Resumen: El objetivo principal de este escrito es proponer un papel propedéutico de las intuiciones racionales, a fin de defender una propuesta híbrida entre el acceso epistémico a priori y a posteriori. Las intuiciones racionales deben ser informadas empíricamente, y descartadas cuando hay pruebas contra ellas, cuando la evidencia empírica muestra que la intuición racional es errada, por lo que cualquier creencia guiada por ella también lo sería. Se sostiene que las intuiciones racionales cumplen un importante rol propedéutico: ayudan a (...) comprender diferentes escenarios modales a través de ejemplificaciones contrafácticas. Esto no se opone a la variación cultural de intuiciones, por ello se propone un confiabilismo intuicional variable. Esta propuesta comprende a las intuiciones como falibles y como no conductoras de verdad: no es el objetivo de las intuiciones rastrear la verdad de alguna proposición, sino ayudar a comprender los escenarios hipotéticos que pueden ser relevantes en diferentes áreas.: The main target of this paper is to propose a preparatory learning role of rational intuitions, in order to defend a hybrid proposal between a priori and a posteriori epistemic access. Rational intuitions must be informed empirically, and discarded when there is evidence against them, when empirical evidence shows that rational intuition is wrong, so any belief guided by it would also be wrong. It is argued that rational intuitions play an important propaedeutic role: they help to understand different modal scenarios through counterfactual exemplifications. This is not opposed to the cultural variation of intuitions, therefore a variable intuitional reliability is proposed. This proposal includes intuitions as fallible and as not truth conducive: it is not the goal of intuitions to trace the truth of a proposition, but to help understand the hypothetical scenarios that may be relevant in different areas. (shrink)

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...) the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

More than two hundred years after his birth, and 150 years after the publication of his most famous essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill remains one of the towering intellectual figures of the Western tradition. This book combines an up-to-date assessment of the philosophical legacy of Millâes arguments, his complex version of liberalism and his account of the relationship between character and ethical and political commitment. Bringing together key international and interdisciplinary scholars, including Martha Nussbaum and Peter Singer, this book (...) combines the latest insights of Mill scholarship with a long-term appraisal of the ways in which Millâes work has been received and interpreted from the time of his death in 1873 to today. The book offers compelling insights into Millâes posthumous fate and reputation; his youthful political and intellectual activism; his views on the formation of character; the development of his thought on logic; his differences from his father and Bentham; his astonishingly prescient, environmentally sensitive and âe~greenâe thought; his relation to virtue ethics; his conception of higher pleasures and its relation to his understanding of justice; his feminist thought and its place in contemporary debates and feminist discourses; his defence of free speech and its fundamental significance for his liberalism; and his continued contemporary relevance on a number of major issues. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Politics, Political Theory, Philosophy, History, English, Psychology, and also Cultural Studies, Empire studies, nationalism and ethnicity studies. (shrink)

The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...) emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain. (shrink)

While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that thecurse of a compositional mindconstitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this extraordinarily original and profound work, Noam Chomsky discusses themes in the study of language and mind since the end of the sixteenth century in order to explain the motivations and methods that underlie his work in linguistics, the science of mind, and even politics. This edition includes a new and specially written introduction by James McGilvray, contextualising the work for the twenty-first century. It has been made more accessible to a larger audience; all the French and German in (...) the original edition has been translated, and the notes and bibliography have been brought up to date. The relationship between the original edition and contemporary biolinguistic work is also explained. This challenging volume is an important contribution to the study of language and mind, and to the history of these studies since the end of the sixteenth century. (shrink)

“Renascent Rationalism represents a new and provocative departure from the mostly barren currents of twentieth-century philosophy. The author, enlisting the aid of theoretical science, leads off from the tradition of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Russell and then steps well beyond. The result is a single, integrated philosophical system resting in direct opposition to the contemporary positions of analysis, empiricism, pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology.There are four major effects of Helier Robinson’s acceptance of the Leibniz-Russell theory of perception as his base: (...) all the philosophic problems of perception are solved; a whole new philosophy of science develops; an entirely new theory of mind emerges; and some startling theological and ethical consequences ensue. The art of metaphysical speculation is thus revived.Renascent Rationalism offers a clear, if controversial, alternative to the dominating influence of Hume and Kant and the resulting blind alleys of much modern philosophizing.”- Publisher. (shrink)

This book brings together thirteen articles on the most discussed thinkers in the rationalist movement: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Malebranche. These articles address the topics in metaphysics and epistemology that figure most prominently in contemporary work on these philosophers. The articles have all been produced since 1980, and their authors are among the most respected in the field.

