Guy Rohrbaugh and Allan Hazlett have provided two arguments against the thesis that musical works are types. In short, they assume that, according to our modal talk and intuitions, musical works are modally flexible entities; since types are modally inflexible entities, musical works are not types. I argue that Rohrbaugh’s and Hazlett’s arguments fail and that the type/token theorist can preserve the truth of our modal claims and intuitions even if types are modally inflexible entities. First, I consider two alternatives (...) for the type/token theorist proposed in recent literature about the topic: the created types’ solution and the created abstract objects’ solution. I argue that none of them is attractive for the type/token theorist because they do not preserve the theoretical advantages of type/token theories to explain musical works’ repeatable nature. Then, I focus on the arguments’ common premise that musical works are modally flexible entities. A deeper analysis of musical practice will show that this premise is not true: our modal claims do not imply that musical works could have had different intrinsic but, instead, extrinsic properties. Finally, I show how the nested types theory may offer a satisfactory explanation of this fact and how it captures the truth of our modal talk about musical works. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to face recent views in the ontology of music that reject that musical works are repeatable in musical performances. It will be observed that musical works? repeatability implies that they are audible and variable in their performances. To this extent, the aim here is to show that repeatability, audibility and variability are ontologically substantive features of musical works? nature. The thesis that will be defended is that repeatability, audibility and variability are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of musical (...) works. The plausibility of the dispositional account of musical works? repeatability, audibility and variability will lead us to the conclusion that they are ontologically substantive features of musical works? nature, and consequently, any suitable explanation of the ontology of musical works must not ignore them. nema. (shrink)

This paper discusses methodological issues of two recent experiments conducted by Christopher Bartel, and Elzė S. Mikalonytė and Vilius Dranseika, respectively, about the repeatability and individuation of musical works. I argue, first, that the reliability of their results about people’s intuitions in our everyday musical practices can be questioned due to the use of descriptions instead of musical stimuli of the works and performances involved in the cases tested. This procedure is prone to place participants in an epistemic situation in (...) which their mental capacities for their everyday judgments are not deployed and makes their judgments more vulnerable to the problem of “filling in”. I provide empirical data of an experiment that implements musical stimuli, obtaining large effect sizes regarding the results obtained by Bartel, Mikalonytė and Dranseika. In addition, I argue that the results of three scenarios of the experiment conducted by Mikalonytė and Dranseika are suspicious of being influenced by presentation effects that favor the contextualist intuition that the composer is a relevant parameter in work-individuation. Formal and superficial aspects of the description of their cases would cause these effects. I supply empirical data of an experiment that neutralizes those effects, obtaining moderate and large effect sizes regarding the results of Mikalonytė and Dranseika. (shrink)

I have recently defended two ideas (Puy 2022a). The first is that our modal claims about musical works do not imply that they are modally flexible entities, i.e.

This paper aims to shed light on the question of whether musical appropriation is ethically unobjectionable. James Young (2021) has recently advanced a position on this topic, according to which, whereas the appropriation of a whole work is uncontroversially non-permissible, the appropriation of parts of a work is usually permissible. He grounds this view in ontological matters and in a criterion of fair use in terms of economic harm to the source work’s composer. I argue that, pace Young, we cannot (...) make general ethical claims about musical appropriation because their truth is sensitive to the musical genres that the involved works belong to. First, I clarify the scope of musical appropriation by means of considerations on musical practices and ontology. This will reveal that versions and covers are not genuine cases of musical appropriation. In a second step, I consider a specific kind of musical appropriation: using the first measures of a source work as the first measures of a secondary work. I show that, even if we assume Young’s ontological framework and his criterion on fair use, the instances of this kind of musical appropriation count as fair or unfair depending on the musical genres of the involved works due to their normative implications for the composition and appreciation of those works. (shrink)

La belleza en Charles S. Peirce: Origen y alcance de sus ideas estéticas is a clearly written and well-structured book on Peirce’s aesthetics. Barrena’s thesis is that aesthetics, conceived as a normative science, is central to Peirce’s philosophical system, and especially to his pragmaticism. The goal of the book is twofold: it aims to offer an analysis of the biographical and theoretical aspects of Peirce’s interest in aesthetics and the arts and purports to elaborate a pragmaticist aesthetics. Both objectives can (...) be said to be well achieved. The book is divided into four chapters. The first is devoted to... (shrink)

