CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY "Let lu start with a review of the theories of other thinkers; for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary ...

_Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degrés du savoir_ was first published in 1932 by Jacques Maritain. In this new translation of _The Degrees of Knowledge_, Ralph McInerny attempts a more careful expression of Maritain's original masterpiece than previous translations. Maritain proposes a hierarchy of the forms of knowledge by discussing the degrees of rational and suprarational understanding. Nine appendices, some longer than the chapters of the book, advance Maritain's thought, often by taking on criticism of earlier editions of the work. (...) Rightly called Maritain's cardinal work, _The Degrees of Knowledge_ is a magnificent and sagacious achievement. Jacques Maritain's masterpiece proposes a hierarchy of forms of knowledge that culminate in mystical experience and wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Maritain argues that the intellectual life is meant to be complemented by the spiritual life and should culminate in sanctity. (shrink)

The present volume brings together a number of things I have written on the subject of analogy since the appearance of The Logic of Analogy in 1961. In that book I tried to disengage St Thomas' teaching on analogous names from various subsequent accretions which, in my opinion, had obscured its import. The book was widely reviewed, various points in it were rightly criticized, but its main argument, namely, that analogical signification is a logical matter and must be treated as (...) such, was, if often confronted, left finally, I think, standing. The studies brought together now reflect the same concentration on the teaching of Aquinas. I am not of the opinion that everything important on the question of analogy, and certainly not everything of importance on those problems which elicit the doctrine of analogy, was said by Thomas Aquinas. But it was my decision, for my personal work, first to achieve as much clarity as I could with respect to the teaching of Thomas, and then to go on to other writers, both ancient and modern. I am currently engaged in working out the relations among equivo cation, analogy and metaphor in Aristotle. When that study is com pleted, I shall turn eagerly to some quite recent contributions to the nature of religious language. In short, the present work, which is by and large a prolongation of my attempt at an exegesis of Thomistic texts, marks the end of one phase of my research into the problem of analogy. (shrink)

This little book, which grew out of lectures given by the author in Tunis, is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author seeks a meaning for the phrase ‘contemporary philosophy’ which can serve him as a guide in the task he has set himself. His efforts to assign a meaning to the term ‘philosophy’ as if he had just set foot on the planet with an unexplained competence in earthly languages is, if obviously forced, not wholly lacking (...) in interest. However, this initial try at an utterly presuppositionless approach is later a cause of unease in the reader. For example, although Breton finds that contemporary philosophy divides into Marxism, Existentialism and Scientific philosophy, the last named is all but ignored in the sequel. The first part concludes with a ‘problematique de la philosophie contemporaine’. The second part is devoted to Marxism, the third to existentialism. Breton’s method is that of the phenomenologist and thus the seeking of the ‘essence’ of Marxism and existentialism takes on ponderous overtones: more or less arbitrary selection of points becomes somewhat dogmatically a revelation of essence. Breton’s reputation does not depend upon this book which, though informative is unavoidably superficial. Breton promises a critical volume on the same points raised here. (shrink)

The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with Cajetan's approach; indeed there (...) have been wholesale attacks on the great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy of names. As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas. We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names. (shrink)

On its release, the Instruction on Respect for Human Life was accused of obstructing the technological enhancement of human life by using slippery slope arguments to impose the Magisterium’s opinion that accepting certain new technologies, like homologous artificial fertilization, would weaken resistance to practices the Church traditionally has opposed. To the contrary, the instruction calls attention to the fact that by using these technologies, we have in principle accepted all sorts of thigs, with or without technology, which are destructive of (...) human life. (shrink)