The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification (...) of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early and late. Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

One of the most important tasks in each philosophical tradition is to determine the methodological foundations and the target reason for research practice. Russian Russian neo-Kantianism raises several fundamental questions, including the criteria for distinguishing individual systems and the possibility of their integral reconstruction, the identification of the independence of Russian philosophers in overcoming the key contradictions of transcendental idealism, as well as discussions regarding the contribution of Russian neo-Kantians to the history of the development of Russian and European (...) philosophy. No less significant is the problem of uniting Russian neo-Kantianism in the context of the general tradition of neo-Kantianism in its development to the latest trends. The prospect of turning to the heritage of Russian philosophers is largely determined by the design of post-Kantianism and post-Neo-Kantianism. In the works of A.I. Vvedensky, and then B.A. Focht, V.E. Seseman, S.L. Rubinstein, and many others, the transition from German classical idealism in the prism of the specifics of Russian philosophy to the formation of a new understanding of transcendental philosophy and its tasks was marked. In many ways, the proposed solutions were distinguished by originality and obvious independence, but at the same time they were implicitly within the boundaries of the tradition of German neo-Kantian philosophy set by I. Kant. Comparing the latest prospects for the development of neo-Kantian methodology, it can be assumed, not without reason, that Russian neo-Kantianism has largely anticipated the latest trends. Russian neo-Kantians need to reveal the unity of the entire tradition for an objective assessment and subsequent actualization of the heritage of the Russian Neo-Kantians, accompanying this process with a historical and philosophical reconstruction of individual systems of philosophy, but also identifying those perspectives for philosophy that were designated by Russian thinkers. Russian neo-Kantians' problem field of self-determination within the framework of the history of Russian and European philosophy is proposed in the content of the article. Special attention is focused on the unity of methodological tasks and the target reason for the research practices of thinkers who at different stages of their development contributed to the formation of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism is traditionally seen as a philosophy that was formed to develop and actualise Kant’s philosophy and Kantian transcendental methodology. However, Kant was the determining, but by no means the only, influence on the emergence of the neo-Kantian tradition. Neo-Kantianism was strongly influenced by the entire German post-Kantian philosophy, especially by Fichte and Hegel, although neo-Kantians have repeatedly tried to dissociate themselves from the great idealists. In many ways neo-Kantianism was cultivated by the Fichtean reading of (...) Kant, which enabled succeeding philosophers, notably H.-G. Gadamer, to consider neo-Kantianism to be “hidden neo-Fichteanism”. The main goal of this study is a historical-philosophical reconstruction of the image of Fichtean philosophy formed within German neo-Kantianism. To achieve this aim I have analysed the key projects of the German neo-Kantians in which the influence of Fichte’s philosophy, in particular his interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, is most clearly manifested. I show that the theory of values of the Southwest neo-Kantians and the ethics of pure will of the Marburg neo-Kantians are associated with the Fichtean revision of Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. The following, in my opinion, are the main features of the image of Fichte’s philosophy: it is close to neo-Kantians precisely because it strives to combine theoretical and practical reason; it is in ethics that Fiche’s ideas are most manifest in neo-Kantianism; neo-Kantian original theories contain the ideas of self-consciousness “in the spirit” of Fichte. The conclusion is drawn that the growth of the metaphysical component in neo-Kantian doctrines may be connected with the influence of Fichte’s philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary PhilosophyFrederick BeiserRudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, editors. Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. Pp. ix. + 331. Paper, $27.95.This collection of essays testifies to the growing interest in neo-Kantianism in the Anglophone world. The editors boast that “it is the first of its kind published in English,” though they have been beat to the (...) post by an issue of the The Philosophical Forum (Vol. XXXIX, no. 2, Summer 2008), Back to Kant: Neo-Kantianism and its Relevance Today, edited by Andrew Chignell, Terence Irwin, and Thomas Teufel. Still, claims to priority are of small moment where quality is concerned, and the many valuable essays in this volume more than compensate for second place. In their introductory essay, Makkreel and Luft make a convincing case for the continuing relevance of neo-Kantianism in contemporary philosophy. Basically, nearly every philosophical movement of the twentieth century—phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, positivism, Frankfurt school—was influenced by, or grew out of a reaction to, neo-Kantianism, so that we cannot understand and assess these movements unless we have a handle on neo-Kantianism itself. The editors missed a trick, however, when they failed to mention the concept of normativity, which plays such a big role in contemporary philosophy, and whose roots lie in neo-Kantianism.Despite the high quality of many of its essays, this volume suffers from a lack of balance and perspective. Contemporary scholars on neo-Kantianism tend to focus on the Marburg school, especially the work of Cohen, Cassirer, and Natorp. This volume reflects this bias: almost all the articles are centered on these figures. Only two essays focus on the Southwestern or Baden school: one on Emil Lask by Steven Crowell, another on Dilthey and the neo-Kantians by Makkreel. The latter article, however, is more a defense of Dilthey than a study of the neo-Kantians. The important contributions of the Southwestern school to value-theory, and the logic of history and the social sciences, receive scant treatment.The lack of balance is especially evident in the case of the neo-Friesian school, which is never mentioned. This school of neo-Kantianism prospered in Göttingen in the early twentieth century under the leadership of Leonard Nelson. Its members—the theologian Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), the psychiatrist Arthur Kronfeld (1886–1941), the Nobel Prize winner Otto Meyerhoff (1884–1951), and the mathematician Gerhard Hessenberg (1874–1925)—were eminent in their own right and advocated noble social and political causes. Their circle is of great cultural interest, and it deserves a place in history no less than the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Following Fries, Nelson developed an anthropological interpretation of Kant competing with the logicist interpretation of the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Nowadays Heidegger is given credit for the anthropological interpretation, though its origins ultimately go back to Fries.The bias in perspective becomes explicit in the essay by Manfred Kühn, “Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians.” Kühn attempts to find the common [End Page 145] interpretation of Kant in the Marburg and Southwestern schools, and locates it in the Platonized version of Kant of the later Cohen, an interpretation that eliminates sensibility and stresses the autonomy of pure thought. Kühn’s generalization is problematic for three reasons: (1) It ignores the anthropological interpretation of the Friesian school; (2) it scarcely works for the Southwestern school, which never eliminated Kant’s sensibility (Kühn bases his interpretation on a single later essay by Rickert, as if it held for all his earlier work and for Windelband and Lask); and (3) it applies only to the later Cohen, who took the plunge toward an objective idealist interpretation only in his 1896 Einleitung mit kritischen Nachtrag zur neunten Auflage der Geschichte des Materialismus. Although there are indeed Platonic tendencies to Cohen’s thinking even in the late 1860s, they do not erase the Kantian dualism between understanding and sensibility, which remains well in place even in the second edition of Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung (1885). On the whole, Kühn’s interpretation is very anachronistic... (shrink)

