Reciprocity is ubiquitous in our lives, both as a way of rewarding and punishing others. Consequently, the social sciences have devoted many studies to this phenomenon. However, the concept of 'reciprocity' is quite polyvalent, and is used in many different ways across different disciplines - a situation potentially prone to equivocation, which hinders fruitful interdisciplinary work. At the same time, although philosophers often invoke 'reciprocity' in their work, there is a lack of conceptual clarification about what reciprocity actually means - (...) an eminently philosophical task. This thesis fills such a gap, by offering a general framework that allows us to understand how 'reciprocity' is used across different sciences. Such a framework consists in a grammar of several uses/meanings of reciprocity. Moreover, the thesis fills a second gap, regarding the correct interpretation of the psychological role of the reciprocity-motive in economic experiments. There has been a long-standing tradition in economics which overemphasizes the role of inequality aversion and downplays the role of reciprocity. Contrary to this deeply ingrained trend, I argue that reciprocity is the main motive of punishment of free-riders in the public goods game. My argument includes the first systematic critique of an experiment which is currently quite popular in behavioural economics. I show that the latter does not deserve the credit which it has received so far, and thus many economists need to revise their endorsement of inequality aversion. By offering a renewed interpretation of the motives in economic experiments, the thesis highlights reciprocity as a distinctive motivation. The thesis also offers tools to rethink key aspects of economic methodology, and proposes a distinction between prediction, explanation and rationalization of behaviour, in order to achieve psychologically realistic explanations of behaviour. The disciplinary home of the thesis is in philosophy of social science, economics and moral psychology. (shrink)

Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.

Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random (...) behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism. (shrink)

The aims of this study were twofold, to: examine the behavior displayed by participants who expected to be nominated for donor roles in dictator games wherein initial endowments of players are determined by lottery and investigate the conduct of donors who were confident in their good fortune in relation to their power as they redistributed the rewards they had gained. Results from a dictator game in which a donor is accorded the absolute power to redistribute initial income and (...) a random dictator game in which both a donor and a recipient declare their redistributive preferences and one of them is selected randomly by a computer were compared. Confident donors made more self-serving redistribution decisions than did unconfident donors in both games, but the difference was clearer in the dictator game. In relation to their preferences exhibited before being informed of their roles, confident donors decreased their redistribution amounts after discovering their roles; the decrements in the dictator game were conspicuously larger than those in the random dictator game. In short, confident donors were greedier than unconfident donors; the difference became more pronounced when their redistributive power was unconditional even though their confidence had no rational basis. (shrink)

This paper reports the results of an economic lab experiment designed to test the impact of Basic Income (BI) on wages and productivity. The experimental design is based on the classic gift exchange game. Participants assigned the role of employer were tasked with making wage offers, and those assigned as employees chose how hard they would work in return. In addition to a control without any social security net, BI was compared to unemployment benefits, and both types of (...) cash transfers were tested at two levels. The results are that wage offers were increased in both the BI and unemployment benefit treatments compared to the control. The higher-level BI treatment also significantly increased effort. Further experimentation could shed more light on how the potential extra value created in the labor market through increased productivity would be divided between employers and employees. (shrink)

To many in the Netherlands it seems that basic income’s time has come, following the wide appeal of several municipal experiments. These random-control trial designs study the effects on employment, social participation, health and well-being of exempting social assistance claimants from the duties of seeking work and participating in training activities under the workfare-oriented Participation Act. In some treatment groups, claimants also retain a larger percentage of earnings, thereby reducing the poverty trap. These two design features resemble an (...) unconditional basic income. I situate the experiments in the wider context of basic income and discuss their theoretical background and policy orientation. Under existing legal strictures, the experimental designs are too limited to judge the effects of replacing the conditional scheme of social assistance by an unconditional one. Yet these experiments point the way for future trials which can compare the effectiveness of basic income-oriented versus workfare-oriented treatments. (shrink)

False information is always produced after the outbreak of major emergencies. Taking this into consideration, this paper discusses the behavior of multiple parties in relation to false information dissemination after major emergencies. First, a game model is constructed, using relevant knowledge of evolutionary game theory, between three parties: regulatory institutions, opinion leaders, and ordinary Internet users. Second, the model equations are solved, and the evolutionary stability strategies of each game party under different circumstances are analyzed. Third, a (...) numerical simulation is applied to the evolutionary trends under different strategy combinations with varying parameters. The results show that the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is positively correlated with the degree of punishment imposed by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release false information, the reward provided by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release positive information, the degree of participation and satisfaction gained by Internet users in adopting positive information, the richness of authentic content released by opinion leaders, and the psychological identification of Internet users with opinion leaders. Meanwhile, the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is negatively correlated with investigation and evidence collection costs borne by opinion leaders who release positive information, the additional income for opinion leaders who have false information adopted by Internet users, the costs of Internet users’ time and energy when they adopt information released by opinion leaders, and the costs of independently judging the accuracy of information by Internet users. (shrink)

