This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This introduction to physical science combines a rigorous discussion of scientific principles with sufficient historical background and philosophic interpretation to add a new dimension of interest to the accounts given in more conventional textbooks. It brings out the twofold character of physical science as an expanding body of verifiable knowledge and as an organized human activity whose goals and values are major factors in the revolutionary changes sweeping over the world today.Professor Kemble insists that to understand (...) science one must understand not only what the scientists have discovered, but how the discoveries were made, why the growth of scientific knowledge had to begin slowly, and what it has done to our habits of thought. He has written neither a history of science nor an introduction to the philosophy of science but an introduction to scientific concepts and principles that supplies as much of their historical and philosophical context as limits of space permit.The volume takes up in turn the story of the astronomy of ancient Greece, the Copernican revolution, the idea of the expanding sidereal universe, the rise of Newton's classical mechanics with its many astronomical applications, the concept of energy and its relation to heat, to steam engines, and to thermodynamics. The volume ends with an account of the successes and failures of classical kinetic-molecular theory of heat. (shrink)

The very juxtaposition of the terms “physical science” and “social sciences” in the same sentence is indicative of the definitive trend now present in both physical science and in the thinking of the physical scientist. The two fields of human interest represented by physical science and the social sciences have drawn closer together, have coalesced at least in those areas of implication deducible from the fields themselves and this conjunction is fraught with consequences (...) important to both fields. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates how natural theology is both encouraged and challenged by the findings of the physical sciences. The scientific method is committed to finding naturalistic explanations, yet the vision that it gives suggests there is more to it than meets this particular eye: the universe seems to be permeated with signs of ‘mind’. The mysterious quantum world has shown us that new ways of thinking are required to deal with material ‘reality’. Quantum theory has also revealed new forms (...) of matter with ‘miraculous’ properties. These properties are not evidence of supernatural intervention in the normal running of the universe but manifestations of a deeper rationality that lay undiscovered by classical physics. (shrink)

The lectures have afforded me an opportunity of developing more fully than in my earlier books the principles of philosophic thought associated with the modern advances of physical science. It is often said that there is no "philosophy of ...

Scott Sehon argues for a complex view about the relation between commonsense psychology and the physical sciences.1 He rejects any sort of Cartesian dualism and believes that the common-sense psychological facts supervene on the physical facts. Nevertheless he asserts that there is an important respect in which common-sense psychology is independent of the physical sciences. Despite supervenience, we are not to expect any sort of reduction of common-sense psychology to physical science, nor are we to (...) expect the physical sciences to conflict with common-sense psychology. (shrink)

Computer simulation is shown to be philosophically interesting because it introduces a qualitatively new methodology for theory construction in science different from the conventional two components of "theory" and "experiment and/or observation". This component is "experimentation with theoretical models." Two examples from the physical sciences are presented for the purpose of demonstration but it is claimed that the biological and social sciences permit similar theoretical model experiments. Furthermore, computer simulation permits theoretical models for the evolution of physical (...) systems which use cellular automata rather than differential equations as their syntax. The great advantages of the former are indicated. (shrink)

The concept of observability of entities in physical science is typically analyzed in terms of the nature and significance of a dichotomy between observables and unobservables. In the present work, however, this categorization is resisted and observability is analyzed in a descriptive way in terms of the information which one can receive through interaction with objects in the world. The account of interaction and the transfer of information is done using applicable scientific theories. In this way, the question (...) of observability of scientific entities is put to science itself. ;Several examples are presented which show how this interaction-information account of observability is done. It is demonstrated that observability has many dimensions which are, in general, orthogonal. The epistemic significance of these dimensions is explained. ;This study is intended primarily as a method for understanding problems of observability rather than as a solution to those problems. The important issue of scientific realism and its relation to observability, however, demand attention. Hence, the implication of the interaction-information account for realism, and the implication of realism for the interaction-information account of observability are discussed in the end. (shrink)

Global warming provides a useful frame of reference for examining the problem of disasters. This paper uses this frame to address three questions: What is a disaster, why do disasters matter so much, and how can we improve our capacity to avoid and respond to disasters. The concept of vulnerability to disasters has biogeophysical as well aspolitical and socioeconomic aspects. The gap between adaptive capacity on the one hand, and actual responses to disaster and the risk of disaster on the (...) other, was evident in the cases of Hurricane Katrina and the European heat wave of 2003. One feature of climate-related disasters is that past experience provides only limited guidance on the potential frequency and intensity of future disasters because the risks are changing as greenhouse gasses increase in the atmosphere. Accordingly, the ability to successfully apply lessons learned will be increasingly challenged the faster the greenhouse gases accumulate and climate changes. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Spinoza on the proper methods and content of physical science. I start by showing how Spinoza's epistemology leads him to a kind of pessimism about the prospects of empirical and mathematical methods in natural philosophy. While they are useful for life, they do not tell us about nature, as Spinoza puts it, “as it is in itself.” At the same time, Spinoza seems to allow that we have some knowledge of physical things (...) and their behavior. So I go on to outline and critique a few of the accounts of how Spinoza thinks we can do this, focusing on the role of the common notions in physics. In the third section, I discuss the possible contents of physics, for Spinoza, and argue that they are not, as is usually thought, fundamentally Cartesian. I conclude by pointing to some promising directions for future research and suggesting a few heuristics for such research. (shrink)

