Over the past decade the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) as a means of crime prevention has reached unprecedented levels. Though critics of this development do not speak with one voice and have pointed to a number of different problems in the use of CCTV, one argument has played a dominant role in the debate, namely, that CCTV constitutes an unacceptable violation of people’s right to privacy. The purpose of this paper is to examine this argument critically. It (...) is suggested that the argument is hard to sustain. (shrink)

(2002). Privacy rights and public spaces: CCTV and the problem of the “unobservable observer”. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 21-27. doi: 10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992113.

Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...) that statistical inferences can violate privacy rights is lacking in the current literature. Secondly, the conclusion is of practical interest due to the need for moral assessment of emerging predictive algorithms. (shrink)

Privacy rights can surely be waived. But can they also be forfeited? If so, why and under what conditions? This article takes up these questions by developing a novel theory of privacy rights forfeiture that draws inspiration from Judith Thomson’s canonical work on privacy. The paper identifies two species of forfeiture rooted in modes of negligent and reckless conduct and argues that both self-directed and other-regarding considerations play a role in grounding forfeiture. The paper also contributes to the literature by (...) proposing a new taxonomy of how Hohfeldian entitlements can be divested generally. It likewise engages at length with a recent article by Benedict Rumbold and James Wilson in which the authors criticize Thomson’s work and appear to reject the very idea of privacy forfeiture. In response, I make the case that Rumbold and Wilson’s forfeiture-free model of privacy is unconvincing on substantive moral grounds. (shrink)

Recently, Street View has come under public scrutiny due to its apparent disregard for personal privacy. Indeed, individuals should have the right to censor personal information -- prior to its public disclosure - and Street View-like services do seem to call this fundamental right into question. As the issue stands, Street View technology provides a useful service that allows for quick and easy access to most places within the vicinity of a main public road. In response to the (...) public outcry against Street View, which is deemed by some an invasion of privacy, Google has made attempts to improve its privacy policy regarding Street View. Google's aim is to provide "valuable services... that reflect strong privacy standards and practices". So far, it has fallen short of its objective, experiencing dramatic failures that threaten the privacy of its customers. Fortunately, it has attempted to respond to public opinion. Thus, although Street View's current violations are relatively minor, such infringements demand an adequate response, or else the predicament will inevitably worsen. Certain violations must be appropriately redressed and reforms made to prevent both future privacy violations and an escalation of the risk inherent in the services provided by Google. If not, dangerous precedents may be set that will ultimately prove detrimental to individuals' privacy rights. Nevertheless, while limits must be placed on these new services, these services cannot be restricted to the extent that they are in effect rejected. To do so would impede progress. Therefore, the ultimate goal should be to ensure the creation of a service that is compatible with the privacy requirements of the general public. No individual's complaints can be ignored; the violation of one person's rights endangers the rights of all. Moreover, to allow the incorporation of new technology without any limitations would be sheer folly. Advances in technology make greater social responsibility an absolute necessity. Society must strive to ensure that new services promote the welfare of all by setting adequate regulations and actively upholding an individual's fundamental right to privacy. Thus, although there is no denying the benefits that these new services provide, a careful balance must be struck between convenience and privacy. (shrink)

This article concerns the nature and limits of individuals’ rights to privacy over information that they have made public. For some, even suggesting that an individual can have a right to privacy over such information may seem paradoxical. First, one has no right to privacy over information that was never private to begin with. Second, insofar as one makes once-private information public – whether intentionally or unintentionally – one waives one’s right to privacy to that information. In (...) this article, however, we suggest the moral situation is more complicated than this. Rather, we argue that there is a class of public information – namely, once-private information that individuals have made public unintentionally – which remains within the scope of an individuals’ right to privacy, even when it has passed into the public domain. Significantly, this class includes any information rights-holders were unaware could be inferred from information they have made public and which they would not otherwise have wanted to be in the public domain. As we show, as well as clarifying several everyday dilemmas with regards to individuals’ privacy rights, this finding has elucidates a number of problems in the ethics of Big Data. (shrink)

Neurotechnologies are revolutionizing our ability to monitor and modify the brain. As these technologies gather more data, many seek to understand whether brain data raises novel privacy concerns a...

