2. But even to the common understanding it soon becomes evident that such knowledge, pursued even to its ultimate perfection, is nevertheless inadequate to many of the modest demands which confront that understanding. For immediately upon the achievement of even slight knowledge of the essence, existence or causes of any finite thing there comes an awareness that this thing could have been other than as it is, could have been produced by other or different causes, could have failed to come (...) into existence at all--is, in other words, radically contingent. Nor does this awareness seem merely a function of the partiality, the incompleteness and finitude of human experience; if it were, we could expect it to diminish directly in proportion to the increasing scope and depth of our experience; this it does not do, but rather grows and increases as experience grows, reaching at last such a state that many, under the spell of its conviction, are led to assert either that such an awareness is a necessary part or aspect of all experience or that its object must be a necessary, analytically discoverable part or aspect of all the objects of experience. No such assertions are necessary here; it suffices to re-affirm our faith in, and faithfulness to, the data of experience; one of the most pervasive and fundamental of all such data, then, we may honestly declare to be the radical contingency of the finite objects of our awareness. The most pervasive is existence. (shrink)

The first of my preliminary arguments which Mr. Wild feels to be erroneous is that in which possibility is held to involve both being and non-being. In defending this thesis I return to the original problem to which it attempted a preliminary solution. The pervasiveness of contingency and change in human experience was first asserted, together with the demand that metaphysics explain, as best it might, all such data; with this much I understand Mr. Wild to agree in the opening (...) paragraph of his critique. Further it was affirmed that through awareness of contingency and change, the understanding comes to possess the concepts of being and nonbeing, and can see that both contingency and change must involve these two concepts. With Mr. Wild I agree that "There is a gulf between being and non-being." To bridge this gulf, then, to mediate these terms, is the very function of possibility. It was this gulf that demanded an intermediate conception, and the characteristics attributed to this mediator were, at the outset, simply those which its function seemed to require. My whole preliminary account of the possible, then, was constructed strictly with this function in mind. Upon careful re-consideration of the matter, I find myself still holding that the bridging of this chasm between the simple non-being of an entity and the simple being of that same entity requires intermediation of precisely the sort that I first offered. How else can we proceed, either in thought or existence, from the non-being of X to the being of X, except by means of that which exceeds but has its basis in the former, and tends toward but falls short of the latter? (shrink)

Although any generalization in matters of such scope is risky, the central issue involved would seem to be this: Can man achieve, and know that he has achieved, a true and adequate philosophy? The Jesuit tendency is to stress the developmental aspects of philosophy and theology, identifying them more closely with the natural sciences. The Dominicans, on the other hand, see in this tendency great dangers, with theological pluralism as perhaps the gravest, short of outright skepticism.