, fixed, linear construct to a dynamic, multifaceted, context-dependent, dialogical, and intrinsically related phenomenon. Since little research has provided an inclusive framework to study teacher identity construction, this article proposes a novel conceptual framework that includes the following components: mirrors of power, discourse, the imagination of reality, investment, emotioncy, and capital. The above core constituents have been discussed thoroughly to trigger significant insights about teacher identity development.
Putting the principles of multisensory teaching into practice, this study investigated the effect of audio-visual vocabulary repetition on L2 sentence comprehension. Forty participants were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. A sensory-based model of instruction was used to teach a list of unfamiliar vocabularies to the two groups. Following the instruction, the experimental group repeated the instructed words twice, while the control group received no vocabulary repetition. Afterward, their electrophysiological neural activities were recorded through electroencephalography while doing a sentence (...) acceptability judgment task with 216 sentences under acceptable and unacceptable conditions. A one-way analysis of variance, a multivariate analysis of variance, and a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA were used to compare the behavioral and neurocognitive responses [N400 as the main language-related event-related brain potential effect] of the two groups. The results showed no significant N400 amplitude difference in favor of any of the groups. The findings corroborated the ineffectiveness of two repetitions preceded by multisensory instruction on L2 sentence comprehension. (shrink)
Photographs and optical images, whatever their contents, are imprints of the electromagnetic waves in the visible range of wavelengths, we refer to as light. Furthermore, they are designed to portray different parts of the visible light in terms of different colours, in analogy with the human eyes, however imperfectly. The world outside our eyes and cameras, however, is permeated by electromagnetic waves with much wider spectrum of wavelengths than those in the visible range. Importantly also, colour is a construct of (...) our eye–brains: the Universe itself has no colour, independently of us. I ask how does the knowledge of these facts change the way we perceive the colour in optical images and photographs, whatever their relationship to the world in a representational sense may be? By employing three images, with very different origins and vistas – one a direct photograph, the other two synthetically constructed images using real cosmological observations – I demonstrate the extent to which colour in such images can hide the underlying phenomena of which they claim to visually speak, both due to its nature as a coarse-grained visual index, and by being restricted to the visible range. The aim is not to belittle the important role that our vision together with our perception of colour have played in the evolution of our species, and still play in the way we relate to the world informationally, aesthetically and emotionally. But rather to show that recognizing the limitations of our vision and complementing it with the knowledge of the phenomena underlying optical images and photographs can allow us to perceive them anew and provide additional tools to imagine and envision such images outside the bounds of the visible range and colour. (shrink)
The relationship between the photographic and optical images and time has been the subject of great deal of debate. Despite their differences, what many of these considerations have in common is their focus on the receiver, whether mechanical, biological, social or the memory and imagination of the observer. My aim here is to shift the emphasis from the receiver to the object or vista that is photographed or viewed and to explore how the constraints implied by our modern understanding of (...) the Universe, concerning space and time, impact on the way we perceive photographic and optical images. Viewed from this perspective, photographs can be treated as light projections of sections of the four-dimensional observable world onto two-dimensional spatial photographic or viewing surfaces. I shall show that despite the severe reduction that such projections imply, these modern considerations have the important consequence of bestowing a complex temporality upon optical images, including photographs. This realization dramatically changes the way we view photographs. I give examples of this rich temporality through considerations of terrestrial images – and more significantly images of the Sky, where these temporal effects are far more pronounced. (shrink)
Infinity, in various guises, has been invoked recently in order to ‘explain’ a number of important questions regarding observable phenomena in science, and in particular in cosmology. Such explanations are by their nature speculative. Here we introduce the notions of relative infinity, closure, and economy of explanation and ask: to what extent explanations involving relative or real constructed infinities can be treated as reasonable?