Metaphysical rationalism is the view that, necessarily, every fact that stands in need of a metaphysical (grounding) explanation has one. Varieties of metaphysical rationalism include classical theism, Spinozism, spacetime priority monism, and axiarchism. Grounding indeterminism is the view that the same ground, in precisely the same circumstances, might not have grounded what it in fact grounds. I argue that a plausible defense of any form of metaphysical rationalism requires a commitment to grounding indeterminism.

This study focuses on the question of individualism in the works of Marcel Proust and Jean-Paul Sartre, particularly with regard to the issue of ethical and political selfhood. If there is to be a fruitful interaction between descriptive narrative ethics and proscriptive ethical theory, the role of the literary imagination needs to be reassessed. The resurging interest in redefining the humanist project begs the question of why exponents of individual liberty and group authority remain firmly opposed to one another. Therefore (...) the analysis begins with a consideration of Sartre's failure to produce a formal system of ethics consistent with his early ontology. Sartre's account of subjectivity is framed within recent reevaluations of ethical individualism in the philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard and Emmanuel Levinas in order to demonstrate that Sartrean existentialism is ethically flawed. It is therefore argued that it is his theory of subjectivity which precludes an existentialist-Marxist alliance--the alliance itself deriving promise from a refinement of the existential position. In posing the question of whether Proust defines a theory of the self or elucidates one of an infinite number of individual paths to an authentic self-relation, I reveal that his emphasis on 'la vie interieure' is not excessive or idealistic individualism but rather ethico-political sobriety. According to Sartre, the novelist's sole purpose should be to present, without any form of edification which could translate to proselytism, the passions and actions of the characters. However, his emphasis on action neglects certain aspects of authorial intervention. When Proust's narrator, through the intricate exploration of his own self-relation, invites the reader to embark on the same journey of self-transformation, the novel becomes a site for experimental selfhood. By addressing these issues, I illuminate the difficulties Sartre faced in attempting to unite a Marxist ethos with the primacy of the individual as well as challenge Richard Rorty's characterization of Proust's literary project as a "purely private act of self-creation.". (shrink)

Tamar Rudavsky's erudite survey of Jewish philosophy during the Middle Ages is the latest compendium of a wide array of thinkers who profoundly constructed bridges between the two worlds of Jewish beliefs informed by the Hebrew Bible and its rabbinic overlay at one end, and of science and philosophy dominated by Aristotelian physics and metaphysics at the other. Jewish philosophers, like their Islamic and Christian counterparts, tirelessly exerted themselves to reconcile the two into a unified system. The very title of (...) Maimonides's seminal Guide of the Perplexed reflects his attempt to resolve the angst of his intellectually sophisticated coreligionists who faced an irreconcilable either/or choice between the... (shrink)

Metaphysical rationalism, the doctrine which affirms the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), is out of favor today. The best argument against it is that it appears to lead to necessitarianism, the claim that all truths are necessarily true. Whatever the intuitive appeal of the PSR, the intuitive appeal of the claim that things could have been otherwise is greater. This problem did not go unnoticed by the great metaphysical rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s response was to embrace necessitarianism. Leibniz’s (...) response was to argue that, despite appearances, rationalism does not lead to necessitarianism. This paper examines the debate between these two rationalists and concludes that Leibniz has persuasive grounds for his opinion. This has significant implications both for the plausibility of the PSR and for our understanding of modality. (shrink)

