This book advances a novel justification for the idea of "publicreason": citizens within diverse societies can realize the ideal of shared political autonomy, despite their adherence to different religious and philosophical views, by deciding fundamental political questions with "public reasons." Public reasons draw upon or are derived from ecumenical political ideas, such as toleration and equal citizenship, and mutually acceptable forms of reasoning, like those of the sciences. This book explains that if citizens share equal (...) political autonomy—and thereby constitute "a civic people"—they will not suffer from alienation or domination and can enjoy relations of civic friendship. Moreover, it contends that the ideal of shared political autonomy cannot be realized by alternative accounts of public justification that eschew any necessary role for public reasons. In addition to explaining how the ideal of political autonomy justifies the idea of publicreason, this book presents a new analysis of the relation between publicreason and "ideal theory": by engaging in "public reasoning," citizens help create a just society that can secure the free compliance of all. It also explores the distinctive policy implications of the ideal of political autonomy for gender equality, families, children, and education. (shrink)
Free PublicReason examines the idea of public justification, stressing its importance but also questioning the coherence of the concept itself. Although public justification is employed in the work of theorists such as John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Thomas Nagel, and others, it has received little attention on its own as a philosophical concept. In this book Fred D'Agostino shows that the concept is composed of various values, interests, and notions of the good, and that no ranking (...) of these is possible. The notion of public justification itself is thus shown to be contestable. In demonstrating this, D'Agostino undermines many current political theories that rely on this concept. Having broken down the foundations of public justification, D'Agostino then offers an alternative model of how a workable consensus on its meaning might be reached through the interactions of a community of interpreters or delegates at a constitutional convention. (shrink)
This book is a defense of political liberalism as a feminist liberalism. A novel and restrictive account of publicreason is defended. Then it is argued that political liberalism's core commitments restrict reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups.
This paper provides a new analysis and critique of Rawlsian publicreason’s handling of the abortion question. It is often claimed that publicreason is indeterminate on abortion, because it cannot say enough about prenatal moral status, or give content to the political value which Rawls calls ‘respect for human life’. I argue that publicreason requires much greater argumentative restraint from citizens debating abortion than critics have acknowledged. Beyond the preliminary observation that fetuses (...) do not meet the criteria of political personhood, I contend, public reasoners may say nothing about prenatal moral status. Indeed, respect for human life is not, I show, a genuine political value, whose interpretation lies within publicreason’s remit. This fact does not, however, prevent deliberators from drawing determinate conclusions regarding the law of abortion. Instead, I show, publicreason has radically permissive implications for the legal regulation of feticide, inclining heavily towards the view that abortion should be allowed with little or no qualification, right until birth. I end by giving grounds for thinking that, even if the argumentative restraint which publicreason enjoins over prenatal moral status does not generate indeterminacy, it is nonetheless objectionable. (shrink)
Law is the expression of publicreason. I want to explicate and justify this assertion, which lies at the core of a normative theory of law. Primarily, I want to focus on the concept of publicreason, showing what it is, relating it to private or individual reason, and finding its rationale in that relation. I shall then argue that publicreason exhausts the normative space where law may be found. Appealing to (...) class='Hi'>publicreason, I shall show that the authority that law claims over the judgments and actions of citizens must ultimately be grounded in their own rationality. (shrink)
When people of good faith and sound mind disagree deeply about moral, religious, and other philosophical matters, how can we justify political institutions to all of them? The idea of publicreason—of a shared public standard, despite disagreement—arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the work of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. At a time when John Rawls’ influential theory of publicreason has come under fire but its core idea remains attractive to many, (...) it is important not to lose sight of earlier philosophers’ answers to the problem of private conflict through publicreason. The distinctive selections from the great social contract theorists in this volume emphasize the pervasive theme of intractable disagreement and the need for public justification. New essays by leading scholars then put the historical work in context and provide a focus of debate and discussion. They also explore how the search for publicreason has informed a wider body of modern political theory¾ in the work of Hume, Hegel, Bentham, and Mill—sometimes in surprising ways. The idea of publicreason is revealed as an overarching theme in modern political philosophy—one very much needed today. (shrink)
In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of publicreason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst publicreason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we (...) have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all publicreason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement. (shrink)
