Recent authors have raised objections to the counterfactual interpretation of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule of time-symmetrised quantum theory. I distinguish between two different readings of the ABL rule, counterfactual and non-counterfactual, and confirm that TSQT advocate L. Vaidman is employing the counterfactual reading to which these authors object. Vaidman has responded to the objections by proposing a new kind of time-symmetrised counterfactual, which he has defined in two different ways. It is argued that neither definition succeeds in overcoming the objections, except (...) in a limited special case previously noted by Cohen and Hiley. In addition, a connection is made between TSQT and Price's concept of 'advanced action', which further supports the special case discussed. (shrink)

In a detailed and careful manner, Taylor sets about an analysis of the notions of causation, human action, purpose, and a whole host of other conceptions such as deliberation, willing, mental acts, and reasons that relate to these key concepts in the philosophy of human action. The issue is, of course, what sort of explanation is suited to grasping the inherent intelligibility of human action. Having argued his way through to a notion of agent causality, which differs little from that (...) of Aristotle, and having concluded to the irreducibility of purpose that this conception implies, Taylor maintains that logical reductionism, behaviorism, and/or mechanism are logically deficient and leave human action unexplained; however, the non-reducibility of common sense, teleological and free will concepts does not imply, for Taylor, a dualism Taylor does leave it open as a matter to be empirically decided whether or not ontological reductionism is a viable alternative. While the book is an extraordinarily skillful and dialectical handling of current discussion in the philosophy of action, there is distressingly little mention of the sources and supports of this discussion. The effect is to make some of Taylor's more controversial pronouncements appear a bit more dogmatic than should be the case; but in the end, content triumphs sufficiently over style to make this book important reading for anyone interested in having some clear light thrown on the thorny problems surrounding the philosophy of action.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This is a translation of Carnap's early classic, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt and his less technical but also important article from the same period, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. It is no secret that Carnap abandoned the phenomenalism of the Aufbau for the physicalism of Logische Syntax der Sprache, but there is no doubt that the real message of the Aufbau—which is punctuated with the Messianic spirit of early logical positivism—is the program of "rational reconstruction" which becomes, on an inverted (...) reading and with the addition of a bias in favor of the universal descriptive and explanatory power of scientific discourse, the program of scientific reductionism. In this light, the continuities between the Aufbau and Carnap's later work completely dwarf in importance the discrepancies between these two periods of his creative output. The Aufbau remains an important book in its own right, and is not simply a detailed manifesto of a now defunct program; it is a pleasure to have it in English.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Colin Cherry's now famous book has been reissued in a third paperback edition in order to put into our hands an economical as well as genial and perspicuous survey of the state and contours of the so-called communication sciences. Cherry's book is properly speaking a manual, as befits its subtitle: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism. It is composed of eight synthetic and lucid chapters each of which deals with a central area of the processes of communication. Philosophers of (...) diverse persuasions will find here a handy and reliable guide through an enormous mass of materials dealing with both the formal and the material aspects of human communication. (shrink)

Volume VI in Doubleday's Modern Studies in Philosophy series. Martin is responsible for the ten Locke essays, Armstrong for the twelve on Berkeley. The essays on Locke are by Ryle, Yolton, Jackson, Barnes, Bennett, Flew, Monson, Macpherson, and Ryan. The last three cover Locke's political philosophy while the others inevitably concern themselves with Locke's psychology and epistemology. The Berkeley essays are by Broad, Luce, Grave, Marc-Wogau, Cummins, Mabbott, Bennett, Furlong, Beardsley, Thomson, and Popper. Popper's essay is on "Berkeley as Precursor (...) of Mach and Einstein." As with Locke, the other topics are predictable, though a total of three essays are devoted to the role of "God" in Berkeley's philosophy. An index and a short bibliography are appended.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Some of the most significant essays of Georg Simmel, an influential nineteenth century German philosopher and sociologist, are collected here. An informative introduction by Michael Landman points out his contribution to the thought of Hartmann, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Cassirer.--R. E.