"Rationalism in Politics, " first published in 1962, has established the late Michael Oakeshott as the leading conservative political theorist in modern Britain. This expanded collection of essays astutely points out the limits of "reason" in rationalist politics.Oakeshott criticizes ideological schemes to reform society according to supposedly "scientific" or rationalistic principles that ignore the wealth and variety of human experience. "Rationalism in politics," says Oakeshott, "involves a misconception with regard to the nature of human knowledge." History has shown that it (...) produces unexpected, often disastrous results. "Having cut himself off from the traditional knowledge of his society, and denied the value of any education more extensive than a training in a technique of analysis," the Rationalist succeeds only in undermining the institutions that hold civilized society together. In this regard, rationalism in politics is "a corruption of the mind."Timothy Fuller is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the College at Colorado College. (shrink)

In his book The Culmination, Pippin leaves no doubt that he still thinks that German Idealism has achieved a level of understanding and radicality that makes its proponents the best conversational partners to develop an understanding of what philosophy is about. It is the question of the very possibility of understanding that comes to be at the center of their writings and informs every page. Yet this radicality is now seen in a different light. It is now conceived as a (...) culmination, not of an understanding that comes to itself but of a misunderstanding that informs, unavoidably, Western philosophical tradition as a whole. The resources for the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong in the conception of what it is to be a being that is able to know anything at all Pippin finds most vividly and forcefully articulated in Heidegger. I will argue that there is something profoundly true about Pippin's idea that, at the bottom of any knowledge we have of ourselves and the world, there is something that Heidegger calls Stimmung, which is essentially non‐discursive. However, I will argue that to defend the latter thought, one has to read Heidegger's notion of Stimmung in a more radical way than Pippin seems to be willing to. (shrink)

David Miller elegantly and provocatively reformulates critical rationalism—the revolutionary approach to epistemology advocated by Karl Popper—by answering its most important critics. He argues for an approach to rationality freed from the debilitating authoritarian dependence on reasons and justification. "Miller presents a particularly useful and stimulating account of critical rationalism. His work is both interesting and controversial... of interest to anyone with concerns in epistemology or the philosophy of science." —Canadian Philosophical Reviews.

Traditionally, attempts at resolving the problem of accounting for the possibility of human freedom against the background of determinism have assumed that the options available are to: endorse determinism and deny human freedom, deny determinism in order to make room for human freedom, or find a compatibilist reconciliation. Commonly, the problem is addressed from an 'externalist' perspective. In the dissertation, the issue is refocused upon the positions of 'internalists' such as Frankfurt, Watson, Taylor, and Wolf. Their compatibilist approaches emphasize the (...) importance of first person, psychological characteristics of agents as the salient determinants of human freedom. But each of these internalist approaches are found to be wanting. Consequently, the dissertation considers an alternative internalist view, that of Spinoza. I examine in detail Spinoza's concept of freedom, as it emerges from his overall metaphysical system, and note that his compatibilism not only affirms determinism, but further holds that a certain kind of necessity is a prerequisite to any coherent account of freedom. I then proceed to show that, by comparison with the views of the aforementioned contemporary compatibilists, only Spinoza's concept of freedom can account for a 'developmental' view of human nature, one which depicts the self as engaged in a process of liberation from the sort of psychological determinism which feeds upon ignorance. (shrink)

everyone loves superheroes. superheroes, of course, have incredible powers; they can leap tall buildings in a single bound, excel in combat, and have X-ray vision. But, in addition, superheroes have a kind of simplicity of motive and focus that makes them pure and comprehensible in the way in which the people we actually know rarely are. For Superman it is about Truth, Justice, and the American Way. For Batman it is all about fighting evil: defeating the Joker, the Riddler, and (...) other nefarious characters. For Spiderman it is an outsized sense of mission: “With great power comes great responsibility.” Superheroes are superhuman individuals, who have a simple philosophy of life that motivates their every action. Of.. (shrink)