The current consensus view of causation in physics, as commonly held by scientists and philosophers, has several serious problems. It fails to provide an epistemology for the causal knowledge that it claims physics to possess; it is inapplicable in a prominent area of physics (classical thermodynamics); and it is difficult to reconcile with our everyday use of causal concepts and claims. In this dissertation, I use historical examples and philosophical arguments to show that the interventionist account of causation constitutes a (...) promising alternative for a “physically respectable” account of causation. The interventionist account explicates important parts of the experimental practice of physics and important aspects of the ways in which physical theory is used and applied. Moreover, the interventionist account succeeds where the consensus view of causation in physics fails. I argue that the interventionist account provides an epistemology of causal knowledge in physics that is rooted in experiment. On the interventionist view, there is a close link between experiment and the testing of causal claims. I give several examples of experiments from the early history of thermodynamics that scientists used in interventionist-type arguments. I also argue that interventionist claims made in the context of a physical theory can be epistemically justified by reference to the experimental interventions and observations that serve as evidence for the theory. I then show that the interventionist account of causation is well-suited to the patterns of reasoning that are intrinsic to thermodynamic theory. I argue that interventionist reasoning constitutes the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory, and that thermodynamic theory can provide clear answers to meaningful questions about whether or not a certain variable is a cause of another in a given context. Finally, I argue that the interventionist account offers the prospect of a unification of “physically respectable” causation and our everyday notion of causation. I conclude the dissertation by sketching an anti-foundationalist unification of causation, according to which causal reasoning occurs in the same manner in physics as it does in other branches of life and scientific research. (shrink)

This chapter raises various questions with regard to philosophy's relationship to the physical sciences and the issue whether we can mount an argument for the occurrence or possibility of progress in philosophy comparable to those raised in the scientific context. It examines cases made pro and contra the progressivist view with reference to recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science, concluding with a qualified endorsement of the argument by analogy. This places the onus of proof very squarely (...) on the skeptics, relativists, anti‐realists, social constructivists, and other progress‐deniers. (shrink)

Originally published in 1963. Can one discern certain regularities in the manoeuvrings and techniques employed by scientists and can these be formulated into the methodological principles of science? What is the origin and basis of such principles? Are they imposed by objective realities, do they derive from conceptual necessities or are they rooted in our own deep seated predilections? This volume investigates these questions and sheds light on the growth mechanism of the evolving structure of science itself.

The central claim of this paper is that computer simulation provides (though not exclusively) a qualitatively new and different methodology for the physical sciences, and that this methodology lies somewhere intermediate between traditional theoretical physical science and its empirical methods of experimentation and observation. In many cases it involves a new syntax which gradually replaces the old, and it involves theoretical model experimentation in a qualitatively new and interesting way. Scientific activity has thus reached a new milestone (...) somewhat comparable to the milestones that started the empirical approach (Galileo) and the deterministic mathematical approach to dynamics (the old syntax of Newton and Laplace). Computer simulation is consequently of considerable philosophical interest. In view of further technical developments in the near future, computer experts suggest that we are at present only at the very beginning of this new era. (shrink)

Perhaps the most influential historian of science of the last century, Alexandre Koyré, famously argued that the icon of modern science, Galileo Galilei, was a Platonist who had hardly performed experiments. Koyré has been followed by other historians and philosophers of science. In addition, it is not difficult to find examples of Platonists in contemporary science, in particular in the physical sciences. A famous example is the icon of twenty century physics, Albert Einstein. This paper (...) addresses two questions related to the Platonism of modern physical science. The first is: How is Galileo’s Platonism compatible with the fact that he did perform experiments? The solution to this apparent paradox can be found in Plato’s late dialogue Timaeus. In the dialogue the world has been created by a divine craftsman according to an original plan. The task of the scientist is not primarily to describe the material world, but to reconstruct the original plan. This view has later been known as “God’s Eye View”. The second question is: If a God’s Eye View is unattainable, how is it possible to give a “rational reconstruction” of Galileo’s Platonism? The key-word is idealisation. It is further argued that idealisation is intimately related to technology. Technology is required to realize ideal experimental conditions, and the results are in its turn implemented in technology. The implication is that the quest for unity in science, based on physics as the basic science, should be replaced by the recognition of the diversity of the sciences. (shrink)