This paper is devoted to face recent views in the ontology of music that reject that musical works are repeatable in musical performances. It will be observed that musical works’ repeatability implies that they are audible and variable in their performances. To this extent, the aim here is to show that repeatability, audibility and variability are ontologically substantive features of musical works’ nature. The thesis that will be defended is that repeatability, audibility and variability are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of musical (...) works. The plausibility of the dispositional account of musical works’ repeatability, audibility and variability will lead us to the conclusion that they are ontologically substantive features of musical works’ nature, and consequently, any suitable explanation of the ontology of musical works must not ignore them. (shrink)

The question of how people change artworks is important for the metaphysics of art. It’s relatively easy for anyone to change a painting or sculpture, but who may change a literary or musical work is restricted and varies with context. Authors of novels and composers of symphonies often have a special power to change their artworks. Mary Shelley revised Frankenstein, and Tchaikovsky revised his Second Symphony. I cannot change these artworks. In other cases, such as those involving jazz standards and (...) folk songs, performers and ordinary folks have more power to change artworks. My preferred explanation of these facts is the created-abstract-simples view, according to which literary and musical works, unlike paintings and sculptures, are created abstract objects that have no parts. On this view, the way to change a literary or musical work is for an individual, empowered by social practices, to change rules about how a literary work should be published or a musical work should be performed. A. R. J. Fisher and Caterina Moruzzi object that the created-abstract-simples view doesn’t allow for literary and musical works to genuinely change, and Nemesio Garcia-Carríl Puy objects that the view doesn’t allow for these artworks to be repeatable. This paper clarifies the created-abstract-simples view and defends the view against these objections. -/- . (shrink)

En opinión de Francisco Puy, el jurista debe ser una persona que agarre decidido una experiencia jurídica siempre conflictiva, la describa, la valores y ofrezca una solución para limpiarla, pacificando los problemas que presenta de apropiación, transmisión, reparto, violación y reposición de derechos. Una experiencia jurídica se inicia cuando un individuo le dice a otro que una cosa es suya y el otro o los otros asienten o consienten en que es suya. Una experiencia jurídica crece, tornándose problemática, cuando un (...) individuo o dos o todo el grupo rechazan la declaración de uno o varios que dijeron que algo es suyo, que tiene un derecho de uso, de disfrute o de propiedad; un interés legítimo o cualquier otra opción jurídica. El Derecho es la misma cosa justa, lo justo materializado en el caso concreto real y práctico; y no lo justo legal ni lo justo diseñado en grandes teorías. Este enfoque teñido de realismo abre un amplio horizonte filosófico-jurídico que Puy ha recorrido en muchas direcciones, ensayando nuevas soluciones para cuestiones viejas. Catedrático ce Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela durante 45 años, Francisco Puy ha dedicado una buena parte de su pensamiento a desarrollar una forma de estudio y comprensión de la experiencia jurídica, la prudencial, diferente de la usualmente utilizada en las universidades públicas. Su camino lo ha conducido por las sendas de la Tópica, la Retórica y la Dialéctica clásicas, que ha actualizado en diálogo con la moderna teoría de la argumentación jurídica. En este libro, los colegas, amigos y discípulos del maestro dialogan con él y entre ellos, transitando un panorama temático tan complejo como sugestivo. (shrink)

1. Introducción a la ciencia del derecho natural.

How do we build up our institutional reality? What do we need in order to construct such things as universities, law firms, banks, retail stores, factories, leg.

Based on a deliberative democracy, this book uses a hermeneutic-critical methodology to study bibliographical sources and practical issues in order to analyse the possibilities, limits and consequences of the digital transformation of democracy. Drawing on a two-way democracy, the aim of this book is intended as an aid for thinking through viable alternatives to the current state of democracy with regard to its ethical foundations and the moral knowledge implicit in or assumed by the way we perceive and understand democracy. (...) It is intended to stimulate reflection and discussion on the basis that, by addressing what we understand as democracy, we can inevitably influence the reality known as democracy. Democracy’s evident regression in today’s world makes this all too apparent: it has become a hostage to all kinds of autocracies and technopopulisms, which are supported to a greater or lesser extent by the current algorithmic revolution. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This chapter shows that reflecting on Hidden Mickeys can take people at least part of the way to a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness. Here is the basic idea: it is often ambiguous whether some constellation of shapes is a Hidden Mickey, and similarly, it is often ambiguous whether some experience is an experience of God's presence and love. In order to develop this idea, the chapter steps away from Hidden Mickeys in order to develop the problem of (...) divine hiddenness in a bit more detail. There is a crucial disanalogy between the problem of divine hiddenness and Hidden Mickeys. One way to bridge the divide is to try out the idea that God simply cannot make his existence as apparent to people as the Disney corporation can make it apparent that it is run by agents acting intentionally. (shrink)

