Este texto nos pone frente a una obra clásica, frente a un maestro de la narración, al mismo tiempo que deja traslucir la fascinación de un lector crítico y apasionado por lo narrado. “Polifonía trágica”, “novela de voces”, “novela de música coral” son invitaciones a abordar de otro modo la novela de Faulkner, Mientras agonizo.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre a educação escolar no sistema prisional contemporâneo. Destacando os marcos legais e documentos oficiais que expressam e orientam o direito à educação nestes espaços não formais. Pensar a educação neste contexto é destacar a importância da educação para o processo transformador do ser humano, ou seja, a educação tem a função de promover a reintegração social do sujeito em situação de privação de liberdade. Para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho temos como abordagem qualitativa, (...) com o suporte das pesquisas bibliográfica e documental. Portanto, promover a acessibilidade da pessoa privada de liberdade, é promover não só a reintegração social via a educação, como promover o exercício da cidadania independente do fato julgado. Nestes termos, a educação escolar no sistema prisional tem sido um desafio para a reintegração social da pessoa privada de liberdade na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

Simulation software used for modeling has become as ubiquitous as computers themselves. Despite growing reliance on simulation in educational and workplace settings, users encounter frustration in using simulation software programs. The authors conducted a study with 26 engineering students and interviewed them about their experience learning the simulation software Arena for optimization modeling. These students experienced frustration with the process of learning to “think” like the simulation software. Students explained their difficulty with learning the software in a way that implied (...) human dialogue with a machine and negotiation with Arena in an attempt to overcome this frustration. Rather than being gender specific, frustrations were experienced by most male and female students equally, specifically those who held a perception of difference between human and machine “thinking.” The authors contend that communication difficulty with the embedded assumptions of the software is the source of frustration rather than deficiencies of users. (shrink)

Los valores cristianos son ahora más relevantes debido a que las empresas no se preocupan solo del beneficio. mediante una muestra de 176 empresas de la zona 4 de Ecuador, se ha estudiado la aplicación de los valores de solidaridad, honestidad, humildad y responsabilidad en los procesos productivos y de contratación de personal. El objetivo es averiguar si estos valores son relevantes en la gestión. Como resultado se encontró que existen pocas empresas que tengan en cuenta estos valores declarados como (...) tal. La ausencia de estos valores indica que las empresas deben incorporarlos para tener mayor sostenibilidad y responsabilidad social. (shrink)

La reflexión que se suscita presenta una visión sobre cómo en la experiencia estética la memoria emerge interfiriendo en el presente y alterando el tiempo continuo. Trataremos a través de la memoria desde diferentes visiones en las que, lejos de ser un archivo o catálogo, se plantea como un despliegue emocional de la experiencia. En la práctica artística se produce un ejercicio cognitivo que habilita la impresión de experiencias intensas. La característica que singulariza una obra de arte no solo está (...) asociada al contexto de la misma sino que configura una realidad única ya sea en la recepción como en su participación activa. (shrink)

Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's ‘Context and Logical Form’. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a sub‐sentential expression—where by ‘sub‐sentential expression’ we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truth‐conditional content (...) of speech acts. We hope to achieve this second aim precisely by defending the genuineness of sub‐sentential speech acts. Given our two aims, it is necessary to highlight briefly their connection—which we do in the first part of the Introduction. Following that, we introduce Stanley's novel objections. This is the role of the second part of the Introduction. We offer our rebuttals in Section 2 (against ‘shorthand’) and Section 3 (against syntactic ellipsis, among other things). (shrink)

Nosso propósito, neste artigo, é aproximar dois modelos éticos distintos, o kantiano e o aristotélico, com o intuito de detectar alguns pontos comuns onde talvez possamos encontrar certo diálogo entre ambos os modelos éticos.

En éste artículo de investigación se sustenta que las elaboraciones de Michel Foucault sobre el decir veraz se hallan inscritas en el contexto de sus preocupaciones por el presente. Los análisis del filósofo francés sobre la Antigüedad no buscan formular la teoría de un poder o de un sujeto universal y abstracto, sino mostrar la constitución histórica de las diferentes formas de sujeto en relación con los juegos de verdad, develar el carácter contingente de nuestros fines y de nuestra historia (...) y poner de manifiesto un poder de resistir a los mecanismos de sujeción en Occidente. (shrink)

