Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds or some properties which seem to be identical are not identical. In this (...) way it is shown that a dispositional account of physical properties is implausible. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of how to specify what is to count as physical for the purposes of debates concerning either physicalism or the completeness of physics. I argue that what is needed from an account of the physical depends primarily on the particular issue at stake, and that the demand for a general a priori specification of the physical is misplaced. A number of attempts to say what should be counted as physical are defended (...) from recent attacks by Chris Daly, and a specific proposal due to David Papineau developed and extended. I argue that this approach is more than suitable for the debates for which it is intended. (shrink)

Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new (...) physical property. In the second section, I will present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of that will be used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Finally, in the third section, I will examine certain very interesting and promising consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the topics above mentioned. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of how to specify what is to count as physical for the purposes of debates concerning either physicalism or the completeness of physics. I argue that what is needed from an account of the physical depends primarily on the particular issue at stake, and that the demand for a general a priori specification of the physical is misplaced. A number of attempts to say what should be counted as physical are defended (...) from recent attacks by Chris Daly, and a specific proposal due to David Papineau developed and extended. I argue that this approach is more than suitable for the debates for which it is intended. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantic bases of class membership in the noun class system of Gújjolaay Eegimaa (Eegimaa henceforth), a Niger-Congo and Atlantic language of the BAK group spoken in Southern Senegal. The question of whether semantic principles underlie the overt classification of nouns in Niger-Congo languages is a controversial one. There is a common perception of Niger-Congo noun class systems as being mainly semantically arbitrary. The goal of the present paper is to show that physical properties and culture-specific (...) factors are central principles of semantic categorisation in the Eegimaa noun class system. I argue that the Eegimaa overt grammatical classification of nouns into classes is a semantic categorisation system whereby categories are structured according to prototypicality, family resemblance, metaphorical and metonymic extensions and chaining processes, as argued within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. I show that the categorisation of entities in the Eegimaa nominal classification system productively makes use of physical properties such as shape as well as using culture-specific, less productive parameters for the semantic categorisation of entities denoted by nouns. The analysis proposed here also shows that the cases of multiple morphosyntactic classifications of nouns reflect multiple conceptual categorisation strategies. A detailed examination of the formal and semantic instances of multiple classification reveals the existence of conceptual correlations between the physical properties and the culture-specific semantic parameters of categorisation used in the Eegimaa noun class system. (shrink)

Physicalism can be roughly characterised as the view that everything is physical, or that everything that is fundamental is physical, or that any non-physical entity—property, substance, fact, event, kind and what have you—is both dependent upon and fully determined by physical entities. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing physicalism is to explain how conscious experience can be accounted for within the physicalist framework. Given these rough characterisations of physicalism, before setting out to address the problem posed (...) by consciousness, there is some prior conceptual work that must be done. In order for debates concerning the nature of consciousness and the ontology of mind and body to proceed in good order, something needs to be said about what it is for an entity to be a specifically physical entity. This paper offers reasons to think that, (i) at least given certain common metaphysical assumptions, discussions of what it is to be physical in general ought to be primarily concerned with what it is to be a physical property and that (ii) two popular approaches to characterising the physical - the Via Negativa and Object Physicalist approaches - face a serious problem. (shrink)

Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new (...) physical property. In the second section, I will present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of that will be used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Finally, in the third section, I will examine certain very interesting and promising consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the topics above mentioned. (shrink)

Discussions about physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, etc., typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. The domain of physical properties would thus have been established once and for all. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. In the first section, I (...) propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of this is used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Lastly, I examine certain interesting consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the above mentioned topics. (shrink)

Averill (1990) argues that not every property is a disposition. I claim here that his reasoning is faulty, suffering at one point from a logical error and at other points from an inadequate account of counterfactuals.

