Critical aspects in the field of education are currently related to low levels of socioemotional competences and high rates of school dropouts. However, there are no standard practices or guidelines for helping countries to assess and train social and emotional competences. To overcome this limitation, the project Learning to be (L2B) aims to propose a comprehensive model of the assessment and development of social and emotional competences that bring together policymakers, researchers, teachers, school authorities and learners from different participating countries: (...) Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. The project attempts to create an international framework for regulating activities and supporting teachers working on the social and emotional competences of the students and to provide tools which can be used across countries. The aim of the paper is to describe how L2B has been developed in Spain by analyzing the contributions of the international framework and extracting the specific needs in the Spanish context. Specifically, we describe two products of the project: a) the process for creating a toolkit, a tool focused on creating activities and materials for helping teachers develop social and emotional competences of students and b) the results of an exploratory study in Spain in which social and emotional competences are assessed and compared to the international framework. First, we explain the definition of social and emotional competences used for creating the toolkit. Second, we analyze responses of Spanish students to questionnaires administered before applying the toolkit in the schools. The paper describes social and emotional competences in Spain and evaluates the overlap between relevant variables in Spain and those used for developing the toolkit, the international tool. Specific needs in Spain are discussed, as well as the contribution of the project for promoting the improved development of students’ social and emotional competences, improving learning outcomes and stronger social cohesion in schools and local communities, as well as the utility of the results for creating new educational policies. (shrink)

Introduction 11 PART I: THE HALLE YEARS Chapter One: The Rehabilitation of the Imagination in Husserl’s Early Thought. 17 §1. Brentano’s Rehabilitation of Intentionality and the Problem of Imagination. §2. Husserl and the Breakthrough of Phenomenology. §2.1 The Meaning-Bestowing Act as ‘the Peg from which Everything hangs.’ §2.2 Consciousness is not a Container. §2.3 ‘A Difference that cannot be Phenomenologically Reduced.’ §3. Imagination as an Authentic, Intuitive Intentionality. PART II: THE GÖTTINGEN YEARS Chapter Two: Irreconcilable Differences: Imagination and Image Consciousness. (...) 71 §1. Separations, Convergences, and Goodbyes §2. A nothing in the midst of things that sees me. §3. Wrestling with the angel of Imagination. §4. Images of Productive Phantasy. Chapter Three: The Garden of the Forking Paths: On Time Consciousness. 107 §1. Picking up an Ancient Cross. §2. Continuum of Continua. §3. In Search of Time Lost. Chapter Four: Absence and the Absolute: The Revisions of Phantasy and Time-Consciousness. 143 Recapitulation: Cutting loose the baggage of the ‘Content for an Apprehension and Apprehension’ Schema. §1. The Concept of an Absolute Consciousness and the Embedment of Contents. §2. Transcendental Phenomenology and the Opening Up of a Closed Field. §3. The Breakthrough on the Contents of Consciousness. §3.1. ‘Consciousness through and through’ §3.2. Ambiguities of Immanence. §4. Primary and Secondary Memory revisited. §5. The New Account of Internal Time Consciousness. Chapter Five: The Breakthrough of the Life of Phantasy: Recollection and Pure Phantasy. 187 §1. Introducing the Pure Ego. §2. The Pending Problem of Belief in Presentifications. §3. Recollection and Internal Time Consciousness. §3.1. The Characterization of Recollection as Consciousness ‘Once Again’ following the Revision of the Schema. §3.2. Recollection as a Modified Appearance and a Directedness toward the Past Object. §3.3. Recollection as the Reproductive Modification of the Internal Consciousness of a Past Act. §4. The Differentiation of Recollection and Pure Phantasy on the basis of Internal Time-Consciousness. PART III: THE FREIBURG YEARS AND BEYOND Chapter Six: The Subject in Image: Husserl’s Revisiting of Image-Consciousness. 239 §1. Introducing the Concept of Perceptual Phantasy. §2. The Subject in Image. §3. Is There Temporality in Image?. §4. Revisiting the Theory of Image-consciousness as Depiction. §5. Pictoriality and Phantasy Temporality. Chapter Seven: ‘Myth that is Truest Memory:’ Phantasy and the Literary Work of Art. 303 §1. Theater and Drama. §2. Is the Literary Work of Art Itself Imaginary? §3. The Literary Work as an Idea with a Temporality. §4. Phantasy and the Consciousness of Possibility. Parting Words on Poetry and Philosophy. Bibliography: 361. (shrink)

