The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority was right to permit tissue typing preimplantation genetic diagnosisOn July 21 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority , Britain’s regulatory agency for reproductive technologies, revised its policy on preimplantation genetic diagnosis for tissue typing.1,2 The authority of the HFEA to enact such a policy was affirmed by the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords, on April 28 2005.3 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis combines in vitro fertilisation with genetic testing. In PGD, embryos generally (...) undergo biopsy prior to the eight cell stage, followed by genetic testing for a particular trait. Tissue typing PGD is done to identify an embryo that is tissue matched for a child suffering from a severe disease requiring bone marrow or cord blood stem cell transplantation and for whom no living donor exists. This procedure was first performed in 2000.4 Precise matching of tissue types is critical to successful tissue transplant, and the donors of such tissues are often referred to as “saviour siblings”.Where a tissue matched individual already exists, extracting bone marrow from that individual or collecting cord blood already in storage, rather than creating a match, presents the most immediate treatment alternative. Bone marrow donation from adults or other medically competent individuals is not generally ethically contested, and bone marrow donation from medically incompetent individuals is also permissible under certain conditions.5 Where no living tissue donor exists, however, intentionally creating a donor through tissue typing PGD is among a short list of possible treatment options.The July HFEA policy change makes PGD licensable in cases where tissue typing is the only purpose of testing. Previously, PGD was licensable in the UK only for disease testing, and tissue typing PGD was permissible only when …. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 29-31, June 2011.

Book Information Intercultural Philosophy. By Ram Adhar Mall. Rowman & Littlefield. 2000. Pp. xiii + 152. Hardback, US$62.00. Paperback, US$16.95.

A Ramsey statement denoted ${n \longrightarrow (k)^2_2}$ says that every undirected graph on n vertices contains either a clique or an independent set of size k. Any such valid statement can be encoded into a valid DNF formula RAM(n, k) of size O(n k ) and with terms of size ${\left(\begin{smallmatrix}k\\2\end{smallmatrix}\right)}$ . Let r k be the minimal n for which the statement holds. We prove that RAM(r k , k) requires exponential size constant depth Frege systems, answering a problem (...) of Krishnamurthy and Moll [15]. As a consequence of Pudlák’s work in bounded arithmetic [19] it is known that there are quasi-polynomial size constant depth Frege proofs of RAM(4 k , k), but the proof complexity of these formulas in resolution R or in its extension R(log) is unknown. We define two relativizations of the Ramsey statement that still have quasi-polynomial size constant depth Frege proofs but for which we establish exponential lower bound for R. (shrink)

Contributed articles on Advaita, Hindu philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature;.

Bruce Janz, Jessica Locke, and Cynthia Willett interact in this exchange with different aspects of Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad’s book Human Being, Bodily Being. Through “constructive inter-cultural thinking”, they seek to engage with Ram-Prasad’s “lower-case p” phenomenology, which exemplifies “how to think otherwise about the nature and role of bodiliness in human experience”. This exchange, which includes Ram-Prasad’s reply to their interventions, pushes the reader to reflect more about different aspects of bodiliness.

