"The unexamined life is not worth living." Socrates's ancient words are still true, and the ideas sounded in Plato's Dialogues still form the foundation of a thinking person's education. This superb collection contains excellent contemporary translations selected for their clarity and accessibility to today's reader, as well as an incisive introduction by Erich Segal, which reveals Plato's life and clarifies the philosophical issues examined in each dialogue. The first four dialogues recount the trial execution of Socrates--the extraordinary tragedy that changed (...) Plato's life and so altered the course of Western though. Other dialogues create a rich tableau of intellectual life in Athens in the fourth century B.C., and examine the nature of virtue and love, knowledge and truth, society and the individual. Resounding with the humor and astounding brilliance of Socrates, the immortal iconoclast, these great works remain powerful, probing, and essential. (shrink)

Les lampes corinthiennes des Ier-IIIe s. apr. J.-C. découvertes à Delphes proviennent essentiellement des nécropoles et de quelques contextes urbains fouillés systématiquement dans les années 1990. Elles constituent une preuve directe des rapports entre Delphes et la capitale de l’Achaïe, Corinthe, rapports qui n’ont pas eu de suite après le IIIe s. Ces lampes portent toutes les caractéristiques techniques du type (forme, mode de fabrication, pâte) et se distinguent par une certaine variété dans le décor des médaillons, inspiré par la (...) mythologie ou par la vie quotidienne. Quatorze noms de potiers ont été recensés sur les bases conservées. Plus d’un siècle après une très brève publication par Perdrizet et quarante ans après les articles fondamentaux sur les lampes corinthiennes de Bruneau, l’approche de ce corpus sous un prisme nouveau nous offre l’occasion de reprendre la discussion sur la morphologie, sur les ateliers et surtout sur les villes où ce type de lampes était produit ; elle nous permet aussi une nouvelle interprétation du décor de plusieurs de ces lampes. (shrink)

Nous examinons ici un type très caractéristique d'installation artisanale, fréquente dans les habitats ou les bâtiments isolés de l'époque minoenne. Elle est composée, dans sa forme la plus simple et la plus courante, d'un récipient tronconique avec bec verseur placé sur une plate-forme artificielle ou un banc et, en immédiate relation avec lui, d'un grand vase situé à un niveau inférieur, servant à recueillir un liquide. On a donné des interprétations variées de ces installations : servaient-elles à séparer deux liquides (...) (huile et eau), au cours de la production de l'huile? à écraser les raisins pendant la fabrication du vin? à laver les vêtements? Après avoir dressé un catalogue, aussi complet que possible, des installations minoennes de ce type connues à ce jour, on tente de comprendre leur fonctionnement, à l'aide de données comparatives et de parallèles iconographiques diachroniques. Enfin, on examine le rôle de ces installations dans le cadre socio-économique plus large de l'époque minoenne. (shrink)

Comme les rapports précédents, celui‑ci rend compte en une fois de deux campagnes, d’étude et de restauration uniquement désormais : en effet, l’équipe est engagée maintenant dans la préparation de la publication de la demeure protobyzantine DOM5 (architecture et trouvailles mobilières) sous la forme d’une monographie destinée à la collection des Études thasiennes. Les campagnes se sont déroulées les deux années de la mi‑juillet à la fin août, avec des effectifs sensiblement équivalents : une...

This paper proposes a new interpretation of Gadamer’s problematic appropriation of Platonic metaphysics. It argues that Gadamer, attempting to respond to the challenge posed by Heidegger’s interpretation of Platonic metaphysics and of its role in the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte), downplayed the transcendence of Platonic Forms. Gadamer achieves a reconfiguration of this transcendence and its transposition into what I call here a plane of immanence through two hermeneutic gestures: 1) interpreting Forms in light of Greek (...) mathematics and especially in light of the structure of the sum-number; 2) introducing temporality and historicity in the Medieval doctrine of transcendentals by giving priority to the Beautiful over the Good. I contend that, Platonically speaking, this amounts to the rejection of νοήσις in favor of διάνοια, and that this raises issues concerning the problem of finitude and the potential limits of linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit). (shrink)

The complete, or almost complete, absence from the Theaetetus of any unequivocal reference to Platonic Forms is a problem, the solution of which appeared to many scholars to have been found and convincingly presented in the late Professor Gornford's book Plato's Theory of Knowledge, published in 1935. Put briefly, his contention was that the main purpose of the dialogue is to show that no acceptable definition of knowledge can be reached if the Forms are left out of (...) account, that there are a number of passages in which any reader of the middle dialogues would see that they were deliberately being left out of account, and one or two, namely in the famous digression on the philosophic life, and in the discussion of ‘common terms’ , where they are actually brought in, though not indeed under the name of. (shrink)

