The eight papers in this book are drawn from two conferences that honored Lewis White Beck, an influential Kant scholar.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Kant's distinction between mental passivity and mental activity is crucial for his "transcendental deduction" in the first "critique". I analyze his conception of active synthesis in cognitive situations and reconstruct the "deduction" in light of this analysis. The "deduction" is seen to argue from the possibility of cognition to objectivity of cognitions, "via" self-consciousness.

Henry Allison over the years has produced important work on Kant's transcendental idealism of the objects of our empirical knowledge as well as on Kant's conception and defence of the freedom of rational agency. He has done so both in two major books and in a string of articles. Most recently, his continuing refinements of a number of interrelated themes prominent in his two books, together with discussions of some other issues, have provided the material for the publication of a (...) collection of papers, Idealism and Freedom) Ten of the twelve essays included in this collection have already appeared elsewhere, but it is gratifying to have them, together with two additions, all available in their present form. Allison's debates, both with himself and with his critics, help increase our understanding of his views and hence of Kant's as well. (shrink)

Hughes has recently argued that there is to be found in Kant's epistemology an aesthetic constraint that makes for an objectivity of empirical knowledge-claims. The reading that she defends leads to a rejection of an imposition-view of empirical concepts and the categories and to an affirmation of a realism in Kant's theory of empirical knowledge. I am in broad agreement with her thesis but disagree with her ultimate explanation of the ontology of Kant's objects of empirical knowledge. Hughes' exposition and (...) my reading wind their way through both Kant's epistemology and his theory of free beauty and of pure judgments of taste. (shrink)

This paper contains a development of the consequences of a form of skepticism closely akin to traditional fallibilism. It is contended that fallibilism properly understood is compatible with actual possession of knowledge and with rationally continuing claims to such possession. In order to justify this contention, the notion of a K—game as a species of game played in accordance with rules is developed, first leaning on Brians Skyrms' notion of a rational dialectic and then on independent grounds. The notion of (...) knowledge which emerges from this is compatible with some but not all of the analyses of knowledge which have recently been put forward. (shrink)

This paper contains a development of the consequences of a form of skepticism closely akin to traditional fallibilism. It is contended that fallibilism properly understood is compatible with actual possession of knowledge and with rationally continuing claims to such possession. In order to justify this contention, the notion of a K—game as a species of game played in accordance with rules is developed, first leaning on Brians Skyrms' notion of a rational dialectic and then on independent grounds. The notion of (...) knowledge which emerges from this is compatible with some but not all of the analyses of knowledge which have recently been put forward. (shrink)

Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".

Kemal's useful introduction is largely devoted to the first half of Kant's Critique of Judgment. It guides the reader through many of the topics which make up that philosopher's aesthetic theory. Among the matters not dealt with, or dealt with only in passing, are Kant's theory of the sublime, his conception of adherent beauty, and the question whether Kant does or can allow for ugliness, the opposite of beauty.

Not only is Kant’s philosophy a deeply rooted cultural phenomenon, it by design is also a philosophy of culture. More specifically, the Critical system both reflects the Enlightenment movement and was designed by its author to explain and foster the aims and very possibility of that movement. Munzel’s work enhances our understanding and appreciation of these features of Kant’s achievement.