En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y (...) acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me (...) is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion. (shrink)

La información es una dimensión de lo real que, a pesar de no tener natu-raleza física, solo existe apoyada en una base física. Y su presencia en los objetos, eventos y procesos que constituyen nuestro entorno vital humano, es lo que permite que el mundo sea inteligible. Sin información no serían posibles las definiciones, ni el pensamiento, ni el lenguaje, ni la ciencia. La importancia de la información está creciendo de manera expo-nencial en nuestros días. Aclarar su estatuto ontológico (...) es una tarea mucho más difícil de lo que a primera vista parece. Y explicar su presencia en los objetos naturales, equivaldría a explicar porqué es inteligible el universo, algo que solo parece posible si, abandonando el ámbito del pensamiento científico, penetramos en niveles más profundos, tradicionalmente reservados a la filosofía o la religión. (shrink)

El contexto de crisis y restricciones presupuestarias sirve de pretexto para promover en la Comunidad de Madrid la implantación de un modelo dual de gestión de los centros y servicios sanitarios, ampliamente contestado en la calle por profesionales sanitarios, asociaciones, pacientes y usuarios. Este proceso se inicia sin evidencia científico-técnica que avale las presuntas ventajas del modelo de concesión y carece de una evaluación solvente de impacto sanitario, conforme a estándares de transparencia, rendición de cuentas y calidad democrática. Entre los (...) aspectos éticos y jurídicos involucrados en este debate analizo los relacionados con el conflicto de intereses y las evidencias recientes que desaconsejan adoptar en España modelos similares. Tras analizar el desafío que supone el nuevo marco institucional para el ejercicio de la responsabilidad profesional conforme a criterios de equidad y buenas prácticas, se concluye aportando elementos para generar un marco más equilibrado de reformas. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

Background: The Directive 2001/20/EC was an important first step towards consistency in the requirements and processes for clinical trials across Europe. However, by applying the same rules to all types of drug trials and transposing the Directive’s principles into pre-existing national legislations, the Directive somewhat failed to meet its facilitation and harmonisation targets. In the field of ethics, the Directive 2001/20/EC conditioned the way of understanding and transposing the “single opinion” process in each country. This led to a situation in (...) which two models of research ethics committees organisation systems exist, being the model in which the “single opinion” is considered to be the decision made by a single ethics committee more effective and simpler in terms of administrative and logistic workload. Method: A survey was conducted in 10 European countries. Members of the European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network working party number 1, with expertise in the field of ethics, responded. Results: There is a major heterogeneity in the composition of ethics committees among the surveyed countries based on the number of members, proportion of experts versus lay members and expertise of the scientific members. A harmonised education of the ethics committees’ membership based in common curricula is recommended by the majority of countries. Conclusions: Despite the efforts for harmonisation of the European Clinical Trial Directive, from an ethical point of view, there remains a plurality of ethics committees' systems in Europe. It is important to comprehend the individual national systems to understand the problems they are facing. (shrink)

Desde un enfoque ecológico, puede decirse que una persona trata de identificar la acción óptima para ella mediante un conjunto de diferentes acciones posibles a través de la intuición. El debate sobre las ‘teorías del proceso dual’ recoge esta idea y postula dos vías diferentes para evaluar las posibilidades de decisión: una vía lógico-analítica y otra intuitiva (Magrabi y Bach, 2013). Predominantemente, se asume que la vía lógico-analítica está relacionada con la racionalidad y, por tanto, es la vía a la (...) que hay que aspirar en la toma de decisiones racionales. Sin embargo, la ciencia ha demostrado que hay que asumir una racionalidad limitada. Por lo tanto, la cuestión de hasta qué punto las emociones o los sentimientos, y en este contexto también las intuiciones, son racionales ha pasado a primer plano (De Sousa, 1987; Evans y Cruse, 2004). En este trabajo, las intuiciones se consideran como un sentimiento con intencionalidad. Las intuiciones siempre se refieren a un entorno apropiado y se dirigen a una decisión que da lugar a una acción. Damásio (1994; 2013) demuestra que una intuición es un sentimiento que se distingue por actuar como un indicio o señal. Asumiendo el supuesto de racionalidad ecológica (Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012; Todd and Brighton, 2016), se puede demostrar que las decisiones intuitivas se basan en el conocimiento experiencial y el reconocimiento implícito de estructuras (Magrabi y Bach, 2013). En consecuencia, con el enfoque de racionalidad ecológica se puede demostrar que una decisión intuitiva es racional en el sentido de que una persona interactúa con éxito con su entorno de forma rápida y energéticamente adaptada y, por lo tanto, identifica la acción óptima para sí misma. Esto puede reconocerse como una ‘corazonada’ o ‘intuición’. En este artículo se explican dos retos: la influencia de un entorno negativo en las decisiones intuitivas y la confusión de una intuición con una emoción u otro sentimiento. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y (...) acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y (...) acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place. (shrink)