The concept of the universe is used in physical cosmology differently from the usual meaning of the term, naively considered as the entire reality. Traditionally, thinking about the whole led to logical contradictions. Taking as reference the Kantian antecedent, different contemporary philosophical notions of the universe are analysed in the first part of this paper, including realist and constructivist approaches, as well as a notion of the universe as a physical object. In the second part, the specific notion from the (...) standard physical cosmology is discussed. Although modelling the universe as a physical system provides a specific way to define some global properties, the universe as a whole remains empirically inaccessible. Hence, the discussion about the under-determined global properties depends ultimately on philosophical preferences. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the realist interpretation of such properties becomes problematic because it leads to unstable conclusions. Finally, it is argued that the notion of the universe as conceived in standard cosmology is not necessarily consistent with an approach that considers it to be a physical object. (shrink)

Los últimos años del siglo XX han coincidido con el fin de unos procesos seculares en la historia de la humanidad, con la acentuación de algunos de sus problemas más acuciantes y con el nacimiento de desafíos nuevos que la especie humana ha de afrontar y a los que ha de responder. Este libro prentende contribuir a la clarificacíon y toma de conciencia de esta situación y aportar planteamientos e ideas para la respuesta a esos problemas y desafíos.

Dysfunction in motor skills can be linked to alterations in motor processing, such as the anticipation of forthcoming graphomotor sequences. We expected that the difficulties in motor processing in schizophrenia would be reflected in a decrease of motor anticipation. In handwriting, motor anticipation concerns the ability to write a letter while processing information on how to produce the following letters. It is essential for fast and smooth handwriting, that is, for the automation of graphomotor gestures. In this study, we examined (...) motor anticipation by comparing the kinematic characteristics of the first l in the bigrams ll and ln written on a digitiser. Previous studies indicated that the downstroke duration of the first l is modulated by the anticipation of the local constraints of the following letter. Twenty-four adult individuals with diagnosis of schizophrenia and 24 healthy adults participated in the study. The classic measures of duration, trajectory, and dysfluency were used for the kinematic analysis of the upstroke and downstroke. In the control group, the duration of the downstroke of the l was longer in ln than ll whereas no differences were found for the group with schizophrenia. Likewise, the control group showed a longer DS trajectory for the l of ln than ll in downstrokes, while the group of patients failed to show this effect. These results suggest that the motor alterations in patients with schizophrenia could also affect their ability for motor anticipation. (shrink)

Resumen En 1976, Nagel y Williams presentaron -en una reunión de la Aristotelian Society- dos célebres textos dirigidos a exhibir el desafío que el azar y la fortuna representan para la imputación kantiana de responsabilidad moral. Desde entonces han proliferado cientos de artículos centrados en analizar este dilema. Dicho debate, no obstante, rara vez es situado al interior del análisis de las implausibles y falsas premisas que dan lugar a él. En este trabajo reconstruyo las coordenadas centrales en las que (...) esta problemática filosófica se origina. Posteriormente muestro que la imputación de responsabilidad ética a un agente no sólo no excluye, sino incluso presupone, lo que llamaré una capacidad impura de agencia donde la suerte ocupa un lugar central.In 1976, Nagel and Williams presented -at the congress of the Aristotelian Society- two famous texts aimed at exposing the challenge that chance and fortune represent for moral thought. Since then, hundreds of articles have proliferated in the literature focused on analyzing this dilemma. This debate, however, is rarely situated within the analysis of the implausible and false premises that give rise to it. In this paper I reconstruct the central coordinates in which this philosophical problem originates. Later, I show that imputation of ethical responsibility to an agent not only does not exclude, but even presupposes, what I will call an impure capacity for agency where luck occupies a central place. (shrink)