There seems to be a distinction between primary and secondary properties; some philosophers defend the view that properties like colours and values are secondary, while others criticize it. The distinction is usually introduced in terms of essence; roughly, secondary properties essentially involve mental states, while primary properties do not. In part because this does not seem very illuminating, philosophers have produced different reductive analyses in modal terms, metaphysic or epistemic. Here I will argue, firstly, that some well-known examples fail, and (...) also that there are deep reasons why such approaches should do so. Secondly, I will argue that it is acceptable to remain satisfied with the non-reductive account in terms of essence. To that end, I will indicate how such an explication could be put to use to support the claim that properties like colours and values are secondary. In a series of recent writings, Kit Fine has argued that essence cannot be reductively analysed in modal terms. Fine offers some examples to motivate his claim. I suggest that the primary/secondary distinction constitutes a philosophically interesting illustration. (shrink)

This article treats recent bioethical discussions of double effect reasoning (DER), offering a summary account of DER and construing it as rooted in a sensible view of what is central to someone's identity as a moral agent. It then treats objections raised in recent years by Judith Thomson, Alison McIntyre, and Frances Kamm against familiar ways of applying DER to certain controversies within medical ethics, especially, that over physician-assisted suicide. After detailing, interpreting, and attempting to rebut the challenges from these (...) philosophers, who are especially interesting because their criticisms of DER come from allies in DER's struggle against consequentialist reasoning, the essay engages DER's contribution to a recent dispute over treatment of patients in what is called ‘persistent vegetative state.' Near its end, the paper sketches several possible points of entry to DER and sources of justification for it. The essay concludes by indicating a connection between these paths and its opening idea of moral identity. (shrink)

Leibniz claims that for every possible substance S there is an individual concept that includes predicates describing everything that will ever happen to S, if S existed. Many commentators have thought that this leads Leibniz to think that all properties are had essentially, and thus that it is not metaphysically possible for substances to be otherwise than the way their individual concept has them as being. I argue against this common way of reading Leibniz’s views on the metaphysics of modality. (...) I develop a model in which individual concepts are innocent; that is, individual concepts are divine ideas that permit God to know everything that will ever happen to all possible substances, if created, but these individual concepts neither require that all properties are had essentially nor require that it is metaphysically necessary for substances to be the way their individual concepts have them as being. (shrink)

I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and (...) upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative (...) theories. (shrink)

Das Buch behandelt die Theologie des brasilianischen Jesuiten und Fundamentaltheologen João Batista Libanio. Der Autor präsentiert dessen Bibliografie und Biografie, nimmt eine Einordnung der Theologie Libanios vor und arbeitet als Leitfaden dieser das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil heraus.

Drawing on phenomenological aesthetics and on the haptic aesthetics of eating as a form of everyday aesthetics, I examine the phenomenon of eating our own as meaningful in three dimensions: vital/natural, somatic/individual, and cross-cultural. Usually conceived as a concrete, rare, and foreign practice, I show how cannibalism is present in our daily lives, both symbolically and as a liminal possibility towards which – as Freud noticed in 1913 – we all tended as children. Cannibalism is present not only in cinematic, (...) literary, or visual art, and in anthropological research that situates it far from “us,” but through narratives and carnal dispositifs of differentiation/assimilation of the Same and the Other, fundamental for our subjective constitution. I conclude with a reflection on how the classical aesthetics of the sovereign subject develops towards alternative models like Pelluchon’s gourmet ego that re-establish the connexion and moral engagement lost by solipsism by means of alimentary metaphors, but also romanticizing them, failing to address the problem of voracity and overconsumption, both at a social and at an individual level. This is more suitably addressed by Viveiros de Castro’s idea of a cannibal cogito, but even better understood by Emmanuel Levinas’ enjoyment-contact model of subjectivity. (shrink)