A tenor de las investigaciones en el campo de la neuroética y más en concreto en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral en autores como Joshua Greene, nos planteamos la cuestión de si la neurociencia conduce necesariamente a una «naturalización del deontologismo». De este modo en nuestra comunicación ponemos en cuestión un modo de hacer neurociencia que pretenda reducir el deontologismo a un tipo de respuesta exclusivamente emocional. Frente a este modelo planteamos otra forma de hacer «neuroética» donde (...) se consideren las estructuras psicofísicas de la moralidad sin incurrir en el reduccionismo miope naturalista. Se trata, por lo tanto, de descubrir la neurociencia de la ética, esto es, la naturaleza de la moralidad sin que eso implique reducir la moralidad a la naturaleza. Así entendida la neurociencia puede contribuir al trabajo interdisciplinar de comprender la vasta naturaleza humana en toda su amplitud. (shrink)

Este artículo está escrito para una colección de ensayos introductorios sobre filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. Es una revisión (selectiva) de la literatura sobre la psicología del juicio moral.

En su célebre artículo sobre la ideología y los aparatos ideológicos de estado, Althusser indicaba que las evidencias por las cuales una palabra “designa una cosa” o “posee una significación” se ubicaban, junto con la evidencia de ser sujetos, al nivel de los efectos ideológicos fundamentales. Por otra parte, Althusser destacaba la carencia de una teoría de la garantía ideológica. Con la primera observación, Althusser se limitaba a señalar un paralelo, sin establecer una conexión. Con la segunda, llegaba a fijar (...) una meta teórica. En el presente trabajo intentaremos reconstruir el trayecto recorrido por Michel Pêcheux para establecer una conexión allí donde Althusser designó una analogía, e intentaremos mostrar cómo el desarrollo de esta conexión permite establecer las líneas generales de una teoría de la garantía ideológica. Nos concentramos en Les vérités de La Palice (1975), en particular en la operación que, siguiendo los límites de lo que Pêcheux denomina “el materialismo de Frege”, intenta convertir en regla lo que en el campo del pensamiento fregeano se presentaba como un non-sens: que el sentido de las palabras, expresiones y proposiciones se viera afectado por su asociación con otras palabras, expresiones y proposiciones. A partir de allí seguimos la construcción de los conceptos fundamentales con los que Pêcheux intenta definir un “nuevo objeto”: formación discursiva, proceso discursivo, interdiscurso, discurso transverso e intradiscurso, guiado por dos mecanismos discursivos extrapolados de la reflexión fregeana: el de lo preconstruido y el de la articulación o efecto de sostén (grosso modo: procesos metafóricos y metonímicos). Intentaremos destacar dos puntos: que los mecanismos discursivos identificados están sometidos a una divergencia (décalage), a partir del cual pueden comenzar a pensarse las paradojas de la interpelación ideológica sin sucumbir a sus evidencias. La divergencia a la que aludimos consiste en que la inscripción del proceso sin sujeto en la ideología requiere la duplicación de los elementos para que puedan actuar sobre sí como si fueran otros que sí mismos. Insistiremos en que es esta divergencia o contradicción, interna a la forma sujeto, y no la propia forma sujeto, lo que constituye el motor del proceso. Por otra parte, intentaremos mostrar que los dos mecanismos aludidos dan lugar a una concepción dual del sujeto ideológico, por el cual éste está sometido a la “garantía empírica”, por la que el sujeto se identifica a sí mismo, a los otros y al mundo de objetos que lo rodea, y a la “garantía especulativa”, que produce el retorno de lo universal de la formación discursiva en el discurso del sujeto. El paso continuo de una forma de garantía a la otra (de la posición del sujeto del discurso como enunciador a su posición de sujeto universal, pretendido “sujeto de la ciencia” por medio de la identificación con el otro) da cuenta del hecho de que “la ideología no tiene afuera”, ya que tiende a absorber espontáneamente cualquier discrepancia en la forma sujeto, o ruptura con la misma, en el interior de la forma sujeto. (shrink)

