This paper examines Plato's ideas on cause-effect relations in the "Phaedo." It maintains that he sees causes as things (not events, states of affairs or the like), with any information as to how that thing brings about the effect relegated to a strictly secondary status. This is argued to make good sense, so long as we recognise that aition means the "thing responsible" and exploit legal analogies in order to understand what this amounts to. Furthermore, provided that we do (...) not pre-suppose that we already know what can and what cannot count as a cause, Plato proves to have an attractive case for his principle that all causation is a matter of like causing like. Once we appreciate this, we are a little closer to understanding his more idiosyncratic principle, which although puzzling is ubiquitous in his writings and often invoked as a premise in key arguments, that opposites cannot cause opposites. The last part of the paper turns to formal causes, defending Plato's advocacy of them, and examining their role in the "Parmenides'" Third Man Argument. The main proposal is that Plato's conception of Forms as causes opens the door to a better version of that argument's "Non-identity" premise than those currently available. (shrink)

This Paper Offers A New Interpretation of Phaedo 96a–103a. Plato has devoted the dialogue up to this point to a series of arguments for the claim that the soul is immortal. However, one of the characters, Cebes, insists that so far nothing more has been established than that the soul is durable, divine, and in existence before the incarnation of birth. What is needed is something more ambitious: a proof that the soul is not such as to pass out of (...) existence. According to Socrates’s initial response to Cebes at 95e8–96a1, giving such a demonstration requires a thorough investigation into “the reason for coming to be and passing away in general” (ὅλως γὰϱ δεῖ πεϱὶ γενέσεως ϰαὶ Φθοϱᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπϱαγματεύσασθαι .. (shrink)

this paper offers a new interpretation of Phaedo 96a–103a. Plato has devoted the dialogue up to this point to a series of arguments for the claim that the soul is immortal. However, one of the characters, Cebes, insists that so far nothing more has been established than that the soul is durable, divine, and in existence before the incarnation of birth. What is needed is something more ambitious: a proof that the soul is not such as to pass out of (...) existence. According to Socrates’s initial response to Cebes at 95e8–96a1, giving such a demonstration requires a thorough investigation into “the reason for coming to be and passing away in general” (ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι 95e9–96a1). This leads Socrates to the passage with which this paper is concerned. He mentions several changes of different sorts and nominates some purported “causes” that he and other theorists used to accept, but which he now finds scarcely intelligible. He then expounds his own mature view that the Forms are causes. The existing literature on this passage is vast and highly sophisticated, so much so that one might reasonably despair of saying something new at this stage. Nevertheless, I think some of Socrates’s remarks on philosophical methodology in our passage have not yet been appreciated as deeply as they should be. In particular, there has been little work showing how well-integrated they are with his positive proposals about causes. I also think that there are metaphysical models available to modern philosophers, not merely coherent with but actually suggested by Socrates’s methodology, which give a more satisfactory picture of those positive proposals than others available in the contemporary literature. That, at any rate, is what this paper aims to provide. (shrink)

The paper reconsiders Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic forms as causes together with its wider implications for the differences but also similiarities between the two philosophers. Analyzing the relevant texts of Metaphysics A 9 and Generation and Corruption II, 9, where Aristotle addresses the hypothesis of forms as put forward in the Phaedo, it discusses two interpretative options : that Aristotle takes these forms for an imperfect anticipation of formal causes, and that he sees them as an aborted (...) attempt at grasping the efficient causation whose proper discovery Aristotle claims to be uniquely his own. Although both readings have their virtues and can be defended from the Aristotelian perspective, their check against the text of the Phaedo reveals that, in this context, efficient causation distinct from material causation is quite plausibly the issue Aristotle has in mind first and foremost. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle’s broader critical stance towards forms as causes : while he seems to detect a split in Plato’s own understanding of the relation between the forms and causation, he is equally critical of the craft-like model as personified by the demiurge of the Timaeus. However, other passages from the Metaphysics suggest that some features of precisely this model, once it is carefully stripped of its personal aspect, may ultimately bear on Aristotle’s own conception of efficient cause. (shrink)

In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered (...) an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philopo­nus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aris­totle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the second­ary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristo­telian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes. (shrink)

The Arabic version of the Enneads is the earliest datable text in which appears the term "anniyya", that features in Avicenna’s metaphysics and lies in the background of the Latin definition of the Causa prima as esse tantum, typical of the Liber de Causis. This paper examines some examples of the use of "to be" in the Arabic translation of the Enneads. It also discusses the description of the First Cause as ‘pure Being’ or ‘first Being’ in the Arabic Plotinus, (...) and compares it with the Divine Names of the pseudo-Dionysius. icona . (shrink)

Edward Feser defends the ‘Neo-Platonic proof ’ for the existence of the God of classical theism. After articulating the argument and a number of preliminaries, I first argue that premise three of Feser’s argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. I then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and instead militates against its mindedness. Finally, I (...) uncover two tensions between Trinitarianism and the Neo-Platonic proof. (shrink)