A partir de El Conocimiento del Amor, Martha Nussbaum emprendió un novedoso proyecto teórico, el de construir una vinculación productiva y no colonizadora entre la literatura y la reflexión moral. Una de las tesis que aúnan sus múltiples textos sobre este proyecto es que la lectura de textos literarios puede ser un componente no solo importante, sino necesario en el desarrollo moral de los sujetos. Por medio de una determinada forma de lectura y de un lector activo y crítico al (...) mismo tiempo, el sujeto podría desarrollar en mayor grado una capacidad empática que le permita reconocer injusticias, afectos y vulnerabilidades en situaciones allende la propia y en otros individuos (Nussbaum, 1997a, p. 111). El objetivo de esta presentación es contrastar esta tesis con un texto central de la literatura argentina moderna, El Juguete Rabioso2 de Roberto Arlt. Escritor, periodista e inventor, Roberto Arlt (1900-1942) es considerado como uno de los primeros escritores modernos de Argentina que incorporó materiales heterogéneos para su obra literaria –textos periodísticos, manuales químicos, etcetera– y que ofreció una interpretación particularísima de la vida urbana cambiante, desigual y políticamente movilizada de las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Construida como una novela de iniciación, el texto arltiano acompaña las desventuras existenciales de Silvio Astier, un joven marginado de los años 30 del siglo pasado que, a pesar de buscar el éxito a cada paso, solo encuentra el fracaso. El punto central de nuestro interés estará colocado en que el acto trascendental de su vida, una acción cruel y vil contra un amigo es llevada a cabo y justificada como producto de leer determinadas novelas literarias. La cuestión problemática de esta contrastación será cómo interpretar esta acción de Astier. ¿Es una refutación parcial de la tesis de Nussbaum, ya que las lecturas de Astier guían esta acción moralmente incorrecta?, ¿o es solo una advertencia contra las esperanzas exageradas de Nussbaum en la capacidad transformadora de la literatura?, ¿o, por el contrario, es una confirmación de la tesis, ya que esa acción no se seguiría del tipo específico de lectura que propone Nussbaum?, ¿o es, en este mismo sentido, una advertencia de que las condiciones capitalistas e individualistas representan obstáculos para el tipo de lectura que promueve Nussbaum?. En este artículo, defenderé que la interpretación más adecuada de la acción trascendental de Astier es que ella no surge de una experiencia lectora demasiado empática, sino de una experiencia lectora que rechaza la empatía, ya que implica la fusión total entre el personaje ficticio arltiano y aquellas novelas que conforman su experiencia literaria. La estructura del trabajo es la siguiente: En la primera sección, reconstruiré lo que Nussbaum denominó la promesa política de la literatura y cómo ella se basa en el mayor desarrollo de las capacidades empática y compasiva que puede ofrecer, en especial cuando se la compara con las teorías éticas generales tradicionales. En la segunda sección, confrontaré dos tipos de respuesta moralizante que la teoría de Nussbaum podría dar frente al “caso Astier” y mostraré que existe una respuesta no-moralizante y que refuerza la teoría de la filósofa. (shrink)

The Greek word mētis (μῆτις) traditionally refers to a particular form of wily intelligence associated with the arts of deception (dolos) and the knowledge of tricks (kerdē), subterfuges, and traps. Mētis evokes innovative and ground-breaking solutions, based on the capability to understand, anticipate, and possibly violate the others’ expectations. Most importantly, mētis presupposes practical wisdom, or prudence (phrόnesis), a dispositional quality that underpins all the virtues that deserve to be cultivated by sportspersons and that is pivotal to perfect sportspersons’ moral (...) character. Not only is prudence required to apply mētis profitably for winning a game, but it is also indispensable to perform consistently with the game’s norms—cognizant of sport values. This analysis of mētis is key to illuminate the embodied dimension of tactical and moral reasoning in contemporary sport practice. In this paper, we first argue that the strategic effectiveness of mētis proves that not only sensorimotor control but also higher forms of intelligence, like strategic reasoning, are embodied and inform skilful performance; second, we argue that relying on mētis is necessary not only to interpret the rules of the game in one’s own favor but also to respect the shared values that these rules uphold in the sport practice. (shrink)

Automated Guided Vehicles (AGV) are an essential element of transport in industry 4.0. Although they may seem simple systems in terms of their kinemat.

