Against a backcloth of philosophical debates on science and technology, and in particular the viewpoints of Karl Marx, this three-volume set proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to scientific and technological evolutions and an ever-changing world. The first volume analyses Marx's reconsideration of science and technology in five parts: its positioning, its historical practice, alienation of science and technology, and its relationship with productivity and human liberty. In the second (...) volume, viewpoints and problems of scientism and anti-scientism are discussed, covering topics such as instrumental reason, scientific optimism and pessimism, irrationalism and the deconstruction of scientism. The final volume discusses complementary value choices, the loss and awakening of scientific culture and reveals a vison for a liberal and open world of science and technology. The volumes will appeal to scholars and students interested in Marxist philosophy, the philosophy of science and technology and topics related to scientific culture. (shrink)

Against a backcloth of philosophical debates on science and technology, and in particular the viewpoints of Karl Marx, this three-volume set proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to scientific and technological evolutions and an ever-changing world. The first volume analyses Marx's reconsideration of science and technology in five parts: its positioning, its historical practice, alienation of science and technology, and its relationship with productivity and human liberty. In the second (...) volume, viewpoints and problems of scientism and anti-scientism are discussed, covering topics such as instrumental reason, scientific optimism and pessimism, irrationalism and the deconstruction of scientism. The final volume discusses complementary value choices, the loss and awakening of scientific culture and reveals a vison for a liberal and open world of science and technology. The volumes will appeal to scholars and students interested in Marxist philosophy, the philosophy of science and technology and topics related to scientific culture. (shrink)

An important module in the Belief-Desire-Intention architecture for artificial agents (which builds on Michael Bratman's work in the philosophy of action) focuses on the task of intention reconsideration. The theoretical task is to formulate principles governing when an agent ought to undo a prior committed intention and reopen deliberation. Extant proposals for such a principle, if sufficiently detailed, are either too task-specific or too computationally demanding. I propose that an agent ought to reconsider an intention whenever some incompatible prospect (...) is sufficiently valuable along some dimension that can be assessed at zero or near-zero computational cost. (shrink)

Harsanyi claimed that his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems provide a justification for utilitarianism. This claim has been strongly resisted, notably by Sen and Weymark, who argue that while Harsanyi has perhaps shown that overall good is a linear sum of individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, he has done nothing to establish any con- nection between the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and that of well-being, and hence that utilitarianism does not follow. The present article defends Harsanyi against the Sen-Weymark cri- (...) tique. I argue that, far from being a term with precise and independent quantitative content whose relationship to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is then a substantive question, terms such as ‘well-being’ suffer (or suffered) from indeterminacy regarding precisely which quantity they refer to. If so, then (on the issue that this article focuses on) Harsanyi has gone as far towards defending ‘utilitarianism in the original sense’ as could coherently be asked. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reconsiderations on History and Antiquarianism: Arnaldo Momigliano and the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century BritainMark Salber PhillipsQuando mia figlia era molto piccola si divertiva a entrare nel mio studio e a chiedermi con finta gravità: “Signore papà che cosa hai concluso?” La sua domanda mi è tornata in mente molte volte più tardi, e mi ritorna nella mente anche oggi. Concludere non è facile, in qualsiasi lingua. E io per natura (...) preferisco proporre problemi.—A. Momigliano, “Epilogo senza conclusione”The question is: can we save for ourselves and for our successors this immemorial tradition, this long-standing delight, of talking to past historians as if they were our senior colleagues?—A. Momigliano, “Polybius Between the English and the Turks”More than any other historian of this century, Arnaldo Momigliano shaped our understanding of the evolution of Western historiography from the ancient to the modern world. Fundamental to this continuity, as Momigliano saw it, was the revival in the Renaissance of the classical division of history into two distinct genres. The first (often called, without further qualification, “history”) is the narrative of public events organized in linear [End Page 297] and causal fashion; the second, antiquities, is a more diverse body of writing that neglects political narrative for philosophical, literary, topographical, and other concerns. After the Reformation antiquarianism took on new tasks in response to the religious controversies of the age, but it remained distinct from the narrative tradition. Only in the eighteenth century did a convergence begin that has finally been completed in the historical methods of our own time. 1This identification of the eighteenth century as the time when historical narrative and antiquarian research converged gives Momigliano’s views their particular interest to students of this period. His terms, however, are always far wider than any single century. In fact his argument constitutes a genealogy of modern historical method, since the merging of the two traditions—first witnessed in the erudite historiography of Edward Gibbon—was a precondition of modern practice. On these foundations, a modern historical discipline has grown up in which systematic research has become indivisible from the task of representing the past in narrative, with the consequence that the ancient separation of history and antiquities has at last been transcended.This essay is intended as a sketch of an alternative approach to the study of historical thought and writing in eighteenth-century Britain. In my view an essential point of departure is the interest of eighteenth-century writers in the structures and experiences of private life, their desire to explore the inward lives of individuals and the everyday life of societies. This revaluation of private life challenged the classical conception of history in fundamental ways, resulting in a fruitful tension between the social and sentimental interests of the age and its inherited view of history. At stake, in the very [End Page 298] broadest terms, was the need to find forms of historical narrative that met the needs of a commercial society and recognized the values and activities of a non-aristocratic audience.In the eighteenth century antiquarian erudition was far from the only genre bordering on the territory of political narrative. Conjectural history, religious history, history of manners, history of sciences and of literature, biography, memoir, and novel all defined themselves in relation to a traditional conception of history and claimed the attention of readers for their own rival narrative spaces. More particularly, these related genres ranged themselves against history’s strict identification with public life, with all the assumptions about audience, gender, and intellectual authority that accompanied the public domain. Without ever displacing the national narrative in the hierarchy of literatures, these other genres offered a variety of alternative histories whose common ground was their resistance to the assumed priority of politics. 2For a generation Momigliano’s dialectic of history and antiquarianism has served as an organizing principle for a good deal of teaching and writing on early modern historiography. 3 It is time, I believe, for a revaluation of this conceptual scheme. The wider consideration of genres I am urging would greatly enlarge the framework of discussion and give us a sharper sense of the interests of eighteenth-century historians and their... (shrink)