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these (...) are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

We all know that Google stores huge amounts of information about everyone who uses its search tools, that Amazon can recommend new books to us based on our past purchases, and that the U.S. government engaged in many data-mining activities during the Bush administration to acquire information about us, including involving telecommunications companies in monitoring our phone calls. Control over access to our bodies and to special places, like our homes, has traditionally been the focus of concerns about privacy, but (...) access to information about us is raising new challenges for those anxious to protect our privacy. In _Privacy Rights,_ Adam Moore adds informational privacy to physical and spatial privacy as fundamental to developing a general theory of privacy that is well grounded morally and legally. (shrink)

"Provides a definition and defense of individual privacy rights. Applies the proposed theory to issues including privacy versus free speech; drug testing; and national security and public accountability"--Provided by publisher.

There are times when two essential human rights may appear to be in conflict, or need to be balanced against one another. This paper examines the right of a party, such as officials, a group of people or an individual, to ‘privacy and confidentiality’ when others may have a conflicting ‘right to know’ about them. Although similar conflicts have been studied by other researchers, there is still controversy over the rightful balance in situations driven by new information and (...) communication technologies. I conducted a survey on the attitude of college students to the privacy right versus the right to know using an actual case at the university. First, I asked the students if they believed protecting the privacy of a married teacher who had fathered a child with a student was more important than the right of the school to know. Second, I asked if they believed a child born to a single mother in such a relationship has the right to know about his father, or the single mother has the right to keep that information confidential. Third, I asked the students if they believed in general that the ‘right to privacy and confidentiality’ was more important or the ‘right to know’. This paper reports on the results of this survey on 222 students at an international university in Japan. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these (...) are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

In recent years there has been concern among law enforcement and national security organizations about the use of “anonymous” prepaid mobile phone service and its purported role in supporting criminal and terrorist activities. As a result, a number of countries have implemented registration requirements for such service. Privacy rights advocates oppose such regulatory measures, arguing that there is little practical value in attempting to register prepaid mobile devices, and the issue raises important questions about a citizen's entitlement to anonymity in (...) the ownership of a networked communications device. This article provides an overview of the issue and presents findings drawn from a recent study on prepaid mobile phone regulation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The article concludes by suggesting that there are significant problems with the claim that mandatory registration of prepaid mobile phone service is a necessary or an effective regulatory course of action. (shrink)

Plagiarism detection services are a powerful tool to help encourage academic integrity. Adoption of these services has proven to be controversial due to ethical concerns about students’ rights. Central to these concerns is the fact that most such systems make permanent archives of student work to be re-used in plagiarism detection. This computerization and automation of plagiarism detection is changing the relationships of trust and responsibility between students, educators, educational institutions, and private corporations. Educators must respect student privacy rights when (...) implementing such systems. Student work is personal information, not the property of the educator or institution. The student has the right to be fully informed about how plagiarism detection works, and the fact that their work will be permanently archived as a result. Furthermore, plagiarism detection should not be used if the permanent archiving of a student’s work may expose him or her to future harm. (shrink)

Where did the right to privacy come from and what does it mean? Is there an underlying principle uniting various applications of the right? When privacy conflicts with another right, how does one decide which right takes precedence? And how does privacy relate to the government's 'compelling interest' in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens?