This innovative collection traces the heretical development of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy. The book offers an original study that comprises unprecedented investigations into the kinaesthetic, pre-linguistic, poetic, historical, artistic, social and political dimensions of the productive power of imagination.

The meaning and validity of Kant’s Kant’s doctrine of schematism remains contested until today. In neo-Kantianism and post-War transcendental philosophy, Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is transformed drastically. Kant’s thesis of heterogeneity is overcome by taking it back into the internal relationships of the structure of cognition. The spontaneity of thought, performing schematizations, is retained, but Kant’s project of conceiving of the foundations of knowledge in the fashion of a theory of apperception of the I (...) as well as the externality of the given and the determination of the given that goes along with it is sublated by an objective order of validity-noematic constitution and regulation. Kant’s doctrine of schematism, then, shows to be methodology. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on several ‘post-Kantians’ who were active between roughly the late 1780s and late 1880s, and whose views on ethics are of continuing interest in the early twenty-first century. These include Jacobi, Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The era under discussion begins historically with the French Revolution and the initial public assimilation of the Kantian philosophy, and ends when the Second German Empire succeeded in establishing itself and neo-Kantianism was beginning to consolidate its (...) hold on academic philosophy. (shrink)

The article presents the philosophical thought of Rudolf Zocher, Wolfgang Cramer and Hans Wagner, whose theoretical stance can be dubbed Neoneo-Kantianism. The article investigates their philosophical output and argues that they developed a transcendental reflection of a different kind than that of Baden Neo-Kantianism. The transcendental reflection of Neoneo-Kantianism, especially in the work of Hans Wagner, takes on the topic of phenomenological inquiry and treats consciousness as a source of subject- object distinction, unlike Rickert and Windelband, who (...) were developing transcendental reflection focused on aprioristic forms of cognition, much in the post-Fichtean vein, thus giving primacy to the subjective conditions of possible experience. (shrink)

RESUMENEl intento del presente artículo es investigar el lugar de Ortega en el panorama del pensamiento europeo, especialmente alemán, de la primera mitad del siglo XX, utilizando uno de los conceptos fundamentales de su filosofía, es decir, el concepto de la «generación». Por tanto se defiende la tesis de que Ortega puede ser considerado como uno de los representantes de la generación post-neokantiana llamada por él mismo la generación de 1911 y que el pensamiento orteguiano se inscriba en el (...) programa intelectual de filósofos como: Nicolai Hartmann, Heinz Heimsoeth, Karl Jaspers o Martin Heidegger. Todos estos filósofos brotan de la tradición neokantiana y la superan creando una nueva actitud filosófica centrándose en la reflexión ontológica y en el proyecto de superar el idealismo moderno.PALABRAS CLAVESORTEGA, GENERACIÓN, NEOKANTISMO, POST-NEOKANTISMO, ONTOLOGÍA, IDEALISMO ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to investigate the site of Ortega in the panorama of European, especially German thought, in the first half of the twentieth century, using one of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy, that is, the concept of «generation». Therefore I will defend the thesis that Ortega can be considered as one of the representatives of the post-neo-Kantian generation, called by himself the «generation of 1911» and that Ortega’s thought participates in the intellectual program of philosophers such as: Nicolai Hartmann, Heinz Heimsoeth, Karl Jaspers or Martin Heidegger. All these philosophers emerge from the neo-Kantian tradition but it overcomes, creating a new philosophical attitude, focusing on ontological reflection and on the project to overcome modern idealism.KEYWORDSORTEGA, GENERATION, NEO-KANTIANISM, POST-NEO-KANTIANISM, ONTOLOGY, IDEALISM. (shrink)

This innovative collection traces the heretical development of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy. The book offers an original study that comprises unprecedented investigations into the kinaesthetic, pre-linguistic, poetic, historical, artistic, social and political dimensions of the productive power of imagination.

The physiologist Johannes Müller’s doctrine of specific nerve energies had a decisive influence on neo-Kantian conceptions of the objectivity of knowledge in the 1850s - 1870s. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Müller amassed a body of experimental evidence to support his doctrine, according to which the character of our sensations is determined by the structures of our own sensory nerves, and not by the external objects that cause the sensations. Neo-Kantians such as Hermann von Helmholtz, F.A. Lange, (...) and Otto Liebmann took Müller’s doctrine to have far-reaching consequences for their epistemologies. Over the course of the 1850s - 1870s, these three neo-Kantians, each in his own way, argued that reflection on Müller’s doctrine ruled out a certain conception of the objectivity of knowledge. It ruled out the view that knowledge is objective in virtue of affording us information about objects in a mind-independent external world. -/- This paper traces how Helmholtz, Lange, and Liebmann developed their arguments for this view, and how each developed his own alternative conception of objectivity, according to which objectivity has nothing to do with a mind-independent world. Finally, the paper concludes by considering why these arguments modelled on Müller’s doctrine would have been so powerful against rival post-Hegelian conceptions of objectivity, especially those of scientific materialists like Ludwig Büchner. (shrink)