When does it make sense to act randomly? A persuasive argument from Bayesian decision theory legitimizes randomization essentially only in tie-breaking situations. Rational behaviour in humans, non-human animals, and artificial agents, however, often seems indeterminate, even random. Moreover, rationales for randomized acts have been offered in a number of disciplines, including game theory, experimental design, and machine learning. A common way of accommodating some of these observations is by appeal to a decision-maker’s bounded computational resources. Making this suggestion (...) both precise and compelling is surprisingly difficult. Toward this end, I propose two fundamental rationales for randomization, drawing upon diverse ideas and results from the wider theory of computation. The first unifies common intuitions in favour of randomization from the aforementioned disciplines. The second introduces a deep connection between randomization and memory: access to a randomizing device is provably helpful for an agent burdened with a finite memory. Aside from fit with ordinary intuitions about rational action, the two rationales also make sense of empirical observations in the biological world. Indeed, random behaviour emerges more or less where it should, according to the proposal. (shrink)

Loss aversion can occur in riskless and risky choices. We present novel evidence on both in a non-student sample (660 randomly selected customers of a car manufacturer). We measure loss aversion in riskless choice in endowment effect experiments within and between subjects and find similar levels of average loss aversion in both. The subjects of the within study also participate in a simple lottery choice task which arguably measures loss aversion in risky choices. We find substantial heterogeneity in both measures (...) of loss aversion. Loss aversion in riskless choice and loss aversion in risky choice are strongly positively correlated, but on average riskless loss aversion is higher than risky loss aversion. We find that in both choice tasks, loss aversion increases in age, income, and wealth, and decreases in education. Our results provide novel supportive input to the debate about the reality of loss aversion. (shrink)

This article discusses the connection between the goddess Fortuna and games, with a particular focus on the period going from late republican Rome to late antiquity. There seems to be an irresolvable tension between the divine status of Fortuna and the randomness inherent to the theme of the “game of fortuna” (ludus fortunae), to the extent that when the ludus appears, fortuna can be personified, but she is never clearly identified as a deity. This semantic tension was exploited by (...) a variety of authors to probe and redefine the boundaries between chance and divine will. (shrink)

Two studies examine whether income volatility might lead to greater personal financial insecurity and might create a decision environment that discourages planning ahead on personal finances. In Study 1, participants who reported more month-to-month variability in their actual income were less likely to have planned for financial contingencies. A lower internal locus of control partially mediated the link between volatility and financial planning decisions in Study 1, and lower internal locus of economic control predicted financial planning decisions independently (...) of volatility. In Study 2, participants who were randomly assigned to receive volatile payments in a simulated work environment were less likely to save their compensation for this work. Again, lower internal locus of economic control predicted financial planning decisions independently of volatility. This is the first study to demonstrate a causal link between income volatility and financial decisions, specifically a heightened tendency to make short-term financial decisions. Both studies also underlined the importance of internal locus of control for financial planning decisions. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the structural optimization of community governance in smart cities and optimize the structure based on the game analysis of dynamic planning evolution. Theoretically, the connotation and extension of the concept of “self-organization” are cleared, and the environment and conditions of community self-organization formation, the formation process of community self-organization, and the types of community self-organization are discussed. The so-called “self-organization” is a process of spontaneously moving from disorder to order, and the environment and conditions (...) of community self-organization are mainly the openness, nonequilibrium state, and nonlinearity of the system. The key parameters of the contract with the change of the values of each factor make up for the inability to collect data for the empirical study in this paper; then, it presents four linear stages along with the cause such as self-creation, self-expansion, self-maintenance, and self-degeneration, respectively. The types of community self-organization mainly include community self-organization with random aggregation, socialized community self-organization, and stable community self-organization with autonomy orientation. By systematically sorting out the relationship between community self-organization and government, while confirming the positive significance of community self-organization to community cultural governance, various complex conflicts and game relationships will deeply affect the actual effectiveness of cultural governance and provide useful knowledge reference for future community cultural governance. (shrink)

Imposing “sin” taxes has been the preferred way governments tried to discourage the over-consumption of temptation goods for decades. However numerous evidence shows that consumers exhibit behavioral biases which can affect their reaction to taxes. This paper investigates a potential bias and how it affects demand for temptation: financial worries associated with poverty have been shown to shift attention towards pressing needs, often at the expense of forward-looking decisions. In an online experiment with UK participants, we randomly induce financial worries (...) and ask participants to allocate a budget between basic necessities and temptation goods in an experimental market. We randomly impose “taxes” on temptation by increasing its price. We find that, in the absence of any tax, inducing financial worries lowers demand for temptation, effect stronger for lower-income participants. However, when financial concerns are salient, increasing the tax does not lower demand among lower-income participants. While financial worries might protect against over-consumption of temptation in the absence of tax changes, they also might hurt the poor the most when additional taxes are introduced. (shrink)