O tema da visão percorreu a obra de Merleau-Ponty. Desde o princípio, tratou-se de investigar o fenômeno da percepção, e nele descobrir o germe ou a presença de um sentido que a tradição intelectualista sempre tributou a uma operação do pensamento, considerando a sensibilidade apenas ocasião para seu exercício ou índice de realidade. Inscrito inicialmente nos quadros da filosofia da existência , o tema encaminha-se, posteriormente, para uma ontologia do Ser bruto. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as reflexões estéticas (...) de Merleau-Ponty que marcam essa passagem, e que representam o encontro da sua filosofia com a pintura na tarefa da expressão de uma ontologia. (shrink)

A experiência do corpo próprio desempenha, na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, o papel de subversão das categorias da metafísica clássica entre sujeito e objeto. Mais especificamente, das antinomias cartesianas entre pensamento e extensão . Nesse sentido, existe-se como coisa ou como pensamento e, com isso, toda sorte de dicotomias herdadas dessa metafísica, sobretudo a grande dificuldade em articular o que é pura extensão, relações externas entre partes e processos objetivos do mundo físico, com a consciência, que é "inextensa", que parece não (...) ocupar lugar algum, a despeito de sua articulação e dependência com os processos do mundo físico . O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar, da Fenomenologia da percepção, a análise de três exemplos nos quais Merleau-Ponty procura superar essas dicotomias, ultrapassando a concepção objetivista de corpo a partir da própria fisiologia.In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, the experience of one's own body plays the role of subverting the classical metaphysics categories of subject and object, or more specifically, of the cartesian antinomies between thinking and extension . In this sense, existence is possible as thing or as thought. This generates all sorts of the dichotomies inherited form such a metaphysics, mainly the great difficulty in articulating what is pure extension, external relationships between parts, objective processes of the physical world with consciousness, which is "non extensive", which seems not to occupy any place in spite of its known articulation, or dependence, with the physical world processes . The objective of the present paper is to present an analysis of three examples, included in the "Phenomenology of Perception", in which Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome these dichotomies by going over the objectivistic conception of body, starting from the very Physiology. (shrink)

A general consensus has been reached in health care organizations that the disclosure of medical errors can be a very powerful way to improve patients and physicians well-being and serves as a core component to high quality health care. This practice strongly encourages transparent communication with patients after medical errors or unanticipated outcomes. However, many countries, such as Brazil, do not have a culture of disclosing harmful errors to patients or standards emphasizing the importance of disclosing, taking responsibility, apologizing, and (...) discussing the prevention of recurrences. Medical error is not discussed or approached during medical school. The stigma of error has a strong connection with value judgments, and emotional support for physicians does not exist. This paper suggests that open communication with the patient is essential. Guidance about error disclosure from health care organizations would be helpful for quality and patient safety and for health care professionals in countries like Brazil. (shrink)

O artigo que se segue formula reflexões acerca de um evento cujo distanciamento e imparcialidade são impossíveis. O caráter ensaístico da escrita é, neste sentido, exigência do próprio evento em análise. Não escrevemos para fornecer respostas, nem com o distanciamento de Heródoto, que evocou de igual forma testemunhos históricos feitos de gregos e troianos; escrevemos para compreender, enfrentar e resistir ao problema. Dessa forma, o presente artigo aborda a pandemia do coronavírus de maneira que possibilite contribuir para uma melhor compreensão (...) do fenômeno que estamos experienciando. Para isso, de início, analisa-se a atual pandemia em suas relações com a modernidade e seu caráter globalizante. Em seguida, adentrando em uma perspectiva que transita entre fatores econômicos e políticos, o artigo destaca as consequências das políticas neoliberais que tornaram o cenário pandêmico uma crise dentro da crise. Para além de uma crise econômica, configura-se como uma crise humanitária. Para tanto, desembocando no dilema que o neoliberalismo impõe à humanidade, o lucro ou as pessoas, expõem-se nitidamente as fissuras do capitalismo. Por fim, analisa-se a atuação da necropolítica na pandemia e discutem-se as medidas de isolamento social a partir de conceitos como "Estado de exceção", e "vigilância". (shrink)

El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

First, we investigate the pertinence of Deleuze-Guattari's criticisms to the philosophy of the flesh, in Merleau-Ponty, particularly this criticism of introducing the image of the transcendent in the immanence of the experience. Finally, we outline the possibility of the affection concept in Deleuze-Guattari be a way of addressing the ontological issue that Merleau-Ponty faced, overcoming the boundaries of the flesh concept, particularly the one of the supposed ambiguity still present in the pair "flesh of the world" and my flesh, according (...) to the criticism of Renaud Barbaras. (shrink)

