This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket (...) shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

In modern democratic societies, the plurality of differing and conflicting moral doctrines stands alongside a commitment to resolve political disputes through the use of moral reasoning. Given the fact of moral pluralism, how can there be moral resolutions to political disputes? What type of moral reasoning is appropriate in the public sphere? These questions are explored through a close and critical analysis of the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Rawls. In this book it is argued that (...) the anti-Enlightenment work of Alasdair MacIntyre, along with post-modernists, fails on epistemological, ethical, and political grounds, while in contrast, Rawls's 'core conception of reasonableness,' which is a type of political reasoning carried out 'in the manner of' the Enlightenment, is better placed to successfully respond to the moral disputes of contemporary politics. The practical application of these ideas is also explored in discussions of civic education and global distributive justice. (shrink)

Tracking the development of Foucault's key concepts Lemke offers the most comprehensive and systematic account of Michel Foucault's work on power and government from 1970 until his death in 1984. He convincingly argues, using material that has only partly been translated into English, that Foucault's concern with ethics and forms of subjectivation is always already integrated into his political concerns and his analytics of power. The book also shows how the concept of government was taken up in different lines (...) of research in France before it gave rise to "governmentality studies" in the Anglophone world. A Critique of Political Reason provides a clear and well-structured exposition that is theoretically challenging but also accessible for a wider audience. Thus, the book can beread both as an original examination of Foucault's concept of government and as a general introduction to his "genealogy of power". (shrink)

Authority is a normative power to create duties in others. The most plausible accounts of this general power relate it to existing reasons the subjects of authority have with which authoritative directives can help them comply. Such accounts lead some theorists to ascribe a morally ambitious function to political institutions. This article argues against such theories. It defends political authority as a modest normative power, constrained by the type of reasons with which it can help its subjects comply. (...) This modest account differs from other liberal views in the limits it imposes on the exercise of political authority. It casts doubt on familiar limits that protect an individual private sphere. Instead, it imposes a condition of moderation. It suggests that legitimate exercises of political authority should leave space for individuals to be motivated by reasons that political institutions do not and should not mediate for them. (shrink)

This paper restates my argument that certain forms of liberalism can and should accept a non-instrumental perspective on the natural world. This perspective is unpacked in terms of ‘respect for nature’s otherness’. Liberalism is represented by Rawlsian political liberalism. I claim there are important congruencies between respect for nature’s otherness and the ‘reasonableness’ involved in political liberalism, such that the latter should incorporate the former. Following a suggestion of B. Baxter I reconsider these congruencies with particular emphasis on (...) the roles of toleration and integrity. I also explain further why I think it arbitrary, rather than logically inconsistent, of the political liberal to exclude respect for nature’s otherness from her conception of the political. Finally I argue that insofar as liberalism embraces ecological justice on the basis of the considerability of non-human interests, it cannot consistently exclude respect for nature’s otherness. (shrink)

According to Stephen Macedo, ‘[liberal], democratic politics is not only about individual rights and limited government, it is also about justification … political justification … understood politically.’ ‘Political justification,’ he asserts, ‘is a core liberal goal.’ Gerald Gaus, similarly, writes that the ‘idea of public justification is at the heart of a contractual liberalism.’ Very many other contemporary political philosophers believe that the politics of a liberal polity must be justifiable to its citizens. In what follows I (...) shall seek to understand the basis for such a belief and, in particular, to expose two possible sources in the views of Locke and Kant. Neither source, I shall argue, provides any warrant for the demand in question. First the bald claim—that the politics of a polity needs justifying—must be unpacked. By way of initial clarification I shall say something about, respectively, ‘justification’ and ‘politics.’. (shrink)

This work presents a new, alternative approach to studying the formation of political ideologies and attitudes, addressing a concern in political science that research in this area is at a crossroads. The authors provide an epistemologically grounded critique on the literature of belief systems, explaining why traditional approaches have reached the limits of usefulness. Following the lead of such continental theorists such as Jurgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens, who stress the importance of Jean Piaget to the development of (...) a strong theoretical perspective in political psychology, the authors develop a different epistemology, theory,and research strategy based on Piaget, then apply it in two emperical studies of belief systems, and finally present a third theoretical study of political culture and political development. (shrink)