Publication date: 15 October 2018 Source: Author: Smiles I. Ume, C.I. Ezeano, R.O. Anozie Role of off-farm income in agricultural production and its environmental effect in Southeast, Nigeria was studied. Two hundred and forty respondents were selected through multi stage random sampling techniques. The objectives of the study were captured using percentage responses, multiple regression and factor analyses. Structured questionnaire was used to collect data from the respondents. The result of socio-economic characteristics of commercial motor cycle riders showed (...) that most riders were youthful, single and experienced. Also, most of the riders used their money generated in the business in hiring labour, procurements of farm inputs, family welfare, expansion of business and procurement of equipment. As well, the menaces caused by motor cycle to the riders and the general society were accidents, traffic jam, crimes, health challenges and gang beating. More so, the determinant factors to the motor cycle riders’ income generated were number of years of experience and marital status. In addition, the effects of motor cycle operations to the environment were dusty and noisy situations, soil erosion, vegetation loss and oil spillage. The avenues in alleviating the affects of motor cycle operations on the environment were use of gadgets, educational programme, ban on the use of big motor cycle, use of traffic control and cleanliness of vehicular emission. The major problems encountered by the riders were extortions by the police, emblem, high cost of fuel and high cost of spare parts. Based on the findings the following recommendations were proffered. There is need to enhance riders’ access to hearing and head protective devices and goggle gadget at affordable prices. Also, experienced and novice riders should be encouraged to remain in business through among others provision of motor cycle parts at affordable prices and rehabilitation of rural roads by the government. Finally, all forms of extortions of the riders should be checkmated and the culprits brought to book. (shrink)

Digital computers are by design completely deterministic, yet they are often consumers of randomness in cryptography, simulations, science experiments and computer games. To generate randomness in software, programmers implement special mathematical algorithms, which produce a series of numbers that appear nondeterministic, so called pseudo random number generators (PRNGs). Computer games make heavy use of such PRNGs to make game simulations and behaviors of game elements appear more natural. An important design element of many video games is (...) class='Hi'>game physics, the simulation of physical reality in video games. Generally overlooked by game developers, is the fact that randomness based on PRNGs are mere simulations themselves and randomness is not treated as a physical property of reality, and thus a form of game physics. Since the dynamics of the very small and the very complex invariably contains randomness, the author suggests this can be used to extend to the scope of game physics by defining two new game physics elements: 1. providing physics based random data to games or interactive media and 2. extracting true randomness from game-player interactions themselves. (shrink)

We study the effect of scarcity on decision making by low income Swedes. We exploit the random assignment of welfare payments to study their borrowing decisions within the pawn and mainstream credit market. We document that higher educated borrowers borrow less frequently and choose lower loan to value ratios when their budget constraints are exogenously tighter. In contrast, low-educated borrowers do not respond to temporary elevated levels of scarcity. This lack of response translates into a significantly higher probability (...) to default and an 11.6% increase in borrowing cost. We show that a difference in access to liquidity and/or buffer stocks cannot explain our results. Instead a framework, where the awareness of self-control problems is positively correlated with education can explain that high-educated consumers choose a lower LTV as a commitment device to increase their likelihood to repay. Analogously, low-educated with less awareness of their future self-control problems, do not tie themselves to the mast and thus ignore the consequences of their credit decisions when focusing on solving acute liquidity problems. Our findings highlight that increased levels of scarcity risk reinforcing the conditions of poverty through overborrowing. (shrink)

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High‐status people generally prefer more inequality than low‐status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self‐interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab‐constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a (...) method that combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality—a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards—first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self‐interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low‐status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality. (shrink)

