Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we (...) take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception. (shrink)

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present two arguments against the dialectical interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophy. This interpretation understands Nagarjuna's philosophy as a method of deconstruction, abstracting from Nagarjuna's own standpoint. The first argument refers to the metaphysical presuppositions of this method. The second argument refers to the positive statements asserted by Nagarjuna and focuses mainly on those concerning Buddhist practice. Furthermore, the conception of 'skilful means' and 'the two truths' will be discussed. The conclusion of this paper is (...) that Nagarjuna's philosophy is based upon determining the conditions of the possibility of the Buddhist practice rather than on a dialectic without any metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

The motor system might well use deictic strategies when subjects learn a new task. However, its not clear that Ballard et al. show this. Multiple eye-fixations may have little to do with deixis and more to do with the unfamiliarity of the task. In any case, deixis does not entail embodiment, since a disembodied Cartesian brain could use deictic strategies.

This article presents German loanwords in the Polish language. Its aim is twofold: to discuss words of German origin in Polish, as well as to stress Polish-German language contacts and their influences on vocabulary. The analysis will not only deal with the meaning and etymology of particular words, but will also scrutinize their description in the dictionaries of Polish edited by Doroszewski and Sobol.

Two fundamental features of a liberal political community are usually identified in contemporary deliberations: there is an inevitable pluralism of visions of good and worthy life, blended into a wide range of religious, philosophical and ethical positions; those who are in power are under an obligation to set public matters in such a way as to avoid discrimination of any class of the ruled. In respect of and, it is presumed that the process of enacting, implementing and executing public law (...) shall be separated from any perfectionist moral position, because being impartial when making political decisions is a prerequisite for non-discriminatory politics. This kind of politics looks for proper, convincing and comprehensible reasons to establish a new legal standard of behaviour in the ‘public reason’ – a set of moral statements and political values commonly shared in an open, pluralistic and tolerant society, which does not provide decisive answers to any questions about the meaning of life and does not bring us closer to discover its ideal. This article tries to reproduce the main notions and ideas of leading, contemporary liberal philosophers – John Rawls and Charles Larmore – that deal with the very nature of impartiality of a liberal state and the ability of policymakers to be impartial. It also presents the critical views of Stephen Macedo and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who question the possibility of building a neutral state. (shrink)

Table of contents -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Neoliberalism and its discontents in the wake of the crisis -- The crunch -- The villain -- The contestants -- Chapter content -- Ideology and its unwarranted obituaries -- The concept -- Ideology¿s foes and friends: from the politics of consensus to the end of history -- End of ideology and its unlikely enthusiasts -- Networking and its pitfalls -- Contours of the debate -- Uniqueness, horizontality and other fantasies -- Revolution without (...) politics? -- The charms and traps of prefigurative politics -- Prefiguration: history and conceptual connections -- The here and now of prefiguration -- Prefiguration as evasion -- We are the 99 percent... but what do we want? -- The story of the 99 percent -- Anti-neoliberal populism: what is missing? -- Ideology for the future of progressive activism -- Ups and downs of anti-neoliberal activism -- Towards counter-hegemony -- Bibliography. (shrink)

Ksenologie, ed. Ksenia Olkusz i Krzysztof M. Maj, 2018. Kraków: Ośrodek Badawczy.

Legal institutions are created at a certain point in time, intended to be applied to ‘life’ as it is perceived at the specific moment when they are elaborated and cast into legal form. As a result, legal institutions always already refer, in their original design, to a certain normality, but between the moment of creation of a legal institution and its application to future situations there is always a certain time lag. Some legal institutions—referred to in the paper as “legal (...) survivals” –outlive the epoch in which they were created and continue their legal life long after the conditions which lead to their creation had, in the meantime, disappeared. The aim of this paper is to put forward an archaeologico–genealogical perspective on legal survivals not only as a method of studying continuity of law and the resilience of juridical form, but also as a line of enquiry capable of enriching our understanding of the juridical in its relation to the changing circumstances of life. The study of legal survivals allows to combine three aspects of legal continuity: firstly, the continued use of the same legal forms in different circumstances and for different purposes, whereby the same juridical form is filled with different socio-economic substance; secondly, the gradual adaptation of legal forms to new circumstances; thirdly, the emergence of new legal forms in close reference to old ones. The study of legal survivals allows to address the foundations of law’s claims to authority, based on stability and predictability of juridical forms. It also reveals the complex and multilayered nature of legal form which effectively has the structure of a palimpsest. (shrink)