Despite the enormous influence of Michel Foucault in gender studies, social theory, and cultural studies, his work has been relatively neglected in the study of politics. Although he never published a book on the state, in the late 1970s Foucault examined the technologies of power used to regulate society and the ingenious recasting of power and agency that he saw as both consequence and condition of their operation. These twelve essays provide a critical introduction to Foucault's work on politics, exploring (...) its relevance to past and current thinking about liberal and neo-liberal forms of government. Moving away from the great texts of liberal political philosophy, this book looks closely at the technical means with which the ideals of liberal political rationalities have been put into practice in such areas as schools, welfare, and the insurance industry. This fresh approach to one of the seminal thinkers of the twentieth century is essential reading for anyone interested in social and cultural theory, sociology, and politics. (shrink)

Foucault is often thought to have a great deal to say about the history of madness and sexuality, but little in terms of a general analysis of government and the state.; This volume draws on Foucault's own research to challenge this view, demonstrating the central importance of his work for the study of contemporary politics.; It focuses on liberalism and neo- liberalism, questioning the conceptual opposition of freedom/constraint, state/market and public/private that inform liberal thought.

Populism’s Challenges to Political Reason can be seen as a consequence of social and cultural trends, the so called ‘emotional culture’, that have been accentuated in recent decades. By considering those trends, this article aims at shedding light on some distinctive marks of contemporary populism in order to argue for a reconfiguration of the public sphere that, without ignoring emotion, recovers argumentation and persuasion based on facts and reason.

Populism’s Challenges to Political Reason can be seen as a consequence of social and cultural trends, the so called ‘emotional culture’, that have been accentuated in recent decades. By considering those trends, this article aims at shedding light on some distinctive marks of contemporary populism in order to argue for a reconfiguration of the public sphere that, without ignoring emotion, recovers argumentation and persuasion based on facts and reason.

Foucault is often thought to have a great deal to say about the history of madness and sexuality, but little in terms of a general analysis of government and the state.; This volume draws on Foucault's own research to challenge this view, demonstrating the central importance of his work for the study of contemporary politics.; It focuses on liberalism and neo- liberalism, questioning the conceptual opposition of freedom/constraint, state/market and public/private that inform liberal thought.

In this paper, I would like to tackle first Schmitt’s defence of the role of exclusion in political reasoning and his attendant rejection of extreme political pluralism. I shall then move on to explain not only why there is nothing Nazi—or even antisemitic—about Schmitt’s concept of the political, but rather the other way around: Schmitt’s concept of the political not only must have been used against National Socialism but it did not fail to have his (...) fair share of Jewish, or at the very least Zionist, enthusiasts. (shrink)

Some people, we may call them realists, endorse the priority thesis. This thesis says political reasons have normative priority whenever we assess political situations. Any putative political reasons, I argue, must satisfy an autonomy condition and an identity condition. I argue that no realist account of political reasons shows such reasons are distinct and autonomous as of yet. One account, the practice-based account, may have the wherewithal to show political reasons are distinct. I also say (...) some things about the relations between identity, autonomy, and priority. (shrink)

The primary instrument of dispute management in political liberalism is a form of political thinking and talking that tries to reconcile opposed positions with an impartial settlement based on fair arrangements and mutual respect, one that is careful to treat rival views equitably, and reasoned through from start to finish with open methods that lead to a public justification understandable to the disputants. But this model of reasoning is notoriously deficient in resolving disputes among radically different communities. (...) A more effective form of political reasoning for these disputes that yet respects the background values of liberalism is found in the languages of state depicted in realist accounts of international relations. These languages avoid liberal appeals to be reasonable, reciprocity controlled by moral criteria, and the quest for common reasons. They represent a deliberative search for an accord that will meet the interests of the disputing parties as they define these interests and understand the settlements, and in this sense are welcome models to manage divisive issues in pluralist democracies. A complete version of political reasoning would contain both liberal and realpolitik models and a mechanism to adjudicate the appropriate uses of each model. (shrink)

Essays showing how environmental philosophy can have an impact on the world by integrating abstract reasoning with actual environmental practice.

The work of re-interpreting Burke goes on. Recent critical studies have made it clear that he is not to be regarded as a utilitarian in ethics or an empiricist in politics. In this book Fr. Canavan shows convincingly that, despite his well-known appeals to feelings, sentiments, and traditions, and his use in a pejorative sense of such words as ‘theory’, ‘speculation’, and ‘metaphysics’, Burke is by no means an anti-rationalist. Indeed, Burke held very strongly that politics and law were the (...) work of reason, but of practical reason, accompanied and modified by prudence. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The essays in this volume deal with political ethics; morality and international relations; the meaning of liberalism; the philosophy of history; the nature of totalitarianism; the responsibility of intellectuals in a free society; and the contemporary crisis of democratic theory and practice.