Consumer surveys indicate that concerns about privacy are a principal factor discouraging consumers from shopping online. The keypublic policy issue regarding privacy is whether the US should follow its current self-regulation course (where the FTC encourages websites to obtain private “privacy web-seals”), or whether a European style formal legal regulation approach should be adopted in the US.We conclude that the use of assurance seals has worked reasonably well and websites should be free to decide whether they have aprivacy seal or (...) not. Given the narrow scope and the wide variety among these seals, we do argue that the seals should commit themselves to the key features of a good privacy policy and that an opt-in provision be required. We believe that insufficient evidence exists to propose formal Government mandated Internet privacy regulation. (shrink)

Consumer surveys indicate that concerns about privacy are a principal factor discouraging consumers from shopping online. The keypublic policy issue regarding privacy is whether the US should follow its current self-regulation course, or whether a European style formal legal regulation approach should be adopted in the US.We conclude that the use of assurance seals has worked reasonably well and websites should be free to decide whether they have aprivacy seal or not. Given the narrow scope and the wide variety among (...) these seals, we do argue that the seals should commit themselves to the key features of a good privacy policy and that an opt-in provision be required. We believe that insufficient evidence exists to propose formal Government mandated Internet privacy regulation. (shrink)

The concept of privacy as a basic human right which has to be protected by law is a recently adopted concept in Thailand, as the protection of human rights was only legally recognized by the National Human Rights Act in 1999. Moreover, along with other drafted legislation on computer crime, the law on privacy protection has not yet been enacted. The political reform and the influences of globalization have speeded up the process of westernization of the urban, educated middle-class (...) professionals. However, the strength of traditional Thai culture means that a mass awareness of the concept of privacy rights remains scarce. This paper explicates the Thai cultural perspective on privacy and discusses the influence of Buddhism on privacy rights, including the impacts of globalization and the influence of Western values on the country’s political and legal developments. The paper also discusses the legal provisions regarding privacy protection, and the debates on the smart ID cards policy and SIM cards registration for national security. (shrink)

Consumer surveys indicate that concerns about privacy are a principal factor discouraging consumers from shopping online. The keypublic policy issue regarding privacy is whether the US should follow its current self-regulation course (where the FTC encourages websites to obtain private “privacy web-seals”), or whether a European style formal legal regulation approach should be adopted in the US.We conclude that the use of assurance seals has worked reasonably well and websites should be free to decide whether they have aprivacy seal or (...) not. Given the narrow scope and the wide variety among these seals, we do argue that the seals should commit themselves to the key features of a good privacy policy and that an opt-in provision be required. We believe that insufficient evidence exists to propose formal Government mandated Internet privacy regulation. (shrink)

For a person to squeeze his fingers is legal. For a person to face towards another person is legal. For a person to sight down the barrel of a gun is legal. Yet, for that same person to do all three of these things at once is very illegal. Although Google Street View, or GSV for short, and similar services may be comprised of previously accepted functions---operation of an automobile, photography, internet publishing, mapmaking, advertising, etc.---the whole of a thing is (...) far different from the constituent pieces with which it is comprised. The context, accessibility, and ease of manipulation pertaining to the data presented by Google are radically altered by the organization that is fundamental to the product. Google Street View must be evaluated as an experimental and almost completely unprecedented foray into a still developing area of technology. (shrink)

Review of Adam Moore's book Privacy Rights.

Arguing that everyone has a right to privacy as control overaccess to `intimate' aspects of one's life, this author draws on thework of Julie Inness to discuss children's rights to privacy inclassrooms. Even if it is agreed that pupils should exercise this right,a central point is that there may be moral or other value considerationsthat justify setting the right aside. Among selected complexities, animportant extension is the right to psychological processes throughwhich learners acquire new knowledge.