We present a conceptual analysis of the notions of actual physical property and potential physical property as used by theoretical physicists/mathematicians working in the domain of operational quantum logic. We investigate how these notions are being used today and what role they play in the specified field of research. In order to do so, we will give a brief introduction to this area of research and explain it as a part of the discipline known as “mathematical (...) metascience”. An in depth analysis of Aristotle’s use of the notions of “actuality” and “potentiality” is presented in order to point out exactly how much of the Aristotelian connotations are embedded in the contemporary use of the concepts under investigation. Although we will not focus in depth on all the drawbacks in the early historical development of physics due to the overwhelming influence of Aristotle’s writings, our analysis does touch upon some aspects of the Aristotelian theory of movement that are often overthrown nowadays. (shrink)

In the framework of the topos approach to quantum mechanics we give a representation of physical properties in terms of modal operators on Heyting algebras. It allows us to introduce a classical type study of the mentioned properties.

The quantum harmonic oscillator is described in terms of two basic sets of coordinates: linear coordinates x, px and angular coordinates eiφ, Pφ (action-angle variables). The angular “coordinate” eiφ is assumed unitary, the conjugate momentum pφ is assumed Hermitian, and eiφ and pφ are assumed to be a canonical pair. Two transformations are defined connecting the angular coordinates to the linear coordinates. It is found that x, px can be physical, i.e., Hermitian and canonical, only under constraints on the (...) pφ eigenvalue spectrum. The conclusion is that eiφ can be a unitary operator. A parallel analysis of the classical harmonic oscillator is done with equivalent results. (shrink)

This paper concerns an issue in the metaphysics of properties. The issue is: what are physical properties? What distinguishes physical properties from all other properties? My conclusions will be ‘downbeat’. I will argue that some major recent approaches to this issue prove unsatisfactory, and that the issue is much more intractable than has widely been supposed. The moral I draw is that there is no principled and well‐defined distinction between physical properties and all other properties, and accordingly (...) certain programmes in metaphysics should be abandoned because they mistakenly assume that there is such a distinction. (shrink)

Contextual emergence was originally proposed as an inter-level relation between different levels of description to describe an epistemic notion of emergence in physics. Here, we discuss the ontic extension of this relation to different domains or levels of physical reality using the properties of temperature and molecular shape as detailed case studies. We emphasize the concepts of stability conditions and multiple realizability as key features of contextual emergence. Some broader implications contextual emergence has for the foundations of physics and (...) cognitive and neural sciences are given in the concluding discussion. Relevant facts about algebras of observables are found in the appendices along with an abstract definition of Kubo-Martin-Schwinger states. (shrink)

This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent (...) advocates of this view, Lynne Rudder Baker and E.J. Lowe, suggest that emergent particulars have physical properties in virtue of the relations they bear to physical particulars—they ‘inherit’ their physical properties. In Sect. 1, I argue that having a property F this way is not instantiating F. In Sect. 2, I raise concerns that if emergent particulars don’t instantiate physical properties, then facts about emergent particulars don’t explain intentional actions. I suggest that emergent dualism would be more attractive if it could avoid this apparent consequence. In Sect. 3, I propose a view according to which some instances of physical properties are instantiated by both an emergent particular and its body. (shrink)

The effect of germanium addition on the physical properties, i.e. density, molar volume, compactness, number of lone-pair electrons, average coordination number, heat of atomization, mean bond energy, cohesive energy and glass-transition temperature, of (Se80Te20)100− x Ge x (x = 0, 2, 4, 6) bulk glassy alloys was investigated. The density of the glassy alloys is found to decrease with increasing Ge content. The molar volume and compactness of the structure of the glass were determined from the measured density. The (...) mean bond energy is proportional to the glass-transition temperature. The cohesive energy of the samples has been calculated using a chemical bond approach and is correlated with an increase in the optical energy gap with increase in the Ge content. The heat of atomization was also calculated and correlated with the optical energy gap. The glass-transition temperature has been estimated using different methods and is found to increase with an increase of Ge content. (shrink)

Can a value of a physical property be created instantaneously by a distant act of measurement? This paper develops an answer to that question by reconciling ideas expressed by Bohr in 1958 with the “standard” Copenhagen interpretation. The point of view thereby obtained is then applied to recently described correlation experiments of various sorts.