This is the first, out of two papers, devoted to Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free system of topology from Grzegorczyk :228–235, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485101). His system was one of the very first fully fledged axiomatizations of topology based on the notions of region, parthood and separation. Its peculiar and interesting feature is the definition of point, whose intention is to grasp our geometrical intuitions of points as systems of shrinking regions of space. In this part we analyze separation structures and Grzegorczyk structures, and (...) establish their properties which will be useful in the sequel. We prove that in the class of Urysohn spaces with countable chain condition, to every topologically interpreted representative of a point in the sense of Grzegorczyk’s corresponds exactly one point of a space. We also demonstrate that Tychonoff first-countable spaces give rise to complete Grzegorczyk structures. The results established below will be used in the second part devoted to points and topological spaces. (shrink)

In the second installment to Gruszczyński and Pietruszczak we carry out an analysis of spaces of points of Grzegorczyk structures. At the outset we introduce notions of a concentric and \-concentric topological space and we recollect some facts proven in the first part which are important for the sequel. Theorem 2.9 is a strengthening of Theorem 5.13, as we obtain stronger conclusion weakening Tychonoff separation axiom to mere regularity. This leads to a stronger version of Theorem 6.10. Further, we show (...) that Grzegorczyk points are maximal contracting filters in the sense of De Vries, but the converse inclusion is not necessarily true. We also compare the notions of a Grzegorczyk point and an ultrafilter, and establish several properties of topological spaces based on Grzegorczyk structures. The main results of the paper are representation and completion theorems for G-structures. We prove both set-theoretical and topological representation theorems for various classes of G-structures. We also present topological object duality theorem for the class of complete G-structures and the class of concentric spaces, both restricted to structures which satisfy countable chain condition. We conclude the paper with proving equivalence of the original Grzegorczyk axiom with the one accepted by us as axiom. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way (Madhyamaka) doctrine met with the objection that it is a mere verbal attack (vitaṇḍā) against other philosophical positions. As one of the Madhyamaka critics pointed out: because Nāgārjuna does not hold own position, he is not able to justify his criticism of the essence (svabhāva). The article is an answer to the question whether, in the context of Indian philosophy, it is possible to know things devoid of essences. Theory of knowledge of this kind, i.e. the concept (...) of omniscience (sarvajña) was presented in Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā sutra. Associations between Nāgārjuna’s texts and the sutra suggest that omniscience could be a substrate for epistemological position of the Middle Way. (shrink)

The most common way of managing cultural heritage recently takes form of cultural routes as they seem to offer a new model of participation in culture to their recipients; they are often a peculiar anchor point for inhabitants to let them understand their identity and form the future; they offer actual tours to enter into interaction with culture and history, to build together that creation of the heritage, which so is becoming not only a touristic product, but, first of all, (...) the space for cultural, social and civic activity. Yet, so far, according to what we know, the research problem concerning the method of cultural route organization into solid structures or more of the networked nature, has not been deliberated. A question arises, what values are brought by routes and how to organize routes to be the carriers of the values important for communities, where routes are functioning. And, as a consequence, if, from the point of view of the values of local communities, organizing solid route structures or organizing more widely-spaced, network-based routes would bring effects and what those effects would be. Thus, the posed question is of course scientifically imprecise because a network is a type of structure but presents a given direction for the development of cultural route structures. Our objective here is to present a certain solidity and rigidity of structure with dynamic and smooth understanding of the network. The research presented in the article is based on 3 case studies. We have selected for this purpose the three largest cultural routes in Poland, organized to various degrees. The outcome of the research was referred also to other cultural route organization research. (shrink)

One of the standard axioms for Boolean contact algebras says that if a region __x__ is in contact with the join of __y__ and __z__, then __x__ is in contact with at least one of the two regions. Our intention is to examine a stronger version of this axiom according to which if __x__ is in contact with the supremum of some family __S__ of regions, then there is a __y__ in __S__ that is in contact with __x__. We study (...) a modal possibility operator which is definable in complete algebras in the presence of the aforementioned axiom, and we prove that the class of complete algebras satisfying the axiom is closely related to the class of modal KTB-algebras. We also demonstrate that in the class of complete extensional contact algebras the axiom is equivalent to the statement: _every region is isolated_. Finally, we present an interpretation of the modal operator in the class of the so-called _resolution contact algebras_. (shrink)

This article presents Slavic loanwords in the Austrian variant of the German language. Its aim is twofold: it discusses words of Polish, Slovakian, Czech, Serbo­-Croatian, and Slovenian origin in the Austrian variant of German, as well as stressing the multicultural history of Austria and its influence on vocabulary. The analysis will not only deal with the meaning and etymology of particular words, but will also scrutinize their description in the “Duden” dictionaries: “Deutsches Universalwörterbuch” and “Duden. Wie sagt man in Österreich?”.

