Increasing privacy concerns are arising from expanding use of aggregated personal information in health practices. Conversely, in light of the promising benefits of data driven healthcare, privacy...

Privacy must be protected for social reasons. That is what was argued in “Privacy and Health Practices in the Digital Age” (Pyrrho, Cambraia, and de Vasconcelos 2022). Versalovic, Goering, and Klei...

I argue that Pyrrho was an epistemological skeptic, rather than the possessor of a positive metaphysical view.

그리스 철학사에서 피론은 그리스 최초의 회의주의자임과 동시에, 아이네시데모스가 창설한 피론학파의 시조였다. 그는 삶의 문제에 있어서 ‘초연함(adiaphoria)’과 ‘태연함(apatheia)’ 그리고 ‘마음의 평정(ataraxia)’을 강조하였으며, 외부 대상에 대한 ‘이해불가능성(acatalepsia)’과 ‘판단유보(epoche)’의 원리를 정립하였다.BR 서구철학사에 나타나는 피론의 모습은 다양하고, 기이하며, 이중적이고, 모순적이기까지 하다. 필자는 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『유명한 철학자들의 생애와 사상』, 아리스토클레스의 『철학에 대하여』그리고 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』등에 대한 연구를 통해, 일차적으로는 그의 회의주의가 피론주의가 아니라는 테오도시오스의 시각을 불식시킴과 아울러, 궁극적으로는 그의 회의주의가 후대의 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다.BR 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 나타난 아리스토클레스의 토막글들은, 피론 철학에 대한 다양한 모습과 (...) 복잡한 해석가능성들을 잘 보여준다. 특히, 아리스토클레스의 단편 C는 복잡한 논쟁을 불러일으키는 문제적 토막글이다. 이것에 대한 해석에는 주관적(인식론적) 해석과 객관적(형이상학적) 해석이 존재하는데, 전자의 입장을 대표하는 연구자로는 E. 젤러가 있고, 후자의 입장을 대표하는 학자로는 연구자로는 S. H. 스바르브손과 R. 베트 등이 있다. 그런데, 주관적 해석을 강조하게 되면 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 있는 장점이 있으나, 텍스트를 일부 수정해야 한다는 단점이 있다. 객관적 해석을 강조하게 되면, 텍스트를 해석하는데 있어서는 논리성을 확보할 수 있으나, 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 없다는 문제점이 노출된다. 이에, 필자는 객관적 해석 또는 형이상학적 해석과 일정한 거리를 두면서, 피론을 회의주의자로, 그리고 피론의 회의주의를 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다. (shrink)

Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain (...) how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading. (shrink)

Richard Bett presents a ground-breaking study of Pyrrho of Elis, who lived in the late fourth and early third centuries BC and is the supposed originator of Greek scepticism. In the absence of surviving works by Pyrrho, scholars have tended to treat his thought as essentially the same as the long subsequent sceptical tradition which styled itself 'Pyrrhonism'. Bett argues, on the contrary, that Pyrrho's philosophy was significantly different from this later tradition, and offers the first detailed (...) account of that philosophy in this light. Bett considers why Pyrrho was adopted as the figurehead for that tradition: his answer suggests that we should distinguish two phases within Pyrrhonism, of which the initial phase is much closer to Pyrrho's own thought than is the better-known later phase. Bett also investigates the origins and antecedents of Pyrrho's ideas; in particular, Plato is singled out as an important inspiration. The result is the first comprehensive picture of this key figure in the development of philosophy. The new claims that Bett puts forward have major implications for the history and interpretation of ancient Greek thought. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Presents a history of early Buddhism based solely on dateable artefacts and archaeology rather than received tradition, much of which data is provided by studying Pyrrho's history.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 116-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics Richard Bett. Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 264. Cloth, $60.00. Charles Brittain. Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. (...) Pp. xii + 406. Cloth, $60.00. These two books demonstrate once again that the ancient skeptics could indeed live their skepticism. In recent decades Myles Burnyeat, Benson Mates, and too many others have retailed the old canard that the skeptic cannot live his skepticism, but here we have two branches of ancient skepticism that sound quite liveable. Both books are subtle and brilliant examples of the genre of reconstructing philosophy from meager and fragmentary evidence.Bett's book follows up on the case he made in his 1997 translation of Sextus Empiricus's Against the Ethicists for three stages in ancient Pyrrhonism. The first is that of Pyrrho (ca. 360-ca. 270 B.C.), a dogmatist who held what Bett labels the indeterminacy thesis: we do not know anything because the world is indeterminate and thus we cannot know it. The second is a similarly dogmatic stage under Aenesidemus (first century B.C.), also followed by Sextus in Against the Ethicists. The third is the more thoroughly skeptical suspension of judgment of the mature Sextus of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (second century A.D.). Bett points out that it would indeed be odd if Pyrrhonism had not evolved in any way in five hundred years. What was unique throughout the tradition was the connection drawn between indeterminacy or suspension of judgment and the goal of ataraxia or tranquility (179, 220).Bett tries to avoid reading later concerns back into the earlier materials, and reevaluates the later materials based on his new reading of the earlier. He argues that Pyrrho's indeterminacy thesis was a metaphysical claim, not an epistemological one. One benefit of [End Page 116] understanding Pyrrho this way is that he does not make a self-refuting exception to his epistemological skepticism for his own claims. Rather, he can just admit to being a kind of dogmatist. Then, Pyrrho's ethical dogmatism is also perfectly consistent. Bett draws a picture of Pyrrho's practical life that rejects the walking-off-of-cliffs apocrypha, but accepts evidence of a quasi-Cynic, anti-theoretical lifestyle. Pyrrho's rejection of social norms puts him at odds with Sextus's later use of laws and customs as guides to behavior. There are still further questions here: why was Pyrrho in particular such a hero to philosophers, if most (or at least many) people are resolutely non-theoretical?Bett points out that Pyrrho gives us no reason to think that the abandonment of theories and opinions must always lead to tranquility (81). But in another connection, he recognizes that temperament may be decisive (111), and that may be the deciding factor here, too. There is no answer to people who say that abandoning theories makes them nervous: the Pyrrhonians simply say that it makes them tranquil. Irreducible differences in temperament may also explain why Pyrrho did not bother with theoretical controversy and Sextus revelled in it.Among other points, Bett discourages all but the most general case for an influence from India on Pyrrho. Bett's thumbnail comparisons between Pyrrho and each of Aristotle, Plato, the Eleatics, Xenophanes, and others show that Pyrrho's philosophy was not at all extraordinary for its time and place. Most philosophers expected claims about nature to be invariable and without qualification (118). Bett says this is odd by modern standards (197), but even today scientific laws are said to apply to all times and all places.The title of Bett's book will mislead some readers. If you are a specialist and your world revolves around ancient philosophy, you will be satisfied that Pyrrho's "legacy" includes Aenesidemus and ends... (shrink)