In Metaphysics M.2, 1077a9-14, Aristotle appears to argue against the existence of Platonic Forms on the basis of there being certain universal mathematical proofs which are about things that are ‘beyond’ the ordinary objects of mathematics and that cannot be identified with any of these. It is a very effective argument against Platonism, because it provides a counter-example to the core Platonic idea that there are Forms in order to serve as the object of scientific knowledge: (...) the universal of which theorems of universal mathematics are proven in Greek mathematics is neither Quantity in general nor any of the specific quantities, but Quantity-of-type-x. This universal cannot be a Platonic Form, for it is dependent on the types of quantity over which the variable ranges. Since for both Plato and Aristotle the object of scientific knowledge is that F which explains why G holds, as shown in a ‘direct’ proof about an arbitrary F (they merely disagree about the ontological status of this arbitrary F, whether a Form or a particular used in so far as it is F), Plato cannot maintain that Forms must be there as objects of scientific knowledge - unless the mathematics is changed. (shrink)

Previous chapter Democritean Rhuthmoi vs Platonic Forms Nietzsche was deeply influenced by Albert Lange's History of Materialism which he read in 1866. Lange's reading triggered a lasting interest in some pre-Platonic Philosophers, especially Democritus, on whose work he took notes from 1867 to 1869 and finally lectured at Basel from 1869 to 1876. These notes include a relatively long paper on Democritus, dated from 1872. Both James Porter and Nina Power, - Sur le concept de rythme – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that Platonic Forms are angels. I make this identification by claiming that Platonic Forms have the characteristics of angels, in particular, that Platonic Forms are alive. I offer four arguments for this claim. First, it seems that engaging in self-directed action is a sufficient condition for being alive. The Forms are, as teleological activities, self-directed actions. Second, bodies receive their being from their Forms, and some bodies (...) are essentially alive. Third, in the Good, all the types of goodness, including life, are identical. The Forms are appearances of the Good. Fourth, since the Good imparts as much goodness as it can, the Forms are alive unless there is some bar to their being alive. There are good reasons to think that there is no such bar. I then show that ethical vices do not give body to human form, but give body to other forms—those that are evil angels. Lastly, I provide a survey of the relationships that various religious traditions posit between ethical vice and the demonic. (shrink)

En este ensayo me propongo dos cosas: a) indicar las razones por las cuales la interpretación predicativa de la teoría de la forma de Platón no es la más adecuada. b) proponer una interpretación alternaiva ¿también predicativa¿ pero más completa, agregando el concepto de modalidad. Creo que la última interpretación se encuentra más cerca del espíritu del texto original, en el sentido que estoy convencido de que algunas de las principales intuiciones que subdeterminan la teoría de las formas de Platón (...) están más desarrolladas y fijas en el lenguaje (por supuesto en un lenguaje diferente) por tal comentario explicativo. Más aún, en esta manera están asociadas ¿sugiriendo una relación histórica¿ a consideraciones actuales en relación al objetivo del conocimiento científico ya que están formuladas en términos modales (es decir, nomotéticos). (shrink)

Forms and Concepts is the first comprehensive study of the central role of concepts and concept acquisition in the Platonic tradition. It sets up a stimulating dialogue between Plato s innatist approach and Aristotle s much more empirical response. The primary aim is to analyze and assess the strategies with which Platonists responded to Aristotle s (and Alexander of Aphrodisias ) rival theory. The monograph culminates in a careful reconstruction of the elaborate attempt undertaken by the Neoplatonist Proclus (...) (6th century AD) to devise a systematic Platonic theory of concept acquisition.". (shrink)

