Hughes has recently argued that there is to be found in Kant's epistemology an aesthetic constraint that makes for an objectivity of empirical knowledge-claims. The reading that she defends leads to a rejection of an imposition-view of empirical concepts and the categories and to an affirmation of a realism in Kant's theory of empirical knowledge. I am in broad agreement with her thesis but disagree with her ultimate explanation of the ontology of Kant's objects of empirical knowledge. Hughes' exposition and (...) my reading wind their way through both Kant's epistemology and his theory of free beauty and of pure judgments of taste. (shrink)
Henry Allison over the years has produced important work on Kant's transcendental idealism of the objects of our empirical knowledge as well as on Kant's conception and defence of the freedom of rational agency. He has done so both in two major books and in a string of articles. Most recently, his continuing refinements of a number of interrelated themes prominent in his two books, together with discussions of some other issues, have provided the material for the publication of a (...) collection of papers, Idealism and Freedom) Ten of the twelve essays included in this collection have already appeared elsewhere, but it is gratifying to have them, together with two additions, all available in their present form. Allison's debates, both with himself and with his critics, help increase our understanding of his views and hence of Kant's as well. (shrink)
Kemal's useful introduction is largely devoted to the first half of Kant's Critique of Judgment. It guides the reader through many of the topics which make up that philosopher's aesthetic theory. Among the matters not dealt with, or dealt with only in passing, are Kant's theory of the sublime, his conception of adherent beauty, and the question whether Kant does or can allow for ugliness, the opposite of beauty.
Not only is Kant’s philosophy a deeply rooted cultural phenomenon, it by design is also a philosophy of culture. More specifically, the Critical system both reflects the Enlightenment movement and was designed by its author to explain and foster the aims and very possibility of that movement. Munzel’s work enhances our understanding and appreciation of these features of Kant’s achievement.
Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".
This paper contains a development of the consequences of a form of skepticism closely akin to traditional fallibilism. It is contended that fallibilism properly understood is compatible with actual possession of knowledge and with rationally continuing claims to such possession. In order to justify this contention, the notion of a K—game as a species of game played in accordance with rules is developed, first leaning on Brians Skyrms' notion of a rational dialectic and then on independent grounds. The notion of (...) knowledge which emerges from this is compatible with some but not all of the analyses of knowledge which have recently been put forward. (shrink)
Kant's distinction between mental passivity and mental activity is crucial for his "transcendental deduction" in the first "critique". I analyze his conception of active synthesis in cognitive situations and reconstruct the "deduction" in light of this analysis. The "deduction" is seen to argue from the possibility of cognition to objectivity of cognitions, "via" self-consciousness.
This paper contains a development of the consequences of a form of skepticism closely akin to traditional fallibilism. It is contended that fallibilism properly understood is compatible with actual possession of knowledge and with rationally continuing claims to such possession. In order to justify this contention, the notion of a K—game as a species of game played in accordance with rules is developed, first leaning on Brians Skyrms' notion of a rational dialectic and then on independent grounds. The notion of (...) knowledge which emerges from this is compatible with some but not all of the analyses of knowledge which have recently been put forward. (shrink)