Abstrak: Mayoritas pembaca Platon menafsirkan filsafat Platon dalam perspektif dualisme, yaitu terdapat dunia idea (kosmos noetos) yang berlawanan dengan dunia indrawi (kosmos aisthetos). Cara tafsir ini menimbulkan banyak kontradiksi. Dalam estetika, E.H. Gombrich, sejarawan seni yang menelurkan teori Revolusi Seni Rupa Yunani, juga membaca Platon dalam tafsir dualisme. Gombrich menyimpulkan bahwa bagi Platon kontemplasi keindahan dapat membawa kita ke dunia idea yang transenden, sedangkan seni hanya menyenang-nyenangkan, mengelabui indra dan menggoda pikiran untuk terikat pada bayang-bayang. Padahal dalam teorinya sendiri, Gombrich (...) menjelaskan bahwa karya seni rupa Yunani terkemuka persis karena keindahannya yang dihidupkan dengan daya ilusif-persuasif. Tulisan ini hendak melempangkan kontradiksi tersebut dengan mengoreksi dunia idea - dunia indrawi menjadi alam visibel – alam inteligibel (horatos topos – noetos topos), istilah yang dipakai Platon dalam corpus-nya. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa Platon tidak menolak daya ilusif-persuasif yang terdapat dalam seni rupa melainkan menempatkannya sebagai instrumen untuk merealisasikan Agathon. Kata-kata Kunci: Daya ilusif-persuasif, keindahan, akal, intelek, seni. Abstract: The majority of Plato’s reader interprets his philosophy in dualistic perspective, that there is the intelligible world (kosmos noetos) which opposed to the sensible world (kosmos aisthetos). This perspective caused many contradictions. In Aesthetics, E.H. Gombrich, an art historian who creates the Greek Revolution Theory, also read Plato under the perspective of dualism. For him, Plato thought that the contemplation of beauty can lead to the realm of transcendent ideas, while art can only flatter, deceive the senses and seduce the mind to feed on phantoms. Meanwhile, Gombrich also thought that Greek Art is beautiful precisely because of the power of illusion-persuasion. This article aims to reconcile the contradiction by replacing the intelligible world - sensible world to the intelligible realm - visible realm (topos noetos - horatos topos), the original term which Plato used in his corpus. And it concludes that Plato did not oppose the power of illusion-persuasion in art but placing them as an instrument to realize Agathon. Keywords: Illusion-persuasion, beauty, mind, intellect, art. (shrink)

According to platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how could we ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects, Colin Cheyne presents the first systematic and detailed account of this epistemological objection to the platonist doctrine that abstract objects exist and can be known. Since mathematics has such a central (...) role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, he concentrates on mathematical platonism. He also concentrates on our knowledge of what exists, and argues for a causal constraint on such existential knowledge. Finally, he exposes the weaknesses of recent attempts by platonists to account for our supposed platonic knowledge. This book will be of particular interest to researchers and advanced students of epistemology and of the philosophy of mathematics and science. It will also be of interest to all philosophers with a general interest in metaphysics and ontology. (shrink)

The belief in innate knowledge has a history almost as long as that of philosophy itself. In our own century it has been propounded in a linguistic context by Chomsky, who sees himself as the heir to a tradition including such philosophers as Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz. But the ancestor of all these is, of course, Plato's theory of recollection or anamnesis. This stands out as unique among all other innatist theses not simply because it was the first, (...) but also because it is in some respects the strangest: Plato proposed not just a theory of innate knowledge, but of forgotten knowledge, and this, of course, goes hand in hand with his interest in the pre-existence of the soul. But my concern here is with another difference that makes Plato's theory unique, though it is not as clear as the previous one: in fact it has been for the most part over-looked by commentators and scholars. I wish to argue that while other theories of innate knowledge or ideas hold that much of what is innate in us is realized automatically and with ease, be it knowledge of moral principles, the idea of cause and effect or linguistic competence, anamnesis is concerned only with the attainment of hard philosophical knowledge, which most of us never reach. (shrink)

Que la philosophie ancienne ait bénéficié de certains raffinements méthodologiques dus à la philosophie analytique n’est guère mis en question, même par ceux qui ne s’en réclament pas. À la grande époque de la philosophie analytique, certains de ses meilleurs représentants étaient encore fort versés en histoire de la philosophie et appliquaient leurs compétences analytiques à ce qu’ils considéraient comme des problèmes centraux chez les auteurs anciens. Cet article suggère à travers deux exemples que, s’agissant de Platon, cette attention n’a (...) pas eu seulement des effets revigorants, mais également déformants. Dans le premier cas, la méthode diérétique si chérie de Platon a été marginalisée par d’éminents philosophes analytiques qui l’ont considérée comme triviale et inintéressante. Dans le second cas, le problème de l’« auto‑prédication » des Idées, qui est celui de savoir si les Idées sont des entités qui possèdent les propriétés qu’elles représentent, a été considéré d’une importance décisive pour la théorie platonicienne des Idées. À cause de ses conséquences supposément désastreuses, mentionnées une unique fois dans le Parménide, on a pensé que Platon avait renoncé à cette théorie sous sa forme classique. Au cours des dernières années, l’importance de la méthode diérétique a été réévaluée et celle du problème de l’auto-prédication réduite à de plus justes proportions. Cela ne diminue pas la valeur des contributions des philosophes analytiques à l’étude de Platon, mais signifie seulement qu’elles doivent n’être acceptées qu’avec précaution. (shrink)

Kant, sans connaître les textes originaux, reproche à Platon nombre d’infractions au criticisme. La synthèse de sensibilité et d’intelligence dans la théorie de l’expérience, l’échelle des valeurs, les concepts de cause naturelle et de cause libre, la séparation entre âme et corps anticipent l’unité synthétique de l’aperception, le jugement synthétique a priori, l’amphibolie des concepts de réflexion, la topique transcendentale de la doctrine des antinomies. Anticipation du libre arbitre en morale, du génie et du plaisir désintéressé en esthétique.