A quantum algorithm succeeds not because the superposition principle allows ‘the computation of all values of a function at once’ via ‘quantum parallelism’, but rather because the structure of a quantum state space allows new sorts of correlations associated with entanglement, with new possibilities for information‐processing transformations between correlations, that are not possible in a classical state space. I illustrate this with an elementary example of a problem for which a quantum algorithm is more efficient than any classical algorithm. I (...) also introduce the notion of ‘pseudotelepathic’ games and show how the difference between classical and quantum correlations plays a similar role here for games that can be won by quantum players exploiting entanglement, but not by classical players whose only allowed common resource consists of shared strings of random numbers (common causes of the players’ correlated responses in a game). *Received October 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Little is known about health of the growing subpopulation of the working poor in Japan. We aimed to evaluate health status and healthcare utilization in relation to income among Japanese working adults. We conducted a one-month prospective cohort study using a health diary in working adults from a nationally representative random sample in Japan. Based on the government criterion, the working poor group was defined as earning an equivalent annual income of less than 1.48 million Japanese-yen. For (...) health status, we measured symptomatic episodes and health-related quality of life (HRQOL). For healthcare utilization, we measured frequencies of visits to a physician or pharmacy, and use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). We constructed multiple linear regression models for these measures adjusted for age, gender, and co-morbidity, using annual equivalent income as a 4-level categorical variable. (shrink)

This paper takes issue with the widespread claim that positional competitions are zero-sum games. It shows how the notions of ‘positional good’ and ‘positional competition’ have changed in meaning and how this has resulted in conceptual confusion in discussions amongst economists and philosophers. I argue that the Zero-Sum Claim is hardly ever true when it comes to the novel understanding of positionality that currently dominates the philosophical literature. I propose dropping the Zero-Sum Claim and construing positional competitions as win-lose. This (...) is conceptually clearer and deepens our understanding and ethical evaluation of these important competitions in contemporary societies. (shrink)

We propose a two-step guessing game to measure the depth of thinking. We apply this method to the P beauty contest game. Using our method, we find that 81% of subjects do not make choice following best response reasoning while the classical method would suggest only 12%. The result suggests that the classical method has the fundamental problem that it cannot distinguish if a submitted number is due to best response reasoning or not. It also suggests that traditional (...) level k analysis falsely attributes some sophistication to random players, and that the degree of false attribution is large. Our procedure provides an alternative way to identify whether the individual has best response reasoning which is essential for any positive level of depth of thinking and differentiates between the depth of thinking and random choice, and hence provides a very different conclusion, which is suggestive of limitations of the classical method. (shrink)

This paper examines the theoretical background and actual behavior in a gaming tournament with endogenous timing where a person has more incentive, structure, and time to form a strategy. The baseline treatment suggests that subgame perfection is a reasonable predictor of behavior –- subjects made 170 of 208 theoretically predicted choices of best actions, with the majority of mistakes made in timing choices by the players who did not survive the cut to the second round. Four sensitivity treatments established that (...) the design feature that lead to more predictable behavior was time to think –- 745 of 960 correctly predicted decisions with more time versus 595 of 960 with less time. A random effects Probit model suggests that the key design feature that closed the gap between predicted and observed behavior was not necessarily the non-linear payoffs created by the tournament design, but rather that the key was providing people with more time to think about their strategy. (shrink)

While talking about sports (and games) we use such expressions as ?random victory?, ?winning by accident?, ?skill against luck?, ?chance (fortune) favours the better player?, etc. Unfortunately, chance-related notions that occur in these expressions are not well defined?their meaning is vague and it is not clear whether they refer to one or many different phenomena. Because such phenomena play an important role in sport, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport it is necessary to give a systematic account (...) of this topic. Although the works of De Wachter, Simon, Dixon, Breivik and Loland contain many important insights, there is still a room for further research in this field. The author tries to establish a typology of phenomena that could generally be called ?chance-phenomena?, which however, should be precisely distinguished. As such the primary task is to present an analysis of several different kinds of chance in sports. In constructing this typology the author uses both the distinction between different kinds of games (performative vs. kinetic) as well as analysis of structure of a game (four constitutive elements: players, constitutive rules, material substrate of the game and the world of the game). The most important method used is phenomenological analysis, especially Ingarden-style analysis. These kinds of ?chance-phenomena? are: aleatoriness, chaos, irregularity, imprecision and arbitrariness. The paradigm cases of each kind of chance are discussed. The genesis and functions of the respective phenomena in sports and games are also shown, as well as their position in the structure of the game. Such analytic work should precede any solutions of the chance vs. skill problem, or other problems concerning chance in sport. As a test of usefulness of the provided distinctions, the author considers the veracity of the judgements expressed in such sentences as ?Fortune favours the better player? (shrink)

We explore different ways to generalize Hintikka’s classic game theoretic semantics to a many-valued setting, where the unit interval is taken as the set of truth values. In this manner a plethora of characterizations of Łukasiewicz logic arise. Among the described semantic games is Giles’s dialogue and betting game, presented in a manner that makes the relation to Hintikka’s game more transparent. Moreover, we explain a so-called explicit evaluation game and a ‘bargaining game’ variant of (...) it. We also describe a recently introduced backtracking game as well as a game with random choices for Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