Harsanyi claimed that his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems provide a justification for utilitarianism. This claim has been strongly resisted, notably by Sen and Weymark, who argue that while Harsanyi has perhaps shown that overall good is a linear sum of individuals’ von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities, he has done nothing to establish any connection between the notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility and that of well-being, and hence that utilitarianism does not follow. -/- The present article defends Harsanyi against the Sen–Weymark critique. (...) I argue that, far from being a term with precise and independent quantitative content whose relationship to von Neumann–Morgenstern utility is then a substantive question, terms such as ‘well-being’ suffer (or suffered) from indeterminacy regarding precisely which quantity they refer to. If so, then (on the issue that this article focuses on) Harsanyi has gone as far towards defending ‘utilitarianism in the original sense’ as could coherently be asked. (shrink)

Home births continue to constitute only a small percentage of all deliveries in the United States, in part because of concerns about their safety. While the literature is decidedly mixed in regard to the degree of risk, there are several studies that report that home birth may at times entail a small absolute increase in perinatal risks in circumstances that cannot always be anticipated prior to the onset of labor. While the definition of “small” will vary between individuals, and publications (...) vary in the level of risk they ascribe to birth at home, studies with the least methodological flaws and with adequate power often cite an excess death rate in the range of one per thousand.Home birth is, in that regard, but one example of patients’ choices and plans that sometimes carry increased risk or include alternatives that individual physicians feel uncomfortable supporting or recommending. Our intention in this opinion piece is not to advocate for or against home birth. Rather, we recognize that home birth is but one example of a patient choice that might differ from what a provider feels is in a woman’s best interests.In this article we will discuss ethical considerations in such circumstances using home birth as an example. We consider in this article how the ethical principles of respect for autonomy and non-maleficence can be balanced using, among other examples, the choice by some for a home birth. We discuss how absolute rather than relative risk should guide individuals’ evaluation of patient choices. We also consider how in some circumstances, the value and safety added by a physician’s participation may outweigh a potentially small increment in absolute risk that might result from a patient’s decision to deliver at home because of a perceived physician endorsement.We recognize, however, that doctors and midwives participating in choices they have not recommended, or may even believe will lead to or increase risk for adverse outcomes, presents dilemmas and raises important questions. When does respect for patient choice and autonomy become support for poor decision making? When is participation not respectful but enabling? Finally we discuss the role and responsibility of organized medicine in making all births as safe as possible. (shrink)

Understanding more about how the brain functionsshouldhelp us understand economic behaviour. But some would have us believe that it has done this already, and that insights from neuroscience have already provided insights in economics that we would not otherwise have. Much of this is just academic marketing hype, and to get down to substantive issues we need to identify that fluff for what it is. After we clear away the distractions, what is left? The answer is that a lot is (...) left, but it is still all potential. That is not a bad thing, or a reason to stop the effort, but it does point to the need for a serious reconsideration of what neuroeconomics is and what passes for explanation in this literature. I argue that neuroeconomics can be a valuable field, but not the way it is being developed and “sold” now. The same is true more generally of behavioural economics, which shares many of the methodological flaws of neuroeconomics. (shrink)

In this paper, I present some preliminary reconsiderations on the interconnection between Nishida Kitarō’s later logic and his political philosophy. These reconsiderations will form the core of an essay in which I intend to use Karatani Kōjin’s remarks concerning a certain “Leibniz-syndrome” in twentieth-century political thought as a starting point for a more in-depth inquiry into Nishida’s philosophy, as an expression of the contradictions and aporias of global capitalist modernity.