Este trabajo se propone estudiar las características de los paralogismos de composición y división (Retórica II 24.II, 1401a), de la consecuencia (Retórica II 24.VI, 1401b20-30) y de la causa aparente (Retórica II 24.VII, 1401b30-34), de modo de analizar si Eurípides los utiliza en el agón de Andrómaca de los versos 577 a 746 This paper intends to study the characteristics of paralogisms due to composition and division (Rhetoric II 24.II, 1401a), due to consequent (Rhetoric II 24.VI, 1401b20-30), and due to (...) false cause (Rhetoric II 24.VII, 1401b30-34), in order to analyze if Euripides uses them in the agon in Andromache (577-746). (shrink)

Benjamin Callard has recently suggested that causation between Platonic objects—standardly understood as atemporal and non-spatial—and spatio-temporal objects is not ‘a priori’ unintelligible. He considers the reasons some have given for its purported unintelligibility: apparent impossibility of energy transference, absence of physical contact, etc. He suggests that these considerations fail to rule out a priori Platonic-object causation. However, he has overlooked one important issue. Platonic objects must causally affect different objects differently, and different Platonic objects must causally (...) affect the same objects differently. How are Platonic objects—ones outside space and time—supposed to do that? CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

L'originalité de la philosophie de Platon et de Plotin est de situer l'origine de toutes choses dans un principe supérieur au monde physique et matériel. Cette décision philosophique, qui ne va pas de soi, visant à placer la cause de toutes choses dans un principe transcendant et immatériel, est concomitante d'un autre choix philosophique consistant à "séparer" la cause de son effet, le haut du bas, l'intelligible du sensible, l'invisible du visible, l'incorporel du corporel. De telles "séparations" poseront à Platon (...) et à Plotin le problème de l'unité du monde et des "relations" que ces deux niveaux différents peuvent ou doivent malgré tout entretenir afin d'éviter toute forme de dérive dualiste et de vision pessimiste du monde. Cet ouvrage propose d'affronter cette question épineuse et d'apprécier la pertinence de la solution qu'y apportent Platon et Plotin, en développant chacun une "philosophie de la relation" tout à fait originale et stimulante. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 3 - 25 In several iterations of the Gnostic ontogenetic myth, we find variations on an intriguing notion: namely, that the first rupture in the otherwise eternal and continuous procession of ‘aeons’ in the divine ‘pleroma’ is caused by a _cognitive overreach and failure_. As much as it might contain a distant echo of certain myths concerning hubris in the classical tradition or in biblical literature, this general schema of _cognitive overreach—cognitive failure—fall_ has (...) no obvious parallel in Greek philosophy prior to Plotinus, in some of whose more pessimistic accounts of hypostatic procession we find a similar schema, in which the generation of each ontological stratum occurs as the result of a cognitive failure on the superjacent level. If Plotinus borrowed this schema from the Gnostics, one might ask how the latter came up with it in the first place. In response, this paper makes the following three points. [1] Gnostic thinkers ultimately derived this schema from a particular juxtaposition of two profoundly aporetic Platonic passages referring to the travails of the individual soul, one certainly genuine, the other quite possibly spurious. [2] The Platonizing Sethian Gnostics closest to Plotinus also employed this latter source text to justify their conception of the _individual_ soul, whose vicissitudes were understood to parallel those of Sophia. [3] This hypothesis is confirmed by evidence of tacit anti-Gnostic argumentation alluding to the _2nd Letter_ throughout Plotinus’ oeuvre. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on Proclus’ concept of the instrumental cause in his commentary on the Timaeus (In Tim.). Unlike earlier Neoplatonists who do not make much use of this type of causality, Proclus relates the instrumental cause to the hypostasis of nature (φύσις). The Demiurge uses nature as an instrument in his ordering and creation of the cosmos. How does Proclus arrive at this understanding of nature? I argue that the definition of nature as an instrumental cause is (...) in part based on his critical reception of Aristotle who identifies nature with the formal, efficient, and/or final cause. That is, Proclus did not develop his views on the causality of nature only by looking at the Timaeus (and other Platonic sources), but also by engaging with Aristotle’s rich – and, to a certain extent, authoritative – reflections on this issue. (shrink)

Les deux textes mis a la disposition du public dans cette edition critique, accompagnee d'une traduction et de notes, nous ont ete transmis sous le nom de Syrianus. Ils sont contemporains du philosophe et commentateur neoplatonicien Syrianus d'Alexandrie (437), et tres probablement de lui. Ce Syrianus, maitre notamment de Proclus, pratiquait dans son enseignement le commentaire de textes anciens. On connait de lui des commentaires sur Aristote, Platon, Homere, et donc, peut-on croire, d'Hermogene (sur les etat de cause et le (...) style), ce qui met ce rheteur en tres bonne compagnie, et ce qui constitue un temoignage de plus de l'interet porte a la rhetorique par les philosophes de ce temps. Sur la question des etats de cause, on a de lui les deux ouvrages edites ici, un commentaire et un traite, dans cet ordre. Le commentaire est fait de scolies, qui reprennent et expliquent pas a pas le texte d'Hermogene. Ces scolies continuent et enrichissent la doctrine de nombreux commentateurs devanciers. Plus tard, sur la base de ce travail, Syrianus a choisi d'exposer ce sujet sous la forme d'un traite a part entiere, remarquable notamment par ses definitions rigoureuses des quatorze, et non plus treize, etats de cause. C'est une synthese des progres de la doctrine a cette epoque. (shrink)

The British utilitarians are not generally considered explorers of classical Greek thought. This paper examines the contribution of James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and George Grote to the development of Platonic studies in nineteenth-century Britain. Their understanding of Platonic philosophy challenged prevalent interpretations, and caused a fruitful debate over long neglected aspects of Plato's thought. Grote's Platonic analysis, which comes last in order of time, cannot, of course, be considered in isolation from the relevant debates in Germany. (...) Grote, the erudite historian of ancient Greece, paid considerable attention to the arguments of the German classicists, put forward in many cases a new point of view, and prompted a radical revaluation of Platonic political thought. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit that it stands in anticipatory relation to Plato’s mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the Timaeus. My assumption is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. In order to support that assumption, I shall argue that a) Plato’s (...) doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word ‘good’ at 176a6 refers to Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage could denote the same entity, i.e. the Timaean Necessity. (shrink)