Superstars are not by accident a conspicuous phenomenon in our culture, but inherently belong to a meritocratic society with mass media, free enterprise, and competition. To make this contention plausible I will use Caillois's book, Man, Play and Games, to compare the mechanisms underlying the superstar phenomenon with a special kind of game, as set out by Caillois. As far as I know, Caillois's book is not quoted in the literature dealing with income distribution theories, although the comparison (...) with play and games is, for limited purposes, interesting. In play and games we find almost all elements which play a role in theories of just income distribution: equality of opportunity, chance, talent, competition and skill, reward, entitlement, winners and losers, etc. These are not chance similarities, for “… games are largely dependent upon the cultures in which they are practised. They affect their preferences, prolong their customs, and reflect their beliefs … One … can … posit a truly reciprocal relationship between a society and the games it likes to play”. Moreover, as we will see, superstars combine the four basic characteristics of play that make their activities a special kind of play. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has developed the so-called capability approach to meet the criticism that income alone may be insufficient as a measure of economic inequality. This is because knowledge about people’s income does not tell us what they are able to acquire with that income. For example, people with the same income may not have the same access to health and transportation services, schools and opportunities in the labor market. Recently, there has been growing interest in empirical (...) studies based on the capability approach. Most of these, however, are only loosely related to quantitative behavioral theory, at least in a concrete and empirically operational way. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the theory of random scale models offers a powerful theoretical and empirical framework for representing and accounting for key aspects of Sen’s theory. (shrink)

This paper examines the theoretical background and actual behavior in a gaming tournament with endogenous timing where a person has more incentive, structure, and time to form a strategy. The baseline treatment suggests that subgame perfection is a reasonable predictor of behavior –- subjects made 170 of 208 theoretically predicted choices of best actions, with the majority of mistakes made in timing choices by the players who did not survive the cut to the second round. Four sensitivity treatments established that (...) the design feature that lead to more predictable behavior was time to think –- 745 of 960 correctly predicted decisions with more time versus 595 of 960 with less time. A random effects Probit model suggests that the key design feature that closed the gap between predicted and observed behavior was not necessarily the non-linear payoffs created by the tournament design, but rather that the key was providing people with more time to think about their strategy. (shrink)

Research suggests that institutions affect the levels of corruption in a country. We take these arguments a step further and examine whether it is the presence of inclusive institutions and/or the credible and consistent implementation of institutions that matter, as regards corruption. We use a novel approach to theoretically conceptualise and empirically operationalise institutions along two analytically distinct dimensions: the nature of the institutions (the de jure dimension), and the extent to which they are credibly and consistently implemented over time (...) (the de facto dimension), using a panel dataset for 148 countries covering 2012 to 2018. We find that formal institutions are most effective in reducing corruption when the rules are credibly and consistently implemented. Furthermore, this effect appears to operate differently at different levels of national income. The nature of the formal institutions appears important across income levels, but particularly so at the upper middle income level, while the credible and consistent implementation of these institutions is primarily influential at upper middle income levels. We explain why this may be the case and elaborate on the policy implications. (shrink)

Purpose: This study aimed to develop a stroke effectiveness test in table tennis based on the temporal game structure to assess the ball speed and ball placement of the players, with a purpose to analyze its reproducibility and validity. Methods: Nineteen male table tennis players participated in this study. The test was performed twice during the first session and once during the second session to assess the intrasession and intersession reproducibility, respectively. Moreover, the test was examined on its ability (...) to discriminate between regional and local performance-level players and on the relationship between the test results and the table tennis performance to assess the discriminant and concurrent validity, respectively. In general, the test consisted of 11 simulated rallies of 2–5 balls with the effort and rest ratio of 0.5, and focused on attack with offensive strokes at defensive balls delivered by a robot randomly between the left and right positions on the table. Results: Ball speed, ball placement, and ball speed-ball placement index showed satisfactory reliability and agreement outcomes. Additionally, the Bland-Altman plots show the systematic error of the analyses closer to 0, and that most values were within the limits of agreements. Concerning validity analyses, regional players had higher scores of ball placement and ball speed-ball placement index as well as made fewer errors than local players. Moreover, ball placement, ball speed-ball placement index, and percentage error presented a strong and significant correlation with table tennis performance. However, ball speed was slightly different between the regional than local players and this variable was not related to table tennis performance. Conclusion: Our findings show evidences that the test is reproducible. Moreover, discriminant and concurrent validity are confirmed for ball placement and ball speed-ball placement index. (shrink)