Based on qualitative interviews with online media professionals conducted in several Spanish online newsrooms, this article explores the ethical issues that are debated by digital journalists, following the implementation of convergence and multiplatform production. Through the journalists' perceptions about the challenges of convergence and the demands of online news production, the main areas of ethical conflicts are examined. Building on Alasdair MacIntyre's theory about communities of practice, I argue that the standards and practices currently being developed in online newsrooms provide (...) a valid framework for ethical decision making. Finally, the premises for constructing online journalism ethics in these communities of practice are discussed. (shrink)

The contents of linguistic and mental representations may seem to be individuated by what they are about. But a problem arises with regard to representation of the non-existent - words and thoughts that are about things that don't exist. Fourteen new essays get to grips with this much-debated problem.

In Charles Mills’ essay, “White Ignorance,” and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenous-and-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills’ view is part of a more general view regarding how racial injustice can affect a subject’s epistemic standing such as whether they are justified in a belief and whether their (...) degree of confidence in the belief is rational given their evidence. Then, in light of this novel exegetical claim, I show how this interpretation of Mills’ view that racial injustice causes ignorance relates to how epistemically justified philosophers and social scientists are in the views that dominate their respective scholarly literature. (shrink)

Intentando responder por el cambio que significa la filosofía contemporánea occidental respecto a su pasado, y a través del análisis de nociones tradicionales de movimiento y cuerpo, mostramos el lazo que une dirección, coreografía y las propias expectativas actorales del danzante, a ciertas concepciones muy particulares de verdad y fidelidad, arraigadas en ideas de tiempo y espacio que son desactivadas en la práctica de la danza, sobre todo en sus fases de investigación corporal, donde aparecen más bien danzas insignificantes y (...) espacios vividos, refractarios a las lógicas del espacio objetivo, el escenario y el espectador. (shrink)

_Winner of the Fabian Dorsch ESA Essay Prize._ Julian Dodd defends the view that, in musical work-performance practice, interpretive authenticity is a more fundamental value than score compliance authenticity. According to him, compliance with a work’s score can be sacrificed in cases where it conflicts with interpretative authenticity. Stephen Davies and Andrew Kania reject this view, arguing that, if a performer intentionally departs from a work’s score, she is not properly instantiating that work and hence not producing an authentic performance (...) of it. I argue that this objection fails. A detailed analysis of work-performance practice reveals, first, that the normative scope of interpretive authenticity encompasses the practice of composing musical versions and that, second, when performers sacrifice score compliance to maximize interpretive authenticity, they are performing the target work by means of performing a version of it. By means of the nested types theory, I then show how performances produced in this way can be properly formed instances, and hence authentic performances, of their target work. (shrink)

Corría el año de 1837. Un joven que había nacido viejo, a los 24 años, encorvado y un poco lerdo en su caminar, con su pipa en la mano, con un rostro amable pero con una mirada que dejaba en silencio hasta al más elocuente, atrapaba con su mirada contemplativa la juventud de la quinceañera Regine Olsen. Ella en ese instante sintió que su inocencia se convertía en un interrogante inmortal y él desbordaba su ingenio en palabras que no lograban (...) siquiera hacer un esbozo de lo que entre ellos acontecía: una de las grandes historias de amor en un pequeño y alejado país confinado a 40 islas en el norte del hemisferio. (shrink)

Cosmopolitan critics attack the scope-limitation of justice of egalitarian liberal theorists to states. They treat justice as the production of a given set of outcomes for people regardless of location or relationship. However, in doing so they either ignore the relevant agent towards whom principles of justice are addressed or see the question of agency as a practical, derivative question, of a secondary character. This paper argues that a principle of justice without a clearly justified agent is not a genuine (...) principle at all. This is what writers like Rawls mean by the "subject" of justice (analogous to the grammatical subject of a sentence, i.e.,the agent). We should reflect on agents and why they would or would not justifiably carry certain burdens for others and what kind of benefits or goods they are able to secure. The answers to those questions explain why the idea of cosmopolitan global justice is incomplete, either requiring a global basic structural agency or not applying because no relevant agent is present that can create cooperative arrangements between individual persons across the globe. Other moral principles will still apply globally, but they will be distinct from those that apply to basic-structural agencies. This account is not a practice dependence account, as it bases the distinctness of moral and political principles on purely moral and value-based considerations. (shrink)

*Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize*: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a (...) third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (shrink)