Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption cases—or rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several (...) new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvation—but only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that what makes our ordinary judgements about token causation true can be explicated in terms of interferences into quasi-inertial processes. These interferences and quasi-inertial processes can in turn be fully explicated in scientific terms. In this sense the account presented here is reductive. I will furthermore argue that this version of a process-theory of causation can deal with the traditional problems that process theories have to face, such as the problem of misconnection and the (...) problem of disconnection as well as with a problem concerning the mis-classification of pre-emption cases. (shrink)

Many pressing problems are of the following kind: some collection of actions of multiple people will produce some morally significant outcome (good or bad), but each individual action in the collection seems to make no difference to the outcome. These problems pose theoretical problems (especially for act-consequentialism), and practical problems for agents trying to figure out what they ought to do. Much recent literature on such problems has focused on whether it is possible for each action in such a collection (...) to make such a tiny impact on the world that it makes no expected difference to the outcomes with which we’re concerned. I argue that even if this is impossible, there are cases in which each action makes no difference, not because it has such a tiny effect on the world, but because if it were not performed, a similar action would be. This recognition allows us to connect these problems with discussions of structural injustice. (shrink)

For over a decade now we live under an economic crisis, its metastases, and its effects. Since the turn of the century, we live under recurring security crises and state attempts to prevent them. This article examines the temporal horizons of the strategies the neoliberal state employs to combat the spectre of crisis in its two quintessential fields of action: the economy and security. It notes a pronounced contrast: whereas security strategy is pre-emptive, economic strategy is reactive. These two opposite (...) strategies aim to the same result: to cancel the future. Security strategy seeks to pre-emptively neutralise the possibility of non-liberal politics, canceling the possibility of political change. By not intervening proactively, economic strategy seeks to guarantee that the economy will remain as it is, averting economic change. This attempt of the state to cancel the future is symptomatic of a malaise affecting the capitalist class. Having fully conquered social resistance, the capitalist class tries to render the moment of its triumph permanent, fixing society in an eternal present. For the first time in its history, the capitalist class has neither vision nor appetite for the future. This signals its hegemonic implosion. (shrink)

The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both (...) the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory. (shrink)

Republicanism gives non-domination a central role. However, the modes of domination change over time. Expertise and anticipation have gained growing relevance in this respect. An emergent form of anticipation is pre-emption. This represents a peculiar ‘politics of time’, whereby an eschatological event is set and continuously postponed, past, present and future are no longer sequentially connected, and change reproduces the ruling order. Mainly addressed in relation to the military and security, pre-emption plays a growing role in the environmental (...) field. The paper discusses three examples: human enhancement, responsible innovation and the ‘ecomodernist’ take on the Anthropocene thesis. In all cases, what is promised on one side – respectively, empowerment, participation and care for nature – is denied on the other, hampering a transformative green politics. To circumvent this deadlock the paper explores the connection between non-domination and inoperosity. The latter does not mean passivity, resignation, but action free from the compulsion to achieve and expand. Non-domination requires recognition of limits as constitutive of the relationship with oneself and the world. On this view, a promising terrain of inquiry for civic republicanism is offered by ‘prefigurative’ mobilizations. (shrink)

Republicanism gives non-domination a central role. However, the modes of domination change over time. Expertise and anticipation have gained growing relevance in this respect. An emergent form of anticipation is pre-emption. This represents a peculiar ‘politics of time’, whereby an eschatological event is set and continuously postponed, past, present and future are no longer sequentially connected, and change reproduces the ruling order. Mainly addressed in relation to the military and security, pre-emption plays a growing role in the environmental (...) field. The paper discusses three examples: human enhancement, responsible innovation and the ‘ecomodernist’ take on the Anthropocene thesis. In all cases, what is promised on one side – respectively, empowerment, participation and care for nature – is denied on the other, hampering a transformative green politics. To circumvent this deadlock the paper explores the connection between non-domination and inoperosity. The latter does not mean passivity, resignation, but action free from the compulsion to achieve and expand. Non-domination requires recognition of limits as constitutive of the relationship with oneself and the world. On this view, a promising terrain of inquiry for civic republicanism is offered by ‘prefigurative’ mobilizations. (shrink)