David Lewis (1969) introduced sender-receiver games as a way of investigating how meaningful language might evolve from initially random signals. In this report I investigate the conditions under which Lewis signaling games evolve to perfect signaling systems under various learning dynamics. While the 2-state/2- term Lewis signaling game with basic urn learning always approaches a signaling system, I will show that with more than two states suboptimal pooling equilibria can evolve. Inhomogeneous state distributions increase the likelihood of pooling (...) equilibria, but learning strategies with negative reinforcement or certain sorts of mutation can decrease the likelihood of, and even eliminate, pooling equilibria. Both Moran and APR learning strategies (Bereby-Meyer and Erev 1998) are shown to promote successful convergence to signaling systems. A model is presented that illustrates how a language that codes state-act pairs in an order-based grammar might evolve in the context of a Lewis signaling game. The terms, grammar, and the corresponding partitions of the state space co-evolve to generate a language whose structure appears to reflect canonical natural kinds. The evolution of these apparent natural kinds, however, is entirely in service of the rewards that accompany successful distinctions between the sender and receiver. Any metaphysics grounded on the structure of a natural language that evolved in this way would track arbitrary, but pragmatically useful distinctions. (shrink)

The Battle of the Sexes game, which captures both coordination and conflict problems, has been applied to a wide range of situations. We show that, by reducing distributional conflict and enhancing coordination, turn taking supported by a “turn taking with independent randomizations” strategy allows players to engage in intertemporal sharing of the gain from cooperation. Using this insight, we decompose the benefit from turn taking into conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing components. Our analysis suggests that an equilibrium measure of the “degree (...) of intertemporal conflict” provides an intuitive way to understand the sources of welfare gain from turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We find that when this equilibrium measure is lower, players behave less aggressively and the welfare gain from turn taking is higher. (shrink)

Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, (...) only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable. (shrink)

The learning of immediate causation within a dynamic environment was examined. Participants encountered seven decision points in which they needed to choose which of three possible candidates was the cause of explosions in the environment. Each candidate was firing a weapon at random every few seconds, but only one of them produced an immediate effect. Some participants showed little learning, but most demonstrated increases in accuracy across time. On average, men showed higher accuracy and shorter latencies that were not (...) explained by differences in self-reported prior video game experience. This result suggests that prior reports of sex differences in causal choice in the game are not specific to situations involving delayed or probabilistic causal relations. (shrink)

Considerable work during the past two decades has focused on modeling the structure of semantic memory, although the performance of these models in complex and unconstrained semantic tasks remains relatively understudied. We introduce a two‐player cooperative word game, Connector (based on the boardgame Codenames), and investigate whether similarity metrics derived from two large databases of human free association norms, the University of South Florida norms and the Small World of Words norms, and two distributional semantic models based on large (...) language corpora (word2vec and GloVe) predict performance in this game. Participant dyads were presented with 20‐item word boards with word pairs of varying relatedness. The speaker received a word pair from the board (e.g., exam‐algebra) and generated a one‐word semantic clue (e.g., math), which was used by the guesser to identify the word pair on the board across three attempts. Response times to generate the clue, as well as accuracy and latencies for the guessed word pair, were strongly predicted by the cosine similarity between word pairs and clues in random walk‐based associative models, and to a lesser degree by the distributional models, suggesting that conceptual representations activated during free association were better able to capture search and retrieval processes in the game. Further, the speaker adjusted subsequent clues based on the first attempt by the guesser, who in turn benefited from the adjustment in clues, suggesting a cooperative influence in the game that was effectively captured by both associative and distributional models. These results indicate that both associative and distributional models can capture relatively unconstrained search processes in a cooperative game setting, and Connector is particularly suited to examine communication and semantic search processes. (shrink)

Although trust and reciprocity are ubiquitous in social exchange, their neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Here, we investigated the effect of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)—a brain region critical for valuing social information—on individuals’ decisions in a trust game and in a risk game. In the trust game, one player, the investor, is endowed with a sum of money, which she can keep or invest. The amount she decides to invest is tripled and sent to (...) the other player, the trustee, who then decides what fraction to return to the investor. In separate runs, ten patients with focal bilateral damage to the vmPFC and control participants made decision while playing in the role of either investor or trustee with different anonymous counterparts in each run. A risk game was also included in which the investor faced exactly the same decisions as in the trust game, but a random device (i.e., a computer), not another player, determined the final payoffs. Results showed that vmPFC patients’ investments were not modulated by the type of opponent player (e.g., human vs. computer) present in the environment. Thus, vmPFC patients showed comparable risk-taking preferences both in social (trust game) and nonsocial (risk game) contexts. In stark contrast, control participants were less willing to take risk and invest when they believed that they were interacting with people than a computer. Furthermore, when acted as trustee, vmPFC patients made lower back transfers toward investors, thereby showing less reciprocity behavior. Taken together, these results indicate that social valuation and emotion subserved by vmPFC have a critical role in trusting and reciprocity decisions. The present findings support the hypothesis that vmPFC damage may impair affective systems specifically designed for mediating social transaction with other individuals. (shrink)

