In this article we argue that commercial boycotting is not an uncontested economic right. Rather, the practice of boycotting often requires further moral justification. We argue that this justification should not rely solely on the consequences of boycotting, nor should it rely solely on the complicity of the consumer. We suggest that both justifications are subject to pressing objections. In light of these objections, we outline an alternative non‐consequentialist justification of commercial boycotting that is grounded in the moral values of (...) conscience and personal integrity. We then explore the scope of this justification in the legal realm. We focus on cases where consumers lack freedom of exchange due to their contractual obligations and conclude by defending a qualified legal right to breach contracts on conscientious grounds. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law.

In her chapter “Duress and Moral Progress”, Seana Shiffrin offers a novel perspective on coerced promises. According to the dominant view, these promises confer no right to performance on the coercer and do not create new reasons for the victim. Shiffrin accepts that these promises fail to confer rights, but disagrees that they never alter the victim’s moral profile. She argues that they do at least where promises are ‘initiated’ by the victim, rather than ‘dictated’ by the coercer. The initiation (...) of a promise, albeit in far from ideal circumstances, opens the door, Shiffrin claims, to valuable opportunities for moral progress. In this response, I argue that Shiffrin makes a misstep by not rejecting the dominant view altogether. I suggest that the older Hobbesian picture, according to which coerced promises do confer rights, is supported by our moral and legal practices. Furthermore, it makes moral progress more likely. (shrink)