In Metaphysics A 6, Aristotle claims that Plato only recognises formal and material causes. Yet, in various dialogues, Plato seems to use and distinguish efficient and final causes too. Consequently, Harold Cherniss accuses Aristotle of being an unfair, forgetful, or careless reader of Plato. Since then, scholars have tried to defend Aristotle’s exegetical skills. I offer textual evidence and arguments to show that their efforts still fall short of the desired goal. I argue, instead, that we can reject (...) Cherniss’ assertation by re-examining Aristotle’s exegetical and methodological assumptions. (shrink)

L'idee d'une multiplicite de causes, introduite dans la philosophie grecque a partir des dialogues de Platon, a trouve chez Aristote sa realisation grandiose et complexe.La discussion sur les causes a l'epoque hellenistique et imperiale confirme l'importance et l'extreme richesse de cette idee. Le titre du volume veut souligner les rapports dialectiques, parfois conflictuels et souvent polemiques, que les doctrines de la causalite de cette epoque presentent entre elles, aussi bien de maniere independante que et par rapport a la (...) systematisation aristotelicienne. Les principaux auteurs (Theophraste, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Plotin) et les principales ecoles philosophiques (Peripatetique, Stoicienne, Epicurienne, Sceptique) de l'age hellenistique et imperial y ont ete abordes dans le but de produire un apercu le plus complet et le plus articule possible du probleme de la causalite a cette epoque. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré à la théorie des causes de Plutarque dans ses rapports avec le platonisme des premiers siècles de l’époque impériale. Le texte le plus important se trouve dans les chapitres 47-48 du dialogue De defectu oraculorum, où Plutarque présente une théorie dualiste des causes, qui admet deux genres de cause : d’une part la cause divine et rationnelle, qui comprend la cause finale et la cause efficiente, d’autre part la cause nécessaire et matérielle, qui comprend (...) la matière et la cause instrumentale. Cette version de la théorie des causes dépend, de manière directe ou indirecte, du Timée de Platon. Dans d’autres ouvrages, comme le De animae procreatione, Plutarque ajoute deux causes différentes, à savoir la cause paradigmatique, qui s’identifie avec le monde des idées ou avec dieu lui-même, et la cause du mouvement, représentée par l’âme pré-cosmique irrationnelle. Il est intéressant de remarquer que, dans son exposition de la théorie des causes, Plutarque emploie la description prépositionnelle, très répandue dans les écoles philosophiques : l’agent est donc to hyph’hou, le paradigme to pros ho, la matière to ex hou, alors que la cause finale est indiquée avec la formule to dia ho. (shrink)

Contrairement à la majorité des interprètes du Timée de Platon, nous ne croyons pas que la figure du démiurge représente réellement une cause productrice. Ce type de causalité, explicitement attribué au νοῦς dans le Phédon, ne peut, selon nous, être associé qu’à l’activité de l’âme du monde et des dieux de la tradition. Le démiurge joue un autre rôle. Représentant le meilleur des êtres intelligibles éternels (37a), un dieu éternel (34a), le démiurge ne peut, à ce titre, être un principe (...) de mouvement, puisque l’intelligible, selon Platon, n’exerce qu’une causalité paradigmatique. La figure du démiurge est, en fait, la représentation mythique de la causalité paradigmatique. Le démiurge représente, plus précisément, à titre de « fabricant » de l’espèce des dieux, la forme intelligible du dieu. Certaines caractéristiques du démiurge (sa corporéité, ses pensées et son activité productrice) sont indissociables de l’analogie employée pour représenter la dépendance des dieux à l’égard des formes intelligibles : le travail artisanal. Le démiurge, en tant que cause productrice, n’a pas de valeur ontologique réelle. Néanmoins, ce qu’il représente, la forme intelligible du dieu, constitue, selon Platon, la cause qui fonde l’immortalité de l’univers et des dieux de la tradition, une cause qui permet ainsi au νοῦς de ces divinités d’exercer leur causalité productrice. (shrink)

The ontology of Stoic causes and effects was clearly anti-platonic, since the Stoics did not want to admit that any incorporeal entity could have an effect. However, by asserting that any cause was the cause of an incorporeal effect, they returned to Plato’s syntax of causes in the Sophist, whose doctrine of the asymmetry of nouns and verbs identified names with the agents and verbs with the actions. The ontological asymmetry of causes and effects blocked the (...) multiplication of causes by reducing it to an efficient cause. However, while ontology and syntax merged into the doctrine of the effect as an incorporeal predicate, this was further complicated by a relational description of a cause as the effect of a body on a body and by the distinction of causes. Since there are different kinds of causes, not every kind of cause has the same syntactical role in the nexus of causal relations. This refinement of the original syntactical model presumably allowed the Stoics to give a more coherent view of human action than is usually assumed. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se explica y comenta la construcción del ser viviente en la cosmología platónica del Timeo, por la confluencia de la inteligencia divina como causa primaria que provee diseños estructurales perfectos, combinada con la necesidad como causa secundaria que provee los movimientos aleatorios ocasionados por las fuerzas naturales. Palabras clave: República; Timeo; Necesidad; Cosmología; CausaIn this work I explain, and comment on, the construction of the living being in Timaeus’s Platonic cosmology. Such a construction results from (...) the confluence of both the divine intelligence as primary cause, which provides perfect structural designs, and need as a secondary cause, which provides the random movements brought about by natural forces. Keywords: Republic; Timaeus; Necessity; Cosmology; Cause. (shrink)