In the context of propositional logics, we apply semantics modulo satisfiability—a restricted semantics which comprehends only valuations that satisfy some specific set of formulas—with the aim to efficiently solve some computational tasks. Three possible such applications are developed.We begin by studying the possibility of implicitly representing rational McNaughton functions in Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic through semantics modulo satisfiability. We theoretically investigate some approaches to such representation concept, called representation modulo satisfiability, and describe a polynomial algorithm that builds representations in the newly (...) introduced system. An implementation of the algorithm, test results and ways to randomly generate rational McNaughton functions for testing are presented. Moreover, we propose an application of such representations to the formal verification of properties of neural networks by means of the reasoning framework of Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic.Then, we move to the investigation of the satisfiability of joint probabilistic assignments to formulas of Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic, which is known to be an NP-complete problem. We provide an exact decision algorithm derived from the combination of linear algebraic methods with semantics modulo satisfiability. Also, we provide an implementation for such algorithm for which the phenomenon of phase transition is empirically detected.Lastly, we study the game theory situation of observable games, which are games that are known to reach a Nash equilibrium, however, an external observer does not know what is the exact profile of actions that occur in a specific instance; thus, such observer assigns subjective probabilities to players actions. We study the decision problem of determining if a set of these probabilistic constraints is coherent by reducing it to the problems of satisfiability of probabilistic assignments to logical formulas both in Classical Propositional Logic and Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic depending on whether only pure equilibria or also mixed equilibria are allowed. Such reductions rely upon the properties of semantics modulo satisfiability. We provide complexity and algorithmic discussion for the coherence problem and, also, for the problem of computing maximal and minimal probabilistic constraints on actions that preserves coherence.prepared by Sandro Márcio da Silva Preto.E-mail: [email protected]:https://doi.org/10.11606/T.45.2021.tde-17062021-163257. (shrink)

In the process of cultural dissemination, the dissemination of false information will have a negative impact on the entire environment. In this case, it is an effective method to regulate the behavior of cultural dissemination participants. Based on the community network structure and the improved classic network communication model, this paper constructs the susceptible-infected-recovered model for the grassroots communication of engineering safety culture and discusses the law of grassroots transmission of engineering safety culture. The communication process is simulated, and it (...) is concluded that a good engineering safety culture will be the first to be covered by low-level engineering safety culture in the process of dissemination. With a modularity coefficient of 0.5 as the boundary, it will affect the scale of good safety culture in different directions; the dissemination infection rate of low-level engineering safety culture changes in the same direction with the speed and scale of transmission; the maximum transmission scale of low-level engineering safety culture does not decrease with the increase of the initial value of the susceptible state. When the initial value of the immune state is 15%, the low-level safety culture scale is the lowest value of 0.135, which is the low initial value of employees with low-level engineering safety culture and is more conducive to control its maximum spread. It also puts forward management recommendations for the subjects and objects of the grassroots dissemination of engineering safety culture. This paper transforms cultural communication into an evolutionary game model, uses a game tree to describe it, and analyzes that the model has a Nash equilibrium point by adding a penalty function to the income matrix. This model can encourage cultural communication participants to take honest behaviors, effectively restrain the transmission of false information, and promote a virtuous circle of cultural communication. (shrink)

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings captured by various widely studied 2 × 2 games. This article develops a repeated game model that allows us to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games, including the battle of the sexes, the game of chicken, the game of common-pool-resources assignment, and a particular version of the prisoners’ dilemma. We consider the “turn taking with independent randomizations” (TTIR) strategy that achieves three objectives: (a) (...) helping the players reach the turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who takes the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection. We determine conditions under which there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also show that there exist conditions under which an increase in the “degree of conflict” of the stage game leads to a decrease in the expected number of periods in reaching the turn-taking path. (shrink)

Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. “Monocyclic” games, such as Rock–Paper–Scissors, have only mixed equilibria, some of which are “stable” in the sense that sequential best replies lead to them; yet, even these games are prone to stable cycles under discrete-time simultaneous best replies, giving an unusual equilibrium-selection problem. This article analyzes such games in a random-utility setting where changing strategies is costly, and the speed of the dynamic is, thus, endogenous. The stochastically stable (...) outcome is determined by the cost of switching strategies; when switching costs are high, mixed equilibria are selected, whereas when switching costs are low, cycles are selected. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has plunged the housing affordability and living sanitary conditions of China's low-income groups into a crisis. Public rental housing has made a significant contribution to alleviating this crisis, yet its exit problem has become more acute due to the impact of the epidemic. In order to explore how to effectively play the role of multi-governance in public rental housing exit, this paper adopts game theory to analyze the evolution of the behavioral strategies of government departments (...) and public rental housing tenants in public rental housing exit by combining four influencing parameters: the epidemic severity, the epidemic influence coefficient, the public participation degree, and the public reporting fairness. In response to exploring the conditions for the effective functioning of the multi-governance model under the impact of the epidemic, the influences of parameter change on the stability of the system are analyzed. The results show that when the COVID-19 epidemic impact coefficient is high, government departments need to reduce their own supervision costs to achieve better multi-governance effects; when public reports are distorted, the government departments’ own supervision capabilities determine the impact of public participation on governance effects. (shrink)