¿Puede la tesis del reemplazo de Raz sobrevivir en el contexto de una teoría dworkiniana del derecho y de la adjudicación? Judging Positivism, de Margaret Martin, fornece una de las mejores reconstrucciones y una de las más interesantes críticas ya planteadas contra la influyente filosofía del derecho de Joseph Raz. En uno de los pasos centrales de su argumento, Martin desafía una sumisión central de Raz, que es el intento de combinar la tesis del reemplazo con la tesis de la (...) justificación normal. Mientras la primera exige que ciudadanos y oficiales excluyan de la deliberación cualesquiera razones de primer orden para la acción, la ultima invita consideraciones sobre legitimidad que no se puede examinar con independencia de las razones de primer orden que la tesis del remplazo pretende excluir. En este comentario crítico, yo acepto la crítica de Martin según la cual esas dos tesis no pueden ser aceptadas como argumentos conceptuales. Sin embargo, sugiero que aún existe un espacio para armonizarlas si se las acepta por razones normativas. Si hay un buen argumento para tratar razones jurídicas como un nivel intermedio de razones para la acción, entonces puede haber buenos argumentos circunstanciales para tratar razones institucionales como remplazantes en el sentido que Raz defiende en su teoría del derecho. (shrink)

Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have...

The pre-emption doctrine as applied to food and drug law argues that manufacturers whose products gain Food and Drug Administration marketing approval are immune from tort liability in state court solely on the basis of their FDA approval. This pre-emption protection applies both to claims of direct damages caused by the product and as well as indirect damages claims.The recent 8-1 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. upheld the manufacturer’s contention that the pre-emption provision (...) in the 1976 Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act completely precluded civil damages suits by injured plaintiffs in state court. Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter. (shrink)

The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic raises a host of challenging ethical questions at every level of society. However, some of the most acute questions relate to decision making in intensive care. The problem is that a small but significant proportion of patients develop severe viral pneumonitis and respiratory failure. It now seems likely that the number of critically ill patients will overwhelm the capacity of intensive care units within many health systems, including the National Health Service in the UK. The experience (...) of Northern Italy—a couple of weeks ahead of the UK, suggests that it will simply not be possible to provide mechanical ventilation to every patient who might need it. When the crunch comes, the unpalatable question facing clinicians is which patient to save. There are some obvious strategies to avoid or reduce the problem—through measures to increase intensive care capacity, and via society-level interventions to reduce the spread of the virus. These are vitally important, but unfortunately they are unlikely to prevent the problem of demand outstripping supply from occurring. What, then, should clinicians do? How should they allocate the scarce resource of intensive care—particularly over the coming weeks as the crisis escalates? There are different values at stake in triage decisions, but at a basic level the key values are those of benefit and …. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation into the notion of degree of influence, and its application to the problem of pre-emption. In 'Causation as Influence', Lewis presented a new account of causation under determinism and some new observations on the problem of pre-emption. He claimed that, in cases of pre-emption, the pre-empting cause is much more of a cause than its pre-empted alternative; it has much more influence. I begin by trying to make sense of the notion of (...) degree of influence. Then I emend Lewis's approach to pre-emption in response to objections, compare it to Kvart's Sustainably Reducible Influence account, and finally conclude that all these accounts fail to solve the problem of pre-emption. (shrink)

The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. affirmed the doctrine of pre-emption protection only for those medical devices reaching U.S. markets via the PMA process and preserved the previous Lohr v. Medtronic decision's lack of preemption protection for those medical devices marketed via the generally more abbreviated 510 clearance mechanism. This paper reviews the logic and faults of the Riegel decision and discusses the implications of the Riegel decision for pre-emption protection for other (...) classes of FDA-approved medical products. (shrink)

In this paper I examine a recent argument that regularity approaches to causation can easily solve the problem of pre-emption. If this argument were successful it would neatly solve the problem of pre-emption—a problem that many still consider to be a central unsolved problem for accounts of causation. The argument is surprising in that the conclusion goes against the common consensus that regularity accounts of causation cannot solve the problem of pre-emption, at least without major amendments. This (...) consensus was one of the reasons for the decline in popularity of the regularity approach and the rise in popularity (for a few decades at least) of the counterfactual approach. In its fullest form the recent argument is due to Strevens (Causation and explanation, topics in contemporary philosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007). He claims, "Mackie's account supplies, without any of the complex amendments now standard in counterfactual theories, a completely satisfactory treatment of the standard cases of pre-emption". This paper examines this argument and refutes it. I argue that Mackie's account really does fail to solve the problem of pre-emption; it fails to account for even the standard cases of pre-emption in the literature. (shrink)

This article examines emergency ambulance calls made by lay callers for patients found to be in cardiac arrest when the paramedics arrived. Using conversation analysis, we explored the trajectories of calls in which the caller, before being asked by the call-taker, said why they were calling, that is, calls in which callers pre-empted a reason-for-the-call. Caller pre-emption can be disruptive when call-takers first need to obtain an address and telephone number. Pre-emptions have further implications when call-takers reach the stage (...) when they are required to deliver the scripted turn ‘tell me exactly what happened’. When there has been a pre-emption earlier on, callers tend to treat the scripted turn as a request for more information and may not repeat their reason-for-the-call. This can occasion delays and important information can be lost. We identified an effective alternative strategy used by some call-takers, pre-emption repeat, which callers treat as a request for confirmation. (shrink)

In this volume, Lloyd Strickland makes the key philosophical writings of maverick Enlightenment philosopher André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (1716-1764) available in English for the first time. His writings contain many provocative ideas and arguments, and anticipate modern developments such as open theism, process theology, and animal theodicy.