Inhalt: I. Logik, Methodologie und Hermeneutik der Interkulturalität. Ram ADHAR MALL: Einheit angesichts der Vielfalt. Bernhard WALDENFELS: Kulturelle und soziale Fremdheit. Gerhard PASTERNACK: Hermeneutik als Daseinsanalytik. Intrakulturelle Explikationen des interkulturellen Verstehens. Franz WIMMER: Identität und Kulturbrüche. Hans P. STURM: Die vierfache Negationslogik im östlichen und westlichen Denken. Jayandra SONI: Einheit und Vielfalt aus der Sicht der siebenstufigen Prädikationslogik. Gregor PAUL: Logik, Verstehen und Kulturen. Michael KRAUSZ: Two Aims of Cultural Interpretation: Explaining and Healing. Thierry LENAIN: Understanding the Past: History as (...) an Intercultural Process. Ryosuke OHASHI: Womit muß der Vergleich in der vergleichenden Ästhetik gemacht werden? Georg STENGER: Phänomenologische Methode und Interkulturelle Philosophie. Douwe TIEMERSMA: On the concepts of energy in Western and Indian traditions and the methodology of intercultural investigation. Dieter LOHMAR: Intersubjectivity and the meeting of cultures. A critique of the hermeneutics of the 'strict analogy'. Morteza GHASEMPOUR: Philosophie und Bildung. Notker SCHNEIDER: Verbindlichkeit zwischen Einheit und Vielfalt - Versuch über die normative Kraft eines 'basalen Essentialismus'. II. Erkennen und Handeln. Gibt es eine Differenz der Geschlechter? Tanella BONI: Das Geschlecht und die Macht. Bettina DAUSIEN: Die biographische Konstruktion von Geschlecht. Yacouba KONATÉ: Mythen und Wirklichkeiten der afrikanischen Frau. Hans Jörg SANDKÜHLER: Pluralismus - Geschlechterdifferenzen und andere mögliche Welten. Martina PLÜMACHER: Geschlechterdifferenz als Symbolsystem. Ilse N. BULHOF: Epistemology and Gender: the Question of Alterity. An Intercultural Reflection. Atsuko ONUKI: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Geschlechterdiskurse. Nausikaa SCHIRILLA: Einheit und Vielfalt - Konstruktionen von Weiblichkeit interkulturell. Michael MEUSER: Kulturelle Deutungsmuster von Männlichkeit. Veränderungen und Kontinuitäten. III. Philosophie und interkulturelle Bildung. Jürgen HENGELBROCK: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen philosophischer Kommunikation in der Schule. Peter GRAF: Interkulturelle Pädagogik als Schule der Wahrnehmung. (shrink)

Given two strings, text t of length n, and pattern p = p1…pk of length k, and given a natural number w, the subsequence matching problem consists in finding the number of size w windows of text t which contain pattern p as a subsequence, i.e. the letters p1,…,pk occur in the window, in the same order as in p, but not necessarily consecutively . Subsequence matching is used for finding frequent patterns and association rules in databases. We generalize the (...) Knuth–Morris–Pratt pattern matching algorithm; we define a non-conventional kind of RAM, the MP-RAMs which model more closely the microprocessor operations; we design an O on-line algorithm for solving the subsequence matching problem on MP-RAMs. (shrink)

In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how (...) it is believed.1 While it is generally agreed upon among Russellians that this distinction needs to be drawn there is considerable disagreement as to what exactly the distinction amounts to and what role the what and the how should play. The most plausible option seems to be to not assign a semantic value to the cognitive role played by the name or indexical in the sentence assented to. But recently Mark Richard2 has attempted to make the cognitive role affect truth values by building it into the truth conditions of belief reports.3 I will argue that Richard’s attempt fails to satisfy our pretheoretical intuitions about the sharing of beliefs. Furthermore, and more surprisingly, I will argue that Richard’s theory makes it virtually impossible for us to judge whether or not most belief reports are true or false, since doing so would involve what I call RAM probing, which would require viewing elements that are essentially private. (shrink)