Consider the claims that representations of physical laws are intersubjective, and that they ultimately provide the foundation for all other intersubjective knowledge. Those claims, as well as the deeper philosophical commitments that justify them, constitute rare points of agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer and their positivist rival, Ernst Mach. This is surprising, since Natorp and Cassirer are both often at pains to distinguish their theories of natural scientific knowledge from positivist views like Mach’s, and (...) often from Mach’s views in particular. Thus the very fact of this agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians and their positivist stalking horse points to a deep current of ideas that runs beneath the whole of the post-Kantian intellectual context they shared. (shrink)

Johannes Daubert he was an acknowledged leader, and in some respects the founder, of the early phenomenological movement, and was considered – as much by its members as by Husserl himself – the most brilliant member of the group. In Daubert’s unpublished writings we find a series of reflections on Lask, and on Neo-Kantianism, which form the subject-matter of this paper. They range over topics such as the ontology of the ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, truthvalues (Wahrheitswerte) and the (...) value of truth, negative judgments and the copula, and the relation between perception and judgment. (shrink)

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and (...) the wider scope of intellectual history. (shrink)

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

This comprehensive treatment of Neo-Kantianism discusses the main topics and key figures of the movement and their intersection with other 20th-century philosophers. With the advent of phenomenology, existentialism, and the Frankfurt School, Neo-Kantianism was deemed too narrowly academic and science-oriented to compete with new directions in philosophy. These essays bring Neo-Kantianism back into contemporary philosophical discourse. They expand current views of the Neo-Kantians and reassess the movement and the philosophical traditions emerging from it. This groundbreaking volume provides (...) new and important insights into the history of philosophy, the scope of transcendental thought, and Neo-Kantian influence on the sciences and intellectual culture. (shrink)

These essays bring Neo-Kantianism back into contemporary philosophical discourse.

The relativistic revolution led to varieties of neo-Kantianism in which constitutive principles define the object of scientific knowledge in a domain-dependent and historically mutable manner. These principles are a priori insofar as they are necessary premises for the formulation of empirical laws in a given domain, but they lack the self-evidence of Kant’s a priori and they cannot be identified without prior knowledge of the theory they purport to frame. In contrast, the rationalist endeavors of a few masters of (...) theoretical physics have led to comprehensibility conditions that are easily admitted in a given domain and yet suffice to generate the theory of this domain. The purpose of this essay is to compare these two kinds of relativized a priori, to discuss the nature of the comprehensibility conditions, and to demonstrate their effectiveness in a modular conception of physical theories. (shrink)

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

By drawing on the insights of diverse scholars from around the globe, this volume systematically investigates the meaning and reality of the concept of negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy—German Idealism, Early German Romanticism, and Neo-Kantianism. The reader benefits from the historical, critical, and systematic investigations contained which trace not only the significance of negation in these traditions, but also the role it has played in shaping the philosophical landscape of Post-Kantian philosophy. By drawing attention to historically neglected thinkers (...) and traditions, and positioning the dialogue within a global and comparative context, this volume demonstrates the enduring relevance of Post-Kantian philosophy for philosophers thinking in today’s global context. This text should appeal to graduate students and professors of German Idealism, Post-Kantian philosophy, comparative philosophy, German studies, and intellectual history. (shrink)

Russian neo-Kantianismʼs status in the history of the development of Russian philosophy is an important, but poorly presented in scientific publications, issue is revealed in the article. With some exceptions, which are represented by a number of few, but informative and informative articles and a monograph, the problem remains without proper reception in the scientific discourse of our time. Russian neo-Kantianism, however, leaving aside the question of what is the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism, it is impossible to productively (...) and consistently actualize the content of Russian neo-Kantians and, moreover, to show their significance in the history of Russian philosophical and socio-humanitarian thought in general. Three key difficulties stand out: 1) the question of originality and the related theme of the independence of the philosophical direction (originality, independence and originality – differ from each other, but are united in their immanent orientation); 2) Russian neo-Kantianism, which in many ways seems to be the most difficult task for researchers engaged in historical and philosophical reconstruction; 3) the question remains ambiguous as to whether Russian neo-Kantianism is a continuation of the German tradition or whether it is a direction of Russian philosophy of thought. Russian neo-Kantianism, the three difficulties identified in the reception of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism taken as a whole, are consistently revealed in the content of the proposed article, supplemented by a brief overview of the most systemic positions of Russian philosophers, ranked among Russian neo-Kantianism. Overcoming the indicated difficulties, which undoubtedly affect the objective disclosure of the creativity of each representative of Russian neo-Kantianism or thinkers related to them, seems appropriate not only from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, but also for actualizing the heritage of philosophers in the conditions of modern socio-humanitarian pragmatics. Russian neo-Kantianism The author of the article suggests that one of the ways to overcome the ambiguity of the definition of Russian neo-Kantianism in the history of Russian thought may be, firstly, a more detailed consecration of the activities of Russian neo-Kantians in the historical and philosophical literature, and secondly, a comprehensive representation of this direction, including studies of individual personalities and their works. Despite the controversial and polemical nature of the task, its formulation is necessary for the objectivity of the meaning of Russian thought in the global context. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.