This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation, can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the (...) much-maligned fragility response to the problems of late pre-emption by understanding fragility in counterpart-theoretic terms. Some reasons to prefer this CCT approach to rivals are discussed. (shrink)

This article develops a notion of the ‘politics of time’ in order to analyse the effects that imaginations of future emergencies have in the fields of law and economy. Building on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social time, it focuses on the multiplex temporalities in contemporary society, which are shown to interact differently with the ‘emergency imaginary’. We demonstrate that the apprehension of the future in terms of sudden, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic events reinforces current modes of producing financial futurity, while (...) it undermines the procedural rhythm and retroactive sentencing of liberal law. As a whole, the article supplements the analysis of the ‘politics of truth’ prevalent in the current debate about precaution and pre-emption with a theoretical perspective on social temporality. (shrink)

A paradox at the heart of language acquisition research is that, to achieve adult-like competence, children must acquire the ability to generalize verbs into non-attested structures, while avoiding utterances that are deemed ungrammatical by native speakers. For example, children must learn that, to denote the reversal of an action, un- can be added to many verbs, but not all (e.g., roll/unroll; close/*unclose). This study compared theoretical accounts of how this is done. Children aged 5–6 (N = 18), 9–10 (N = (...) 18), and adults (N = 18) rated the acceptability of un- prefixed forms of 48 verbs (and, as a control, bare forms). Across verbs, a negative correlation was observed between the acceptability of ungrammatical un- prefixed forms (e.g., *unclose) and the frequency of (a) the bare form and (b) alternative forms (e.g., open), supporting the entrenchment and pre-emption hypotheses, respectively. Independent ratings of the extent to which verbs instantiate the semantic properties characteristic of a hypothesized semantic cryptotype for un- prefixation were a significant positive predictor of acceptability, for all age groups. The relative importance of each factor differed for attested and unattested un- forms and also varied with age. The findings are interpreted in the context of a new hybrid account designed to incorporate the three factors of entrenchment, pre-emption, and verb semantics. (shrink)

The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting-point the suggestion that C causes E iff (C E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (E C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre-emption. It is found that the 'reversed' counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre-emption (...) with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general, philosophical account of the use of harmful force in self-defence as a type of retaliation. It argues that pre-emption — the use of harmful force for prevention — is not an act of self-defence. The associations between the concepts of retaliation, self-defence, and pre-emption are discussed.

L'ordre juridique qui se met en place, en France, aux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge a encore tout récemment été l'objet de riches débats : l'auto-développement des coutumes, l'autorité des droits savants et l'interventionnisme du roi de France ont notamment été au cœur de vives controverses historiographiques. La lecture des sources est à l'origine de querelles interprétatives, auxquelles s'ajoutent des difficultés méthodologiques que rencontrent les historiens du droit. Tandis que l'historien n'a accès qu'à une proportion infime du concret, celui-ci s'efforce (...) de combler ces lacunes, parfois même à l'aide d'une projection des catégories juridiques contemporaines. Cet anachronisme des concepts – parfois couplé à un anachronisme des faits – ne constitue-t-il pas l'un des vices rédhibitoires de la discipline? Cette méthode ne présente-t-elle pas, à l'inverse, une indéniable vertu heuristique et disciplinaire? Certains estiment alors que la théorie du droit est anhistorique, quand d'autres critiquent l'emploi par les historiens des concepts contemporains, comme la hiérarchie des normes, la souveraineté ou encore l'État. Outre de telles projections, c'est le sens donné à certains signifiants médiévaux ou modernes qui peut être relativisé, comme c'est le cas notamment pour les notions de droit positif, de droit commun ou encore de loi. Ces difficultés révèlent aussi à certains égards l'ambivalence de l'histoire du droit, écartelée entre science historique et dogmatique juridique. Ce livre propose alors une réflexion épistémologique sur l'un des grands enjeux de l'historiographie juridique contemporaine : peut-on penser l'ordre juridique médiéval et moderne à partir des catégories juridiques contemporaines? (shrink)

When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching/short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s causal (...) intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment? (shrink)