This book explicitly addresses policy options in a democratic society regarding cognitive enhancement drugs and devices. The book offers an in-depth case by case analysis of existing and emerging cognitive neuroenhancement technologies and canvasses a distinct political neuroethics approach. The author provides an argument on the much debated issue of fairness of cognitive enhancement practices and tackles the tricky issue of how to respect preferences of citizens opposing and those preferring enhancement. The author persuasively argues the necessity of a laws (...) and regulations regarding the use of cognitive enhancers. He also argues that the funds for those who seek cognitive enhancement should be allocated free of charge to the least advantaged. The work argues that the notion of autonomy has been mistakenly associated with the metaphysical concept of free will, and offers a political definition of autonomy to clarify how responsibility is implicitly grounded in the legal and political system. As such, this book is an essential read for everyone interested in neuroethics, and a valuable resource for policy makers, as well as scholars and students in philosophy, law, psychiatry and neuroscience. (shrink)
Publicreason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is publicreason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that publicreason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the publicreason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their (...) own requirements. My discussion has several important implications for the debate on publicreason. (shrink)
In this innovative and important work, Gerald Gaus advances a revised and more realistic account of publicreason liberalism, showing how, in the midst of fundamental disagreement about values and moral beliefs, we can achieve a moral and political order that treats all as free and equal moral persons. The first part of this work analyzes social morality as a system of authoritative moral rules. Drawing on an earlier generation of moral philosophers such as Kurt Baier and Peter (...) Strawson as well as current work in the social sciences, Gaus argues that our social morality is an evolved social fact, which is the necessary foundation of a mutually beneficial social order. The second part considers how this system of social moral authority can be justified to all moral persons. Drawing on the tools of game theory, social choice theory, experimental psychology and evolutionary theory, Gaus shows how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium that is endorsed by all, and how a just state respects, and develops, such an equilibrium. (shrink)
In ‘PublicReason and Prenatal Moral Status’, Jeremy Williams argues that the ideal of Rawlsian publicreason commits its devotees to the radically permissive view that abortion ought to be available with little or no qualification throughout pregnancy. This is because the only political value that favours protection of the foetus for its own sake—the value of ‘respect for human life’—turns out not to be a political value at all, and so its invocation in support of (...) considerations bearing upon the permissibility of abortion is beyond publicreason’s remit. Thus, it will scarcely if ever be legitimate to restrict women’s equality and bodily autonomy for the sake of the foetus, even at full term. In this paper, I argue that Williams fails to establish that Rawlsian reasonable citizens must endorse the radically permissive stance vis-à-vis abortion. Citizens can, I claim, reasonably accord the value of respect for human life weight, and indeed converge on the claim that it outweighs other salient political values, during later stages of gestation. Nevertheless, Williams’s argument gets something right in that it reveals why the value of respect for human life is inadmissible at the bar of publicreason in early stages of pregnancy. But then, far from throwing Rawlsian publicreason into disrepute, Williams’s argument actually provides arguably more compelling grounds than any hitherto rallied for endorsing Rawls’s much maligned claim that opposition to the duly qualified right to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy is ‘unreasonable’. (shrink)
Publicreason liberals typically defend an accessibility requirement for reasons offered in public political dialog. The accessibility requirement holds that public reasons must be amenable to criticism, evaluable by reasonable persons, and the like. Publicreason liberals are therefore hostile to the public use of reasons that appear inaccessible, especially religious reasons. This hostility has provoked strong reactions from publicreason liberalism's religion-friendly critics. But publicreason liberals and their (...) religion-friendly critics need not be at odds because the accessibility requirement is implausible. In fact, the accessibility requirement is ambiguous between two interpretations, one of which is too stringent and the other too loose. Depending upon the interpretation, accessibility either restricts the use of too many secular reasons or permits appeal to a wide range of religious reasons. The accessibility requirement should therefore be rejected. (shrink)
In recent years, leading publicreason liberals have argued that publicly justifying coercive laws and policies requires that citizens offer both adequate secular justificatory reasons and adequate secular motivating reasons for these laws and policies. In this paper, I provide a critical assessment of these two requirements and argue for two main claims concerning such requirements. First, only some qualified versions of the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular justificatory reasons for coercive laws and policies may be justifiably (...) regarded as plausible liberal principles of public justification. And second, the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular motivating reasons for coercive laws and policies is untenable on multiple grounds. Publicreason liberals should focus on assessing the justificatory reasons offered for and against coercive laws and policies rather than requiring citizens to offer adequate secular motivating reasons for such laws and policies. (shrink)