This chapter presents an overview of the Neo‐Kantian movement in philosophy that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that was concentrated geographically in Germany. Following a summary of the institutional and intellectual context surrounding Neo‐Kantianism, the chapter explores the core philosophical principles associated with the movement, attending in particular to the ways in which Neo‐ Kantian philosophers appropriate and depart from the core tenets of Kant's critical philosophy. After briefly surveying the context in which Neo‐Kantianism (...) took shape, the chapter surveys the two major “schools” into which the movement crystallized around 1880: the Marburg School, comprised primarily of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, and the Baden, or Southwest School, comprised principally of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Both schools of Neo‐ Kantianism are marked by a rich and fascinating process of internal conceptual development. (shrink)

The paper uses the Neo-Kantian distinction between Natural and Human sciences and its methodological implications to navigate W. E. B. Du Bois’s and Alain L. Locke’s theories of race. In tracing a continuity between these two figures, the paper also shows how their respective reliance on Neo-Kantian categories leads them to different results. The goal is to show how, while Du Bois’s Neo-Kantianism is best understood as a Diltheyan Neo-Kantianism of the psycho-physical unity of human nature influenced by (...) an anti-metaphysical orientation, Locke’s Neo-Kantianism can be seen as a Neo-Kantianism whose focus is the rejection of causality and of the causal nexus between biological and non-biological traits. (shrink)

This article deals with Moritz Schlick's critical realism and its sources that dominated his philosophy until about 1925. It is shown that his celebrated analysis of Einstein's relativity theory is the result of an earlier philosophical discussion about space perception and its role for the theory of space. In particular, Schlick's "method of coincidences" did not owe anything to "entirely new principles" based on the work of Einstein, Poincaré or Hilbert, as claimed by Michael Friedman, but was already in place (...) before these principles were developed. The first part of the article is devoted to Alois Riehl's critical realism—a neo-Kantian variant which rejects the dominant interpretation of the thing-in-itself as a mere limiting concept and takes empirical theories of space perception into consideration. The second part deals with the central role of "Psychological Parallelism" for Riehl and its integration with Kant's epistemology. In the third part it is shown that Schlick's theory of knowledge is based on Riehl's intricate reworking of Kantian epistemology, physiological psychology, theory of sense perception and philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion stresses the position of the unity of consciousness in Riehl's philosophy which Schlick admittedly cannot cope with. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) was among the most accomplished Jewish philosophers of modern times. This newly translated collection of his writings illuminates his achievements for student readers and rectifies lapses in his intellectual reception by prior generations.

Neo‐Kantianism, a movement with roots deep in the nineteenth century, dominated German academic philosophy between 1890 and 1920. Though it carried the impulse of German Idealism into the culture of the twentieth century and set the agenda for philosophies which displaced it, the movement is little studied now. One encounters it primarily in liberation narratives constructed by those whose own thinking took shape in the clash between neo‐Kantianism and the “rebellious” interwar generation spearheaded by jaspers (see Article 17) (...) and heidegger (see Article 18). Thus, before Heidegger – so Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1978, p. 294) – “philosophy was not so much communicated as drowned in a sea of boredom.” And with Heidegger – so Hans‐Georg Gadamer (Gadamer 1977, p. 214) – “the complacent system‐building of neo‐Kantian methodologism” gave way; its “calm and confident aloofness … suddenly seemed to be mere child's play” (Gadamer 1977, p. 230). Here neo‐Kantianism is the terminus ad quem of a “liberation from the unbreakable circle of reflection” toward recovery of the “evocative power of conceptual thinking and philosophical language” (Gadamer 1977, p. 202). It thus enters the lore of Continental philosophy as the father who had to be slain in order that philosophy might live. (shrink)