Plantea la educación en línea nuevos problemas a la Ciencia de la Educación, que tiene un carácter dual: es Ciencia Social y Ciencia de lo Artificial. La mediación de la Tecnología refuerza la dimensión artificial de la Ciencia de la Educación, que se configura como una Ciencia de Diseño. Esto revierte en la vertiente interna y la dimensión externa de la actividad educativa. Este artículo ofrece un análisis filosófico-metodológico de la Educación mediada por la Tecnología. Lo hace desde el marco (...) teórico de las Ciencias de lo Artificial, lo que aporta novedad: por un lado, este enfoque es poco habitual; y, por otro, la Filosofía de la Ciencia apenas ha prestado atención a la Ciencia de la Educación. Dentro de este marco temático, para resolver problemas en los procesos de enseñanza mediados por la Tecnología, se contextualizan los diseños educativos como diseños científicos. Después se analizan sus límites para atender las distintas dimensiones de la Educación. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo pretende analizar algunos de los postulados principales de la ontología vitalista de Leibniz, en especial su noción de máquina natural y su propuesta monadológica, con la finalidad de demostrar la viabilidad en su pensamiento de una teoría de la acción. Se divide en tres partes: la primera examina la estructura compleja de las máquinas naturales, a partir de la cual se puede observar una composición dual de la acción; a partir de esto, la segunda parte distingue (...) tres tipos de mónadas con la intención de perfilar la posibilidad de una agencia racional; y, finalmente, la tercera parte ofrece algunas conclusiones relevantes para su teoría de la acción, como el papel de la percepción en el proceso de elección y el intelectualismo leibniziano, entre otros.: This paper aims to analyze key postulates of Leibniz’s vitalist ontology, with a special emphasis on his conception of a natural machine and his monadological proposal. It is divided into three sections: first I analyze the complex structure of natural machines, from which a twofold composition of action can be reckoned; hence, the second section identifies three kinds of monads, with the purpose of devising the possibility of rational agency; finally, the third section draws some relevant conclusions for Leibniz’s account of action, as the place of perception in the process of choice and Leibnizian intellectualism, among others. (shrink)

It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, (...) the belief that φing has a moral property, and the utterance of the sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the person in question has an action-guiding attitude in relation to φing. This account has significant advantages over competing views: (i) As it is purely cognitivist, it does not have the difficulties of expressivism and various ecumenical positions. (ii) Yet, in spite of this, it can explain the close, “meaning-like,” connection between moral language and attitudes. (iii) In contrast to other pragmatic accounts, it is compatible with any relevant cognitivist view. (iv) It does not rest on a contentious pragmatic notion, such as conventional implicature. (v) It does not imply that utterances of complex moral sentences, such as conditionals, convey attitudes. In addition, the generalized implicature in question is fully calculable and cancellable. (shrink)

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

Las generaciones actuales se encuentran delante de un auténtico proceso al Humanismo. A este proceso de amplias repercusiones, George Uscatescu, que en anteriores estudios había perfilado la situación del hombre en el ámbito de la Utopía y en la aventura de la libertad, dedicada este libro. El proceso al Humanismo empezó con Nietzsche y la metafísica vitalista. Intelectualmente acaba en le proceso al hombre que hace Michel Foucault y en los esfuerzos "libertadores" de la técnica y de la socieda tecnificada, (...) propugnados por Marcuse y sus discípulos. En el centro de las inquietudes que este nuevo libro de Uscatescu contiene, está la juventud del mundo, su gran rebeldía y las consecuencias acaso últimas del nihilismo contemporáneo. Proceso al Humanismo hecho de cara al año 2000. (shrink)

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing (...) distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes. What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory. (shrink)

Consider the following 'principles':2(Norm of Belief Schema) Necessarily, a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if p (at that scenario) — where 'p' has the aforementioned content .(Generalized Norm of Belief) Necessarily, for all propositions , a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if is true (at that scenario).Both 'principles' appear to capture the aim(s) of belief. (NBS) particularizes the aims to beliefs of distinct content-types. (GNB) generalizes these aims of (...) beliefs as truth. Properly understood, the instances of (NBS) appear to be at least approximately true as does (GNB). Of course, one might harbor concerns about whether these are mere .. (shrink)

Some of philosophy's most central concepts, including art, friendship, and happiness, have been argued to be dual character concepts. Their main characteristic is that they encode not only a descriptive dimension but also an independent normative dimension for categorization. This article introduces the class of dual character concepts and discusses various accounts of their content and structure. A specific focus will be placed on their relation to two other classes of concepts, thick concepts and natural kind concepts. The study of (...) dual character concepts not only demonstrates that a wide range of concepts is inherently normative, but it also reveals new possibilities for investigating gender biases, generics, and social roles. (shrink)