It is often claimed that Socrates rejects material causes in the Phaedo because they are not rational or not teleological. In this paper I argue for a new account: Socrates ultimately rejects material causes because he is committed to each change having a single cause. Because each change has a single cause, this cause must, on its own, provide an adequate explanation for the change. Material causes cannot provide an adequate explanation on their own and so Socrates (...) rejects them. Aristotle agrees that material causes cannot explain changes on their own, but by allowing the same change to have multiple causes, he makes room for a material cause. Aristotle draws attention to the anti-Platonic implications of his four causes in a passage in Physics II.3 (195a3- 14) that has been overlooked by commentators. (shrink)

Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es zu zeigen, wie Platons Verständnis von Lust und Unlust in seinem Dialog Philebus mit Spinozas Theorie der Affekte zusammenhängt. Beide Denker verstehen den Affekt der Lust in Relation zu Werturteilen und dem Charakter einer Person. Ich behaupte, dass Platon und Spinoza gleichermaßen feststellen, dass die Wahl des Individuums für lustvolle Objekte von der Definition und Bestimmung des Guten und des Ideals des Individuums selbst abhängt, und somit auch von der Ursache der Lust. Beide Philosophen stimmen (...) darin überein, dass sich das Vergnügen eines vernünftigen Menschen von dem eines unvernünftigen unterscheidet, da auch ihr Urteil über Gut und Böse jeweils unterschiedlich ist. Ich schließe, dass Platons und Spinozas Bild eines vernünftigen Menschen im Zusammenhang mit den Affekten der Lust und des Unlustempfindens übereinstimmt, weil es hierbei um ein ganzheitliches Bild vom Menschen geht, der Affekte nur entsprechend seiner Natur oder seines Wesens erlebt. (shrink)

Cet article s'interroge sur l'origine des quatre causes d'Aristote (formelle, matérielle, efficiente, finale), c'est-à-dire sur le coeur de la métaphysique. En effet pourquoi y a-t-il quatre causes? Qu'est-ce qui fait leur communauté et leur « systématicité »? Dans un premier temps, l'auteur montre que le système des quatre causes est articulé par deux couples d'opposition formant deux schèmes de la causalité : d'une part le couple cause formelle/cause matérielle, statique, qui renvoie à une causalité analytique (schème rationnel) (...) ; d'autre part le couple cause finale/cause efficiente, dynamique, qui renvoie à une causalité synthétique (schème causal). Dans un deuxième temps, l'A. montre que ce « système étiologique tétrapolaire » est déjà présent dans l'oeuvre de Platon : plus particulièrement dans le Timée, avec les couples d'opposition démiurge/milieu matériel (chôra) et formes intelligibles/monde sensible, mais aussi dans le Philèbe et le Sophiste, où une double opposition systématique analogique à la précédente est à l'oeuvre. Une fois mises en évidence ces « deux souches de la métaphysique », l'auteur montre que le schème rationnel l'emporte sur le schème causal, aussi bien dans l'oeuvre d'Aristote que dans celle Platon. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relation between the intelligible and the material world in the works of the Neoplatonic philosopher Damascius (ca. 460-ca. 538 AD), who uses the theory of the Platonic Ideas in order to discuss the evolution from the One to the Manifold. This relation arises through specific laws that lead to the development of a harmonious cosmic system. The vertical and the horizontal segmentation of metaphysical causes is implemented in the process of the generation of the (...) empirical world, which is nevertheless imperfect in the sense that it is an image of the metaphysical world and is subject to generation and decay. The metaphysical world constitutes a normative basis for the beings of the world of experience to the same extent in the ontological as in the aesthetic and ethical area. The vertical segmentation cannot be understood without the horizontal because in that case the generation of tangible beings, which are complex realities, would be implausible. At the same time, the horizontal segmentation without the vertical would result in inactive metaphysical causes. The simple fact that the empirical world exists excludes such alternatives. (shrink)

Although Michael Kelly, in his article, “On the Mind’s Pronouncement of Time” (Proceedings of the ACPA 78 [2005]: 247–62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, I argue that the similarity does not lie where he thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl’s early period. Instead I locate the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which I find expressed at Parmenides 151e–152e. This essay shows how (...) the Neoplatonic conception of time, which I claim inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experimentfrom 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine. It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as “trapped” in the present. The point is a significant one if, as I conclude, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completedsuccession of nows, eternally fixed. (shrink)

