It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying (...) upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments of rightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they become intuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character. (shrink)

Within the climate justice debate, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle holds that those who benefit from greenhouse emissions associated with industrialization ought to pay for the costs of mitigating and adapting to their adverse effects. This principle constitutes a claim of inter-generational justice, and it is widely believed that the non-identity problem raises serious difficulties for any such claim. After briefly sketching the rationale behind ‘beneficiary pays,’ this paper offers a new way of understanding the claim that persons in developed societies (...) have benefited from industrialization. It argues that when we think of the claim in this new way, it evades the non-identity problem entirely. Some objections to this approach are then considered and rebutted. The paper concludes by comparing the present, relatively modest solution to the nonidentity problem with a much more ambitious attempt from the recent literature. (shrink)

This paper explores some parallels between the concept of action as it is deployed in two theoretical projects: constructing a virtue-ethical account of right action; and explaining human actions in causal terms. Although one project is normative and the other non-normative, I argue that they face essentially the same fundamental challenge: both have a difficult time dealing with the familiar fact that persons have the ability to act out of character. For virtue ethics, this fact threatens to undermine its most (...) distinctive account of what makes an action right, one that grounds rightness in virtuous character. For causal theories of action, it makes trouble for the idea that all human actions can be explained adequately within an event-causal framework. (shrink)

In this chapter we first discuss the main principles of justice and note the standard objections to them, which we believe necessitate a hybrid approach. The hybrid account we defend is primarily based on the distributive principle of sufficientarianism, which we interpret as the idea that each country should have the means to provide a minimally decent quality of life for each of its citizens. We argue that sufficientarian considerations give good reason to think that what we call the ‘ability (...) to pay objection’ should be taken much more seriously in this debate. Following this, our account emphasises what we believe are the two most important moral desiderata in any attempt to distribute responsibility for dealing with climate change: the ability to mitigate the problem and the making of culpable contributions to the problem. After noting that our proposal includes enough detail to be a useful start for policy makers, we defend our account against some potential objections. (shrink)

Der aktuelle Eurozentrismus führt dazu, dass Europa und hier insbesondere die Europäische Union verschiedene Entwicklungen und Ereignisse in den internationalen Beziehungen falsch auffassen und interpretieren. Der Autor setzt sich thesenhaft mit diesem Phänomen auseinander und zeigt auf, wie es durch eine eurozentristische Sichtweise, die er als Überbewertung europäischer Interessen, Bedürfnisse, Strukturen und Ereignisse versteht, zu einer verzerrten Wahrnehmung der internationalen Politik durch die Europäer kommt.

Book Information Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Suffering and Moral Responsibility Meyerfeld Jamie New York Oxford University Press ix + 237 Hardback £35 By Meyerfeld Jamie. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. ix + 237. Hardback:£35.

Rajan Gurukkal is a leading social scientist and is currently the Sundararajan Visiting Professor at Centre for Contemporary Studies, Indian Institute of Science. He has been the former Vice Chancellor, M. G. University, Kottayam, Kerala. An avid reader, critical theorist and a prolific writer, he has authored several monographs, research articles and has been actively engaged with several projects in association with UGC, the Ford Foundation to name a few. His research interests explore the historiographic dimensions and dialectical processes involving (...) the state and society. He can be reached at [email protected] (shrink)

Conversion is a critical part of Evangelical theology and missiology. It has been defined as a crisis experience or a decision at a specific point in time. However, there is always an aspect of development, a process, involved. Increasingly, the phenomenon of conversion of those from non-Christian backgrounds, for example from other world religions, indicates that how they become followers of Christ is often characterised by a gradual journey, sometimes accompanied by visions and dreams. This paper looks at the phenomenon (...) of conversion through a historical and missiological lens to explain and understand the dynamics of the conversion. (shrink)

In large anonymous games, payoffs are determined by strategy distributions rather than strategy profiles. If half the players choose a strategy a, all of them get a certain payoff, whereas if only one-third of the players choose that strategy, the players choosing may get a different payoff. Strategizing in such a game by a player involves reasoning about not who does what but what fraction of the population makes the same choice as that player.We present a simple modal logic to (...) reason about such strategization in large games. Since actual numbers are irrelevant, a player need not even know how many others are in the game, thus leading to the consideration of games with unboundedly many players. The logic we consider is the propositional modal fragment of a first order modal logic. We show that it has a bounded agent property, giving us a decision procedure for satisfiability. We also present a complete axiomatization of the valid formulas. The logic admits a natural model checking algorithm and bisimulation characterization. The logic with quantification over players is more appropriate, but is undecidable. (shrink)

This paper interrogates the routine and unproblematic use of terms such as in biomedical and anthropological discourse. A typical depiction of the social factors that explain the practice of in India is to put together the supply side factors (such as protection offered by the government for the production of generic drugs, especially in the small scale sector, and expansion of the number of drug store outlets), with the increasing demand for allopathic drugs. The paper provides an ethnographic account of (...) the intricate connections between households and biomedical practitioners in urban neighbourhoods in Delhi. It breaks away from the conventional opposition drawn between the practices of physicians and the beliefs of their patients, and suggests that what constitutes the medical environments of these neighbourhoods is the product of medical practices, household economies and concepts of disease. Thus pharmaceutical use is determined as much by practices of dispensation and by how practitioners understand what constitutes therapy as by household understanding of the normal and the pathological. This paper uses both quantitative data and narrative interviews to provide an in-depth understanding of the circulation of pharmaceuticals within the life worlds of the urban poor. (shrink)

Sundar Sarukkai is a philosopher and is currently associated with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore as a Professor of Philosophy. His research interests range from philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, postmodernism, phenomenology to philosophy of art. A critical philosopher whocan, with élan, and a certain sense of analytical rigour, transverse the philosophical terrains between the Western and Indian traditions. He has authored several books, such as Translating the World: Science and Language, Philosophy of Symmetry and Indian Philosophy (...) and Philosophy of Science. Hehas earned his doctoral degree from Purdue University, USA following which he has been associated with several institutes such as Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Manipal University and National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He has been the Founder-Director, Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University, Manipal. He can be reached at [email protected] (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between gender, nations and nationalisms vis-a-vis the Indian state's nationalist identity and perceptions of security. It explores how the postcolonial Indian state's project of nation-building — reflective of a western secular-modern identity and a Hindutva-dominated identity — incorporates gender, with continuities and discontinuities, to articulate divergent forms of nationalist/communalist identities, `cartographic anxieties' and nuclear securities. The article contends that with the recent rise of the Hindu-Right BJP, guided by Hindutva ideology, the nature of representing the (...) Indian nation, its women and securities has changed from a geopolitical to a cultural perception — thereby necessitating a rereading of the Indian nation, nationalism, gender and its perceptions of security. (shrink)