The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect (...) which basic function is associated with each social role. However, Experiment 2 indicates that the normative dimension always represents the relevant commitment as an end in itself. We argue that social role concepts represent the commitments to basic functions because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role-dependent behavior of others. (shrink)

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process (...) theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a.. (shrink)

Thanks to advances in machine learning in recent years the ability of AI agents to act independently of human oversight, respond to their environment, and interact with other machines has significantly increased, and is one step closer to human-like performance. For this reason, we can observe contemporary researchers’ efforts towards modeling agency in artificial systems. In this light, the aim of this paper is to develop a dual-process approach to the problem of AI agency perception, and to discuss possible triggers (...) of various agency perceptions. The article discusses the agency attribution phenomenon, based on which the argument for the dual-process nature of agency perception is developed. Two distinct types of thinking involved in human reasoning on AI agency are suggested: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one is fast, automatic, routine, and often unconscious; the second is a slower, controlled, more conscious one. These two distinct types of processing can yield differing and sometimes conflicting results for human cognition and interaction. The preliminary philosophical findings may contribute to further investigations in philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology and could also be empirically tested in HCI and UX studies. (shrink)

Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theories go further and assign these two types of process to two separate reasoning systems, System 1 and System (...) 2 – a view sometimes described as ‘the two minds hypothesis’. It is often claimed that System 2 is uniquely human and the source of our capacity for abstract and hypothetical thinking. This study is an introduction to dual-process and dual-system theories. It looks at some precursors, surveys key work in the fields of learning, reasoning, social cognition and decision making, and identifies some recent trends and philosophical applications. (shrink)

Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. (...) The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons. (shrink)

I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm that (...) both aim at. Instead, I unify them through their cognitive foundations. Because Type 1 and Type 2 cognition are complementary, reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. Thereby, this dual-process theory of epistemic virtue gives a naturalised account of virtues as well as an explanation of how reliabilism and responsibilism relate. This approach offers a solution for both the generality problem and the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology; additionally it preserves the epistemological autonomy of each virtue type. (shrink)

This book explores three schools of fascinating, talented, and gifted scholars who absorbed into their thought the Jewish and secular cultures of their respective homelands. They include halakhists such as Rabbi Ettlinger and Rabbi Eliezer Berkowitz; Jewish philosophers from Isaac Bernays to Yeshayau Leibowitz; and biblical commentators such as Samuel David Luzzatto and Rabbi Umberto Cassuto. Running like a thread through the analysis of the different scholars, is the attempt to conciliate Jewish orthodoxy with a wish to connect with Western (...) culture and philosophy and to accept the conclusions of scientific research. Among these attempts is Luzzatto's famous "dual truth" approach. This book is the sequel to the Ephraim Chamiel's previous book The Middle Way, which focused on the challenges faced by the members of the "Middle Trend" in nineteenth-century Jewish thought. (shrink)

This article introduces a new pragmatic framework for dual character concepts and their expressions, offering an alternative to the received lexical‐semantic view. On the prevalent lexical‐semantic view, expressions such as “philosopher” or “scientist” are construed as lexical polysemes, comprising both a descriptive and a normative dimension. Thereby, this view prioritizes established norms, neglecting normative expressions emerging in specific contexts. In contrast, the pragmatic view integrates pragmatic modulation as a central element in explaining context‐dependent dual character concepts and expressions. This not (...) only accounts for a wider range of phenomena but also addresses several theoretical shortcomings of the lexical view. (shrink)

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual (...) structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta una caracterización del proceso de autogestión laboral ocurrido en la Argentina en el período 1990-2006, apuntando especialmente sobre el universo de las Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores. En esta dirección, se argumenta sobre una serie de dimensiones analíticas que singularizan a este proceso con referencia a otras experiencias autogestionarias ocurridas antecedentemente. Esta singularidad descansa específicamente en que estas experiencias pueden ser estudiadas como procesos de recolectivización laboral, cuya emergencia y desarrollo se ubica en un escenario atravesado (...) por un profundo proceso de descolectivización social, económica y política. Las dimensiones destacadas y analizadas para aludir al proceso de recolectivización suponen la exposición de argumentos en torno a los siguientes elementos interpretativos: la reconstrucción de un espacio y una experiencia colectiva de trabajo que recuperó parte de la historia asalariada de los trabajadores, la reconfiguración de vínculos de sociabilidad al interior del espacio productivo, la relación con organizaciones sociales y gremiales que representaron los intereses de los trabajadores de estas empresas recuperadas. (shrink)

