In Commit to Win, Heidi Reeder, PhD, unpacks over forty years of research by psychologists and economists to show that the key to reaching any goal, whether it' to hit the gym more often or to finally quit that dead-end job, isn' motivation, willpower, or determination. It' commitment. Busting the myths most of us believe about commitment, Reeder shows that it all comes down to four variables: treasures, troubles, contributions, and choices. Together, these variables make up a formula (...) that not only measures how committed we are, but also shows which factors we can change to get our commitment level in sync with what we want to do. (shrink)

This volume centers on debates about how far moral judgments bind across traditions and epochs. Nowadays such debates appear especially volatile, both in popular culture and intellectual discourse: although there is increasing agreement that the moral and political criteria invoked in human rights documents possess cross-cultural force, many modern and postmodern developments erode confidence in moral appeals that go beyond a local consensus or apply outside a particular community. Often the point of departure for discussion is the Enlightenment paradigm of (...) a common morality, in which it is assumed that certain unchanging beliefs inhere in the structure of human reason. Whereas some thinkers continue to defend this paradigm, others modify it in diverse ways without abandoning entirely the attempt to address a universal audience, and still others jettison virtually all of its distinguishing features. Exhibiting a range of positions Western participants take in these debates, this volume seeks to advance the substance of the debates themselves without prejudging the outcome. Rival assessments of the Enlightenment paradigm are offered from various philosophical and theological points of view. In addition to the editors, the contributors include Robert Merrihew Adams, Annette C. Baier, Alan Donagan, Margaret A. Farley, Alan Gewirth, David Little, Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, and Lee H. Yearley. (shrink)

This volume centers on debates about how far moral judgments bind across traditions and epochs. Nowadays such debates appear especially volatile, both in popular culture and intellectual discourse: although there is increasing agreement that the moral and political criteria invoked in human rights documents possess cross-cultural force, many modern and postmodern developments erode confidence in moral appeals that go beyond a local consensus or apply outside a particular community. Often the point of departure for discussion is the Enlightenment paradigm of (...) a common morality, in which it is assumed that certain unchanging beliefs inhere in the structure of human reason. Whereas some thinkers continue to defend this paradigm, others modify it in diverse ways without abandoning entirely the attempt to address a universal audience, and still others jettison virtually all of its distinguishing features. Exhibiting a range of positions Western participants take in these debates, this volume seeks to advance the substance of the debates themselves without prejudging the outcome. Rival assessments of the Enlightenment paradigm are offered from various philosophical and theological points of view. In addition to the editors, the contributors include Robert Merrihew Adams, Annette C. Baier, Alan Donagan, Margaret A. Farley, Alan Gewirth, David Little, Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, and Lee H. Yearley. (shrink)

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

I offer a novel solution to Zeno’s paradox of The Arrow by introducing nilpotent infinitesimal lengths of time. Nilpotents are nonzero numbers that yield zero when multiplied by themselves a certain number of times. Zeno’s Arrow goes like this: during the present, a flying arrow is moving in virtue of its being in flight. However, if the present is a single point in time, then the arrow is frozen in place during that time. Therefore, the arrow is both moving and (...) at rest. In “Zeno’s Arrow, Divisible Infinitesimals, and Chrysippus,” White suggests using an infinitesimal value as the length of the present. Contra Zeno, this allows the arrow to be moving in the present, rather than frozen in place. In this paper, I follow the basic outline of White’s solution but argue that his solution suffers from arbitrariness and a related theoretical artificiality in relation to the system of infinitesimals he invokes, viz. in relation to the hyperreal infinitesimals of nonstandard analysis. After arguing that any solution to the paradox must satisfy certain theoretical requirements, I examine White’s solution alongside two nilpotent solutions. One of these solutions is inspired by F.W. Lawvere’s Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis and the other is inspired by Paolo Giordano’s ring of Fermat Reals. I argue that Giordano’s nilpotents supply the best answer to Zeno’s paradox. (shrink)

This is a survey of the concept of continuity. Efforts to explicate continuity have produced a plurality of philosophical conceptions of continuity that have provably distinct expressions within contemporary mathematics. I claim that there is a divide between the conceptions that treat the whole continuum as prior to its parts, and those conceptions that treat the parts of the continuum as prior to the whole. Along this divide, a tension emerges between those conceptions that favor philosophical idealizations of continuity and (...) those that are more readily available for mathematico-scientific use. (shrink)

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument (...) for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people. (shrink)

One approach to the problem of differentiating a religious from a non- religious ethic would be to formulate a definition of religion that would clearly distinguish between religious and nonreligious traditions; however, a broad definition of religion would include some moral traditions, such as Marxism, commonly thought to be forms of secular humanism. A second approach would argue that some moral beliefs are independent, both in content and justification, of religious convictions; such a set of moral beliefs could be described (...) as a secular version of natural law. This approach would be rejected by those who argue that religious convictions go "all the way down." While the first can be debated by appealing to the heuristic value of various definitions of religion, the second involves familiar issues of moral epistemology. The author explores the consequences of holding a broad definition of religion and an "all the way down" epistemology. (shrink)

In order to sketch an account of a moral commitment to persons as such, the essay examines empathy, sympathy, and benevolence as they arise first in special relations and then are reconstructed to include the stranger under the rubric of "extensive benevolence" or "universal love." The account, the author argues, must deal with conceptual empowerment and authorizing reasons, weakness and evil, normative conflict, and the relation of benevolence to justice.

