This translation with introduction and commentary of Plato's Philebus was originally issued under the title Plato's Examination of Pleasure and first reprinted as Plato's Philebus. This dialogue, generally agreed to be one of Plato's latest and most sophisticated, analyses in detail the nature of pleasure - its meaning, its varieties and importance. Professor Hackforth here translates the dialogue for the student and general reader. There is a running commentary on the course of the argument (...) and the meaning of key Greek terms and a full introduction to explain the philosophical background and the place of this work among Plato's writings. (shrink)

Turnbull offers a close and detailed reading of the Parmenides, using his interpretation to illuminate Plato's major late dialogues. The picture presented of Plato's later philosophy is plausible, highly interesting, and original.

A translation of Plato's dialogue on the nature of pleasure and its relation to thought and knowledge. It includes a cogent introduction, notes, and comprehensive bibliography.

We discuss the one–many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one–many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and (...) part, and thereby construct three new ‘problems of the one and the many’ (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus–Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Is virtue teachable? What should we value as an ideal? Is pleasure or perception the highest good that ought to be the object of our lives? Three of Plato's most important dialogues are brought together in a single volume to address these concerns which continue to occupy serious minds today. In the Protagoras Plato attempts to answer questions about the nature of virtue and whether it is inherent in humans or a subject capable of being taught. In the (...) class='Hi'>Philebus he addresses the nature and content of the good and whether wisdom or pleasure is to be preferred. The Gorgias applies what is learned from the previous discussions to address larger issues, such as the proper functioning of society and the state and the individual's appropriate place within them. (shrink)

Plato, the great philosopher of Athens, was born in 427 BCE. In early manhood an admirer of Socrates, he later founded the famous school of philosophy in the grove Academus. Much else recorded of his life is uncertain; that he left Athens for a time after Socrates' execution is probable; that later he went to Cyrene, Egypt, and Sicily is possible; that he was wealthy is likely; that he was critical of 'advanced' democracy is obvious. He lived to be 80 (...) years old. Linguistic tests including those of computer science still try to establish the order of his extant philosophical dialogues, written in splendid prose and revealing Socrates' mind fused with Plato's thought. In Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, Socrates and others discuss separate ethical conceptions. Protagoras, Ion, and Meno discuss whether righteousness can be taught. In Gorgias, Socrates is estranged from his city's thought, and his fate is impending. The Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, and the unforgettable Phaedo relate the trial and death of Socrates and propound the immortality of the soul. In the famous Symposium and Phaedrus, written when Socrates was still alive, we find the origin and meaning of love. Cratylus discusses the nature of language. The great masterpiece in ten books, the Republic, concerns righteousness. Of the six so-called dialectical dialogues Euthydemus deals with philosophy; metaphysical Parmenides is about general concepts and absolute being; Theaetetus reasons about the theory of knowledge. Of its sequels, Sophist deals with not-being; Politicus with good and bad statesmanship and governments; Philebus with what is good. The Timaeus seeks the origin of the visible universe out of abstract geometrical elements. The unfinished Critias treats of lost Atlantis. Unfinished also is Plato's last work of the twelve books of Laws, a critical discussion of principles of law which Plato thought the Greeks might accept. The Loeb Classical Library edition of Plato is in twelve volumes. (shrink)

The _Philebus_ is hard to reconcile with standard interpretations of Plato’s philosophy and in this pioneering work Donald Davidson, seeks to take the _Philebus _at face value and to reassess Plato’s late philosophy in the light of the results. The author maintains that the approach to ethics in the _Philebus _represents a considerable return to the methodology of the earlier dialogues. He emphasizes Plato’s reversion to the Socratic elenchus and connects it with the startling reappearance of Socrates as the leading (...) voice in the _Philebus_. (shrink)