RESUMO Nossa intenção é apresentar a filosofia da vida de Renaud Barbaras, reunida em Le désir et le monde, e o lugar que ela nos parece ocupar na fenomenologia. Barbaras divide sua filosofia da vida em três níveis: fenomenológico, cosmológico e metafísico. Sem deixar de contemplar seu projeto total, nosso enfoque será mais fenomenológico, destacando, e discutindo, suas noções de desejo, sentimento e relação com o outro. ABSTRACT Our intent is to present Renaud Barbaras' philosophy of life, assembled in his (...) book 'Le désir et le monde', as well as the place it seems to us it occupies in phenomenology. Barbaras divides his philosophy of life in three levels: the phenomenological, the cosmologic and the metaphysic levels. Though not foregoing his overall project, our focus will be rather a phenomenological one, highlighting and discussing his notions of desire, feeling and relationship with the other. (shrink)

resumo O texto aborda algumas noções centrais nos estudos que Merleau-Ponty realizava através de seus cursos nos Collège de Fra nce ent re os anos de 1954 e 1960. Trata da passagem da anima l idade ao corpo hu mano, e tão importante quanto marcar sua diferença, procura mostrar seu Ineinander, um no outro ou pertença comum. A seguir, dá destaque às noções de instituição e de inc o ns c ie nte: com a prime i ra, o filósofo pretende (...) superar os limites da noção de cons c i ê ncia, com a segunda, marca distânc ia da noção em Lévi-Strauss e intensifica o debate com o freudismo. palavras-chaves Fenomenologia; Merleau-Ponty; natureza; corporeidade; inconsciente. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é trazer o debate de alguns autores sobre a crise atual da sociedade ocidental contemporânea, a partir de três questões que nos parecem discriminar parte considerável dos seus principais problemas: a autonomização da economia, a razão instrumental e a decadência cultural. Com a primeira e a segunda questão se acusam os riscos da separação da economia, da ciência e da técnica diante das necessidades da vida, e com a terceira se acusa nosso estado atual de impotência (...) para responder a tais desafios. O objetivo é fomentar a discussão crítica desses problemas, que nos parecem questões incontornáveis no presente de nossas vidas. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show the relevance of Michel Henry's thinking towards a reflection on the phenomenological meaning of life. A reflection that will question both history of philosophy and historical phenomenology, and which will implicate the very history of modern and contemporary Western society. Our presentation of Michel Henry's philosophy is divided into five sections: the question of the prerogative of Greek’s meaning of phenomenon and truth in the history of philosophy; the concept of “flesh” to (...) the definition of life; the transcendental illusion of life through the ego; the abstraction of life or devitalization of the world, due to this illusion; and, finally, the diagnosis of the decay of life in modern Western society, as the result of this process. (shrink)

Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge (...) in the sense of the so-called ‘nomological supervenience’ views. (shrink)

This is a very poorly written book. It is highly repetitive and verbose. Moreover, despite the repetition, it is fundamentally unclear—both because of unhelpful and unexplained terminology, and because of its distinctively tangled prose. Here is one example of the latter.

O presente trabalho tece considerações sobre o problema metodológico que o pensamento político de Arendt confronta. Procuramos destacar que, embora seja errôneo atribuir a Arendt a posse de um método, no sentido tradicional do termo, podemos falar de um exercício de pensamento expresso no verbo “compreender” e no seu correlato “pensar o que estamos fazendo”. Iremos explorar a riqueza semântica que o compreender adquire nas reflexões da autora, apresentando o termo primeiramente como exercício de pensamento e, em seguida, como metáfora (...) filosófica do espectador, procurando distinguir a compreensão do filósofo-espectador da compreensão do homem de ação, traçando os limites entre o filósofo e o político. Veremos que a recusa de Arendt a refletir sobre um método relaciona-se com a recusa a fazer de si um critério normativo para o pensamento alheio. Se Arendt ressalta a importância de pensar o que estamos fazendo, não fornece respostas prontas para este dilema, mas reserva ao interlocutor a tarefa de pensar por si mesmo e chegar a suas conclusões particulares. (shrink)

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...) original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”. (shrink)

Je commence par tenter de clarifier le concept de « conscience phénoménale », suivant la notion de « l’effet ça fait » élaborée par Nagel (1974). Deuxièmement, je défends la réalité de la conscience (phénoménale) en opposition avec l'éliminativisme. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas non plus prouver qu’elle n’en est pas un. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut. Troisièmement, j’introduis une notion (...) générale de physicalisme et de survenance [supervenience], et soutiens qu’un monisme physicaliste est la métaphysique la plus raisonnable. Ceci, étant donné l’existence de relations causales entre le corps et l’esprit, et malgré nos intuitions dualistes. Je prétends qu’il existe une propriété X, qui est une propriété physique ou une propriété survenante (sur le physique), telle que être conscient—au sens phénoménal—c’est instancier X. Enfin, je critique le panpsychisme et conclus que la conscience est une propriété de certaines entités physiques complexes. (shrink)