In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides comprehensive rules for the processing of personal data. In addition, the EU lawmaker intends to adopt specific rules to protect confidentiality of communications, in a separate ePrivacy Regulation. Some have argued that there is no need for such additional rules for communications confidentiality. This Article discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality of communications in Europe. We look at the right’s origins to assess the rationale for (...) protecting it. We also analyze how the right is currently protected under the European Convention on Human Rights and under EU law. We show that at its core the right to communications confidentiality protects three individual and collective values: privacy, freedom of expression, and trust in communication services. The right aims to ensure that individuals and organizations can safely entrust communication to service providers. Initially, the right protected only postal letters, but it has gradually developed into a strong safeguard for the protection of confidentiality of communications, regardless of the technology used. Hence, the right does not merely serve individual privacy interests, but also other more collective interests that are crucial for the functioning of our information society. We conclude that separate EU rules to protect communications confidentiality, next to the GDPR, are justified and necessary. (shrink)

Property rights of personal data have been advocated for some time. From the perspective of economics of law some argued that they could lower transaction costs for contracts involving personal data. This may be the case, but new transaction costs are introduced by propertization and the issue has not been settled. In this paper, I focus on a different and potentially more important aspect. In the actual situation, data collectors externalize costs and internalize benefits. An ownership regime that enables every (...) citizen to hold a personal data account, like a bank account, and that gives people ownership rights over secondary use of personal data could correct these misallocations. I hope to shed new light on the normative implications of the issue by offering normative justifications for property rights of personal data (Sections 2–4). Secondly, I present fundamental goals and building blocks of a property regime of personal data (Section 5) and, thirdly, I illustrate how income from personal data ownership could for instance contribute to financing pensions under proper regulation (Section 6). (shrink)

Property rights of personal data have been advocated for some time. From the perspective of economics of law some argued that they could lower transaction costs for contracts involving personal data. This may be the case, but new transaction costs are introduced by propertization and the issue has not been settled. In this paper, I focus on a different and potentially more important aspect. In the actual situation, data collectors externalize costs and internalize benefits. An ownership regime that enables every (...) citizen to hold a personal data account, like a bank account, and that gives people ownership rights over secondary use of personal data could correct these misallocations. I hope to shed new light on the normative implications of the issue by offering normative justifications for property rights of personal data (Sections 2–4). Secondly, I present fundamental goals and building blocks of a property regime of personal data (Section 5) and, thirdly, I illustrate how income from personal data ownership could for instance contribute to financing pensions under proper regulation (Section 6). (shrink)

Moore attempts to show that privacy, conceived as "control over access to oneself and to information about oneself" is "necessary" for human well-being. Moore grounds his argument in an analysis of the need for physical separation, which Moore suggests is universal among animal species. Moore notes, "One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek periods of individual seclusion or small-group intimacy." Citing several studies involving rats and other animals, Moore points out that a lack of such (...) separate space frequently results in threats to survival. Moore goes on to suggest, quite plausibly, that since we evolved from such animals, we share some need for separation. I argue such reasoning involves a conceptual mistake, as a need for physical space and separation is not obviously tantamount to a need for privacy of any kind - much less a need for information privacy. (shrink)

This article compares three frameworks for legal regulation of the human body. Property law systematically favors those who use the body to create commercial products. Yet contract and privacy rights cannot compete with the property paradigm, which alone affords a complete bundle of rights enforceable against the whole world. In the face of researchers' property rights, the theoretical freedom to contract and the meager interest in privacy leave those who supply body parts vulnerable to exploitation.

The legal status of the human body is hotly contested, yet the law of the body remains in a state of confusion and chaos. Sometimes the body is treated as an object of property, sometimes it is dealt with under the rubric of contract, and sometimes it is not conceived as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy rights. Which body of law should become the law of the body? This question is even more pressing in the (...) context of current biomedical research, which permits commodification and commercialization of the body by everyone except the person who provides the “raw materials.” The lack of property protection for tangible parts of the human body is in stark contrast to the extensive protection granted to intellectual property in the body in the form of patents upon human genes and cell lines. Moreover, even courts that reject ownership claims on the part of those who supply body parts appear willing to grant property rights to scientists, universities, and others who use those body parts to conduct research and create products. (shrink)

