In the 20th century, the role of the unconscious in Kant s philosophy has been in great part neglected by Kant scholars. Nevertheless, the unconscious, the other of consciousness, is a key problem of the critical philosophy. The purpose of the volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant research and to offer a complete survey of the topic in different areas of research, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology. ".
Dieser Band analysiert den Begriff des ‚Abenteuers der Vernunft’, welcher in der dritten Kritik von Kant als Hypothese für die Erklärung des Ursprungs des Lebendigen aufgestellt wird. In systematischer Hinsicht werden vornehmlich zwei Themen behandelt: der kantische Materialismus und das Verhältnis zwischen dem Abenteuer der Vernunft und der kopernikanisch-newtonianischen Wende. Der Nietzsche gewidmete Teil hat das Anliegen, seine Theorie aus dem Jahre 1868 als eine selbständige Erarbeitung physiologischer, empirischer und materialistischer Aspekte des Kantischen Kritizismus zu präsentieren.
This volume, developing research on a theme that has been addressed very little, deals with the relation between the discovery of a priori feelings and emotions in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and the «Preface» to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in which he announces a revolution in the way of thinking. In Chapter One, I treat some aspects of the relation between the role of feel-ings and the Newtonian model in some of Kant’s pre-critical writings. (...) Chapter II will analyze the moral theory of the Critique of Pure Reason in order to show that in this work moral feeling is always conceived of as an a posteriori and em-pirical element. Chapter Three is devoted to the examination of the concept of a revolution in Kant’s way of thinking and of its relationship to the Newtonian model in the first Critique. Although the term ‘Copernican turn’ [kopernikanische Wende] is usually used, it will be shown that this expression emphasizes only one aspect of the change that Kant achieves. While both Kepler and Newton have given apo-dictic certainty to the hypothetical thoughts of Copernicus, Kant will transform the hypothesis proposed in the first Critique into apodictic certainty. The only possibility for demonstrating the transcendental and hypothetical ideals of free-dom, God and immortality rests, for Kant, with the objective reality of moral consciousness. Hence, Kant will become the Newton of the thing in themselves. In Chapter Four, I address the theme of feelings and emotions in the «Dia-lectic» and the «Doctrine of Method» sections of the Critique of Practical Rea-son. This will prove that the passage from hypothesis to apodictic certainty, from Copernicus to Newton, both in speculative and in moral philosophy is strictly connected to the discovery of a priori emotions and feelings. Respect, contentment, interest, effort, need, and propensity of reason are the grounds of the proof of the objective reality of moral consciousness, of the primacy of prac-tical reason, of moral faith, and of education to the moral sublime. In some cases this will be illustrated by highlighting the relation between Kant’s theory and the doctrines of his sources, such as Hume, Milton, Montaigne, Rousseau, Sweden-borg, and Virgil. (shrink)