This paper discusses the debate over whether emotional expressions are spontaneous or intentional actions. We describe a variety of empirical evidence supporting these two possibilities. But we argue that the spontaneous-intentional distinction fails to explain the psychological dynamics of emotional expressions. We claim that a complex systems perspective on intentions, as self-organized critical states, may yield a unified view of emotional expressions as a consequence of situated action. This account simultaneously acknowledges the embodied status of environment, evolution, culture and mind (...) in theories of emotion. (shrink)

A competent systematic exposition, following the accounts of Couturat and Lewis.--R. W.

Conformably to the practice of the series to which this edition belongs, the critical apparatus accompanying the Greek text is simplified, reporting only the readings of the six oldest manuscripts, except for eighteen passages on which the readings are given more fully, as samples. In his Latin preface Sir David briefly evaluates the Greek commentators and reports the contributions of the Western editors, particularly Torstrik. In the text he proposes a number of readings of his own, and his edition will (...) be of value to scholars as well as to students.--R. W. (shrink)

Existential phenomenology is the name given to a philosophical method which seeks to overcome the traditional dichotomy between subject and object by a return to experience considered as a primitive presence. Whether or not this philosophical method is adequate to experience in a way in which the traditional dichotomy is not, is problematic. Calvin Schrag, however, has no such reservations in this book. Philosophy is an elucidation about how experience means, where experience is considered from the inquiry stand-point of "lived-through" (...) experience. Our "lived-through" experience occurs within a definite structure. "World-experience" is a dynamic field and not granular. World-experience has its horizon forms, space and time, but not as representations. In addition, world-experience is intentional, that is, we find ourselves thrown into a context which already has vectors that are "bearers of meaning," and are not categorical relations that have been abstracted and derived. (shrink)

A scholarly and superbly done history of formal logic, devoted mainly to four movements: the Greek; the scholastic; modern mathematical logic; and Indian Logic. Father Bochenski makes extensive use of direct quotation--in German translation by himself, when the original language is not German. The translations are sound, the documentation precise, and the organization lucid. The treatment is balanced and unified; the selection of passages to be quoted is judicious. All in all, a masterly work. Criticism will probably focus more on (...) his views of the relation of formal logic to philosophical logic, than on the factual accuracy of his account.--R. W. (shrink)

A translation of the earlier books of Galen's On Anatomical Procedures, extant in the original Greek text, was published by Charles Singer in 1956. The remainder, surviving in an Arabic translation, is here presented in a handsomely published English translation. A welcome supplement to the meagre Loch Galen.--R. W.

Wolff sees Leibniz, in contrast with, for example, the epistemologist Berkeley, as "in erster Linie Lebensphilosoph", and thus a forerunner of Nietzsche. The historical influence, mediated by Schopenhauer and Hartmann, was recognized by Nietzsche only near the end of his career. New Essays IV.vi.7 ad fin., which speaks of "the pleasure of being deceived by an agreeable perspective," is interpreted thus : "Leibniz spricht hier wie Nietzsche:... Aufheben der Illusion... würde den Menschen zum Wahnsinn treiben."--R. W.

Sir David Ross, now nearing his eightieth birthday has published another of his valuable critical texts, provided, like its predecessors, with a commentary. He has made full use of the contributions of Drossaert Lulofs, Forster and Nuyens, at the same time judging them with an independent mind and adding views and arguments of his own. This book greatly facilitates the study of these physiological-psychological treatises which form so indispensable a supplement to the De Anima. --R. W.

Inviting comparison with I. M. Bochenski's History of Formal Logic, this highly competent history differs in several features of plan. It deals exclusively with the Western world, and gives more than half its space to the modern period. It presents a continuous exposition rather than a sequence of direct quotations connected by comments. It has few references to the secondary literature, referring the reader to Bochenski and to the Journal of Symbolic Logic for these. Philosophical logic, or philosophy of logic, (...) receives as much attention as formal logic. Far from being rivals, these two distinguished histories complement one another in a desirable way.--R. W. (shrink)

In this relatively short work the author offers us both an explanation for radicalism of various kinds, and a denunciation of what he terms "Objectivity." The radicalism is seen to be a form of "New Romanticism" somewhat along the lines of Rousseau, and is essentially an appeal to individual conscience as the highest authority as against public or constitutional law. The author supports this claim of individual conscience by referring us to a somewhat arbitrary look at Husserl and Kierkegaard; he (...) distills from their thought the notion of an individual whose choices confer meaning upon his work. The world is seen as one created by individuals from their particular perspectives, the whole of which constitutes "subjective reality." For individual human beings there is no one world of reality, but perspectival regions of ethical concern. (shrink)

This book is a translation of a work which in the original French appeared in two volumes in 1953. It is a tour de force by a man who is philosophically very close to Merleau-Ponty, and who has a deep appreciation for a wide spectrum of works of art. The book has four parts: the first distinguishes the "aesthetic object" from the "work of art"; the second is an analysis of types of works of art, especially music and painting; the (...) third is an analysis of aesthetic perception; and the fourth is a Kantian critique of aesthetic experience. (shrink)