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  1. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.
    In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies---in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View---are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in (...)
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    Towards a moderate scientism.Sander Verhaegh & Pieter van der Kolk - 2015 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 107 (3):285-299.
    Scientism, the view that only scientifically supported beliefs are epistemically justified, faces two influential problems: (1) scientism itself does not seem to be scientifically supported and hence self-referentially incoherent; and (2) scientism seems to dismiss many plausible ordinary beliefs as unjustified. In this paper, we show that both problems presuppose a needlessly narrow conception of science and that when scientism is based on a broader, more realistic conception of science neither problem arises. Furthermore, we argue that our variant of scientism (...)
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  3. Opschorting En Onenigheid.Pieter van der Kolk & Sander Verhaegh - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):37-52.
    Suspension and DisagreementSome sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue (...)
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    Suspension and disagreement.Pieter van der Kolk & Sander Verhaegh - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):37-52.
    Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, (...)
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    Een Middenweg Voor Sciëntisme.Sander Verhaegh & Pieter van der Kolk - 2015 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 107 (3):285-299.
    Towards a moderate scientismScientism, the view that only scientifically supported beliefs are epistemically justified, faces two influential problems: scientism itself does not seem to be scientifically supported and hence self-referentially incoherent; and scientism seems to dismiss many plausible ordinary beliefs as unjustified. In this paper, we show that both problems presuppose a needlessly narrow conception of science and that when scientism is based on a broader, more realistic conception of science neither problem arises. Furthermore, we argue that our variant of (...)
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