Public reason in practice and theory -- False starts: unsuccessful justifications of public reason -- Respect for persons as a constraint on coercion -- Higher-order unanimity escape clause -- Civic friendship as a constraint on reasons for decision -- Public reason and (same-sex) marriage.

For over twenty years, Paul Weithman has explored the thought of John Rawls to ask how liberalism can secure the principled allegiance of those people whom Rawls called 'citizens of faith'. This volume brings together ten of his major essays, which reflect on the task and political character of political philosophy, the ways in which liberalism does and does not privatize religion, the role of liberal legitimacy in Rawls's theory, and the requirements of public reason. The essays reveal (...) Rawls as a thinker deeply engaged with political and existential questions that trouble citizens of faith, and explore how - in firm opposition to political realism - he tries to show that the possibility of liberal democracy and the natural goodness of humanity are objects of reasonable faith. The volume will be of interest to political philosophers, political theorists, moral theologians, and religious ethicists. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers usually emphasize the importance of logic, clarity and reason. Therefore when they address political issues one would expect that they would usually inject a dose of rationality in these discussions. But this book gives a lot of examples showing the unexpected level of political irrationality among leading contemporary philosophers.

Written between 1978 and 2006, these essays engagingly address the most hidden tradition in European political thought: the unpolitical.

Nurses are exposed to bullying for various reasons. It has been argued that the reason for bullying can be political, meaning that the behavior occurs to serve the self-interests of the perpetrators. This study aims to identify how nurses perceive the relevance of individual and political reasons for bullying behaviors. In February 2009 a survey was conducted with nurses working in a research and training hospital located in Turkey. The results showed that the aim of influencing promotion, task (...) assignments, performance appraisal, recruitment, dismissal, allocation of equipment and operational means, together with allocation of personal benefits and organizational structure decisions, were perceived as potential political reasons for bullying by nurses. Moreover, the reasons for the various bullying behaviors were perceived as relevant to individual characteristics, namely, the perpetrators’ need for power, and their psychological and private life problems. (shrink)

George Sher’s book Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics has, he says, two main purposes. The first is to “defuse the main reasons to deny that the state may seek to promote the good”, the other is to “develop a conception of the good that is worth promoting” (1). In this article, I will not be concerned with either of these aims. Instead, I will focus on Sher’s preliminary discussion of the “scope and meaning” of neutralism (20). I consider Sher’s careful (...) analysis of the structure of neutralism one of the book’s virtues, alongside his original theory of the good and his comprehensive and convincing arguments against neutralism. This careful analysis inspires me to attempt some critique and development. I will defend an account of neutralism according to which this doctrine puts a constraint on what reasons should enter into political reasoning. What I defend is not neutralism per se, but only this account of neutralism relative to competing accounts. I believe this account is an improvement over Sher’s, in terms of conceptual precision and normative plausibility, both in general and from the perspective of the doctrine’s proponents in particular. (shrink)

Who gets to decide what it means to live a healthy lifestyle, and how important a healthy lifestyle is to a good life? As more governments make preventing obesity and diet-related illness a priority, it's become more important to consider the ethics and acceptability of their efforts. When it comes to laws and policies that promote healthy eating--such as special taxes on sugary drinks and the banning of food deemed unhealthy--critics argue that these policies are paternalistic, and that they limit (...) individual autonomy over food choices. In Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Anne Barnhill and Matteo Bonotti show that both paternalistic justifications for healthy eating efforts and anti-paternalistic arguments against them can be grounded in perfectionist views that overly prioritize some values over others. The authors therefore propose a more inclusive, public reason approach to healthy eating policy that will be appealing to those who take pluralism and cultural diversity seriously, by providing a framework through which different kinds of values, including but not limited to autonomy and health, can be factored into the public justification for healthy eating efforts. Additionally, the book adopts a 'farm to fork' approach to the ethics of healthy eating efforts: it engages with theories and debates in political philosophy, considers the implications of different theoretical positions for healthy eating efforts, and then develops a concrete tool for assessing policies that will be of interest to both scholars and policymakers. As well as offering a novel normative analysis of healthy eating policy, the authors offer a new theoretical framework that will be applicable to a wide range of public policy scenarios. (shrink)