Publicreason liberalism is defined by the idea that laws and policies should be justifiable to each person who is subject to them. But what does it mean for reasons to be public or, in other words, suitable for this process of justification? In response to this question, Kevin Vallier has recently developed the traditional distinction between consensus and convergence publicreason into a classification distinguishing three main approaches: shareability, accessibility and intelligibility. The goal of (...) this paper is to defend the accessibility approach by demonstrating its ability to strike an appealing middle course in terms of inclusivity between shareability and intelligibility. We first argue against Vallier that accessibility can exclude religious reasons from public justification. Second, we use scientific reasons as a case study to show that accessibility excludes considerably fewer reasons than shareability. Throughout the paper, we connect our discussion of accessibility to John Rawls’s model of publicreason, so as to give substance to the accessibility approach and to further our understanding of Rawls’s influential model. (shrink)
The essays that make up this volume, explore the idea of publicreason. The task of identifying a distinctively publicreason has become pressing in our deeply pluralistic society, just because doubt has arisen whether what is good reasoning for one must be good reasoning for all. Examining the theories of Hobbes and Kant, and also using more recent work such as the comments and theories of John Rawls and David Gauthier, this book explores aspects of (...) the idea of publicreason. It explains publicreason, and discusses areas such as pluralism, reasonable disagreement, moral conflict, political legitimacy, public justification and post-modernism. (shrink)
Political liberals usually assume the coercion account, which argues that state actions should be publicly justified because they coerce citizens. Recently some critics object this account for it overlooks that some policies are non-coercive but still require public justification. My article argues that, instead of understanding coercion as particular laws or policies, it should be understood as the exercise of collective political power that shapes the basic structure. This revised coercion account explains why those ostensibly non-coercive policies are in (...) fact coercive. Moreover, I argue that the alternative accounts suggested by critics fail, unless they assume the revised coercion account. (shrink)
Some theorists—including Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—endorse versions of 'publicreason' as the appropriate way to justify political decisions while rejecting 'ideal theory'. This chapter proposes that these ideas are not easily separated. The idea of publicreason expresses a form of mutual 'civic' respect for citizens. Publicreason justifications for political proposals are addressed to citizens who would find acceptable those justifications, and consequently would comply freely with those proposals should they (...) become law. Hence public reasoning involves 'local ideal theorizing': the justification of political proposals includes their consideration and evaluation under conditions of compliance with them by the citizens to whom those justifications are addressed. Local ideal theorizing, moreover, can lead to 'full ideal theorizing', wherein citizens outline and evaluate an amended version of their society’s 'basic structure'. This argument is illustrated by some recent empirical work on inequality within the United States. (shrink)
Steven Wall has two compelling arguments for what I shall call publicreason liberalism's reflexivity requirement. The political concerns to reconcile persons who hold diverse moral views, and to avoid authoritarianism in politics not only require the public justification of coercion but the public justification of the standard used to determine when coercion is publicly justified. The reflexivity requirement is said to entail that publicreason is self-defeating. Once RR is correctly formulated, however, cases (...) of self-defeat will be rare, as citizens seldom employ public justification requirements as reasons. When they do, such requirements are rarely their sole reason for supporting political coercion. A properly formulated reflexivity requirement, therefore, does not imply self-defeat. It also allows for a more ecumenical understanding that establish the processes of public justification. (shrink)
This paper addresses the question of whether the duties associated with publicreason are conditional on reciprocity. Publicreason is not a norm intended to stabilize commitment to justice, but a moral principle, albeit one that is conditional on reciprocity because grounded in the idea of mutual respect despite ongoing moral disagreement. We can build reciprocity into the principle by stipulating that unanimous acceptability is required only with respect to points of view accepting the principle. If (...) compliance with law is assured, then the duties of publicreason associated with authorship of law should be considered conditional on reciprocity only in this ‘internal’ sense, which is not proportional but bi-lateral. (shrink)
In PublicReason Confucianism, Sungmoon Kim presents an important Confucian political theory that seeks to combine a specific conception of Confucianism and the ideal of publicreason. My article examines this theory and identifies some of the theoretical complications with Rawlsian publicreason.
What resources do we have, Frohock asks, to develop a version of publicreason which can succed even in the deep pluralism anticipated in democratic practices ...