A most interesting attempt to weld together a Marxist and a semiotic approach to art. The Marxist insistence upon the historicity of consciousness and the categories in which it expresses itself is accompanied by a systematic semiotically oriented reflection upon the epistemological conditions of meaning. The principal target of della Volpe's project is the Crocean theme that there is something supra-rational conveyed by a work of art, some cosmic feeling or some ineffable content, accessible only to intuition. Della Volpe's position, (...) on the contrary, is rationalist, though with a very specific twist. (shrink)

Like its predecessors in this new sixty volume edition of the Summa, this book has been meticulously prepared. A working text has been taken from the Parma text with corrections added from the Leonine version, and Gilby provides his usual sound but readable translation. The specific questions treated are "Moral Good and Evil in Human Acts in General," "Moral Good and Evil in the Will's Inner Activity," "Moral Good and Evil in Outward Acts," and "Corollaries to Moral Good and Evil (...) in Human Acts." Gilby's appendices give a compendious treatment to St. Thomas' entire moral philosophy, locating it systematically within the successively broadening contexts of moral theology and sacra doctrina generally and substantively in the dual contexts of St. Thomas' biologically based anthropology and metaphysically founded natural theology—E. A. R. (shrink)

This major and mature work of Duns Scotus covers a variety of questions, twenty-one altogether, ten of which are put under the heading of "God," while the other 11 are grouped under the heading of "Creatures." The first question investigates whether the essential perfections of God are more immediately related to his essence than the perfections proper to the Persons of the Trinity as such. There then follow six questions bearing on the Trinity: the number of the divine Persons ; (...) their distinction and equality; whether the first Person could be a Person apart from the relationship of origin, and so forth. Five questions focus on God’s external activity: his omnipotence and the object of his omnipotence. Here the demonstrability of this divine attribute is first considered, and then such subtle questions as whether the Son has some special causality in reference to creatures, and whether a body can exist without local presence, the accident of "ubiety.". (shrink)

Beginning with an attempt to remove what he believes are the most common misconceptions about Hegel, e.g., that he is a "transcendent metaphysician," a "subjectivist," and an "a priorist," Findlay goes on to deal with Hegel's concept of Geist and his dialectical method. He argues that Hegel's philosophy does not consist of a body of truths, but rather of an exhaustive and subtle analysis of all possible ways of conceiving experience. Hegel's is, he holds, "one of the most anti-metaphysical of (...) philosophical systems, one that remains most within the pale of ordinary experience, and which accords no place to entities or properties lying beyond that experience, or to facts undiscoverable by ordinary methods of examination".--R. E. (shrink)

An impressive addition to the growing corpus of phenomenologica by a young phenomenologist who has already contributed significantly to phenomenology as a translator of two works of Mikel Dufrenne and as the author of almost a dozen articles centering upon the role of imagination in philosophy, art, and psychology. Imagining attends to the very core of phenomenological method which rests upon the technique of imaginative variation as the means to eidetic intuition. Though guided by Husserl especially, the work is not (...) about phenomenology, but is an actual specimen of phenomenology. Significantly, too, the author also takes his bearings from suggestions in Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, and Ryle and displays an awareness of the whole history of the treatment of imagination in philosophy, psychology, and art criticism. But the focus is upon the Sache selbst, on the phenomena of imagining as they present themselves directly in experience. If at times the works of phenomenologists appear to be diffuse, cumbersome, and linguistically opaque, the present work is remarkably clear and well-organized—almost establishing a new genre in phenomenological writing. Perhaps some indebtedness to Weiss shows through in the author’s attempt, not only to describe, but to systematize the field of the phenomena in question; the influence of the analysts appears in the clarity of the overall style. (shrink)

This volume contains papers from a 1962 Symposium in the Philosophy of Mind held at Wayne State University. There are seven essays, each accompanied by lengthy and usually quite astute comments, and followed by a shorter rejoinder. Chisholm contributes a refinement of his much discussed criteria for intentional connectives: "On Some Psychological Concepts and the 'Logic' of Intentionality." The scare quotes are well-placed around "Logic," as it is Chisholm's intuitive rather than formal logical perspicacity which carries the weight of the (...) argument. Ayer's paper, "The Concept of a Person," has already been published in his book of the same name. The most deliberate exercise in epistemic logic is Castañeda's paper, "Consciousness and Behavior: Their Basic Connections." This essay deserves close scrutiny, as it represents a disciplined attempt to rehabilitate more traditional conceptions of consciousness and, particularly, self-consciousness. Putnam has some more to say about minds and machines in "The Mental Life of Some Machines." In what is possibly the best paper in the volume, Sellars develops the dialectic that runs from phenomenalism, through various forms of realism, to a critical scientific realism mediated by a Kantian-style phenomenalism. Aune's comments on the paper are very illuminating. Alston, owing to the delay in publication of the Symposium, joins a bit late the list of those who are criticizing and rejecting the logical barrier between reasons and causes that has been erected by Melden et al. Finally, Firth tries to delimit our concept of seeing by arguing in a manner more suggestive than definitive for causal criteria for the use of the term. The general tone of the volume is exploratory.—E. A. R. (shrink)