A partire dall’analisi di alcuni passi del Timeo, il testo propone lo studio delle cause e dei tipi di infermità che affliggono la salute umana al fine di mostrare che la maniera in cui il filosofo concepisce le malattie è una chiave per approfondire l’antropologia e l’etica dell’ultimo Platone. Presupposto della ricerca è la visione olistica che caratterizza il Timeo, in cui la condizione umana influenza il livello socio-politico e il livello cosmico, i quali, a loro volta, condizionano e sono (...) condizionati dalla presenza dell’uomo. Per finalizzare lo studio abbiamo circoscritto l’analisi ai passi 69c-90c del Timeo. Starting with the analysis of some Timaeus passages, the text proposes the study of the causes and of the types of infirmity that afflict human health in order to demonstrate that the way the philosopher conceives illnesses is a key to get a deeper knowledge of the anthropology and ethics of the last Plato. Premise of the research is the holistic vision that characterizes the Timaeus, in which the human condition affects the socio political level and the cosmic level which, in their turn, affect and are affected by the human presence. To finalize the study, we analyzed the pages 69c-90c of the Timaeus. A partire dall’analisi di alcuni passi del Timeo, il testo propone lo studio delle cause e dei tipi di infermità che affliggono la salute umana al fine di mostrare che la maniera in cui il filosofo concepisce le malattie è una chiave per approfondire l’antropologia e l’etica dell’ultimo Platone. Presupposto della ricerca è la visione olistica che caratterizza il Timeo, in cui la condizione umana influenza il livello socio-politico e il livello cosmico, i quali, a loro volta, condizionano e sono condizionati dalla presenza dell’uomo. Per finalizzare lo studio abbiamo circoscritto l’analisi ai passi 69c-90c del Timeo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis):Grassi's Platonic Rhetoric between Gadamer and KristellerRocco RubiniToday's situation is such that in our desacralized and demythologized world we believe in no annunciations, in no purely directive statements, in no evangelist, be it a God or a prophet. We turn to rational thought, to proofs and reasons in order to free ourselves from the subjectivity and relativity of appearances.... Thus not only is every access (...) to religious sacred texts closed to us but so also is the possibility of a metaphysics, a science that tells us about the "essence of man" (Humanism).—Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as PhilosophyDonald P. Verene commemorated Ernesto Grassi by recognizing that his work allows for a fresh approach to Vico, Heidegger, Renaissance, and rhetorical studies (1996, 295–303). While Grassi's authority on Vico remains undisputed, examination of his relevance to other fields of study is still wanting. As for Martin Heidegger, his students have been too numerous and successful for Grassi to easily claim pride of place among them. In turn, as Verene notes, American Renaissance scholarship has failed to realize that Grassi's work represents a direct alternative to that of Paul Oskar Kristeller, another student of Heidegger. Kristeller's influential characterization of Renaissance [End Page 242] humanism as a rhetorical and thus, in his view, nonphilosophical tradition often causes Grassi to be simply dismissed.1 Finally, his reception in rhetorical studies remains problematic and limited in its own right.In his Foreword to the reprint of Grassi's Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), Timothy W. Crusius clearly expresses the confused deference that has caused rhetoricians to steer clear of the "anomaly" Grassi represents. Crusius laments that scholars have not attempted to bring Grassi into conversation with partisans of rhetoric like Hans-Georg Gadamer and that very little attention has been paid to works such as The Primordial Metaphor (1994) or to the overall religious dimension of his thought. Crusius attributes this general neglect to the American rhetoricians' unfamiliarity with the Latin-humanist rhetorical tradition: Grassi, in direct opposition to Heidegger, would have fashioned his philosophy from Roman rather than Greek sources (2001, xiii–xviii).This essay closely narrates2 how Grassi's notions of metaphysics and "rhetoric" developed in his early writings in order to dispel some of the misconceptions that have prevented readers from entering what Grassi himself defines as the "originary tension" awakening his own and, indeed, any philosopher's concerns, interests, and pathos (1994, 5–6). For if Grassi often lamented Heidegger's philhellenism—an aversion to romanitas at which he and other "Latin" students such as José Ortega y Gasset took personal offense (1988, 347)—we shall see that his philosophy was originally grounded on a nontraditional reading of Greek sources. Indeed, a reader would be at pains to recover a sustained reading of Cicero or Quintilian in his entire corpus, while between 1932 and 1946 Grassi published three volumes dedicated to an original interpretation of Plato.3Whereas the following account might make Grassi's notion of "rhetoric as philosophy" even more idiosyncratic—originally founded neither on a recovery of Roman eloquence nor, as we shall see, on a rehabilitation of the Sophists—his early Platonism makes him conversant with Gadamer and provides insight into his religiosity. Grassi's distinctive Platonism also spurs consideration of his missed confrontation with Kristeller and of the mutual disregard between American Renaissance scholars and rhetoricians in the latter part of the twentieth century. The following pages place the reader in a position to appreciate the relevance of Grassi's work to current scholarship.Heidegger's Anti-Platonism and Recent Plato StudiesThe belated and ongoing publication of Heidegger's lectures prior to Being and Time (1927) has led us closer to the experience of his students and offered [End Page 243] clear insight into his preference for Aristotle over Plato. The WS 1924–25 lecture course on the Sophist—one of Heidegger's most sustained confrontations with Plato before his Plato's Doctrine of Truth (1942)—begins with the assertion "What Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (1997, 8). By developing... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic ThemesCatherine E. MorrisonHuman Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes by Paul Schollmeier Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 302. $80.00, cloth.This is a book about spirits—human, godly, ghostly, and alcoholic. Paul Schollmeier's Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes explores how humble humans act morally in an absurd world. Schollmeier contends that the Socratic spirit, or daimon, (...) of self-knowledge and hypothesis testing provides the foundation for a deeply human moral philosophy. It is, in Schollmeier's elegant phrasing, daimonic rather than eudaimonic, joining Aristotle and Plato with William James, as well as contributions from the ghosts of David Hume and Immanuel Kant and a few rounds of whiskey. Spirits abound! Mixing Socratic skepticism with Jamesian empiricism, Schollmeier argues that we act best when we apply general principles held as opinion (not as certain knowledge), and tested through experience, to our particular situation. When these opinions yield fruit, we find ourselves less at the whim of our capricious surroundings; when they do not, we are obliged to recognize the provisional nature of our opinions and change them. The ends of these day-to-day activities reflect a far grander cosmological order, one we ignore to our mortal (and moral) peril. It is by engaging in this intellectual activity that we are made happy, and it is in measured pursuit of this happiness that we are virtuous. Our actions are neither absolutely true nor perfect. They are instead the best that we can do. And for a reviewer attempting to encapsulate a finely nuanced book in a small space, this is comforting advice indeed. [End Page 190]The book begins with a puzzle: The curious twin claims in Plato's Apology that, true to the Delphic oracle's proclamation, Socrates is both wise and knows nothing. The key to this apparent paradox, Schollmeier contends, is the difference between divine knowledge, "ultimate, nonhypothetical knowledge of final causes" (6), and human knowledge, which is hypothetical only. Schollmeier marshals William James to argue that as humans, we encounter objects of knowledge perceptually; even our concepts are fashioned from this meager material. Without access to divine knowledge, humans must test hypotheses and assume that they are true only provisionally.James's (and Hume's) emphasis on the passions as the foundation for action, however, gives Schollmeier pause. In order to construct a moral philosophy that avoids absolutism but remains objective, Schollmeier argues for a harmony between the intellectual and the passional that is ultimately rational, our Socratic daimon. We are neither gods nor animals. Should we surrender rationality to desire, Schollmeier warns in concert with Socrates, our already fragile perceptual knowledge will be further distorted by fickle emotion. It is precisely because our grasp on the world is so tenuous that we must pay heed to cool intellect rather than hot passion.Such skepticism of our claim to know might make one hesitant to engage in the enigmatic world—but we have no choice! In order to find our hybrid daimon, both Socratic and pragmatic, Schollmeier suggests rhetoric as the methodology best suited to serving practical knowledge because it eschews certainty in favor of probability and acknowledges that the hypotheses on which we act are tentative and revisable. To this end, Schollmeier highlights the enthymeme and argument by example as the two techniques that best suit the nature of our hypothetical knowledge, and he urges a return to philodoxy, the love of opinion.Giving up our claim to certainty need not be a dismal proposition. Having established his methodology, Schollmeier begins building a moral philosophy that embraces an ontology of change and contends that our happiness provides us with stability in the form of a rational teleology. The objects of our human happiness are fleeting and changeable, so happiness cannot be static but is, rather, an activity that is its own end, "an activity that is an intellectual inquiry" (78). Our happiness is contingent on our ability to hypothetically determine, in our particular setting, our function and then fulfill this role to the best of our abilities. Depending on the setting, it may be dancing, parenting, or simply a lively... (shrink)

