The paper argues that colouring is a conventional ingredient of literal meaning characterized by a considerable degree of semantic under-determination and a high degree of context-sensitivity. The positive, though tentative, suggestion made in the paper is that whereas in the case of words such as "but" and "damn" we are dealing with words lacking in specificity, in the case of pejoratives in general, and racist jargon in particular, we are dealing with words that express concepts that purport to describe the (...) world as being in a certain way. The circumstance that in certain contexts of utterance colouring can be cancelled out, does not show that it forms a detachable part of a word's literal meaning. It only shows that to account for the interplay between context, literal meaning and assertoric content is much trickier than meets the eye. (shrink)

After describing the philosophical background of Kerry's work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano's conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege's work and Kerry's views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: (a) the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; (b) the logical roles of the definite article. Not only (...) did Frege in 1892 offer an unconvincing solution to Kerry's puzzle concerning 'the concept horse' but he also overlooked the many criticisms levelled by Kerry against the notion of an (indefinite) extension on which his own definition of number was based. (shrink)

Rorty's assessment of the origins of the analytic/continental divide is discussed and criticized on several grounds. Rorty's plea in favour of the philosophical quietism implicit in the pragmatists' dismissal of metaphysics rests on an uncritical faith in scientific progress. To emphasize the tensions implicit in the ideal of progress a novel interpretation of the significance of Faust's encounter with Sorge (Care) is offered and compared with Heidegger's construal of Sorge in Sein und Zeit . A better understanding of the analytic/continental (...) divide is gained if we concentrate on the impact of Nazism and Fascism on the philosophical tradition with which philosophers living on the Continent had to come to terms after the Second World War. In this respect Adorno's attitude to progress in general and to philosophy in particular is very instructive and can be usefully contrasted with Rorty's dismissal of metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay attempts at elucidating the relationships between cosmopolitanism and nationalism and between State and Nation in Fichte’s thought on the basis of the new evidence provided by the critical edition of his works. The analysis of the Reden an die deutsche Nation highlights the ambiguity of the concept of Nation, strictly connected to the thesis of the primacy of Germans. This position is discussed in the light of the reflections devoted to this matter by Fichte in his last months (...) of life, as recorded in his diary. (shrink)

The attitude of believing or "holding true" fulfils a twofold role in Davidson's theory of meaning: it provides the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation and it also constitutes the key notion in terms of which the linguistic act of assertion is to be characterized. It is however doubtful whether the notion of "holding true" can fulfil either of these two roles without presupposing an implicit grasp of the public significance of the practice of making assertions. The lack (...) of specific conventions governing assertoric force and linking assertion to what is believed true is no ground for supposing that a theory of meaning can dispense with an account of the act of assertion: on the contrary, such an account is indispensable if we are to understand the bearing of the notion of truth on that of linguisticmeaning. (shrink)

The attitude of believing or "holding true" fulfils a twofold role in Davidson's theory of meaning: it provides the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation and it also constitutes the key notion in terms of which the linguistic act of assertion is to be characterized. It is however doubtful whether the notion of "holding true" can fulfil either of these two roles without presupposing an implicit grasp of the public significance of the practice of making assertions. The lack (...) of specific conventions governing assertoric force and linking assertion to what is believed true is no ground for supposing that a theory of meaning can dispense with an account of the act of assertion: on the contrary, such an account is indispensable if we are to understand the bearing of the notion of truth on that of linguisticmeaning. (shrink)

The attitude of believing or "holding true" fulfils a twofold role in Davidson's theory of meaning: it provides the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation and it also constitutes the key notion in terms of which the linguistic act of assertion is to be characterized. It is however doubtful whether the notion of "holding true" can fulfil either of these two roles without presupposing an implicit grasp of the public significance of the practice of making assertions. The lack (...) of specific conventions governing assertoric force and linking assertion to what is believed true is no ground for supposing that a theory of meaning can dispense with an account of the act of assertion: on the contrary, such an account is indispensable if we are to understand the bearing of the notion of truth on that of linguisticmeaning. (shrink)

Eva Picardi was one of the most influential Italian analytic philosophers of her generation. She taught for forty years at the University of Bologna, raising three generations of students. This volume presents a selection of Picardi's essays on Frege's philosophy of logic, language, and psychology. Together, these papers provide a close look at the milieu within which Frege operated, and serve to highlight the relevance of his work for contemporary debates, particularly in the philosophy of language. One strand in Picardi's (...) work on Frege concerns understanding and contextualizing Frege's anti-psychologism. Picardi contends that Frege was motivated by semantic considerations, much more so than by adherence to Kantian transcendentalism. Furthermore, Picardi draws on her deep knowledge of German, and the fact that she was a native speaker of Italian, to reconstruct the intricacies of Frege's relationship with other logicians of his time-both in Germany, like Kerry and Sigwart, and in Italy, like Peano and his school. Picardi's work shows how the historical and the theoretical, complement and enrich one another. (shrink)