We consider the domain of applicability of general relativity (GR), as a classical theory of gravity, by considering its applications to a variety of settings of physical interest as well as its relationship with real observations. We argue that, as it stands, GR is deficient whether it is treated as a microscopic or a macroscopic theory of gravity. We briefly discuss some recent attempts at removing this shortcoming through the construction of a macroscopic theory of gravity. We point out that (...) such macroscopic extensions of GR are likely to be nonunique and involve non-Riemannian geometrical frameworks. (shrink)
The recent literature on epistemic virtues advances two general projects. The first is virtue epistemology, an attempt to explicate key epistemic notions in terms of epistemic virtue. The second is epistemic virtue theory, the conceptual and normative investigation of cognitive traits of character. While a great deal of work has been done in virtue epistemology, epistemic virtue theory still languishes in a state of neglect. Furthermore, the existing work is non-naturalistic. The present paper contributes to the development of a naturalistic (...) epistemic virtue theory by presenting a virtue-theoretic evaluation of need for cognition as informed by the relevant psychological studies. (shrink)
While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world (the Disconnection Problem). Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” and “exercise of virtue,” (...) James Montmarquet (1993; 2000) has offered, to my knowledge, the only solution to this problem. In this paper, I evaluate this solution by deriving from it an important implication and arguing that, if examined in the light of the recent work on self-control in philosophy and psychology, this implication proves problematic. I conclude by drawing a general lesson about the prospects of internalism and suggesting that in the absence of a satisfactory solution to the disconnection problem, externalism and mixed theories become more attractive. (shrink)
In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.
At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's (...) arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Gilbert's influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage. (shrink)
Why do we run toward people we love, but only walk toward others? Why do people in New York seem to walk faster than other cities? Why do our eyes linger longer on things we value more? There is a link between how the brain assigns value to things, and how it controls our movements. This link is an ancient one, developed through shared neural circuits that on one hand teach us how to value things, and on the other hand (...) control the vigor with which we move. As a result, when there is damage to systems that signal reward, like dopamine and serotonin, that damage not only affects our mood and patterns of decision making, but how we move. In this book, we first ask why in principle evolution should have developed a shared system of control between valuation and vigor. We then focus on the neural basis of vigor, synthesizing results from experiments that have measured activity in various brain structures and neuromodulators, during tasks in which animals decide how patiently they should wait for reward, and how vigorously they should move to acquire it. Thus, the way we move unmasks one of our well-guarded secrets: how much we value the thing we are moving toward. (shrink)
According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...) First, it claims that in the absence of other kinds of obligations, rational agents would still be bound by these epistemic obligations, i.e., that the latter are normatively independent. Second, it claims that, no matter what other obligations are at stake, rational agents are bound by these epistemic obligations, i.e., the normativity of these epistemic obligations is absolute in that it cannot be undercut by any moral or other sort of obligation. The argument turns on an exploratory reading of Kant’s remarks in “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” (1786) about the maxim of “thinking for oneself” as the “supreme touchstone of truth.” In contrast to O’Neill and Kitcher, I argue that if we interpret this maxim as stating the unifying principle of theoretical and practical reason, then we must interpret it as stating an epistemic, and not merely practical imperative. This result, I argue, vindicates epistemicism and illuminates interesting lessons about Kant’s conception of the category of “epistemic” norms. Further, it helps us make headway with Kant’s enigmatic remarks about the unity of practical and theoretical reason in the Groundwork, first and the second Critiques, and the Lectures on Logic. On my proposal, principles of the practical and theoretical uses of rea-son are unified through a formal epistemic principle. (shrink)