Los procesos democráticos de toma de decisiones pueden ser evaluados por sus resultados, por su valor intrínseco o por una combinación de ambas cosas. Mostraré que analizar a fondo estas alternativas permite sacar a la luz las debilidades más serias en los modos usuales de justificación del constitucionalismo. La fundamentación teórica de la articulación entre democracia y constitucionalismo ha permanecido atrapada en una trampa que busco romper. Concluiré mostrando la necesidad de rebasar los argumentos epistémicos y contra-epistémicos sugiriendo pautas que (...) hasta ahora creo han sido poco ponderadas en la literatura clásica sobre el tema. (shrink)

Me propongo comparar el enfoque sobre la normatividad que hallamos en varias de las obras de un filósofo como Rorty, con el modelo metodológico positivista que hallamos en un jurista como Hart. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar cómo ambos casos se alejan de explicaciones simples, basadas, tanto en modelos iusnaturalistas, como en el modelo austiano. Ambas perspectivas se aproximan a un análisis que ubica el origen de las normas en una perspectiva más plausible y compleja donde se parte, (...) o bien de la idea de "reglas de reconocimiento" que permiten identificar como reglas de un sistema normas que no necesariamente son legisladas, o bien del análisis de las proposiciones no polémicas que determinan e informan sobre cuáles cosas cuentan como normas y cuáles no al interior de una determinada práctica social etnocéntrica. (shrink)

Aunque el debate jurídico entre Hans Kelsen y Carl Schmitt ha sido extensamente discutido y analizado, rara vez se lo sitúa en el marco de la disputa entre el mundo político antiguo y el moderno. La pérdida de este punto central de referencia impide focalizar la raíz filosófica de fondo en la polémica entre ambos autores, a saber, una batalla entre dos modelos alternativos de racionalidad política y moral. Uno es el antiguo (reivindicado por Schmitt) y otro el moderno (defendido (...) por Kelsen). Sostengo que no situar dicho debate en semejante contexto nos priva de comprender las implicaciones jurídicas que se desprenden del conflicto entre los supuestos teóricos normativos que hacen surgir a la Modernidad y el horizonte teleológico que da lugar a la Antigüedad. While the legal debate between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt has been widely discussed and analyzed, it is rarely located within the coordinates of the political dispute between the ancient and modern world. The loss of this central point of reference prevents focusing on the deeply philosophical root wich is in the midst of the controversy between the two authors, namely, a battle between two alternative models of political rationality and morality. One is the ancient (claimed by Schmitt) and the other is the modern (defended by Kelsen). i argue that not placing this debate in such context deprives us from understanding the legal implications arising from the conflict between the normative theoretical assumptions that give rise to Modernity and the teleological horizon which gives rise to the ancient world. (shrink)

La crítica de Feuerbach concibe el fenómeno religioso como una manifestación efectiva de la autoconciencia humana. Partiendo de este supuesto, el presente artículo tiene como objeto contextualizar, a la luz de un desarrollo histórico, el humanismo propuesto por el autor como siguiente estadio del proceso de autoconocimiento humano. Dicha propuesta implicaría necesariamente el reconocimiento de los mecanismos de enajenación implícitos en la religión y, en definitiva, su superación. Al desembarazarse de las especulaciones propias de la fe, la reducción de la (...) teología a la antropología despojaría a la realidad de todo elemento sobrenatural y supondría un avance significativo en pos de la plenitud humana. (shrink)

Human genomics is a translational field spanning research, clinical care, public health, and direct-to-consumer testing. However, law differs across these domains on issues including liability, consent, promoting quality of analysis and interpretation, and safeguarding privacy. Genomic activities crossing domains can thus encounter confusion and conflicts among these approaches. This paper suggests how to resolve these conflicts while protecting the rights and interests of individuals sequenced. Translational genomics requires this more translational approach to law.