"The unexamined life is not worth living." Socrates's ancient words are still true, and the ideas sounded in Plato's Dialogues still form the foundation of a thinking person's education. This superb collection contains excellent contemporary translations selected for their clarity and accessibility to today's reader, as well as an incisive introduction by Erich Segal, which reveals Plato's life and clarifies the philosophical issues examined in each dialogue. The first four dialogues recount the trial execution of Socrates--the extraordinary tragedy that changed (...) Plato's life and so altered the course of Western though. Other dialogues create a rich tableau of intellectual life in Athens in the fourth century B.C., and examine the nature of virtue and love, knowledge and truth, society and the individual. Resounding with the humor and astounding brilliance of Socrates, the immortal iconoclast, these great works remain powerful, probing, and essential. (shrink)

The essay aims at demonstrating that it is dangerous to try to reconstruct a philosophical doctrine taking into account solely or predominantly the analysis of vocabulary. This is particularly true of the philosophical doctrines of the ancients, who generally did not feel obliged to adopt a coherent and unambiguous technical terminology. Starting from the essay of F. Camera, Sui molteplici significati di hermeneia in Platone, which was published in 2004 and then re-edited in 2011 with few modifications but with a (...) different title, the author shows that the method of facing Plato’s hermeneutics through the ἑρμηνεύειν-words is a source of distortions and over-interpretations; that is, it causes excessive density and conceptual significance to be attributed to words used instead in their current meaning. One must remember, even if it should be well known to anyone who devotes himself to these themes, that not all words, expressions and concepts become philosophical entities only because they appear in the works of an author tagged “philosophy.”. (shrink)

Quel est l'intérêt philosophique d'une réflexion sur le "bien" dans le Phédon de Platon, et sur les "origines de la crise" développée par Parménide d'Elée dans son Poème et Paul de Tarse dans sa Première Lettre aux Corinthiens? Il s'agira d'abord de voir comment le "bien" du Phédon de Platon est en mesure d'offrir, du haut de sa transcendance et d'une manière étonnante, une solution inédite au problème de la "séparation" (chôrismos) dans le but d'assurer la cohésion de l'univers, de (...) sauvegarder l'unité de l'homme et de fonder tout discours logique. Une telle étude aurait notamment pour résultat de remettre en cause l'idée reçue selon laquelle Platon développe une philosophie dualiste dans le Phédon. La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage propose de voir comment la "crise" (krisis) provoquée par le logos (raison) philosophique de Parménide d'Elée opère une critique des valeurs mondaines de son temps, et en quoi cette critique demeure valable pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui, afin d'examiner, par la suite, l'apport spécifique de Paul de Tarse au traitement de la "crise" corinthienne qu'il rencontre et qu'il tente de résoudre à partir de son logos (langage) spirituel, tout aussi critique que celui de la philosophie. Peut-on soutenir que ce logos est également en mesure de servir, aujourd'hui, de garde-fou salutaire à toute forme de débordement et d'excès? De quels excès s'agit-il? De quelles façons chacun de ces deux types de logos philosophique et spirituel procure-t-il à l'homme un sens du discernement nécessaire à sa vie? Telles sont certaines des questions auxquelles le présent ouvrage tente de répondre. (shrink)