Kripke [1972] a présenté un argument très influent contre le physicalisme, basé sur l’idée suivante : les énoncés psycho-physiques—ceux qui identifient les phénomènes psychologiques de l’expérience à des phénomènes physiques—sont, s’ils sont vrais, nécessairement vrais. Pourtant, ils semblent être contingents. Par la suite, Levine [1983] a prétendu que l’apparence de contingence était due à un «fossé explicatif » qui se trouve dans ces énoncés : les phénomènes physiques ne semblent pas rendre compte de l’existence et des caractéristiques des phénomènes psychologiques. (...) Je suspecte que l’apparition du fossé explicatif résulte, du moins en partie, du fait que l’on prend la subjectivité de l’expérience comme une condition ontologique alors qu’elle serait épistémologique. Dans ce papier je présente et développe cette idée. (shrink)

Une entité est phénoménalement consciente si et seulement s’il existe quelque chose comme l’effet-que-ça-fait d’être cette entité. À partir de cette définition, aucun test empirique ne peut être fourni pour établir si une entité S est consciente ou pas. S peut croire qu’elle est consciente parce qu’en effet elle l’est, mais pour qu’un sujet W puisse attribuer la conscience à S, une théorie est nécessaire. Cette théorie doit fournir des critères intersubjectifs, basés sur l’observation du comportement, les propriétés physiques ou (...) quelque chose de cette sorte. En bref : (C) Pour qu’un sujet S puisse établir si une autre entité W est consciente, il doit faire appel à une théorie empirique proposant un critère d’un point de vue à la troisième personne pour l’attribution de la conscience. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas prouver non plus que ce ne soit pas le cas. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut, alors que pour l’éliminativiste l’existence de la conscience est une affirmation théorique. J’adhère à une vision réaliste de la conscience, supportée par le fait qu’il me semble vraiment que j’ai des expériences phénoménales, et par l’idée que la dichotomie réalité/ apparence ne s’applique pas aux contenus phénoménaux. Il y a manifestement des corrélations entre les phénomènes physiques et mentaux, qui donnent de bonnes raisons de croire qu’il y a des relations causales entre le monde physique (y compris le corps) et les esprits (conscients). Le dualisme des substances, le dualisme des propriétés, l’épiphénoménalisme et le panpsychisme ne parviennent pas à fournir une explication convaincante de ces corrélations. Une forme de physicalisme apparaît être l’alternative la plus raisonnable, en dépit du fait que l’esprit ne semble pas, d’un point de vue subjectif, être de nature physique. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's 'Context and Logical Form'. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a subsentential expression—where by 'subsentential expression' we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truthconditional content (...) of speech acts. We hope to achieve this second aim precisely by defending the genuineness of subsentential speech acts. Given our two aims, it is necessary to highlight briefly their connection—which we do in the first part of the Introduction. Following that, we introduce Stanley's novel objections. This is the role of the second part of the Introduction. We offer our rebuttals in Section 2 (against 'shorthand') and Section 3 (against syntactic ellipsis, among other things). (shrink)

Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker (...) can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. (shrink)

Regenerative agriculture refers to a suite of principles, practices, or outcomes which seek to improve soil health, biodiversity, climate, ecosystem function, and socioeconomic outcomes. However, recent reviews highlight wide heterogeneity in how it is defined. This impedes our ability to understand what regenerative agriculture is and has left the movement open to strategic repurposing by diverse stakeholders. Furthermore, the conceptual franchising of the regenerative agriculture debate by Western culture has omitted discussions surrounding social justice, relational values, and the contribution of (...) Indigenous and local knowledge that does not align with Western-centric producer-consumer frameworks. This is a continuation of injustice by creating barriers to representation and participation, and its confrontation will ultimately be necessary for regenerative agriculture to achieve its transformative potential. This article demonstrates that the farming techniques associated with the regenerative agriculture movement today have been practiced for centuries, and in some cases millennia, by Indigenous and local communities around the world. We propose that current Western academic attempts to define regenerative agriculture have resulted in long lists of practices, principles, and outcomes which fall short of describing the whole, because they lack the relational values component that is so integral to these Indigenous and local knowledge systems. We take an urgently needed, Indigenous-informed approach to defining regenerative agriculture, which confronts current epistemic injustice and prioritizes sociocultural and relational values. Finally, we propose an anti-colonial definition that draws on diverse knowledge systems including Indigenous ecophilosophies and published scientific analyses. (shrink)