According to contrastivism in epistemology - advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer - the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections (...) I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy endeavored to define the role of language as communicative. Language became an original “code” of multifarious meanings and designations but it is also a code which entails emotions and different sorts of internal and external reactions of an individual. The mechanism of penalty and the notion of penalty have invariably raised emotions and meaningful reactions. The analysis focuses on a short derivation of the notion of penalty. It considers its functions, basic tasks and external impact—a short word revealing (...) so many actions and social behaviors. (shrink)

Tematem rozważań jest ludzka agresja. Czy agresja jest wrodzona? Jak sposób rozumienia tego, czym jest agresja, wpływa na sposoby radzenia sobie ze szkodliwymi skutkami zachowań agresywnych?

Response to novelty in rats tested in isolation and in pairs: focus on exploration and play The main goal of the study was to compare investigatory responses towards novelty in 20 Wistar rats divided into two experimental groups. Additionally, relationship between novelty and social play/interaction was analyzed in the dyad group. Procedure involved placing animals in an experimental chamber during fifteen, six minute trials on successive days of the study. On the eleventh session a new object was introduced. The results (...) are summarized within several behavioral categories. Investigatory responses of rats in dyad to novel object in familiar environment were not quantitatively different, than those of isolated animals. The animals from both groups responded to the novel object by focusing their exploratory activity on the source of new stimulation. Amount of social play and social exploration was influenced by the experimental manipulation with important sex differences present. (shrink)

This is the third installment of a paper which deals with comparison and evaluation of the standard slingshot argument (for the claim that all true sentences, if they refer, refer to the same object) with the doxastic formulation.

Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a , 1991b ; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004 ; Thought experiments, 2008 ) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs “platonic”). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical reasons: (...) there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, “platonic” TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how “platonic” TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo’s TE involving falling bodies. (shrink)

Abstract:This article is concerned with the role of Buddhist philosophy, and more broadly of non-Western philosophies, within the discipline of philosophy as this is professed and practiced today. I begin by deliberately engaging in a game of definitions to demonstrate that, whichever of the definitions standardly employed to deny non-Western philosophy the prestigious moniker, Buddhism nevertheless wins: it does count as philosophy. Having made that point, however, I go on to effectively undermine it by pointing out that anyone can win (...) the game if they get to make up the rules. Given that the score is arbitrary, then, I show up the game itself as absurd. On this basis, I ultimately cry foul at the perpetuation of a game still so plainly played on fields far from level, and therefore argue against excusing philosophers engaged in it of the charge of racism. (shrink)

This is a spin-off paper to [3, 4] in which we carried out an extensive analysis of Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology from [5]. In [1] Loredana Biacino and Giangiacomo Gerla presented an axiomatization which was inspired by the Grzegorczyk’s system, and which is its variation. Our aim is to compare the two approaches and show that they are slightly different. Except for pointing to dissimilarities, we also demonstrate that the theories coincide in presence of axiom stipulating non-existence of atoms.

We generalize the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem on ideal convergence. We show examples of ideals with and without the Bolzano-Weierstrass property, and give characterizations of BW property in terms of submeasures and extendability to a maximal P-ideal. We show applications to Rudin-Keisler and Rudin-Blass orderings of ideals and quotient Boolean algebras. In particular we show that an ideal does not have BW property if and only if its quotient Boolean algebra has a countably splitting family.

There is an "under-representation problem” in philosophy departments and journals. Empirical data suggest that while we have seen some improvements since the 1990s, the rate of change has slowed down. Some posit that philosophy has disciplinary norms making it uniquely resistant to change (Antony and Cudd 2012; Dotson 2012; Hassoun et al. 2022). In this paper, we present results from an empirical case study of a philosophy department that achieved and maintained male-female gender parity among its faculty as early as (...) 2014. Our analysis extends beyond matters of gender parity because that is only one, albeit important, dimension of inclusion. We build from the case study to reflect on strategies that may catalyze change. (shrink)

With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy’s great ...

We show that taking together the principle ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ (OIC) and The Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) leads to a contradiction as long as we assume that there are situations in which we ought to assert what we cannot know. We call this The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion (PIKA) and argue that this is a genuine problem. At the end, we point out a generalization of PIKA.