Lloyd's book, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, correctly stresses the deductive element in Hobbes's proofs of the laws of nature. She believes that “the principle of reciprocity” is the key to these proofs. This principle is effective in getting ego-centric people to recognize moral laws and their moral obligations. However, it is not, I argue, the basic principle Hobbes uses to derive the laws of nature, from definitions. The principle of reason, which dictates that all similar cases be (...) treated similarly, is. It is important not to diminish the centrality of reason for Hobbes because it is essential to understanding his reply to “the fool” and understanding why the state of nature cannot be a continuum. (shrink)

That which connects ethics and epistemology is the concept of truth. The threads concerned with the ethical and epistemological understanding of truth are interwoven throughout the history of philosophy. They are also interwoven in Józef Tischner’s philosophy. In Tischner’s thought, the description of this interweave and its consequences, as well as ways of dealing with it, are very inspiring. In the present paper, I address Tischner’s highly interesting analysis of the development of the “political reason.” Then I juxtapose this (...) analysis with Tischner’s demand concerning the “ethics of truth.” I also show how Tischner, by referring to the Gospel and proposing a peculiar ‘Christological imperative,’ resolves dilemmas emerging at the interface of epistemology and ethics. Thanks to the reference to Christ, who not only realizes the ideal of the “ethics of truth,” but also becomes the privileged “vantage point of the world,” and thus a peculiar epistemological centre, the connection between the epistemological and ethical dimensions of truth is established. Also, a sufficiently solid justification for the demand that the “ethics of truth” be realized becomes possible, and the way of defending oneself against the charm spread by the “political reason” and its works is identified. (shrink)

Aristotle's Rhetoric presents a number of problems for interpreters. It contains criticisms of sophists, yet seems to teach sophistical techniques of persuasion. It is unclear to some readers whether the book is an elaboration of a rational discourse or not. And its diversity of material has led some to view it as a collection of texts rather than as a unified book. In his commentary Arnhart argues that Aristotle's Rhetoric is a coherent account of public speech as a kind of (...) rational discourse less rigorous than scientific demonstration but more rational than sophistry. (shrink)

Aristotle's Rhetoric presents a number of problems for interpreters. It contains criticisms of sophists, yet seems to teach sophistical techniques of persuasion. It is unclear to some readers whether the book is an elaboration of a rational discourse or not. And its diversity of material has led some to view it as a collection of texts rather than as a unified book. In his commentary Arnhart argues that Aristotle's Rhetoric is a coherent account of public speech as a kind of (...) rational discourse less rigorous than scientific demonstration but more rational than sophistry. (shrink)

The author explores the viability of rational political action - here understood as a philosophy of liberation - through an examination of practical and material, practical-discursive, strategic and instrumental, critically normative, discursive, and strategic criteria.

The author explores the viability of rational political action - here understood as a philosophy of liberation - through an examination of practical and material, practical-discursive, strategic and instrumental, critically normative, discursive, and strategic criteria.

What is the nature of law? Does our obligation to obey the law extend to unjust laws? From what source do lawmakers derive legitimate authority? What principles should guide us in the design of political institutions? The essays in this collection, written by prominent contemporary philosophers, explore how these questions were addressed by ancient political thinkers, including the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics and Epicureans. Classical theories of human nature and their implications for political theory are (...) examined, as is the meaning of freedom and coercion in Plato's thought. Plato's idea that philosophers should be political rulers receives scrutiny, too. Other essays ask what we can learn from ancient thinkers like Aristotle about the principles of constitutional design or the limits of political obligation. (shrink)

This book examines the ways in which reasonable people can disagree about the requirements of political morality. Christopher McMahon argues that there will be a 'zone of reasonable disagreement' surrounding most questions of political morality. Moral notions of right and wrong evolve over time as new zones of reasonable disagreement emerge out of old ones; thus political morality is both different in different societies with varying histories, and different now from what it was in the past. McMahon (...) explores this feature of his theory in detail and traces its implications for the possibility of making moral judgments about other polities, past or present. His study sheds light on an important and often overlooked aspect of political life, and will be of interest to a wide range of readers in moral and political philosophy and in political theory. (shrink)