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the familiar non-Archimedean field of hyperreals from Abraham Robinson’s nonstandard analysis and Paolo Giordano’s ring extension of the real numbers containing nilpotents. There is an interesting nontrivial homomorphism from the limited hyperreals into the Giordano ring, whereas the only nontrivial homomorphism from the Giordano ring to the hyperreals is the standard part function, namely, the function that maps a value to its real part. We interpret this asymmetry to (...) mean that the nilpotent infinitesimal values of Giordano’s ring are “smaller” than the hyperreal infinitesimals. By viewing things from the “point of view” of the hyperreals, all nilpotents are zero, whereas by viewing things from the “point of view” of Giordano’s ring, nonnilpotent, nonzero infinitesimals register as nonzero infinitesimals. This suggests that Giordano’s infinitesimals are more fine-grained. (shrink)

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.

I argue for the possibility of hypergunk: that is, it is possible that there exists an x such that every part of x has a proper part and, for any set S of parts of x, there is a set S′ of parts of...

We apply Benacerraf’s distinction between mathematical ontology and mathematical practice to examine contrasting interpretations of infinitesimal mathematics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, in the work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weierstrass’s ghost behind some of the received historiography on Euler’s infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to understand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser declares classical analysis to be a “primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-century theories.” Meanwhile, scholars like (...) Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology, practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler’s own. Euler’s use of infinite integers and the associated infinite products are analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition for the sine function. Euler’s principle of cancellation is compared to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leibnizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler. We argue that Ferraro’s assumption that Euler worked with a classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean conceptual framework obscures important aspects of Euler’s work. Such a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versatile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies for his inferential moves. (shrink)

El sentido como cabe o entre en el orden de lo público, en laCondición humana de Hannah Arendt, es de suyo esclarecedorde las posibilidades del lenguaje; y, de retorno, el lenguaje comofundamento para la comprensión de lo político (público); en estosdos lados se presenta como una dialéctica del fluir de la acción–que quizá por igual puede llamarse: la experiencia humana delmundo. Interesa, igualmente, ver la distinción entre el fluir –en elmodo del río heraclíteo– del sentido y la emergencia –en el (...) mododel nacimiento del agua en una fuente. Nuestra hipótesis es queen el pensamiento de Arendt tiene más el segundo que el primersentido. ¿Cómo se relacionan en este caso tiempo y sentido? Es,como telón de fondo, la pregunta que atraviesa nuestro “ensayode comprensión”1. La ponencia se desarrollo en cinco apartados;en el apartado, I La preeminencia del derecho, se mira el enlaceentre la teoría política de la autora y juicio de Eichmann; en elapartado II, La identidad narrativa, se estudia la primacía de lajustificación en mediante la cual el sujeto se construye en el relatoy, así mismo, el ir hacia o la apertura de sentido que ofrece elmismo; en el apartado III, Lo público, se estudia cómo la intersubjetividades terreno común para llegar a construir lo propio, la esfera de propiedad; en el apartado IV, El lenguaje, se mira sucarácter de entre, en medio de o cabe tanto en las relacionesintersubjetivas como en la comprensión subjetiva de mundo; finalmente,el apartado V, La persona, y a manera de conclusión sediscute la preeminencia de las tesis agustinianas sobre la persona–su carácter de hipóstasis al ser, al tiempo, entre y suidad– encuanto relación, así mismo se discuten los alcances y limitacionesde la tesis de la autora siempre que se evalúen a la luz de la perspectivafenomenológico-genética para el estudio de la políticacomo cosa misma. (shrink)

Contrary to the views of Alasdair MacIntyre and others who assert that modern Western morality is in disarray, torn by incommensurable moral views, John Reeder believes that there is much agreement about taking and saving lives. Many people might, in fact, agree on the various circumstances in which the death of a person constitutes a violation of the right to life, or that people have a right to our help, especially a right to life-saving aid. In_ Killing and Saving_, (...) Reeder analyzes five sorts of situations in which we are morally permitted or even obligated to take human life: e.g., when we repel an attacker who voluntarily "forfeits" the right to life; when we are confronted with "involuntary pursuit" or "material aggression"; when someone "yields" the right to life; when all will die if nothing is done, but some can be saved if others are killed; and when there is a "double effect" in which we take life as a foreseen but unintended consequence of attempt to achieve a greater good. Reeder argues that these categories account for many of our convictions ranging from abortion to infanticide, to starvation, to war. He also examines the concept of absolute or exceptionless right to life. Reeder draws on a number of moral views, from theological ethics to Enlightenment notions of natural rights or respect for rational creatures. He does not attempt to argue for a foundation for the right not to be killed and the right to be saved. Rather, he focuses on the content of the convictions themselves and argues that where disagreements remain, such as the case of abortion, they can be accounted for by the way the rights in question are explained and justified. (shrink)

Averill (1990) argues that not every property is a disposition. I claim here that his reasoning is faulty, suffering at one point from a logical error and at other points from an inadequate account of counterfactuals.