Tal y como reza la cita de la Apología platónica que encabeza estas líneas, ya el propio Sócrates habría advertido a sus jueces de que no le iban a tomar en serio al pensar que hablaba de forma irónica, en broma. Pues bien, en este trabajo de tesis doctoral, defenderemos que, hoy por hoy, esa advertencia sigue vigente; que sigue siendo necesario tomar a Sócrates en serio, pensar que no habló irónicamente y todo ello asumiendo expresamente los postulados de la (...) hermenéutica gadameriana. Unos postulados a los que nos referimos en el apartado inicial: “Introducción y cuestiones metodológicas” y según los cuales cabe conocer, desde nuestro propio horizonte de praxis, lo que la tradición nos dice en su sentido propio y diferente, si bien hemos de ser conscientes de la posible aplicación de prejuicios no percibidos, ocultos, que pueden volvernos sordos a eso que la tradición nos dice. (shrink)

Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality (...) that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation, agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC against three objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc, (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible to make self-sacrifices that don’t make things worse for others, and (3) that it violates certain axioms of expected utility theory, viz., transitivity and independence. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to articulate a novel account of the ordinary concept ART. At the core of our account is the idea that a puzzle surrounding our thought and talk about art is best understood as just one instance of a far broader phenomenon. In particular, we claim that one can make progress on this puzzle by drawing on research from cognitive science on dual character concepts. Thus, we suggest that the very same sort of phenomenon that (...) is associated with ART can also be found in a broad class of other dual character concepts, including SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, GANGSTER, and many others. Instead of focusing narrowly on the case of ART, we try to offer a more general account of these concepts and the puzzles to which they give rise. Then, drawing on the general theory, we introduce a series of hypotheses about art concepts, and put those hypotheses to the test in three experimental studies. (shrink)

Five experiments provide evidence for a class of ‘dual character concepts.’ Dual character concepts characterize their members in terms of both (a) a set of concrete features and (b) the abstract values that these features serve to realize. As such, these concepts provide two bases for evaluating category members and two different criteria for category membership. Experiment 1 provides support for the notion that dual character concepts have two bases for evaluation. Experiments 2-4 explore the claim that dual character concepts (...) have two different criteria for category membership. The results show that when an object possesses the appropriate concrete features, but does not fulfill the appropriate abstract value, it is judged to be a category member in one sense but not in another. Finally, Experiment 5 uses the theory developed here to construct artificial dual character concepts and examines whether participants react to these artificial concepts in the same way as naturally occurring dual character concepts. The present studies serve to define the nature of dual character concepts and distinguish them from other types of concepts (e.g., natural kind concepts), which share some, but not all of the properties of dual character concepts. More broadly, these phenomena suggest a normative dimension in everyday conceptual representation. (shrink)

This book deals with the problem of dual-use science research and technology. It first explains the concept of dual use and then offers analyses of collective knowledge and collective ignorance. It goes on to present a theory of collective responsibility, followed by four chapters focusing on a particular scientific field or industry of dual use concern: the chemical industry, the nuclear industry, cyber-technology and the biological sciences. The problem of dual-use science research and technology arises because such research and technology (...) has the potential to be used for great evil as well as for great good. On the one hand, knowledge is a necessary condition, and perhaps a constitutive feature, of technologies that contribute greatly to individual and collective well-being. Consider, for example, nuclear technology that enables the generation of low cost electricity in populations without obvious alternative energy sources. So technological knowledge is a good thing and ignorance of it a bad thing. On the other hand, these same technologies can be extremely harmful to individuals and collectives, as with the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So, at least with respect to some technologies evidently knowledge is a bad thing and ignorance a good thing. Accordingly, the question arises as to whether we ought to limit scientific research and/or the development of technology and, if so, which research or technology, in what manner and to what extent. This book examines the answer to that question. (shrink)

The argument of this article is that the dual-nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision-making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation (...) to both authoritative and non-authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to put forward an original theory of artifact function, which takes on board the results of the debate on the notion of biological function and also accommodates the distinctive aspects of artifacts. More precisely, the paper develops and defends the Dual-Aspect Theory, which is a monist account according to which an artifact’s function depends on intentional and reproductive aspects. It is argued that this approach meets a set of theoretical and meta-theoretical desiderata and is (...) superior to alternative views. (shrink)