This article is a novel assessment of Hermann Cohen’s theoretical philosophy, starting out from his Kant interpretation. Hermann Cohen was the head and founder of the Marburg School of Neo- Kantianism. In the beginning, hence, I will commence with some initial reflections on the makeup and importance of this school, before I move on to Cohen’s revolutionary Kant interpretation and its ramification for the Marburg School in general.

This article defends the paradoxical thesis that neo-Kantianism is better described as neo-Fichteanism rather than neo-Kantianism. It maintains that neo-Kantianism is closer to Fichte than Kant in four fundamental respects: in its nationalism, socialism, activism, and in its dynamic and quantitative conception of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. By contrast, Kant’s philosophy was cosmopolitan, liberal, non-activist quietist and held a static and qualitative view of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. I attempt to explain why it (...) took the neo-Kantians so long to recognize these profound affinities with Fichte: they were influenced by Fries conception of Fichte as a speculative metaphysician. I argue that the hold of Friesian interpretation of Fichte was first broken by Emil Lask in his Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte. (shrink)

After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophical subjects. The essays discuss classical figures and themes, including the Marburg and Southwestern Schools, Cohen, Cassirer, Rickert, and Natorp's psychology. In addition they examine lesser-known topics, including the (...) Neo-Kantian influence on theory of law, Husserlian phenomenology, Simmel's study of Rembrandt, Cassirer's philosophy of science, Cohen's philosophy of religion in relation to Rawls and Habermas, and Rickert's theory of number. This rich exploration of a major philosophical movement will interest scholars and upper-level students of Kant, twentieth-century philosophy, continental philosophy, sociology, and psychology. (shrink)

The phenomenon of sacrifice was a major problem in nineteenth-century social thought about religion for a variety of reasons. These surfaced in a spectacular way in a German trial in which the most prominent Jewish philosopher of the century, the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, was asked to be an expert witness. The text he produced on the nature of Judaism was widely circulated and influential. It presents what can be taken as the neo-Kantian approach to understanding ritual. But it also reveals (...) the ways in which neo-Kantianism avoided becoming relativistic social science. In this case, it came to the edge and stopped. Cohen's account is compared to the similar, but ‘empirical’, account of the same material in Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, which completed the transition. (shrink)

In the first two decades of the century Vvedenskij developed and defended what he took to be an original argument in support of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge. This argument, which he hailed as a proof, involved an examination of the four laws of thought alone. As it made no appeal to the highly technical analyses found in Kant''s first Critique, Vvedenskij considered it to be more efficient and thereby effective than Kant''s own arguments. Although Vvedenskij''s estimation of his accomplishment (...) actually increased with the passage of time, the proof rested on highly dubious assumptions. (shrink)

This is a translation of a work increasingly recognized as one of the most important & innovative contributions to the history of philosophy in recent times. Kohnke's account of the impact of the amorphous movement known as neo-Kantianism combines statistical analysis of the actual courses taught at German universities with broader speculation on the political & social tastes of the thinkers discussed. A major contribution to the intellectual history of the nineteenth century, Kohnke's book has profound implications for the (...) way in which the history of philosophy is pursued. Lewis White Beck, the dean of American scholars in this field, has provided a foreword to R. J. Hollingdale's lucid translation, & the whole is likely to have an impact well beyond specialists in nineteenth-century German thought. (shrink)