This paper argues that gossip can be a central element in inducing cooperation. The underlying assumption here is that human beings value payoffs in most societies, and are willing to have less now for more in the future. This basic interaction is tempered through gossip - as our behavior now may affect our future interactions and subsequent payoffs. As such, reputation matters and plays a crucial role in inducing cooperation. In order for gossip to be an effective policing mechanism a (...) number of conditions must be met: namely, there must be an incentive for behavior and the behavior must be conducted in a credible manner. Herein lies the utility of charisma and perhaps problem, in inducing cooperation. (shrink)
Adopting Murdoch’s pragmatist reading of Bohr’s theory of meaning with regard to Bohr’s notion of complementarity, in this paper I try to see Bohr’s post-Como and, in particular, post-EPR philosophy of quantum mechanics in the light of Peircean pragmatism with the hope that such a construal can shed more light to Bohr’s philosophy. I supplement Murdoch’s position on Bohr’s pragmatism by showing that in addition to his complementarity, Bohr’s correspondence principle, instrumentalism and realism can be read on the basis of (...) Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and his notion of indeterminism has commonalities with Peirce’s tychism. Also, Bohr’s practice of applying the correspondence principle can be interpreted in the light of Peirce’s fallibilism. However, when it comes to Bohr’s understanding of the symbolic character of quantum mechanics, Bohr’s philosophy deviates from Peircean pragmatism. Bohr’s philosophy distinguishes between the symbolic language of quantum formalism, which counts as a tool practically useful for prediction, and observation sentences which are visualizable in space and time and refer to the so-called individual phenomena. Such an epistemologically significant distinction is not recognized by Peircean pragmatism. (shrink)
In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are in line with logical positivism, (...) are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism. (shrink)
Knowledge management is important in the construction industry, but there is a dramatic gap between rhetoric and reality, highlighting mistaken expectations of technology. We report on a case study of a major construction company. The UK construction industry, with scarce academic qualifications, and limited use of IT, depends on knowledge sharing, and, crucially, on tacit knowledge. Economic crisis presents particular problems, and recent trends in work organization have far-reaching implications. The industry depends on human knowledge, with limited systems support. A (...) shared concern for health and safety provides the surest guarantee of sustainability of both knowledge and the company. (shrink)
This study examined cross-sectional links of the theistic and non-theistic sanctification of marriage and positive and negative religious coping with marital adjustment for 316 married Muslims from Iran. Perceiving marriage to be a manifestation of God and reflective of sacred qualities as well as engaging in positive and negative religious/spiritual coping strategies each uniquely contributed variance to marital adjustment, after controlling for each other and global indicators of devotion to Islam, and demographic variables. Specifically, theistic sanctification, non-theistic sanctification, and positive (...) r/s coping were uniquely tied to higher marital adjustment whereas negative r/s coping was uniquely tied to lower marital adjustment theistic in a hierarchical regression model with all primary variables and controls entered. These findings replicate and extend prior findings on the perceived sanctity of marriage with US samples of predominantly Christians to Muslims living in the Middle East, and offer novel cross-cultural insights into the possible roles that sanctification of marriage and r/s coping may play for marital well-being for non-distressed married Muslims. (shrink)
In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the world, (...) eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity respectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained. (shrink)
In the waking state, in the absence of meta-awareness, mind wandering with specific contents can lead to negative mood. Such negative mood can be incorporated into dreaming according to the continuity hypothesis of dreaming. In this paper we argue that in the presence of what we call ‘sustained phenomenal meta-awareness’, negative mood would not follow mind wandering in waking. Sustained phenomenal meta-awareness has a non-sensory, non-affective phenomenal character. It is essentially intransitive, prereflectively self-aware, non-propositional, non-conceptual and devoid of subject-object structure. (...) In other words, this unique kind of meta-awareness is non-representational. Evidence is then provided that such sustained phenomenal meta-awareness can be incorporated into the subsequent dream state as non-dual lucid dreaming in which, again, no negative mood would arise. Based on the latter observation, we have coined the term ‘mindful mind wandering’ and defined it as mind wandering in the presence of sustained phenomenal meta-awareness. We argue that not only does mindful mind wandering not lead to negative mood in waking, but also its incorporation into dreaming, as non-dual lucid dreaming, result in a state that is free of negative affection. (shrink)
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences.