The article deals with the algorithm of encrypting graphic information using transformation matrixes. It presents the actions that can be done with the image. The article also gives algorithms for forming matrixes that are created with the use of random processes. Examples of matrixes and encryption results are shown. Calculations of the analysis of combinations and conclusions to them are carried out. The article shows the possibilities and advantages of this image encryption algorithm. The proposed algorithm will allow to transmit (...) encrypted information through open communication channels. The algorithm uses all possible actions that can be done with the image, namely: image resizing, adding redundant elements to the image, changing the location of the pixels, changing the brightness of the image pixels, inverting the image pixels, changing the colours of the images pixels. A randomized approach to matrix formation will make it impossible to use neural systems. The algorithm of the implementation of writing encryption code is rather simple. It is not possible to decrypt the image without a key as the number of possible combinations is extremely large. This algorithm can be used in the military, intelligence, information security. Encryption does not require significant computing or RAM resources. This algorithm can be implemented in WEB-technology and in mobile applications, it has no recursive functions and loop in loop. The algorithm hides the image size, which in turn adds extra protection. Redundant elements will not allow neural networks to compare pixels. Changing colors, changing brightness, inversion by random processes will not allow neural networks to find the decryption function. The article considers an image encryption algorithm that will give a possibility to generate a key. The key will be a set of two-dimensional arrays formed in a randomized manner. A randomized approach to matrix formation will make it impossible to use neural systems. The algorithm uses all possible actions that can be done with the image, namely: Image resizing. Adding redundant elements to the image. Changing the location of the pixels. Changing the brightness of the image pixels. Inverting the image pixels. Changing the colours of the images pixels. The pixel positioning matrix gives us! combinations. The pixel brightness change matrix gives us 8 *! combinations. The pixel inversion matrix gives us 8 *! combinations. The pixel colour change matrix gives us 6 *! Combinations. The total number of combinations N is equal to: It is not possible to decrypt the image without a key as the number of possible combinations is extremely large. The algorithm of the implementation of writing encryption code is rather simple. This algorithm can be used in the military, intelligence, information security. The advantage of this algorithm is the fact that the encrypted image can be transmitted through open chann. (shrink)

Liberals claim that some perceptual experiences give us immediate justification for certain perceptual beliefs. Conservatives claim that the justification that perceptual experiences give us for those perceptual beliefs is mediated by our background beliefs. In his recent paper ?Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic?, Nico Silins successfully argues for a non-Moorean version of Liberalism. But Silins's defence of non-Moorean Liberalism leaves us with a puzzle: why is it that a necessary condition for our perceptual experiences to justify (...) us in holding certain perceptual beliefs is that we have some independent justification for disbelieving various sceptical hypotheses? I argue that the best answer to this question involves commitment to Crispin Wright's version of Conservatism. In short, Wright's Conservatism is consistent with Silins's Liberalism, and the latter helps to give us grounds for accepting the former. (shrink)

Rieber 1998 proposes an account of "S knows that p" that generates a contextualist solution to Closure. In this paper, I’ll argue that Rieber’s account of "S knows that p" is subject to fatal objections, but we can modify it to achieve an adequate account of "S knows that p" that generates a unified contextualist solution to all four puzzles. This is a feat that should matter to those philosophers who have proposed contextualist solutions to Closure: all of them have (...) motivated their contextualism by appeal to the fact that they can explain the plausibility of each of the statements in Closure taken individually, and they can do this without having to deny that each of those statements is true, at least in the context in which it is plausible. But notice that this consideration would equally well motivate a contextualist approach to the other puzzles. Nonetheless, no contextualist has yet suggested how a contextualist solution to the other puzzles might go. (shrink)

Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed (...) accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set. 1 Introduction 2 The elements of one's evidence set are propositions 3 Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set? 3.1 Doxastic accounts of evidence 3.2 Non-doxastic accounts of evidence 4 Elaborating and defending the LIE CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

I here describe meanings attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive - and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors' views about the basis of con-sciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its con-tents. The prospects for reaching (...) any single, agreed, theory independent definition of consciousness thus appear remote. How-ever, much confusion could be avoided if authors were always to spec-ify which aspects of consciousness they refer to when using the term. An example is outlined of how this can be done. (shrink)

In the last decade, reading research has seen a paradigmatic shift. A new wave of computational models of orthographic processing that offer various forms of noisy position or context-sensitive coding have revolutionized the field of visual word recognition. The influx of such models stems mainly from consistent findings, coming mostly from European languages, regarding an apparent insensitivity of skilled readers to letter order. Underlying the current revolution is the theoretical assumption that the insensitivity of readers to letter order reflects the (...) special way in which the human brain encodes the position of letters in printed words. The present article discusses the theoretical shortcomings and misconceptions of this approach to visual word recognition. A systematic review of data obtained from a variety of languages demonstrates that letter-order insensitivity is neither a general property of the cognitive system nor a property of the brain in encoding letters. Rather, it is a variant and idiosyncratic characteristic of some languages, mostly European, reflecting a strategy of optimizing encoding resources, given the specific structure of words. Since the main goal of reading research is to develop theories that describe the fundamental and invariant phenomena of reading across orthographies, an alternative approach to model visual word recognition is offered. The dimensions of a possible universal model of reading, which outlines the common cognitive operations involved in orthographic processing in all writing systems, are discussed. (shrink)