This dissertation concerns Plato's theory of education and the problem of how one can actually acquire knowledge of the Forms. Plato's theory of education aims to make one a good person, which requires knowledge of the Form of the Good. Yet, how exactly one would acquire such knowledge has remained a mystery. Various models of learning are presented by Plato: elenctic refutation ; hypothesis; recollection; the mathematical, dialectical, and political studies of the Republic's curriculum; and diairesis to name just (...) those that are explicit. I have argued here that as rich as these learning strategies are we need to augment our examination of Socratic pedagogy with a full exegesis of Platonic epistemology. ;In order finally to appreciate how they, Socratic education and Platonic epistemology, are meaningfully inseparable, I have explored the following questions: what kind of teacher Socrates is and the way in which he struggles against the sophistic methods of teaching; why Plato has Socrates include ten years of mathematical study in the ideal philosophical curriculum and how we can take the Republic's paradoxical curriculum seriously; how the philosopher utilizes the mathematical training in coming to know a Platonic Form; what role opposites play in Plato's metaphysical imagination; and what kind of person would one be if one actually knew the Form of the Good. I have shown that if one were to partake of a Socratic education, to pursue the requisite mathematical training, and to arrive finally at knowledge of the Platonic Forms, then one would be the sort of person that Socrates has in mind when he articulates the principles of Socratic intellectualism. ;What has been novel about this approach is its demonstration of how, despite the fact that Socratic learning and Platonic epistemology have separately been the object of perennial scholarly attention, the two taken genuinely together have been in need of fresh critical engagement. This inquiry reveals the metaphysical constraints on knowledge and in so doing reconciles Plato's theory of knowledge with Socrates' style of educating potential philosophers. (shrink)

Aquinas consistently criticizes Plato and his followers for their commitment to the existence of separate forms or ideas. There is no whiteness existing by itself apart from any particular white things or any particular person's thoughts about them. The same goes for every natural form, from humanity to heat. And yet Aquinas is happy to appeal to such separate forms as examples to illustrate his own metaphysical views. This seems like a strange and dangerous procedure. If Aquinas considers (...) Platonic forms to be incoherent, then surely their incoherence will infect the notions he uses them to illustrate. But does Aquinas consider Platonic forms to be incoherent? I don't think so. The very fact that he uses them as examples to illustrate his own views suggests otherwise. And at one point Aquinas even grants that God could create a Platonic form such as a separate whiteness. Why, then, does he reject such forms? What has Aquinas got against them? An examination of his main critical discussions of Platonic forms shows that he rejects them not because he thinks they are impossible, but because he thinks they are unnecessary. In other words, Aquinas rejects Platonic forms on grounds of parsimony, since he thinks they cannot explain any of the things that Plato posited them to explain, such as the changes things undergo, the nature and existence of things, and our knowledge of them. Where Plato's separate forms fail, however, Aquinas thinks Aristotle's inherent forms succeed. (shrink)

‘Is being one only one? – The Argument for the Uniqueness of Platonic Forms’ Abstract: Each Form is unique in number; no two numerically distinct Forms can share the same nature. Plato argues for this claim in Republic X. I identify the metaphysical principles Plato presupposes in the premises of the argument, by examining the reasoning behind them, and offer a reconstruction of the argument showing the principles in use. I argue that the metaphysical significance of the (...) argument’s conclusion is to establish that if a Form F were not unique, if there were many Forms F, their nature would alter along with their number: a Form cannot recur without change in its constitution. This is why there can be only one Form for each character in the world. (shrink)

In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered (...) an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philopo­nus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aris­totle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the second­ary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristo­telian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes. (shrink)

I am interested in examining the reasoning of Plato’s extremely condensed argument in Republic X for the uniqueness of Forms. I will explore the metaphysical principles and assumptions that are supplied in the text, or need to be presupposed in order to understand the reasoning in the argument. Further, I will reflect on the truth and philosophical significance of its conclusion.

Timothy Mahoney discovers and champions an ecologically benign account of Plato in opposition to my own critical analysis of the reason-centeredness, reason-nature dualism, and nature and body devaluation in the Platonic dialogues, in which multiple linked dualisms of reason and nature associated with systems of oppression provide major organizing principles for Platonic philosophy. I show first that Mahoney's criticisms of my interpretation involve some careless and mistaken readings of my own text. Second, I argue that Mahoney* s account (...) of nature is significantly different from Plato's. Mahoney's interpretation of Plato is an overly generous and idealized one which plays on the multiplicity and elasticity of the concept of nature and the notorious vagueness of the concept of participation to conflate, among other things, Plato's attitude to celestial nature with his attitude to biological nature. Mahoney's interpretation involves setting aside Plato's gender politics, playing down some of Plato's most offensive and revealing passages of earth disparagement, and ignoring the network of social meanings from which Plato's philosophy emerges. Finally, I give some reasons why Mahoney's accounts of participation and nature, even considered as a reworking of Plato, would be highly problematic as the foundation for an ecological philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Direct Conversations Frames and Framed Fiction and Reporting Socrates on Question and Answer Socratic Aporia The Paradox of Writing Drama and the Ethical Dimension Limitations of the Ethical The Soul's Silent Dialogue Reflection and its Content.