Sungmoon Kim finds the grounds of Robert A. Carleo III’s criticism too narrow, and argues that it fails to take into account his theory’s central aim: relevance to actual East Asian societies. Kim revises publicreason as a means of public justification in a manner that is deliberately and explicitly non-Rawlsian-liberal—an instrument of democratic perfectionism for the East Asian societies that are sufficiently liberal, increasingly pluralist, and characteristically Confucian. That Carleo measures it by Rawlsian-liberal standards suggests his (...) philosophical commitments have led him to overlook the value of revising publicreason in this way. Moreover, the stipulation of basic liberties as constitutional rights along with the democratic version of Confucianism that Kim’s theory endorses—which respects important forms of equality and freedom—are intended to allay the concerns raised. Kim also clarifies that there is no dilemma between East Asian liberal democratic institutions and Confucian culture. Addressing Carleo’s proposed alternatives, he suggests one is subject to the very criticism levied at his own theory while the other adopts problematic Rawlsian presumptions. Kim’s own Confucian publicreason is a matter of actual public deliberation, not first principles, making it more democratic and meaningfully “liberal” for East Asian citizens. (shrink)
Se aborda la idea de razón pública, atendiendo en particular a su concomitante ideal de razonabilidad. Se expone la continuidad de esta noción desde John Locke a John Rawls, destacando su vínculo con la religiosidad doctrinalmente minimalista de la tradición erasmista. Se cuestiona que, dado tal vínculo, esta ida pueda servir de criterio para evaluar la presencia de otras voces religiosas en la vida pública. The article addresses the idea of publicreason, treating in particular its concomitant ideal (...) of reasonableness. It exposes the continuity of this notion from John Locke to John Rawls, highlighting its connection to the minimalist doctrinal religiosity of the Erasmist tradition. It questions if this idea can serve as criteria to evaluate the presence of other religious voices in public life, given this connection. (shrink)
John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing on an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of publicreason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by (...) a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier. (shrink)
This article is a contribution to a critical exploration of the liberal project of normatively justifying basic political principles. The specific focus is John Rawls's use of the idea of publicreason. After briefly discussing the evolution of Rawls's ideas from A Theory of Justice to his most recent writings, the key components of his conception of publicreason are set out. Two principal lines of criticism are developed. The first is that the criteria of legitimacy (...) Rawls establishes for a democratic procedure are unworkably demanding. The second is that there is no reason to think that resort to the idea of publicreason will significantly constrain the scope of substantive political disagreement within a constitutional democracy. The article concludes with a few speculative reflections about the relevance of the limitations of Rawls's account of publicreason for the project of liberal justification more generally. (shrink)
Mainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive (...) power of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all. (shrink)
Examining the theoretical and empirical status of applied ethics, this volume demonstrates how a pluralistic and democratic society can deal with ethical issues in the light of its moral conscience.
Health systems that provide for universal patient access through a scheme of prepayments—whether through taxes, social insurance, or a combination of the two—need to make decisions on the scope of coverage that they secure. Such decisions are inherently controversial, implying, as they do, that some patients will receive less than comprehensive health care, or less than complete protection from the financial consequences of ill-heath, even when there is a clinically effective therapy to which they might have access.Controversial decisions of this (...) sort call for a public justification for covering or not covering a given treatment. Priority-setting agencies play a key role in providing such a justification. A recent... (shrink)
The article starts with a sketch of Prijic Samarzija?s hybrid theory. After that, it provides an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, her proposal is discussed and confronted with a slightly amended version of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls. nema.
This book explores and elaborates three theories of publicreason, drawn from Rawlsian political liberalism, natural law theory, and Confucianism. Drawing together academics from these separate approaches, the volume explores how the three theories critique each other, as well as how each one brings its theoretical arsenal to bear on the urgent contemporary debate of medical assistance in dying. The volume is structured in two parts: an exploration of the three traditions, followed by an in-depth overview of the (...) conceptual and historical background. In Part I, the three comprehensive opening chapters are supplemented by six dynamic chapters in dialogue with each other, each author responding to the other two traditions, and subsequently reflecting on the possible deficiencies of their own theories. The chapters in Part II cover a broad range of subjects, from an overview of the history of bioethics to the nature of autonomy and its status as a moral and political value. In its entirety, the volume provides a vibrant and exemplary collaborative resource to scholars interested in the role of publicreason and its relevance in bioethical debate. (shrink)
Gerald Gaus was one of the leading liberal theorists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. He developed a pioneering defence of the liberal order based on its unique capacity to handle diversity and disagreement, and he presses the liberal tradition towards a principled openness to pluralism and diversity. This book brings together Gaus's most seminal and creative essays in a single volume for the first time. It also covers a broad span of his career, including essays published shortly (...) before his death, and topics including reasonable pluralism, moral rights, publicreason, and the redistributive state. The volume makes accessible the work of one of the most important recent liberal theorists. Many readers will find it of value, especially those in political philosophy, political science, and economics. (shrink)
A central idea of publicreason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Publicreason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ publicreason from the citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing publicreason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging (...) these compromises sheds light on publicreason liberalism. Publicreason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. (shrink)