The Philebus is hard to reconcile with standard interpretations of Plato’s philosophy and in this pioneering work Donald Davidson, seeks to take the Philebus at face value and to reassess Plato’s late philosophy in the light of the results. The author maintains that the approach to ethics in the Philebus represents a considerable return to the methodology of the earlier dialogues. He emphasizes Plato’s reversion to the Socratic elenchus and connects it with the startling reappearance of Socrates (...) as the leading voice in the Philebus. (shrink)

In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates’ second account of ‘false’ pleasure (41d-42c) outlines a form of illusion: pleasures that appear greater than they are. I argue that these pleasures are perceptual misrepresentations. I then show that they are the grounds for a methodological critique of hedonism. Socrates identifies hedonism as a judgment about the value of pleasure based on a perceptual misrepresentation of size, witnessed paradigmatically in the ‘greatest pleasures’.

In modern epistemology, one ‘value of knowledge’ problem concerns the question why knowledge should be valued more highly than mere true belief. Though this problem has a background in Plato, the present paper, focused on Philebus 55–9, is concerned with a different question: what questions might one ask about the value of knowledge, and what question does Plato ask here? The paper aims to articulate the kind of value Plato here attributes to ‘useless’ knowledge, knowledge pursued without practical object; (...) and why, according to him, there is value in being a knower. Though his answer to this question requires commitments we may resist, it has a structure of general philosophical interest. (shrink)

This is the inaugural volume of the Plato Dialogue Project: it offers the first collective study of the Philebus - a high point of philosophical ethics, containing some of Plato's most sophisticated discussions of human happiness. The contributors work through the text, discussing pleasure, knowledge, philosophical method, and the human good.

이 논문에서 나는 소크라테스의 엘렌코스가 검증의 역할을 수행하는 진리탐구의 한 방법이며, 비단 윤리의 영역에서 뿐만 아니라 지식을 획득할 수 있는 모든 영역에 있어서 사용되는 탐구방법임을 주장한다. 소크라테스의 엘렌코스에 대한 논의는 대부분 플라톤의 초기 대화편에 한정하여 이루어지지만, 나는 『필레보스』를 통해 엘렌코스의 목적을 밝혀야만 한다고 주장한다. 엘렌코스를 진지한 탐구방법으로 보지 않는 해석은 엘렌코스가 탐구에 성공하지 못하고 아포리아에 빠져버리는 대화상황만을 고려했기 때문인데, 『필레보스』에서는 인간에게 좋은 것이 무엇인지에 대한 탐구가 성공한 경우에 엘렌코스가 쓰인 것을 볼 수 있기 때문이다. 엘렌코스는 언제나 ‘ti esti 물음’에서 시작하는 (...) 탐구와 동시에 작동하며, 소크라테스는 상대방을 논박하는 데에 관심이 있는 것이 아니라 프로타르코스라는 좋은 대화상대자와 함께 대화를 잘 이어나가 탐구를 수행하기를 원한다는 점, 그리고 실제로 이들이 변증술을 통해 성공적으로 탐구를 이행하게 된다는 점을 들어 나는 이 방법이 진리탐구를 목적으로 한다고 주장한다. (shrink)

Plato’s Philebus is motivated by a question concerning the relationships among pleasure, wisdom, knowledge, and the good human life. Something of a philosophical tour de force, it also contains discussions of numerous important Platonic subjects like cosmic intelligence, distinctions among intellectual capacities, and the method of dialectical inquiry through division and collection. But the riches of the dialogue are obscured by its exceptional difficulty, a frequent grievance from commentators beginning at least with Galen. Plato’s Philebus: A Philosophical Discussion (...) is an indispensable new contribution to our understanding of this important and challenging dialogue, containing a wealth of new... (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to illustrate the significance of hope (elpis, elpizein) in Plato’s Philebus and to indicate topics under this heading that invite further investigation. Even though there is some scholarship treating the issue of hope in the Philebus, there is no study solely devoted to this topic. By providing such a study I intend to fill this lacuna and to show that examining this topic is valuable because it develops our understanding of the good (...) life. In this essay I maintain that the Philebus defines hope as (1) a pleasure of the soul that (2) anticipates pleasure as certain, (3) may be true or false, (4) may be pure or impure, and (5) involves memory. I proceed chronologically through the Philebus’s discussions of hope and make every effort to treat each of the aforementioned components of the definition separately. In so doing I explain why certain topics, such as the relationship between pure intellectual hope and philosophical activity, invite further investigation. (shrink)