La 4e de couv. indique : "Il platonismo è l'esclusivo "sfondo" teoretico della cultura filosofica di lingua latina tra il IV secolo e il XII, "scenario" che comprende, e si confonde con, gli elementi aristotelici, stoici e neopitagorici che le fonti del pensiero medievale trasmettono agli ambienti colti latini secondo le forme dell'uso neoplatonico della tradizione filosofica classica ed ellenistica. Scopo di questo lavoro è evidenziare, alla luce di testi e problematiche rappresentativi della tradizione filosofica del medioevo latino "alto" (secc. (...) VI-X) e "centrale" (secc. XI-XII), le trasformazioni del modello tardoantico di filosofia come scienza dell'essere e del rapporto tra quest'ultima e la teologia mistica, collegando tale movimento delle idee ai contesti, civili e religiosi, e alla crescita della biblioteca filosofica, che, a fronte di una scarsa conoscenza diretta dei dialoghi di Platone, consentono di usare le idee che indirettamente sono a lui riferite e la sua immagine in funzione dell'attualità culturale.". (shrink)

Dans la genese de sa constitution, la philosophie n'a pu faire l'economie d'une confrontation avec la musique qui fournissait aux anciens Grecs les schemes fondamentaux de la culture. De cette confrontation Platon est le temoin. Scindant la musique, il privilegie l'Harmonique, qui en est la partie theorique, sans toutefois lui reconnaitre la titre de science supreme. Correlativement, il condamne comme dysharmonie, tumulte fracassant et perturbateur de l'ordre cosmique, l'harmonie chromaticiste dont il s'emploie, non sans paradoxe, a decrire le detail. Par (...) cette lecture en filigrane des Dialogues de Platon, l'auteur se propose de reconstruire la pensee qui procede de l'harmonie chromaticiste et de montrer son importance dans l'elaboration de la philosophie fondatrice. Au carrefour des disciplines du savoir antique, ce livre s'adresse non seulement aux philosophes, mais aussi a tous ceux qui, musiciens ou stylisticiens, s'interessent a la forme musicale. (shrink)

Utilisant de nouveaux outils d'analyse, les études platoniciennes contemporaines cherchent dans tout ce qui accompagne le contenu explicite d'une œuvre - tout ce qui est suggéré de façon oblique, les situations, l'atmosphère, les digressions, les réticences... - des indications sur ce que l'auteur, soit veut communiquer, soit communique réellement. Ce fait si simple et en même temps énigmatique, connu de tout temps, à savoir que la philosophie de Platon ne nous est accessible que par ses dialogues, constitue l'un de ces (...) traits par lesquels tout énoncé philosophique émis par Platon se trouve inévitablement modalisé. L'attention à la forme dialogue, telle qu'elle est thématisée ici, c'est donc la prise en compte, pour mieux entendre Platon, de tous les aspects " para-énonciatifs " de ses dialogues ; de tout ce qui fait le sens, non seulement des énoncés théoriques prêtés à tel ou tel personnage, mais de leur ensemble, de l'échange en tant que tel (entre les personnages, entre l'auteur et le lecteur), et de la stratégie platonicienne pour faire de la réception de son œuvre une expérience (y compris émotive) pour son lecteur. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Socratic Theory of Definition The Meno: Between Definitions and Forms Forms.

A DISCUSSION OF: CATHERINE COLLOBERT, PIERRE DESTRÉE, FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ , PLATO AND MYTH: STUDIES ON THE USE AND STATUS OF PLATONIC MYTHS. MNEMOSYNE. SUPPLEMENTS, 337. LEIDEN/BOSTON: BRILL, 2012. PP. VIII + 476. ISBN 9789004218666. $222.00.

This volume examines the historical end of the Platonic tradition in relation to creation theories of the natural world through the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus' (412-485) elaboration of an investigation of Plato's theory of metaphysical archetypal Forms. Proclus proceeds to a systematic construction of this theory and grounds it in ontological monism. He presents the Forms as constructing, through their combinations, the presuppositions for the creation of the natural world, in such a way that it functions in an (...) orderly and harmonious way, showing the natural world is not produced by chance or means of automatizations, but on the basis of a teleological planning. This volume also reflects Proclus' dealing with the topics of objective reality and the nature of the "universals.". (shrink)