Recently, Emil Lask’s work has been the object of renewed interest. As it has been noted, Lask’s work is much closer to phenomenology than that of his fellow Neo-Kantians. Many recent contributions to current discussions on this topic have compared his account of logic to Husserl’s. Less attention has been paid to Lask’s original metaphilosophical insights. In this paper, I explore Lask’s conception of transcendental philosophy to show how it led him to a phenomenological conversion. Lask found in Husserl’s Logical (...) Investigations the possibility of grounding transcendental philosophy in purely objective terms, thus avoiding any risk of psychologism. But he also concluded that the tools found in Logical Investigations needed to be complemented by a method which would inquire back fr om the constituted to the constituting and a way of grounding such a methodological move in experience itself. Lask then provided a model for reduction and motivation without bringing a transcendental ego into the picture. (shrink)

In the first two decades of the century Vvedenskij developed and defended what he took to be an original argument in support of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge. This argument, which he hailed as a "proof," involved an examination of the four laws of thought alone. As it made no appeal to the highly technical analyses found in Kant's first Critique, Vvedenskij considered it to be more efficient and thereby effective than Kant's own arguments. Although Vvedenskij's estimation of his accomplishment (...) actually increased with the passage of time, the ‘proof’ rested on highly dubious assumptions. (shrink)

This paper looks at the neo-Kantian response to Darwinism as a historical science. I distinguish four responses to this aspect of Darwin’s thought from within the neo-Kantian tradition. The first line of response, represented by August Stadler and Bruno Bauch, views Darwin’s model of historical explanation as a fulfilment of Kant’s criteria of scientific intelligibility. The second, represented by Otto Liebmann, regards historical explanation as intrinsically limited, because it cannot tell us why nature develops as it does. The third line (...) of response questions whether we can give a historical account of qualitative change. Friedrich Lange expresses this scepticism in general terms, while Alois Riehl and Ernst Cassirer extend it to human beings specifically. A fourth line of response, represented by Heinrich Rickert, challenges the misperception that Darwinian explanatory principles such as natural selection have normative or socio-political significance. (shrink)

The article deals with the main tendencies in the studies of Russian neo-Kantianism in Poland. Although the number and quality of research in the history of Russian neo-Kantianism still cannot be equated with those of the history of German neo-Kantianism, the situation of these studies is constantly changing for the better. The authors mark the undeniable progress in the studies of Russian neo-Kantianism in Poland in the recent years: there are monographs, articles, collections, research projects on (...) particular thinkers or themes related to the history of Russian neo-Kantianism. The authors consider A. Noras’s idea of the development of neo-Kantianism into post-neo-Kantianism rather heuristic. One of the main features of this development is the ontologization of the cognitive process. This “ontological turn”, typical of Russian neo-Kantianism, in particular as represented by S. Hessen, V. Sesemann, B. Jakovenko, is, on the one hand, the hallmark of the entire Russian philosophy and, on the other, it brings together the philosophical efforts of Russian neo-Kantians and the conception of the author of the “new ontology” – N. Hartmann. (shrink)

This paper explores the Baden Neo-Kantian attempt to integrate hermeneutic ‘understanding’ into the formal philosophy of the historical sciences. It focuses primarily on Heinrich Ricker...

This chapter contains sections titled: The Setting and Development of Neo‐Kantian Thought Windelband's Division of the Sciences: Nomothetic and Idiographic Heinrich Rickert's Theory of Historical Knowledge Cassirer's Logic of the Cultural Sciences References Further Reading.

The works of Max Weber have generated a most promising interest in the social sciences with regard to his contribution to contemporary thought. While many of his substantive insights have been recognized, the attention accorded his methodological works has been comparatively scant, and often is a mere reflection of the scattered manner in which Weber himself often pursued this topic. Despite the many confusions and contradictions in Weber's methodological thought, a Weberian methodological program can be constructed from his writings. By (...) focusing on Weber's emphasis on the study of values as developed within a neo-Kantian framework, the development of Weber's methodological thought is outlined, and out of this a methodological program consistent with Weberian principles is proposed. Thus, the argument is made that Weber's methodological works are not merely of historical interest, but inform the ongoing debate over the appropriate methodological orientation of the social sciences. (shrink)