This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science. Logical (...) Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricism’s philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwell’s role in the worldview of logical empiricism, on Reichenbach’s account of objectivity, on the impact of Poincaré on Neurath’s early views on scientific method, Frank’s exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics, and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories, including Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s positions on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Reichenbach’s critique of unified field theory, and the logical empiricists’ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Mises’ frequentism; Frank’s account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagel’s, Feigl’s, and Hempel’s versions of logical empiricism. (shrink)

To put it bluntly, Physicalism is the thesis that everything that exists is physical. Although Physicalism enjoys a great deal of popularity, two widely accepted theses, the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study, and dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, seem to guarantee that, under some sense of the word, the physical sciences are fated to give us an "incomplete" picture of what exists.In what follows, this challenge to Physicalism (...) will be referred to as "the challenge of categorical properties.". (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was a prominent English mathematician and philosopher who co-authored the highly influential Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Originally published in 1922, this book forms the follow-up volume to "The Principles of Natural Knowledge" (1919) and "The Concept of Nature" (1920). In it, Whitehead puts forward an alternative theory of relativity, one which goes against the heterogeneity of Einstein's later theories in deducing that 'our experience requires and exhibits a basis in uniformity'. The text is divided into (...) three parts - 'General Principles', 'Physical Applications', and 'Elementary Theory of Tensors' - and exhibits a characteristically ambitious approach in mixing various academic disciplines. This is a fascinating book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in natural science, physics, and philosophy, together with the history of science. (shrink)

The quality of doctoral-level chemistry (N=145), computer science (N=58), geoscience (N=91), mathematics (N=115), physics (N=123), and statistics/biostatistics (N=64) programs at United States universities was assessed, using 16 measures. These measures focused on variables related to: program size; characteristics of graduates; reputational factors (scholarly quality of faculty, effectiveness of programs in educating research scholars/scientists, improvement in program quality during the last 5 years); university library size; research support; and publication records. Chapter I discusses prior attempts to assess quality in graduate (...) education, development of the study plans, and the selection of disciplines and programs to be evaluated. Chapter II discusses the methodology used, focusing on each of the assessment measures. Chapters III to VIII present, respectively, findings from the analyses of the chemistry, computer science, geoscience, mathematics, physics, and statistics/biostatistics programs. Chapter IX includes a summary of results, correlations among measures, several additional analyses, and suggestions for future studies. Among the findings reported are those indicating that mathematics programs had, on the average, the largest number of faculty (N=33) in December 1980 followed closely by physics (N=28) and chemistry (N=23), and that 80 percent of computer science students had job commitments by graduation. (Survey instruments and supporting documentation are included in appendices.) (JN). (shrink)

In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of Life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms and so on. However, advancement (...) in various fields of biology has repeatedly given rise to questions against such a denial and has supplied more and more evidence against the completely misleading ideological imposition that living entities are particular states of matter. In the recent past, however, the realization has arisen that cognitive nature of life at all levels has begun presenting significant challenges to the views of materialism in biology and has created a more receptive environment for the soul hypothesis. Therefore, instead of adjudicating different aprioristic claims, the development of an authentic theory of biology needs both proper scientific knowledge and the appropriate tools of philosophical analysis of life. In a recently published paper the first author of present essay made an attempt to highlight a few relevant developments supporting a sentient view of life in scientific research, which has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of life and its origin [1]. The present essay highlights the uniqueness of biological systems that offers a considerable challenge to the mainstream materialism in biology and proposes the Vedāntic philosophical view as a viable alternative for development of a biological theory worthy of life. (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION (A) Historical Problem Suggested by the Nature of Modern Thought How curious, after all, is the way in which we moderns think about ...

The authors survey some debates about the nature and structure of physical theories and about the connections between our physical theories and naturalized metaphysics. The discussion is organized around an “ideal view” of physical theories and criticisms that can be raised against it. This view includes controversial commitments regarding the best analysis of physical modalities and intertheory relations. The authors consider the case in favor of taking laws as the primary modal notion, discussing objections related to (...) alleged violations of the laws, the apparent need to appeal to causality, and the status of probability. The “ideal view” includes a commitment that fundamental physical theories are explanatorily sufficient. The authors discuss several challenges to recovering the manifest image from fundamental physics, along with a distinct challenge to reductionism based on acknowledging the contributions of less fundamental theories in physical explanations. (shrink)