Rawls hoped to meet these critics on their own ground by accepting that a comprehensive liberal position cannot be vindicated and by showing how a less ambitious, merely political, version of liberalism could be vindicated. His conception of political liberalism was less ambitious in two ways. In the first place its substantive normative claims were confined to the domain of politics: all he aspired to was a liberal theory of justice. Secondly, he argued that liberalism could dispense with metaphysical and (...) moral foundations: liberal justice could be vindicated as “political not metaphysical.” Since the publication of Political Liberalism, the term ‘political liberalism’ has increasingly been used to indicate this quite specific version of liberalism, whose normative claims are merely political, and which purports not to draw on “comprehensive moral doctrines,” or on unsustainable metaphysical claims. (shrink)
Public reasoning is widely thought to be essential to democracy, but there is much disagreement about whether such deliberation should be constrained by a principle of publicreason, which may seem to conflict with important democratic values. This paper denies that there is such a conflict, and argues that the distinctive contribution of publicreason is to constitute a relationship of civic friendship in a diverse society. Acceptance of publicreason would not work (...) against mutual understanding, learning, or compromise, nor does the principle involve any violation of political equality. The real threat to democracy is not publicreason, but the framing of publicreason by a presumption against state action. (shrink)
This article considers the justification of laws to religious citizens. It does via a consideration of the debate surround the teaching of Intelligent Design. It argues that one widely held view of political morality, publicreason liberalism, requires that schools should allow teaching ID. This is contrary to the views of many defenders of this theory. I show that this argument reveals a deep problem with publicreason liberalism, and that it undermines the judgement of the (...) court in the high profile case of Kitzmiller vs Dover. (shrink)
Greenblum and Hubbard argue that physicians are duty-bound by the constraints of Rawlsian ‘publicreason’ to avoid engaging their patients’ religious considerations in medical decision-making.1 This position offers a number of appealing benefits to physicians. It will appear plausible because Rawls’s philosophical tradition of Political Liberalism enjoys the status of ideological orthodoxy in institutions tasked with forming the moral imaginations of physicians and other elites.2 3 It casts the physician in the role of a ‘reasonable person’ occupying the (...) space of publicreason whose medical and ethical judgments are opposed by ‘sectarian’ religious patients who refuse to be reasonable. This narrative authorises the exclusion of patient religious considerations from medical decision making when they do not ‘translate’ into reasons recognised by ‘reasonable’ medical professionals and manages the trauma of overwhelmed physicians by legitimising disengagement from difficult interactions with religious patients. The authors’ arguments depend on concepts from Rawls’s Political Liberalism 4 and are presented as if the premises of Liberal theory are incontestable—despite the fact that a large body of philosophical literature challenging its premises and core concepts has existed for decades.3 5–7 This ‘nothing to see here, move along’ approach saves more space for anecdotes about religious people, at which …. (shrink)
The ever-increasing application of algorithms to decision-making in a range of social contexts has prompted demands for algorithmic accountability. Accountable decision-makers must provide their decision-subjects with justifications for their automated system’s outputs, but what kinds of broader principles should we expect such justifications to appeal to? Drawing from political philosophy, I present an account of algorithmic accountability in terms of the democratic ideal of ‘publicreason’. I argue that situating demands for algorithmic accountability within this justificatory framework enables (...) us to better articulate their purpose and assess the adequacy of efforts toward them. (shrink)
Most publicreason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. (...) If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to publicreason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’. (shrink)
Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...) giving reasons for collective decisions, where such reasons should also be collectively decided. I compare these two accounts on the basis of a formal model developed in the growing literature on the ‘discursive dilemma’ and ‘judgment aggregation’ and address several questions: What is the trade-off between the (minimal liberal) demand for reaching agreement on outcomes and the (comprehensive deliberative) demand for reason-giving? How large should the ‘sphere of publicreason’ be? When do the decision procedures suggested by the two accounts agree and when not? How good are these procedures at truthtracking on factual matters? What strategic incentives do they generate for decision-makers? My discussion identifies what is at stake in the choice between minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts of collective decisionmaking, and sheds light not only on these two ideal-typical accounts themselves, but also on many characteristics that intermediate accounts share with them. (shrink)
Within democratic societies, a deep division exists over the nature of community and the grounds for political life. Should the political order be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life or should it be based on some such conception? This book addresses one crucial set of problems raised by this division: What bases should officials and citizens employ in reaching political decisions and justifying their positions? Should they feel free to rely on whatever grounds seem otherwise persuasive to them, (...) like religious convictions, or should they restrict themselves to "public reasons," reasons that are shared within the society or arise from the premises of liberal democracy? Kent Greenawalt argues that fundamental premises of liberal democracy alone do not provides answers to these questions, that much depends on historical and cultural contexts. After examining past and current practices and attitudes in the United States, he offers concrete suggestions for appropriate principles relevant to American society today. This incisive and timely analysis by one of our leading legal philosophers should attract a wide and diverse readership of scholars, practitioners, and concerned citizens. (shrink)