According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non-human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant’s account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat (...) non-humans in certain ways and that it sanctions only weak obligations vis-à-vis organisms. I develop an alternative indirect duty view: given a direct duty to oneself to cultivate virtuous dispositions, one has an indirect duty to abstain from treating organisms in ways that erode one’s virtues or develop vices. I argue that this indirect duty view strictly proscribes knowingly causing unnecessary harm to organisms, and I show that it is not subject to the damaging objections directed against the indirect duty view attributed to Kant by the orthodox interpretation. This suggests that indirect duty views are more worthy of consideration than is often supposed. (shrink)

What do exclusionary reasons exclude? This is the main issue I address in this article. Raz appears to endorse what I label the “motivational” model of exclusionary reasons. He stresses that within the context of his theory of practical reasoning, exclusionary reasons are reasons not to be motivated by certain first-order reasons (namely, the first-order reasons which conflict with the first-order reasons that the exclusionary reasons protect). Some of his critics take him to be committed to another model of exclusionary (...) reasons which I label the “consideration” model. According to this model exclusionary reasons are reasons not to consider or think of the conflicting first-order reasons. I argue that Raz's account of the exclusionary function of decisions suggests a third model of exclusionary reasons which I label the “reconsideration” model. In the reconsideration model, exclusionary reasons are reasons not to reconsider the balance of first-order reasons. In this article I show how the reconsideration model differs from both the motivational and the consideration model and how it can account for the exclusionary function not only of decisions but also of personal rules and authoritative directives. (shrink)

Up to the introduction of the term and concept of incommensurability by T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend in the early 1960s, scientific texts were supposed to pose no problem as regards their translation, unlike literature, which was thought very difficult to translate. After the introduction of the term, translation of scientific language became equally problematic because, due to conceptual and perceptual incommensurability, there was no common observation basis to ground linguistic equivalences between languages of incommensurable paradigms. This article (...) highlights the presuppositions that link incommensurability to dramatic consequences (impossibility of communication, translation, and comparative evaluation of paradigms) and tries to sketch an alternative way of understanding incommensurability and translation drawing on Kuhn’s work. From this perspective, translation is not an all-or-nothing affair for either science or literature and becomes a problem to be solved for each particular set of circumstances. (shrink)

The received view that John Stuart Mill opposed the use of violence to attain desirable political goals has been undermined by authors stressing Mill's defence of revolutionary causes during his lifetime and his efforts to outline a justificatory theory of political violence. In light of this scholarship, claims of Mill's ostensible with regard to the appropriate methods and pace of social progress may merit reassessment. At the same time Mill's account appears to sanction violence that respects criteria of justice but (...) not of expediency and vice versa, making it untenable as a cogent guide for carrying out or evaluating acts of violence. That this tension is analogous to tensions elsewhere in Mill's writings provides more evidence for the view that his theoretical project was a systematic one, and raises new questions about his philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

This paper assumes the significance of Rousseau's Emile for the practice of radical education in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. It is argued that the educational philosophy espoused in Emile is far more conservative than that actually attributed to his inspiration by some radical educators.

Altruistic behavior and motivation has traditionally been regarded as a defense mechanism defined by the vicissitudes of instinctual gratification. In this article, we suggest that there exists a substantial body of evidence from the fields of ethology, infant research, and experimental psychology to support the existence of an independently motivated altruism that is nondefensive in nature. We attempt to show how the view of altruism as a universal motivational system stems from the recent developments in evolutionary theory and contributes to (...) our understanding of intrapsychic factors influencing human behavior in general and the process of psychotherapy in particular. It is not our goal to prove the existence of "pure altruism" that can never be derived from selfish motives. Rather, our thesis is that self-oriented and altruistic motivations are equal and essential partners in human evolution and development. It is the optimal balance of these two forces that is necessary for evolutionary advancement and for psychological health. (shrink)

Attitudes towards the fourth way differ from incredulity and embarrassment to seeing it as a profound demonstration of God’s existence. Aside from general treatments on all the five ways, the fourth way has received little by way of direct commentary in comparison to the other better known (and arguably better appreciated) ways. In this article I seek to present Aquinas’s fourth way as a way to God which makes use of his general and more familiar metaphysical reasoning. This serves to (...) give the reading of the fourth way as a profound argument for God’s existence, and also to integrate it with the other four ways given the common metaphysical backdrop. (shrink)