A. Whitney Sanford: Growing Stories from India: Religion and the Fate of Agriculture Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10806-012-9394-y Authors Frederick Kirschenmann, Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Iowa State University, Ames, LA, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a (...) path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. (shrink)

I. INTRODUCTION The notion of randomness has always been rather perplexing. Altho it is frequently used in natural and social science, both technically a informally, it seems to have been somewhat neglected by philosophers o science ever since the discussion of the foundations of the so-called fre- quency theory of probability, in which it was assigned a basic role, faded. Yet this discussion is of such significance that any attempt clarifying the notion of randomness will have to relate to it. (...) After a fe preliminary remarks on some of the problems and puzzles of randomne I shall, therefore, expound and discuss a concept of random distribution of a property in classes and sequences, defined in terms of relative f quencies and their limits. Because of certain shortcomings of this conce it appears advisable to turn to probabilities, in terms of which a qu different concept, viz., that of random conjunction of properties, can rea ily be defined as stochastic independence. This concept still has featu clashing with the ordinary sense of 'randomness' which become ma fest in cases where certain probabilities assume extreme values. However when we take measures defined in information theory as measuring the degree of randomness, to which purpose they lend themselves parti larly well, we find that these seemingly troublesome cases are rath harmless. A by-product of the discussion of measures of randomnes the concept of primitive randomness. The conclusion points out som further problems. (shrink)

Many have argued for a new, environmental or ecolegical ethics. Can nature, or natural science, provide the basic principles for such an ethics? Or, can the issues involved be adequately analysed in terms of rights, interests, and duties to future generations? The papor explores the idea of an intrinsic value of what exists in nature with respect to these questions, especially those of Conservation and preservation. The idea can provide a supplementary basis for an ethics of preservation, leading to certain (...) prima facie duties. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the idealizational interpretation of the dialectical Marxist methodology of science which has been worked out and applied in a diversity of ways by L. Nowak and the other members of the so-called Pozna school. I examine the sense in which, and the extent to which, this methodology is or can be said to be dialectical. Subsequently, I discuss and criticize Nowak's claim that this methodology can function at the same time as a meta-methodology; I (...) do this in connection with a corresponding and equally questionable claim put forward by I. Lakatos, and with one of Nowak's concrete examples, which is meant to show that certain developments in neopositivist methodology of science followed his (meta-)methodology. Lastly, I comment on the normative-descriptive character of Nowak's methodology, examine its adequacy as a comprehensive account of science, compare it with alternative accounts of the place and role of idealizations in science, and raise the question of whether Nowak's idealizational theory of socio-economic formation is a refutation or a dialectical negation of Marx's historical materialism. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the idealizational interpretation of the dialectical Marxist methodology of science which has been worked out and applied in a diversity of ways by L. Nowak and the other members of the so-called Poznań school. I examine the sense in which, and the extent to which, this methodology is or can be said to be dialectical. Subsequently, I discuss and criticize Nowak's claim that this methodology can function at the same time as a meta-methodology; I (...) do this in connection with a corresponding and equally questionable claim put forward by I. Lakatos, and with one of Nowak's concrete examples, which is meant to show that certain developments in neopositivist methodology of science followed his methodology. Lastly, I comment on the normative-descriptive character of Nowak's methodology, examine its adequacy as a comprehensive account of science, compare it with alternative accounts of the place and role of idealizations in science, and raise the question of whether Nowak's idealizational theory of socio-economic formation is a refutation or a dialectical negation of Marx's historical materialism. (shrink)

A philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics presupposes a clear understanding of what is asserted by this theory. The aim of this paper is to help clarify one specific theorem of quantum mechanics, namely the so-called uncertainty relations. The surprisingly wide spread belief that these relations generally imply a reciprocal or inversely proportional relationship between the respective uncertainties is shown to be mistaken. Several reasons why this mistaken belief has been embraced are suggested. The conditions under which one could say that (...) the uncertainty relations imply an inversely proportional relationship between uncertainties are specified. (shrink)

The Anthropic Principle (AP), in its many versions, has received diverging assessments. I mainly examine the less speculative weak (WAP) and strong (SAP) versions and their assessments. I argue, among others, the following points. The construal of the WAP asa consistency requirement or a truth of (Bayesian) confirmation theory, while correct, does not quite capture its spirit. The charge of its being a tautology, which occasionscomparisons with the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS), is overstated. Still, in contrast with PNS's role, (...) it is never substantially involved in „anthropic explanations”. „Many worlds”-hypotheses, joined to the SAP, can yield (rather speculative) explanation. Friends of the AP roughly accept common scientific standards, which make the AP appear — even to some of them — as a temporary stop-gap. (shrink)