I argue that practical knowledge can be understood as constituted by a kind of imagining. In particular, it is the knowledge of what I am doing when that knowledge is represented via extramental imagination. Two results follow. First, on this account, we can do justice both to the cognitive character and the practical character of practical knowledge. And second, we can identify a condition under which imagination becomes factive, and thus a source of ob-jective evidence. I develop this view by (...) extracting an account of self-knowledge via extramental imagination from the writings of Ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240). (shrink)
Pulleys and cranes are used for hoisting loads with or without providing a significant gain in force. Both of these devices have provided convenience to humans since ancient times. Pulleys are considered to be one of the five mechanical powers of the ancient world. Their history is very much linked with the early history of cranes. The cranes originated from the pulley systems. In this paper, the early history of the application of these well-preserved ancient mechanical instruments is examined together. (...) This paper mainly focuses on the various interesting applications of pulleys and cranes in ancient and medieval times. Yet theoretical developments in the timeline mentioned above are also included in this paper. (shrink)
Le problème de l’inaction des intellectuels est un thème récurrent dans les écrits de Ralph Waldo Emerson. Les commentateurs ont accordé beaucoup d’attention à «l’intellectuel américain», mais moins à ses remarques concernant l’«intellectuel pâle». Dans cet article, je me concentre sur ce dernier point, en montrant qu’une compréhension de la manière dont évoluent les idées d’Emerson sur ce qui compte pour l’action permettrait non seulement d’approfondir notre compréhension de sa philosophie ainsi que son orientation vers la conduite de la vie, (...) mais aussi d’expliquer pourquoi, selon Emerson, il ne semble pas y avoir de réconciliation possible entre «la théorie et la pratique de la vie». (shrink)
Rumi’s story of the elephant in the dark room is the story of the reception of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Depending upon where they have touched, which constitutes their vantage points, commentators have come to believe Emerson to be, among others, the “philosopher of Democracy”, the theologian of the American religion of self-reliance, the philosopher of the ordinary, the “friend and aider of those who live in spirit”, a genteel soul “impervious to the evidence of evil”, or a naïve writer whose (...) essays “are already an encumbrance”. Was Emerson somehow all the above—a man for all seasons or a “Professor of Things in... (shrink)
This study is defined within the context of the critical posthuman project of decentring humanist subjectivity. We argue that because agential realism, and the agency and performativity that go with it, do not enable non-human matter to be accountable, only human matter, in its intra-active becoming with non-human matter, can support an ethical project. Secondly, we map our understanding of Barad’s agential realism, explaining the importance of agential cuts in phenomena-in-their-becoming that are the world worlding itself, and evaluate ethics, agency, (...) and performativity in this material-discursive framework. Thirdly, understanding the material-discursive to underpin storied matter, we engage it via some clarification of narrative, and narrative agency. We conclude that much organic or inorganic nature as non-human matter is directional and responsive, so alive and generative and, in this sense, capable of worlding itself. However, it does not tell its own stories in the process. (shrink)
In this paper, I discuss two different formalisms of quantum mechanics, i.e. the orthodox and the de Broglie-Bohm formalisms, as explanations of the interference pattern observed in the doubleslit experiment. I evaluate the explanations provided by these two formalisms on the basis of Hempel's DN model of scientific explanation, showing that both formalisms can sufficiently explain the phenomenon. However, once the interpretations associated with the two formalisms come into play, the sufficiency of the DN model's evaluation of the explanations becomes (...) questionable. Whereas the Copenhagen interpretation, associated with the orthodox quantum formalism, would evaluate the DN model as sufficient, Bohm's interpretation, associated with the de Broglie-Bohm formalism, would not. Bohm's interpretation would require descriptions containing relevant metaphysical relations to be included in the explanans. The DN model does not contain such a requirement. Then, Strevens's kairetic account of explanation will be introduced as an alternative model of scientific explanation. The kairetic account allows for descriptions of relevant metaphysical relations to be included in the explanans. I argue that the proponents of both interpretations will accept the evaluation provided by Strevens's kairetic account as sufficient. This highlights the role of quantum interpretations in modeling scientific explanation of quantum phenomena in two ways: in determining the relevant explanans of the model of explanation, and in evaluating models of explanation by virtue of evaluating the relevancy of their explanans or by evaluating whether the requirements of a model are fulfilled in the context of an interpretation. (shrink)