This unique anthology brings together for the first time the reactions that greeted the publication of Adam Smith's major philosophical work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Spanning over a hundred years of critical responses, the collection includes three different sections: the initial reply from Smith's friends David Hume, Edmund Burke and William Robertson the more considered opinions put forward by Smith's contemporaries, fellow Scots philosophers such as Lord Kames, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson or Dugald Stewart and, finally, the later (...) nineteenth-century, largely critical, views expressed by a new generation of philosophers. The book reclaims Adam Smith as a major eighteenth-century moral philosopher, giving a rare insight into the atmosphere in which his ideas emerged and evolved. --brings together a wealth of inaccessible material, from 1759 to 1881 --stresses Smith's importance not only as an innovative economist but as a major ethical thinker --includes some of Smith's replies to his critics --contributions by all the key figures of the period, including Hume, Burke, Robertson, Kames, Reid, Stewart and Ferguson. (shrink)

Harry P. Reeder has produced an indispensible tool for the study of Felix Kaufmann's thought. The book opens with an introduction to the thought of Felix Kaufmann followed by chapters on methodology, science, social sciences and philosophy.

This cluster of essays by Julia E. Judish, John P. Reeder Jr., Donald K. Swearer, and Lee H. Yearley considers benevolence as a virtue construed in various ways in different traditions. The essays explore: the roots of benevolence or caring, especially towards strangers; the normative issue of the relation between universal love and concern for particular others in special relations; and the question of possessions, in particular the ideal of voluntary poverty. A theme that runs throughout the essays is (...) the relation of benevolence to religiously interpreted transformations of the self. (shrink)

Contrary to the views of Alasdair MacIntyre and others who assert that modern Western morality is in disarray, torn by incommensurable moral views, John Reeder believes that there is much agreement about taking and saving lives. Many people might, in fact, agree on the various circumstances in which the death of a person constitutes a violation of the right to life, or that people have a right to our help, especially a right to life-saving aid. In_ Killing and Saving_, (...) Reeder analyzes five sorts of situations in which we are morally permitted or even obligated to take human life: e.g., when we repel an attacker who voluntarily "forfeits" the right to life; when we are confronted with "involuntary pursuit" or "material aggression"; when someone "yields" the right to life; when all will die if nothing is done, but some can be saved if others are killed; and when there is a "double effect" in which we take life as a foreseen but unintended consequence of attempt to achieve a greater good. Reeder argues that these categories account for many of our convictions ranging from abortion to infanticide, to starvation, to war. He also examines the concept of absolute or exceptionless right to life. Reeder draws on a number of moral views, from theological ethics to Enlightenment notions of natural rights or respect for rational creatures. He does not attempt to argue for a foundation for the right not to be killed and the right to be saved. Rather, he focuses on the content of the convictions themselves and argues that where disagreements remain, such as the case of abortion, they can be accounted for by the way the rights in question are explained and justified. (shrink)

Focusing on a 1628 Lenten sermon, this essay explores Donne’s handling of the complex problem of how we should conceive of time antecedent to the creation. Read in the light of Donne’s remarks elsewhere, and of those by St. Augustine, this sermon shows him considering pre-time time as an argument for the importance of vocation. Contemplation of the mystery of God’s activity before the creation yields a powerful idea of one’s life and calling as the surpassingly meaningful culmination of a (...) vast process. Additionally, such contemplation helps Donne cope with the vagaries of his own life, especially his ties to Roman Catholicism, by contextualizing his own past-ness within the larger story of humanity’s sin and redemption. (shrink)

Focusing on a 1628 Lenten sermon, this essay explores Donne’s handling of the complex problem of how we should conceive of time antecedent to the creation. Read in the light of Donne’s remarks elsewhere, and of those by St. Augustine, this sermon shows him considering pre-time time as an argument for the importance of vocation. Contemplation of the mystery of God’s activity before the creation yields a powerful idea of one’s life and calling as the surpassingly meaningful culmination of a (...) vast process. Additionally, such contemplation helps Donne cope with the vagaries of his own life, especially his ties to Roman Catholicism, by contextualizing his own past-ness within the larger story of humanity’s sin and redemption. (shrink)

Electron micrographs of active ribosomal genes from many species show a similar picture in which gene regions covered with nascent transcripts alternate with apparently non‐transcribed spacers. Since the gradients of visible nascent transcripts stop near the 3′ end of the 28S sequence it has often been assumed that transcription by RNA polymerase I also terminates at that point. Recent biochemical studies have shown however, that transcription continues far beyond the 3′ end of the 28S and in some species continues across (...) the entire spacer. In this article we review the evidence for spacer transcription in Xenopus, mouse and Drosophila and discuss possible reasons for its invisibility in the electron microscope. (shrink)