The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? In this chapter, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, (...) which is maintained during the middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feeling that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other. (shrink)

A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not (...) care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self- interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values. (shrink)

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics' vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of logical constants and substructural logics encode a pragmatically enriched sense of those connectives. The paper is divided (...) into four parts: first, I introduce the motivation for the pluralist thesis of the paper; second I introduce the calculus for the different logics endorsed in the pluralist thesis; third, I motivate how the different behaviors of the logical vocabulary of these logics can be pragmatically interpreted, and fourth, I motivate how the different inferential roles that each substructural logic attribute to logical constants can coexist, and how we should reason with a logical constant c given this plurality. (shrink)

Partiendo de la constatación husserliana de la crisis filosófica como crisis vital de una humanidad que se ha desviado de su _télos_ al implantar el modelo tecno-científico del dominio del mundo, el artículo investiga el lugar de la filosofía en el sistema educativo, explorando las reformas propuestas en Baviera y Prusia por Niethammer y Humboldt a principios del siglo XIX y que plantean, cada una a su modo, la necesaria incorporación de la filosofía a una educación de Estado que, frente (...) a las pretensiones utilitarias del filantropismo, logre elevar al hombre a su humanidad. En este sentido, retorna al concepto humanista de formación (_Bildung_) al que se consagran ambas reformas y que Gadamer recupera precisamente en _Verdad y método_ como un ideal para enfrentar la pretensión de universalidad de la ciencia moderna en relación a las nociones de conocimiento y de verdad, así como para pensar el horizonte ontológico de la experiencia hermenéutica. Es precisamente este ideal el que permite localizar el lugar de la filosofía en el conjunto del saber y conducir al hombre a su humanidad. (shrink)

In this paper we mainly study preservation theorems for two fragments of the infinitary languagesLκκ, withκregular, without the equality symbol: the universal Horn fragment and the universal strict Horn fragment. In particular, whenκisω, we obtain the corresponding theorems for the first-order case.The universal Horn fragment of first-order logic (with equality) has been extensively studied; for references see [10], [7] and [8]. But the universal Horn fragment without equality, used frequently in logic programming, has received much less attention from the model (...) theoretic point of view. At least to our knowledge, the problem of obtaining preservation results for it has not been studied before by model theorists. In spite of this, in the field of abstract algebraic logic we find a theorem which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of infinitary languages without equality which, apart from function symbols, have only a unary relation symbol. This theorem is due to J. Czelakowski; see [5], Theorem 6.1, and [6], Theorem 5.1. A. Torrens [12] also has an unpublished result dealing with matrices of sequent calculi which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of a first-order language. And in [2] of W. J. Blok and D. Pigozzi we find Corollary 6.3 which properly translated corresponds to our Corollary 19, but for the case of a first-order language that apart from its function symbols has only oneκ-ary relation symbol, and for strict universal Horn sentences. The study of these results is the basis for the present work. In the last part of the paper, Section 4, we will make these connections clear and obtain some of these results from our theorems. In this way we hope to make clear two things: (1) The field of abstract algebraic logic can be seen, in part, as a disguised study of universal Horn logic without equality and so has an added interest. (2) A general study of universal Horn logic without equality from a model theoretic point of view can be of help in the field of abstract algebraic logic. (shrink)