I develop a contractualist theory of just intelligence collection based on the collective moral responsibility to deliver security to a community and use the theory to justify certain kinds of signals interception. I also consider the rights of various intelligence targets like intelligence officers, service personnel, government employees, militants, and family members of all of these groups in order to consider how targets' waivers or forfeitures might create the moral space for just surveillance. Even people who are not doing anything (...) prejudicial to other states' security can be modeled as ceding rights against diagnostic collection--light touch collection limited to ascertaining if someone is likely an intelligence threat--as part of their duty to support just foreign institutions. Foreign intelligence officers could not perform the same job potential targets can reasonably demand their intelligence agencies perform on their behalf without this ceding of rights. More invasive forms of collection can only be justified if officers can reasonably model their citizens consenting to being the target of the same sort of collection by adversary states. (shrink)

"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

Social media data hold considerable potential for predicting health-related conditions. Recent studies suggest that machine-learning models may accurately predict depression and other mental health-related conditions based on Instagram photos and Tweets. In this article, it is argued that individuals should have a sui generis right not to be subjected to AI profiling based on publicly available data without their explicit informed consent. The article (1) develops three basic arguments for a right to protection of personal data trading on (...) the notions of social control and stigmatization, (2) argues that a number of features of AI profiling make individuals more exposed to social control and stigmatization than other types of data processing (the exceptionalism of AI profiling), (3) considers a series of other reasons for and against protecting individuals against AI profiling based on publicly available data, and finally (4) argues that the EU General Data Protection Regulation does not ensure that individuals have a right not to be AI profiled based on publicly available data. (shrink)

The 2010 competition was the sixth year of the Schubmehl-Prein contest for the Best Essay on Social Impact of Computing. The topic for this year turned was one that turned out to be in the news even more than anticipated -- What Should Individual Privacy Rights Be With Respect To Services Such As "Street View? The topic was originally envisioned primarily as one that would lead students to consider the different concepts of privacy that various countries have enforced in dealing (...) with Street View. But the anticipated scope expanded when Street View hit the news for having intercepted and saved some unsecured wireless traffic during data acquisition. In any case, this year's topic was clearly one that students were able to have fun working on. (shrink)

For the last several decades, ensuring human rights and national security have remained an important goal and a condition for existence of every state. The interests of national security often presuppose the need to narrow some natural rights, such as, for example, the right to privacy, the right to secrecy of communication, etc. Traditional concept of security is related to ensuring national security. According to the traditional concept of security, the state is considered the main object of security; (...) therefore, the states mainly focus on external threats. It is stated that the most important thing is to protect the state from external aggression, ensure protection of state borders and institutions. Protection of human rights is ensured simultaneously. It is, however, observed that a secure state does not necessarily mean that the citizens of the state are secure. Security of a person is under threat due to limitations imposed on human rights while seeking to ensure national security. (shrink)

Civil liberty and privacy advocates have criticized the USA PATRIOT Act (Act) on numerous grounds since it was passed in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001. Two of the primary targets of those criticisms are the Act’s sneak-and-peek search provision, which allows law enforcement agents to conduct searches without informing the search’s subjects, and the business records provision, which allows agents to secretly subpoena a variety of information – most notoriously, library borrowing records. Without attending to (...) all of the ways that critics claim the Act burdens privacy, I examine whether those two controversial parts of the Act, the section 213 sneak-and-peak search and the section 215 business records gag-rule provisions, burden privacy as critics charge. I begin by describing the two provisions. Next, I explain why those provisions don’t burden privacy on standard philosophical accounts. Moreover, I argue that they need not conflict with the justifications for people’s claims to privacy, nor do they undermine the value of privacy on the standard accounts. However, rather than simply concluding that the sections don’t burden privacy, I argue that those provisions are problematic on the grounds that they undermine the value of whatever rights to privacy people have. Specifically, I argue that it is important to distinguish rights themselves from the value that those rights have to the rights-holders, and that an essential element of privacy rights having value is that privacy right-holders be able to tell the extent to which they actually have privacy. This element, which is justified by the right-holders’ autonomy interests, is harmed by the two provisions. (shrink)