In F. Nietzsche’s philosophical thought, there is a profound link between European Nihilism and the task of modern philosophy to produce new Platos. The current article demonstrates how G. Deleuze uses the Nietzschean term Unzeitgemäβ – (Untimely – Unfashionable) in his attempt to overturn nihilistic Platonism. Deleuze enriches the Stoic paradox of [non-] when seeking an image of thought without image for the sake of what he calls the “untimely creative intensity,” an affirmative power in immanence. I argue that Deleuze (...) reads the Stoic [non-] using the lens of the Nietzschean untimely to construct the technique of reversibility in his philosophical plane. Following the cartography of Deleuze’s philosophical route, I first examine two problems caused by Platonic nihilism: the destruction of the form in anonymity and the noiseless transmutation of copies into simulacra. Second, I discuss Deleuze’s two types of nihilism: (i) the cruciform structure of the Platonic and (ii) the use of the paradox of the [non-] upon the surface by Stoics. Finally, I comment on Deleuzian nihilism as the birthplace of creation. (shrink)

For two and a half millennia readers of Aristotle have been struggling to understand just what sort of causation is being attributed to the Prime Unmoved Mover or PM, whether final or efficient, assuming that this supreme being could not be a material cause or even a formal cause of the entire cosmos. Fred Miller entered into this still ongoing debate with a fresh proposal, drawing on an almost incidental remark in GC 1.6.323a25-33 that was later picked up by Philoponus (...) in his commentary on Aristotle’s text. The fundamental question is whether the PM’s causal role is to be restricted to a case of final causation or is there evidence for efficient causation as well? Just how ancient this question of interpretation is can be clearly shown by the following remarks made by Simplicius in the first half of the sixth century in his Neo-Platonist commentary on Phys VIII.6.267b17-26:Simplicius goes on to argue in some detail for this dual picture, primarily because of his harmonizing approach to Plato and Aristotle, but also by referencing some very specific passages in other works—notably Cael, GC, DM—but also Met, albeit only from its first book (1361.11-1363.24). He starts out here by claiming that “[n]o one disputes that Aristotle calls god or the primary mover a final cause” but realizes that showing that the PM is an efficient cause as well needs some textual support, which he dutifully attempts to provide. We will be going over some of the same ground cited here in trying to articulate Aristotle’s conception of divine causation and in particular to decide if Fred Miller’s thoughts about the “untouched toucher” will help us in the overall endeavor to explore Λ.6-10. Since he points out (at p. 278) that the PM could hardly be a material cause or even a formal cause, his framing the issue as to whether the mode of causation here is exclusively efficient or exclusively final, or, on the other hand, both at once, seems very close to how Simplicius set up the problem. Indeed, he cites the same section of Simplicius’s commentary quoted above and finds this ancient perplexity a good jumping off point for his own attempt to shed light on a fundamental issue of interpretation, noting that if we balk at the Neo-Platonic suggestion that Aristotle’s PM “is on a par with Plato’s demiurge,” the question becomes: “in what way is the prime mover supposed to be an efficient cause?” (p. 279). Miller’s novel suggestion is that one way of dealing with this question is the thought that the PM is an “untouched toucher.” It is crucial to his picture that this suggestion is strongly tied to the prospect of finding “a way in which the unmoved mover of the cosmos could be a genuine efficient cause” (p. 287) and not I believe, as W.D. Ross may have held, an efficient cause only by being a final cause. This will become important when we explore what untouched touching would be quite generally, given the emphasis on the psychological dynamics of this sort of affective action as suggested by the everyday examples provided by both Aristotle and Philoponus. (shrink)

Both the Athenian wrestler and the Florentine clerk, it turns out, demonstrate a persistent concern with the moral problematic--that is, the tendency of human beings to do what they want to do at the cost of that which they ought to do. Both thinkers see man's vulnerability to fortune as a symptom of this tendency, and they agree as to its ultimate cause: the inability of men to accurately weigh that which is present here and now against that which is (...) far removed in time and space. Machiavelli does not part company with Plato until it is time to suggest a remedy. Here he indeed accomplishes a radical innovation--perhaps as radical as was suggested above. Whereas Plato resolves the problematic by founding the soul on that which is, and which is better than and prior to man, Machiavelli supposes that man, starting from scratch, can construct his own foundations. Nonetheless, the Florentine walks a long way with the Athenian before he takes his leave; it may be best, then, to interpret Machiavelli's writing less as a monologue than as a dialogue, the dramatis personae of which include himself and Plato. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the question of education in Plato from the historical context, thinking the model of Athens, Lesbos and Sparta, and from the perspective where a bad paideía, the low quality in the formation of citizens, becomes the main cause generating social disruption. Then, a reflection was made on the educational possibilities that Athenians from different social classes would have and on the Platonic proposal based on the combination of gymnastics and music, so that a citizen (...) profile with solid collective ideals would be developed to the point of avoiding stásis. DRAFT TRANSLATION!!! Original pagination will be indicated in brackets, e.g. [p. 104]. Portuguese published version: Carvalhar, C. (2020). A má educação como a principal causa da ruptura social. Revista Enunciação, 5(1), p. 102-117. (shrink)

This volume gathers contributions on key concepts elaborated in the Platonic tradition (Proclus, Plotinus, Porphyry or Sallustius) and reconsidered by Arabic (e.g. Avicenna, the Book of Causes), Byzantine (e.g. Maximus the Confessor, Ioane Petritsi) and Latin authors (e.g. Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas etc.).

In this paper, a pluralistic explanation of the sources of evil according to Plato is offered, which takes into account not only ethics, but also cosmology. In Plato, one must distinguish between negative evils, which result from the inherent distortion of images, that is, of bodies, as compared to their model, that is, of intelligible reality; and positive evils, whose ultimate cause is the soul. In the case of the soul of the world, one must speak of relative positive evils (...) that are the consequence of its degraded power, and in the case of man, of absolute positive evils, which are the consequence of error. (shrink)

Le prophète Balaam.--M. Hauriou collectiviste malgré lui.--Sombart contre Marx.--La méthode de M. Hauriou et ses mérites.--Le cas de M. Duguit --La sirene évolutionniste.--La nécessité du droit naturel.