This paper addresses two interpretive puzzles in Plato’s Philebus. The first concerns the claim, endorsed by both interlocutors, that the most godlike of lives is a pleasureless life of pure thinking. This appears to run afoul of the verdict of the earlier so-called ‘Choice of Lives’ argument that a mixed life is superior to either of its ‘pure’ rivals. A second concerns Socrates’ discussion of false pleasure, in which he appears to be guilty of rank equivocation. I argue that (...) we can solve both puzzles by attributing to Plato an account of pleasure as a species of intentional attitude. (shrink)

This paper extracts and articulates the account of normativity in Plato’s Philebus. Central to this account is the concept of measure, which plays both an ontological and a normative role. With regard to the former, measure is what makes particular things to be the specific kind of thing they are; with regard to the latter, measure supplies the appropriate standard for determining whether or not those things are good or bad instances of their kind. As a result of measure (...) playing these two roles, normative evaluation is grounded in the ontological structure of the thing being evaluated. (shrink)

Socrates’ claim that pleasure is a γένεσις unifies the Philebus’ conception of pleasure. Close examination of the passage reveals an emphasis on metaphysical-normative dependency in γένεσις. Seeds for such an emphasis were sown in the dialogue’s earlier discussion of μεικτά, thus linking the γένεσις claim to Philebus’ description of pleasure as ἄπειρον. False pleasures illustrate the radical dependency of pleasure on outside determinants. I end tying together the Philebus’ three descriptions of pleasure: restoration, indefinite, and γένεσις.

The unity of the Philebus: metaphysical assumptions of the good human life -- The placement of pleasure and knowledge in the fourfold articulation of reality -- Hybrid varieties of pleasure: true mixed pleasures and false pure pleasures -- The nature of pleasure: absolute standards of filling or replenishment and due measure -- Pleasures of learning and the role of due measure in experiencing them -- Plato's conception of pleasure confronting three Aristotelian critiques -- The Philebus' implicit response (...) to the aporiai of participation from the Parmenides. (shrink)

This study examines Plato's dialogue on the good life and argues, most centrally, that the "pleasures of learning" exemplify, for Socrates, the possibility of good becoming or change.

Do the later Platonic dialogues abandon the earlier doctrine of forms? If not, do the forms, as the objects or contents of thought, have any relation to experienced things? Schipper, in this lucid and scholarly study of the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Philebus, and Timaeus, maintains that Plato continues to assume the essentials of the earlier doctrine of forms, and that while he offers no complete and explicit answer to the second question, the later dialogues do provide clues which are (...) consistent with each other. In formulating this answer, Schipper suggests that sensible things can be considered in two aspects: as immediately sensed and as known by means of the forms; the two aspects are united by the perceiving and knowing mind. However, this seems to be merely a restatement of the problem. Her other, more provocative suggestion is that forms are not discovered by an intellectual perception, but are assumed or posited as demanded by logos or argument in order to explain and define experienced things. Thus the interrelated forms can apply to things without being immanent in them. Although the treatment of the dialogues is careful, the book is primarily a spiritless exegesis of the text, together with an account of what other scholars have said. It is bereft of an index.—S. A. S. (shrink)

Presenting a case for the possibility of interpreting the metaphysical passages of the "philebus" consistently with the view that plato substantially revised the theory of transcendent forms in his later dialogues. sections (1) to (5) make necessary initial philosophical distinctions and present a brief account of material in other dialogues. sections (6) to (10) discuss in detail the interpretation of relevant specific passages.