A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external (...) world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context-sensitive in their semantics. It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world. (shrink)

Kavramlar doğru anlamlandırılmadığı takdirde meselelerin anlaşılması noktasında yanlış sonuçlara varmanın kaçınılmaz olduğu bir hakikattir. Fıtrat kavramı bu manada insanın neliği bağlamında başat kavram olarak her daim farklı değerlendirmelere konu olmuştur. İnsanın, gerek kendisini var eden Allah ile olan ilişkisi gerekse hemcinsleriyle ve içerisinde yaşadığı âlemle ilişkisi çerçevesinde bu kavramın anlam alanının tespiti yine ait olduğu dünya üzerinden yapıldığı zaman konu hakkında doğru sonuçların elde edilmesine imkân tanıyacaktır. Kur’ân ve hadislerde yerini bulan fıtrat kavramının anlam alanına yönelik çalışmaların bu alanlarda derinlemesine (...) tahlili noktasında söz konusu metinleri, kendi iç bütünlükleri ve birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri bağlamında meseleyi ele alması, en sağlıklı yol olacaktır. Bu çalışmada kavramın önce sözlük anlamı, türevleri üzerinden ele alınmış daha sonra Kur’ân ve hadislerde geçtiği durumları, belirtilen usûl üzerinden değerlendirmeye tâbi tutulmuştur. Sonuç olarak luğavî anlamı da dikkate alınarak fıtrat kavramı ile Kur’ân’da insanın Allah’la ilişkisine, hadislerde ise insanın doğasındaki sâfiyete ve insanlarla olan ilişkisinde dikkat gerektiren yönüne vurgu yapıldığı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

(NEG) is widely accepted both by internalist and by externalists. In fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson (e.g., 2000) rejects (NEG), for reasons that have by now received a great deal of scrutiny.2 John McDowell also rejects (NEG), but his reasons have not received the scrutiny they deserve. This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood. We believe that McDowell’s challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy of fair assessment, and maybe (...) even correct. In this paper, we explain McDowell’s challenge to (NEG), and also explain how McDowell can address a seemingly fatal objection to his view. (shrink)

Despite renewed interest in work, philosophers have largely ignored self-employment. This neglect is surprising, not just because self-employment was central to classic philosophizing about work, but also given that half of the global workforce today, including one in seven workers in OECD countries, are self-employed. We start off by offering a definition of self-employment, one that accounts for its various forms while avoiding misclassifying dependent self-employed workers as independent contractors, and by mapping the barriers to becoming and remaining self-employed (section (...) 2). We then examine five arguments why governments ought to promote self-employment, despite the forgone opportunities to promote employee work instead that this often entails (sections 3-7): the argument from job creation, the argument from job satisfaction, the argument from independence, the argument from occupational freedom, and the argument from subsistence under non-ideal circumstances. Some of these are unconvincing, we argue, but others are not. Although the strength of the latter arguments hangs on various context-dependent conditions, such that they need to be carefully weighed against considerations of efficiency and equality, they nonetheless offer compelling pro tanto reasons to promote, and not just to protect, self-employment. (shrink)

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for (...) S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non-theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons. (shrink)

Historically, prominent proponents of the guidance deontological conception of epistemic justification have thought that the guidance deontological conception entails access internalism. Alvin Goldman has argued that this is not so, and that there is no good argument from the guidance deontological conception of justification to access internalism. This paper refutes Goldman's argument. If the guidance deontological conception of epistemic justification is correct, then so is access internalism.

This volume features the complete text of all regular papers, posters, and summaries of symposia presented at the 16th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science ...