As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness (...) or the existence of experiencers by mere vibrations or motions. The problem arises because the objectivity of the language of physical theory is antithetical to the subjectivity of consciousness. The gap between them can be understood analogously to the gap between ''is'' and ''ought'' reasoning in ethics. One solution may be to bypass formal languages that attempt to purely deduce consciousness from without, and instead explain it using a pseudo- poetic language that can withstand both physical and introspective interpretation. This paper introduces such a language, and it uses the new language to define an "Ontological Principal." Preface This essay is an attempt to fit consciousness into a physical worldview by expanding our ideas of the nature of the physical world to encompass more than just the descriptions of physics. This is not a reductionist argument in the sense put forth by Fodor in The Language of Thought. Such arguments from the special sciences to physics are of the form 1 ? 2, where the left side of the bi- conditional contains the laws of the special science and the right side contain some kind of bridge laws that lead towards the laws of physics. Fodor gives a convincing argument as to why we should not expect such a reduction for cognitive psychology. The strategy taken here is to explain consciousness by immersing physics inside a larger and less formal view of. (shrink)

An argument to the effect that non-relativistic quantum particles can be understood as individual objects in spite of the empirical evidence seemingly lending support to the opposite conclusion. Ways to understand quantum indistinguishability and quantum statistics in terms of individuals are indicated.

Is there a problem of causal exclusion between micro- and macro-level physical properties? I argue (following Kim) that the sorts of properties that in fact are in competition are macro properties, viz., the property of a (macro-) system of 'having such-and-such macro properties' (call this a 'macro-structural property') and the property of the same system of 'being constituted by such-and-such a micro- structure' (call this a 'micro-structural property'). I show that there are cases where, for (...) lack of reducibility, there is a prima facie intra-level causal competition between the two kinds of properties. The problem can be resolved without giving up on the causal efficacy of the macro-structural properties if we understand instances of macro-structural properties to be parts of micro-structural property instances. The parthood relation between both kinds of property instances can be mapped onto the way physical theory deals with the relation of their descriptions in the framework of perturbation theory. The application of this framework to the problem of emergent properties is discussed. (shrink)

IN a recent article Dr. Paul D. Wienpahl proposes an explication for Frege's notion of sense that, he believes, "fits the data of Frege's discussion and does not make sense a subsistent entity" (p. 483). Wienpahl's proposal is that "the sense of a sign is the combination of its physical properties" (p. 488). But in the face of the requirements which he has set himself, there seem to be three considerations which lead to the conclusion that his proposal is (...) defective. (shrink)

Many physicalists are vague about how defining‘physical property’fits in with characterizing physicalism. We determine the proper relation of these tasks. Employing panpsychism as a yardstick, we argue that defining‘physical property’and characterizing physicalism are subject to contradictory conditions of adequacy. We conclude that these tasks should be kept neatly apart. Exploiting this insight, we save physicalists from an apparently disastrous anti‐physicalist argument, we propose and defend a viable definition of ‘physical property’, and we argue that (...) the standard characterization of physicalism is flawed. We propose an improved account. (shrink)

Many physicalists are vague about how defining‘physical property’fits in with characterizing physicalism. We determine the proper relation of these tasks. Employing panpsychism as a yardstick, we argue that defining‘physical property’and characterizing physicalism are subject to contradictory conditions of adequacy. We conclude that these tasks should be kept neatly apart. Exploiting this insight, we save physicalists from an apparently disastrous anti‐physicalist argument, we propose and defend a viable definition of‘physical property’, and we argue that the (...) standard characterization of physicalism is flawed. We propose an improved account. (shrink)