An important addition to the study of ancient skepticism, this book argues that there were three schools of thought associated with the name of Pyrrho in antiquity, and that although they are distinct from one another on crucial philosophical points they are similar enough to be linked genealogically. First comes Pyrrho himself in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., who took the metaphysical position that “reality is inherently indeterminate” and therefore chose a way of life characterized by distrust (...) of sensory experience, avoidance of theoretical inquiry, and freedom from emotional disturbance. In a cautiously argued chapter entitled “Forerunners,” Bett argues for Pyrrho’s originality; some earlier philosophers distrusted theory and some sought freedom from disturbance, but Pyrrho was the first Greek thinker to connect the two themes, so far as we can tell. (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. R. Bett (Ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 380+xii, ISBN 780521697545. -/- The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, edited by Richard Bett, consists of an Introduction and fifteen papers written by international authors (three of them have been diligently translated into English by the editor). The volume presents the major figures of ancient skepticism and the major interpretational problems. Separate papers are devoted to Pyrrho of Elis (Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson), Arcesilaus and (...) Carneades (Harald Thorsrud), Aenesidemus (R.J. Hankinson) and Sextus Empiricus (Pierre Pellegrin). Agrippa seems to be the only missing figure on the list. Moreover, we can also find a lot of information about the minor figures of ancient skepticism. Mi-Kyoung Lee presents skeptical ideas in early Greek philosophy and Carlos Levy writes about the later academic skeptics, especially Clitomachus, Philo of Larissa and Cicero. Richard Bett in his Introduction lists the most important problems in interpreting ancient skepticism: What kinds of belief, if any, are open to a skeptic? Can a skeptic allow for choice and action and if so, then how? Is skepticism compatible with an ethical outlook? Is there a real difference between the Academic and Pyrrhonist varieties of skepticism? Casey Perin takes on the first one, Katja Maria Vogt—the second, Richard Bett—the third, and Gisela Striker—the last one. We also have the next five papers presenting other important aspects of ancient skepticism. Paul Woodruff writes about skeptical modes, James Allen about the relation between Pyrrhonism and medical schools, Emidio Spinelli about the critique of specialized sciences, Luciano Floridi about the modern rediscovery of ancient skepticism, and Michael Williams about its Cartesian transformation. The Companion is very rich in content and very up-to-date, presenting the latest hypotheses. Here I would like to discuss the problem of Pyrrho’s place within the skeptical tradition. (shrink)

I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement (...) on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt. (shrink)

We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press, entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. (...) In making his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy. (shrink)

Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three‐part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.

Overview of the philosophy of this atomist, sophist, and compatriot of Pyrrho.

Recently there has been a debate on whether Pyrrho’s philosophy could be influenced by Indian Buddhist philosophy. Discussions revealing striking similarities between them often point out Pyrrho’s complicated sentence, referred to as tetralemma, as one of the most striking similarities. The central question of this paper is whether Pyrrho’s sentence is of the tetralemmatic kind. Authors argue that if Pyrrho’s sentence is not fourfold in structure it could scarcely be classified as similar to the Buddhist tetralemma. (...) A careful analysis of the question is provided, arguing that the approach to the problem of tetralemmatic structure cannot be carried out solely on syntactic grounds. An aspect of a deeper philosophical meaning of the formula is applied, which alone enables us (if at all) to link Pyrrho’s philosophy to Buddhism. (shrink)

Recently there has been a debate on whether Pyrrho’s philosophy could be influenced by Indian Buddhist philosophy. Discussions revealing striking similarities between them often point out Pyrrho’s complicated sentence, referred to as tetralemma, as one of the most striking similarities. The central question of this paper is whether Pyrrho’s sentence is of the tetralemmatic kind. Authors argue that if Pyrrho’s sentence is not fourfold in structure it could scarcely be classified as similar to the Buddhist tetralemma. (...) A careful analysis of the question is provided, arguing that the approach to the problem of tetralemmatic structure cannot be carried out solely on syntactic grounds. An aspect of a deeper philosophical meaning of the formula is applied, which alone enables us (if at all) to link Pyrrho’s philosophy to Buddhism. (shrink)