En quoi consiste l’explication d’une action ? La question, fondamentale pour toute réflexion méthodologique sur les sciences de l’homme, renvoie d’abord à une pratique commune. Dans nos rapports à autrui, il arrive que la compréhension fasse défaut. C’est alors que surgit le besoin d’explication, afin de comprendre la conduite d’autrui ou encore éclairer les autres sur ce que nous faisons… Qu’est-ce qu’une action intentionnelle ? Les pensées d’un agent causent-elles son comportement ? Comment caractériser le savoir qu’un agent possède de (...) sa propre action ? Quel rapport l’explication d’une action entretient-elle avec ce savoir ? À quelles conditions est-il possible de comprendre autrui ? S’appuyant sur l’approche logico-grammaticale de Ludwig Wittgenstein et d’Elizabeth Anscombe, Rémi Clot-Goudard récuse les conceptions faisant des prédicats psychologiques les noms d’états ou d’événements internes aux agents et connus d’eux seuls. Il fait valoir que le caractère intentionnel des actions doit se comprendre à partir des règles qui gouvernent leur mode de description et qu’il faut rapporter les intentions au raisonnement pratique et à la connaissance pratique pour cerner leur force explicative. Il soutient ainsi que la maîtrise des concepts psychologiques est un savoir-faire enté sur l’expressivité naturelle du corps humain et la dimension intrinsèquement sociale et institutionnelle de la vie humaine – invitant ainsi ses lecteurs à se déprendre de l’illusion moderne d’un “sujet désengagé”. (shrink)
Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), (...) MIT Press, 2000 (1998), p. 31). The main question then is not to know whether there is mental causation at all, but how we should account for it. How can the mind move our body? In her 1983 paper, “The Causation of Action”, Elizabeth Anscombe shows how confused this way of putting things is. For her, if intentions or beliefs can indeed be taken to be causes of action, it is not in any metaphysically problematic sense. Seeing this requires us to distinguish clearly two theses: (1) “to be done in execution of a certain intention” is not a causal relation between intention and action; (2) an intention may be said to cause something: but this pertains to a specific kind of causal history, different from that which is uncovered by physical enquiry. First we will show how the metaphysical problem of mental causation arises from a given conception of action. Then we will turn to Anscombe’s arguments in favour of the two aforementioned theses. (shrink)
Dans le monde philosophique anglophone, Elizabeth Anscombe fait déjà partie des références incontournables. Son nom est généralement associé à celui de Wittgenstein dont elle fut l’un des principaux éditeurs et traducteurs. Mais elle est aussi l’auteure reconnue de deux contributions majeures : Intention , à l’origine du renouveau contemporain de la philosophie de l’action, et « Modern moral philosophy » , qui ouvrit la voie au retour de l’éthique des vertus. La philos..
En quoi consiste l’explication des actions humaines? Au sein de la philosophie analytique, la réponse standard à cette question, que les travaux de Davidson ont largement contribué à façonner, est la conception causaliste : expliquer une action consiste à mentionner la raison pour laquelle l’agent l’a accomplie, conçue comme la combinaison particulière d’états mentaux (désir et croyance) dont l’occurrence est la cause des mouvements corporels constituant l’action. En identifiant les raisons à des causes, cette conception a fait ressurgir les questions (...) métaphysiques modernes touchant la causalité mentale, la nature de l’esprit et sa relation au monde physique. Mais les difficultés auxquelles donne lieu le causalisme ne justifient-elles pas plutôt son réexamen? C’est ce que se proposent de faire les auteurs des contributions réunies dans ce volume, que ce soit pour en défendre et en prolonger les intuitions fondatrices ou au contraire pour en contester le bien-fondé. (shrink)
Ce volume rassemble les textes majeurs du confucianisme : " Les entretiens " de Confucius, " La grande étude " de Daxue et " Le classique de la Piété filiale " de Xiaojing.
Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)
Bilinç ile beyin arasındaki ilişki, düşünce tarihi boyunca tartışma konusu olmuştur. Son yüzyıla kadar zihin-beden ya da ruh-madde gibi kavramlarla anılan bu mesele, nörolojinin ivme kazanmasıyla birlikte beyin ve bilinç arasındaki ilişkiye indirgenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, insanın beyninde ortaya çıkan bilinçlilik durumunun, başka bir deyişle fenomenal deneyimlerin, nasıl meydana geldiği ve beyin ile bilincin birbirlerini nasıl etkiledikleri, hem bilimsel verilerle hem de bu verilerden hareketle ortaya konan felsefi yaklaşımlarla açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, beyin ve bilinç arasındaki etkileşim sorununun nörolojinin verilerinden hareketle (...) nasıl ele alındığı incelenecektir. (shrink)
Bu çalışmada, bitkibilimde kullanılan bir terim olan liken kelimesine, kök anlamına sadık kalarak Türkçe yeni bir karşılık önerilmektedir. Bu önerinin mantıksal çerçevesi, Antik Yunancadan, Orta Çağ Arapçasına, Orta Çağ Latincesine ve nihayetinde de Türkçeye kadar uzanan bir yelpazede, konuya esas teşkil eden tarihî metinlere ve onların kaydedildiği elyazmalarına dayanmaktadır. Türkçe metinlerde liken terimi yerine yalaç teriminin kullanımı öneri lmektedir. Bu öneri ülkemizdeki dilbilim, onomastik ve bitkibilim uzmanlarının eleştirel dikkatine sunulmaktadır.
This article challenges the claim that Friedrich Nietzsche is a good reader of the French moralist, Chamfort, when it comes to Chamfort's politics. Chamfort is a meritocrat rather than the bitter egalitarian Nietzsche protrays him to be. Moreover, the moralist's meritocratic beliefs, his hopes for a new social order and the emergence of a new aristocracy resemble many of Nietzsche's own values. Had Nietzsche read Chamfort as a meritocrat, he could have found much to stimulate and clarify his own thoughts (...) about the aristocracy of the future. (shrink)
Bu makalede en temelde dil üzerine bir düşünme denenmiştir. Dilin evrimsel ve tarihsel gelişimine, oluşumuna dair farklı görüşler incelenmiştir. Bu görüşler üzerinden, konuşmanın ve bir söz söylemenin -herhangi bir şey söylemekten farklı olarak- felsefi anlamı düşünülmüştür. Dil ve düşünme arasındaki ilişkinin ne kadar derine gittiği ya da gitmediği araştırılmıştır. Heidegger‘in dile, konuşmaya ve söze ilişkin görüşleri sunularak günlük konuşmanın sıradanlığı ve dilin şiirselliğinin özsel önemi arasındaki karşıtlık bir nebze de olsa giderilmeye çalışılmıştır.
Scopo del saggio è confrontare alcune tra le principali visiones della letteratura occidentale – tra cui la Visio Pauli e la Commedia – e le diverse redazioni della tradizione islamica dell’ascensione celeste e viaggio oltremondano del profeta Muhammad, nel tentativo di stabilire se le affinità, tematiche e strutturali, osservabili tra i due gruppi di testi siano frutto di semplice poligenesi o vadano piuttosto spiegate con rapporti di effettiva intertestualità.Tra le visiones, la tradizione mirajica e la Commedia si instaura dunque un (...) dialogo a tre voci, o di sinfonia, i cui temi principali si arricchiscono e si richiamano a vicenda. Dante, primo comparatista, è in grado di reinventare, armonizzandoli, elementi strutturali e tematici provenienti sia dalle visiones latine che dalla tradizione islamica del Isra’ wa’ l Mi‘râj.The purpose of this essay is to make a confrontation between the main important visiones of the Occidental Literature – also the Visio Pauli and the Dante’s Commedia – anche the various redactions of the Islamic Isra’ wa-l mi’râj. The confrontation is in order to establish if the remarked affinities are just due to polygenesis or rather caused by concrete intertestuality.Between the visiones, the mirajic tradition and the Commedia we are in front of a three voices dialogue: it’s like a symphony, in which the themes enriches themselves and, at least, the arrive to Dante for being harmonized. Dante is the first comparatist. (shrink)