데까르뜨의 지식나무에서 도덕학은 최상의 지혜를 얻는 분야이다. 그는 『철학의 원리』에서 완벽한 도덕 체계의 구성이야말로 그의 철학 최고의 목적이 될 것이라고 선언하였다. 그런데도 그는 본격적인 도덕학 주제 저서나 논문을 남기지 않았다. 그의 초기 작품인 『방법서설』에는 ‘잠정적 도덕률’이 등장한다. 왜 잠정적 도덕률인가? 데까르뜨의 근대성은 세속화의 과정과 밀접한 관계를 갖는다. 그의 도덕적 입장도 이런 세속화의 관점에서 완벽하게 설명될 수 있을까? ‘잠정적 도덕률’에 반영된 합리주의적 태도는 『정념론』에서도 발견된다. 여기서는 좋은 삶을 위한 실제적 처방이 제시되고 있다. 육체의 작용을 이해하고 정념을 지배하는 기술들을 고안해 내는 데 (...) 이성을 사용해야 한다고 말한다. 정념의 억제라는 측면에서 스토아학파의 섭리 개념도 검토의 대상이다. 그러나 이상의 검토만으로는 데까르뜨의 진정한 도덕적 입장을 드러내기에는 역부족이다. 데까르뜨에게 최고의 행복은 최고선을 소유하는 데 있다. 그런데 이 최고의 선은 신이다. 데까르뜨는 진리와 선의 원천과 척도를 신에게서 구하고 있으며 이성만으로는 근본적으로 도덕의 진정한 기초가 될 수 없다고 말한다. 데까르뜨는 도덕적 숙고에 있어 이성이 신앙에 의존하고 있다는 것을 자각하고 있으며 따라서 이 범위 내에서는 그의 이성 개념들이나 의지도 완전히 세속화될 수 없는 지점을 보여주게 된다. 신을 제외한 도덕론은 제한된 지혜와 자기 통제력 정도의 소극적 도덕론에서 멈추게 된다. 잠정적 도덕률에 머무를 수밖에 없다. 데까르뜨의 의지는 자기 고유의 자의적 결정에서도 또 물질적인 복지에 관련한 도구적 효용에서도 스스로 그 완전한 척도가 될 수 없다. 이 척도는 근본적으로 기독교 형이상학에서 물려받은 신에게서 온다. 자연의 정복과 인간 육체에 대한 통제라는 세속적인 실천적 목표는 그 척도를 무한한 신으로부터 구하는 것이다. 결국 데까르뜨의 도덕적 입장은 그 핵심에서 근본적인 종교적 경건함을 바탕으로 삼는다. 세속의 덕은 기독교의 덕을 통해 적극적으로 완성된다. 세속적인 과학 프로그램의 기초도 이성만으로는 성립될 수 없다. 기독교 정신은 고유의 덕 개념을 통해 데까르뜨의 도덕적 입장 속에 확정적 도덕률의 가능성을 마련한다. 자유의지는 신의 섭리와 양립가능하다고 데까르뜨는 말한다. (shrink)

In his New Science of Politics, Eric Voegelin offers an analysis of modernity: at its heart, it is a radicalization of Christianity—a radicalization that counts as a betrayal. Like other movements of its time, Christianity judged this world in terms of another—one wherein all of us were brothers and sisters, wherein justice mattered more than victory and mercy more than justice. But rather than endure in patience their own limitations, those whom Voegelin calls “gnostics” tried to build heaven on earth—inevitably, (...) by violence. This serves as his postmortem on the twentieth century: liberalism, communism, and fascism are all, according to Voegelin, trying to do what cannot be done—specifically, to do what Voegelin calls “immanentizing the eschaton.” Each is, in its own way, a revolt against the human condition—and so a revolt against God. -/- But these gnostics would hardly have seen themselves in this demonic light. Indeed, they often called themselves “rationalists” and saw themselves as a brave few who might lead humanity out of the madness of the past. Of course, Voegelin would hardly grant that Plato or Saint Augustine were less rational than, say, Thomas Hobbes. But he would certainly grant that the gnostics hoped to render the world “rational” by abolishing whatever aspects of the human condition were “irrational”—in the case of Hobbes, our capacity for mystical experience of God. -/- Of course, this is hardly how contemporary political scientists would explain Hobbes. In the introduction to his New Science of Politics, though, Voegelin offers an indirect explanation of this. He warns that the social sciences are prisoners of their idolatry of the natural sciences: they ignore any data that cannot be rendered in language that is entirely descriptive—insisting as they do so that this methodology is only “rational.”. (shrink)