This paper develops a full account of Rawls's notion of a well-ordered society and uses it to address two luck egalitarian objections to his principles of justice. The first is an internal criticism which claims that Rawls's account of justice is better captured by a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian account. The second is an external objection according to which, regardless of the alleged inconsistency between Rawls's principles and his account of justice, we should reject those principles in favour of a responsibility-sensitive criterion (...) because it better captures our moral intuitions about distributive justice. The argument presented answers both objections by defending the value of well-orderedness and showing the difficulties of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian conceptions in realizing this ideal. (shrink)

The status of economic liberties remains a serious lacuna in the theory and practice of human rights. Should a minimally just society protect the freedoms to sell, save, profit and invest? Is being prohibited to run a business a human rights violation? While these liberties enjoy virtually no support from the existing philosophical theories of human rights and little protection by the international human rights law, they are of tremendous importance in the lives of individuals, and particularly the poor. Like (...) most individual liberties, economic liberties increase our ability to lead our own life. When we enjoy them, we can choose the occupational paths that best fit us and, in so doing, define who they are in relation to others. Furthermore, in the absence of good jobs, economic liberties allow us to create an alternative path to subsistence. This is critical for the millions of working poor in developing countries who earn their livelihoods by engaging in independent economic activities. Insecure economic liberties leave them vulnerable to harassment, bribery and other forms of abuse from middlemen and public officials. This book opens a debate about the moral and legal status of economic liberties as human rights. It brings together political and legal theorists working in the domain of human rights and global justice, as well as people engaged in the practice of human rights, to engage in both foundational and applied issues concerning these questions. conomic liberties leave them vulnerable to harassment, bribery and other forms of abuse from middlemen and public officials. This book opens a debate about the moral and legal status of economic liberties as human rights. It brings together political and legal theorists working in the domain of human rights and global justice, as well as people engaged in the practice of human rights, to engage in both foundational and applied issues concerning these questions. (shrink)

Öz Çalışmanın konusu irfanî geleneğin on beşinci yüzyıldaki önemli temsilcilerinden ve aynı zamanda İbnü’l-Arabî’nin takipçilerinden biri olan İbn Türke’nin varlık mertebelerine dair görüşleridir. Konu, İbn Türke’nin varlık ve varlığın mertebeleri ile ilgili düşüncelerinden hareketle hazırlanmıştır. Birincil kaynakların esas alındığı bu çalışmada, İbn Türke ve Ekberî geleneğin önemli temsilcilerinin eserlerine müracaat edilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, felsefe ve kelâmın yanı sıra tasavvuf felsefesinin en önemli konularından biri olan varlık düşüncesi ve varlık mertebelerini İbn Türke’nin görüşleri çerçevesinde ele alarak âlemdeki varoluşun hakikatinin ne olduğu, (...) insanoğlunun özünün nereden geldiği gibi temel sorulara cevap olabilecek özgün bir çalışma ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmayla; varlığın bir ve tek hakikat olduğu, Hak’tan feyz ederek görünür âlemde ortaya çıkan her şeyin O’nun isim ve sıfatlarının tecellisi olduğu, her ne kadar Hak’tan ayrıymış gibi görünse de aslında Hakk’a doğru sonsuz bir dönüş içerisinde olduğu, dolayısıyla tek varlıktan kaynaklı çok sayıda varlığın esasen yokluğa mahkûm olduğu ve asıl varlığın Allah olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

Economic disparities often translate into disparities in political influence, rendering political liberties less worthy to poor citizens than to wealthier ones. Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of the content and grounding of such guarantee, which we here offer. After examining three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more (...) promising yet less explored argument that builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the conditions and duties that securing self-respect entails. We then look into how uneven allocations of the value of political liberties bear, expressively and due to the power imbalances they yield, on such conditions and duties. (shrink)

Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can (...) have the very same perceptual experience no matter whether she is enjoying a veridical perception of some mindindependent object, or merely hallucinating. What differs across these two kinds of case is not the kind of experience that she has, but rather the connections between her experience and the rest of the world. So say most philosophers. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is a particular species of epistemic justification – a species that, following Roderick Firth, I call “propositional justification.”1 Propositional justification is a relation between a person and a proposition. I will say that for S to bear the propositional justification relation to p is for S to be “justified in believing” that p. What is propositional justification? What is it for S to be justified in believing that p? Here’s my answer.

Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.