En este trabajo presentamos la traducción al castellano del tratado «Sobre la forma primera y la materia primera» del filósofo zaragozano Avempace, precedida por una introducción que trata de mostrar los cauces por los que ha llegado hasta nosotros esta obra y los problemas que presenta para la traducción.The aim of this essay is to offer the Spanish translation of the "Treatise on Primary Form and Primary Matter" written by the philosopher Avempace, from Saragossa. The preceding introduction is an attempt (...) to show the ways through which this work has reached us and the difficulties it presents for its translation. (shrink)

): This study answers the following question: How does John M. Finnis introduce in his Theory of Law the hartian and razian concept of “an exclusionary reason for action”? The search for an answer entails at least the following items: (a) the generic concept of a “reason for action” and its distinction from other possible motivations for action; (b) the distinctive elements of a legal reason for action, and its difference from other classes of reasons for action; (c) the correlative (...) concepts of authority and obligation, as applied to Law. This analysis will highlight some descriptive and evaluative achievements in Finnis’ proposal, particularly regarding his positivist predecessors, but also some theoretical difficulties, which we presume are linked to Finnis’ aim in trying to conciliate Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory.Resumen:Este estudio intenta responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿cómo introduce John M. Finnis en la teoría ius-naturalista del derecho, la idea hartiana y raziana de que el derecho proporciona razones excluyentes para la acción? En la búsqueda de una respuesta se abordarán los siguientes ejes temáticos: (a) el concepto genérico de razón para actuar, y su distinción de otras motivaciones posibles para la acción; (b) los rasgos propios de la razón jurídica para obrar, que la diferencian de otro tipo de razones para la acción; (c) los conceptos correlativos de autoridad y obligación en referencia al derecho. En este análisis se señalarán algunas fortalezas en la propuesta de Finnis con respecto a sus predecesores de la tradición positivista, pero también algunas debilidades descriptivas e inconsistencias teóricas. Estas dificultades se presumen ligadas a la dificultad de Finnis en su intento de conciliar el aparato conceptual heredado de la tradición iuspositivista, con el esquema conceptual heredado de la tradición iusnaturalista y, más ampliamente, con la epistemología práctica tomista que recoge de esta tradición. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is to argue contra Waluchow’s and Raz’s versions of legal positivism – as main representatives of the inclusive and exclusive variants – that legal interpretation always requires an appeal to law’s rea- son or purpose. The main thesis could be expressed as follows: one technique of legal interpretation (the author labels it as systematical), one that demands that the interpreter interprets the law through its general pur- poses in legal practice, is not one technique amongst (...) many, it is necessary in all legal interpretation.The second purpose of the paper is to argue that this systematic approach towards legal interpretation enables an evaluative role on the part of the interpreter that may be called “interpretative creativity”. Due to this, the creative role in legal interpretation is not an exception, but a necessary element in all interpretation. This creative role is not a defect or an inevitable evil in law, but is functional and instrumental to law’s coordinating activity of citizen’s conducts in a reasonable manner.Resumen:Este trabajo se propone mostrar, en contraposición al positivismo jurídico de Wilfrid Waluchow y Joseph Raz —como representantes, respectiva- mente, de la versión incluyente y excluyente del positivismo contemporáneo—, que la interpretación jurídica supone atender siempre, y no de modo excepcional o recortado, a las razones o fines del derecho. La expresión metodológica de esta tesis podría enunciarse diciendo que la interpretación teleológica-sistemática, mediante la cual el intérprete determina el sentido de las normas a la luz de los fines globales de la práctica jurídica, no es un método interpretativo más, sino el modo necesario de toda interpretación jurídica.El segundo propósito de este trabajo es argumentar que la dimensión teleológica sistemática de la interpretación abre un espacio para la valoración por parte del intérprete que podría denominarse, “creatividad interpretativa”. Por esto mismo, la creatividad en la interpretación jurídica no es una excepción, sino una nota general y necesaria de toda interpretación. Se intentará mostrar, por último, que esta creatividad interpretativa no es un defecto o un mal inevitable del derecho, sino que es funcional o instrumental a la función del derecho de coordinar conductas de modo razonable. (shrink)