Subjects in experiments use real-life strategies that differ significantly from those assumed by experimenters. First, true randomness is rare in both natural and constructed environments. Second, communication follows conventions which depend on the game-theoretic aspects of situations. Third, in the common rhetorical stance of storytelling, people do not tell about the representative but about unusual, exceptional, and rare cases.

Unlike other creatures, humans developed the ability to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers and a tendency to comply with social norms. However, humans deviate from social norms in various situations. This study used the modified ultimatum game to explore why humans deviate from social norms and how their prosocial behavior can be promoted. In Study 1, participants were asked to imagine working with an anonymous counterpart to complete a task and obtain a certain amount of money (e.g., ¥10). The (...) computer divided the money randomly in favor of the participant (e.g., 9:1 or 8:2). Participants should decide whether to accept or reject such a self-benefiting division. In the non-risk condition, an absolutely fair redivision of money would take place if participants reject self-benefiting division (e.g. 5:5 or 6:4). By contrast, in the risk condition, other-benefiting redivision of money (e.g., 1:9 or 2:8) would take place if participants rejected the self-benefiting division. Results involving 40 college students showed the main effect of condition. The frequency of accepting self-benefiting division in the risk condition was higher than that in the non-risk condition. As such, compliance with social norms is based on the preservation of material resources. In Study 2, we used economic or moral rewards to compensate for economic loss following compliance with the norm. Results involving 28 college students revealed a significant effect of compensation. The rewards, including moral praise, effectively decreased selfish choices. These findings extend previous studies on social norm compliance by emphasizing the importance of internal, fairness-based balance between material and moral needs, as well as the role of moral praise in promoting prosocial behavior. (shrink)

The current research investigated the role of gratitude in economic decisions about offers that vary in fairness yet benefit both parties if accepted. Participants completed a trait/dispositional gratitude measure and then were randomly assigned to recall either an event that made them feel grateful or the events of a typical day. After the gratitude induction task, participants played the ultimatum game, deciding whether to accept or reject fair offers and unfair offers from different proposers. Results showed that trait gratitude (...) was positively correlated with respondents’ acceptance of unfair offers. However, experimentally induced momentary gratitude did not influence acceptance of unfair offers. The trait or disposition to be grateful involves the enduring capacity across different types of situations and benefactors to see the good that is present, even when that benefit is small. Accordingly, dispositional gratitude – but not momentarily induced gratitude – was associated with a greater propensity to accept even the small benefits within unfair offers which otherwise pose barriers to making the effective economic decision of accepting offers regardless of their relative size. (shrink)

Previous research has demonstrated that attitudes are a primary determinant of intention to gamble on electronic gaming machines consistent with the Theory of Reasoned Action. This paper aims to address how biases in judgment can contribute to attitudes and subsequently behavior, including maladaptive problematic gambling behavior. We take a novel approach by viewing overconfidence in one’s understanding of how outcomes are determined on EGMs as an indication of cognitive distortions. The novelty of this paper is further increased as we compare (...) attitudes to existing EGMs with novel EGMs which include a skill component, referred to as skill-based gaming machines, which enables a better controlled comparison between actual and perceived skill. In Study 1, 232 US-based participants were recruited online who were shown various slot machines and SGMs and asked a series of questions about perceived skill and chance in determining outcomes to assess their understanding, then were asked their confidence in their understanding, attitudes toward the machines and they completed the Problem Gambling Severity Index. In Study 2, 246 Australian participants were recruited through community and university student samples; they attended a laboratory where they were randomly allocated to play a real EGM or SGM without money and completed the same measures as in Study 1. In Study 2, participants were randomly told that the outcomes on the machine they would play were determined entirely by chance, skill, or a mixture of both. In both studies, our findings suggest that there are more extreme values in overconfidence in how EGMs work, whereas individuals are more similar in their confidence in understanding SGMs. We also find a relationship between overconfidence in EGM understanding and positive attitudes toward EGMs, but no such relationship with SGMs. There was no impact from controlling for demographics, problem gambling severity, or labeling of machines on these relationships. (shrink)