The older topos ›historia magistra vitae‹ – which was coined by Cicero, borrowing from a Hellenistic pattern – lasted almost unbroken into the eighteenth century, also thanks to its flexibility in accommodating the most different conclusions. As demonstrated by R. Koselleck, the common place was emptied of meaning just between the eighteenth and nineteenth century, at the same time and in connection with the invisible and sudden semantic process, through which in the German language area the naturalized foreign world Historie (...) and the plural ›die Geschichten‹ were displaced by the collective singular ›die Geschichte‹. This paper aims to frame Fichte’s position in the process of dissolution of the topos, described by Koselleck. For this purpose, the paper will be articulated in the following steps. Firstly, it reconstructs the most important and probable filters, through which Fichte has received Cicero’s topos. The second part will examine deeply the criticisms that Fichte moves to the different versions of the formula, during his whole speculative itinerary. Finally, the conclusive part considers how Fichte recovers and reworks the topos – since his first works – by transposing it in the completely different theoretical frame of his own philosophy of history and of his theory of the State.Die Wendung ›historia magistra vitae‹ – die in Anlehnung an hellenistische Vorbilder von Cicero geprägt wurde – währte fast ungebrochen bis in das achtzehnte Jahrhundert, wobei eine solche Dauerhaftigkeit auch und zunächst auf seiner Elastizität beruhte, die die unterschiedlichsten Schlüsse zuließ. Wie R. Koselleck gezeigt hat, wird die Formel lediglich zwischen dem achtzehnten und dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert – gleichzeitig und parallel mit dem unmerklichen und unbewussten Vorgang, der im deutschen Sprachgebiet die Pluralform von ›die Geschichte‹ zu einem Kollektivsingular verdichtet hat – sinnentleert. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht darauf aus, Fichtes eigentümliche Stellung in dieser Auflösung des alten Topos zu verdeutlichen. Dazu untersucht man zuerst die Quelle, die Fichtes Rezeption des Topos ermöglichen und vermitteln. Im zweiten Teil betrachtet man alle Stelle tiefgehend, wo Fichte im Lauf seiner ganzen philosophischen Untersuchung an den Topos kritisch aufweist. Am Schluss wird die radikale neue Auslegung illustriert, die Fichte auf Grund seiner Philosophie der Geschichte und seiner Auffassung der Staatslehre anbietet. (shrink)

After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano’s conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege’s work and Kerry’s views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; the logical roles of the definite article.Not only did Frege in (...) 1892 offer an unconvincing solution to Kerry’s puzzle concerning “the concept horse” but he also overlooked the many criticisms levelled by Kerry against the notion of an extension on which his own definition of number was based. (shrink)

Cet essai reconstruit les principales étapes de la confrontation de Ricœur avec la dialectique de Hegel, depuis ses premières notes manuscrites sur « Hegel et la négativité » jusqu’à l’essai de 1975, « Le lieu de la dialectique ». L’objectif que l’on vise est triple. Il s’agit tout d’abord de reconstruire dans sa genèse l’effort ricœurien de « régionalisation » de la dialectique hégélienne, dont les raisons ne peuvent pas être réduites à un refus générique des effets de totalisation systématique (...) de l’identification hégélienne entre négation et médiation. Le deuxième objectif est la mise en relève des raisons exogènes et endogènes qui sous-tendent l’élargissement et le déplacement que le lieu de la dialectique hégélienne subit, suite à la greffe ricœurienne de l’herméneutique sur la phénoménologie. Enfin, on vise à déterminer la place variable que la dialectique hégélienne occupe par rapport aux autres « dialectiques » qui nourrissent le style dialectique de la philosophie de Ricœur, de la « dialectique » du paradoxe de Kierkegaard et de la dialectique des cinq genres du Sophiste – telles qu’il les interprète – à la dialectique nabertienne entre acte et signes. (shrink)

L’article examine la façon dont Hegel traite la représentation des attributs divins, avec référence particulière à deux questions traditionnelles : la question de leur compatibilité réciproque et le problème de l’univocité ou équivocité entre les prédicats humains et divins. Les hypothèses défendues sont les suivantes : la prétention de connaître Dieu en lui attribuant plusieurs prédicats constitue selon Hegel l’erreur fondamentale de la théologie rationnelle ; néanmoins, Hegel ne considère pas tous les attributs divins comme représentations dépourvues de noyau spéculatif (...) et donc simplement destinées à disparaître, avec le passage du niveau de la Représentation au niveau du Concept ; il affirme plutôt la correspondance des prédicats de toute-puissance, bonté, justice et sagesse, avec les déterminations du Concept ; la transposition spéculative de ces attributs divins est une partie intégrante de la « véritable théodicée » de Hegel, car elle représente une réplique – alternative à celle de Leibniz – par rapport à l’anti-théodicée de Pierre Bayle, centrée sur l’affirmation d’une contradiction insoluble entre la bonté, la toute-puissance et la justice divines ; enfin, l’éclaircissement du lien dialectique que Hegel établit entre justice et sagesse divines – à travers leur transposition spéculative – permet de mieux saisir la façon dont il conçoit le rapport entre justice humaine et justice divine, qui est ici examinée à travers une analyse de l’interprétation hégélienne du livre de Job. (shrink)