The Unknowable, arguably the greatest Russian philosophical work of the 20th century, was the culmination of S. L. Frank's intellectual and spiritual development, the boldest and most imaginative of all his writings, containing a synthesis of epistemology, ontology, social philosophy, religious philosophy, and personal spiritual experience.

In _Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief_, Dan Arnold examines how the Brahmanical tradition of Purva Mimamsa and the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti challenged dominant Indian Buddhist views of epistemology. Arnold retrieves these two very different but equally important voices of philosophical dissent, showing them to have developed highly sophisticated and cogent critiques of influential Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti. His analysis--developed in conversation with modern Western philosophers like William Alston and J. L. Austin--offers an innovative (...) reinterpretation of the Indian philosophical tradition, while suggesting that pre-modern Indian thinkers have much to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates. In logically distinct ways, Purva Mimamsa and Candrakirti's Madhyamaka opposed the influential Buddhist school of thought that emphasized the foundational character of perception. Arnold argues that Mimamsaka arguments concerning the "intrinsic validity" of the earliest Vedic scriptures are best understood as a critique of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy stemming from Dignaga. Though often dismissed as antithetical to "real philosophy," Mimamsaka thought has affinities with the reformed epistemology that has recently influenced contemporary philosophy of religion. Candrakirti's arguments, in contrast, amount to a principled refusal of epistemology. Arnold contends that Candrakirti marshals against Buddhist foundationalism an approach that resembles twentieth-century ordinary language philosophy--and does so by employing what are finally best understood as transcendental arguments. The conclusion that Candrakirti's arguments thus support a metaphysical claim represents a bold new understanding of Madhyamaka. (shrink)

This chapter looks at approaches developed by philosophers of science that may be useful to those working in religion, theology, and the philosophy of religion. Philosophers of science have spent a lot of time thinking about how theories change, what to do with surprising data and conflicting explanations, and what to say when we need more categories than true and false. Sometimes, all this is hidden behind terms such as antirealism, paradigm, verisimilitude, and inference to the best (...) explanation. The author unpacks a bit of jargon from the philosophy of science and considers some analogies and applications to matters of religion. The chapter also presents some of the tools developed in the philosophy of science. Finally, it discusses what is supposed to be the fundamental divide between religion and science: the former is based on faith, while the latter is based on reason. (shrink)

"This book may be described as an attempt to do two things; first, to explain religion through nature and man; and, secondly, to construe Christianity through religion. The author conceives religion to be a joint product of the mind within man and the nature around him, the mind being the source of the ideas which constitute its soul, the nature around determining the usages and customs which build up its body. He does not think, therefore, that any (...) one of its special forms can be explained without the local nature which begot and shaped it, or that its general being can be resolved and construed without the reason or thought which is common to the race. He sees in religion the greatest of all man's unconscious creations, and the most potent of the means which the past, while it was still a living present, formed for the making of the man and the times that were yet to be." -- From the Preface. (shrink)

이 연구는 성서텍스트에 대한 나이브한 접근인 “1차 단순성”을 해체한 불트만의 비신화화를 비판하면서 리쾨르가 성서의 신화를 해석학적으로 복원하는 논증이다. 소위 2차 단순성(seconde naïveté)을 해명하기 위해 이 논문의 3장부터 리쾨르가 본격적으로 비판하게 될 불트만은 성서의 신화에서는 사유할 거리가 있는 그 어떤 것도 찾아내지 못한다. 말하자면 불트만은 신화를 너무 무가치한 것으로 본 것이다. 게다가 불트만은 자신의 신앙을 보존하기 위해 결국 이성에서 벗어나야만 했다. 고로 비합리적이고 실존적인 결단력에 의한 믿음의 비약이 그에게 필요했으며 이것이 바로 ‘신앙주의’로 불리게 된다. 반면 리쾨르는 신화에서조차 인간이 사유할 거리를 발견하면서 (...) 이성의 외부로 신화를 던져버리지 않는다. 그는 결코 합리적 반성의 외부에서는 판단하지 않을 이 신화들의 공헌으로부터 자신을 단절하지 않은 채 믿음의 보존을 바란 것이다. 요컨대 리쾨르는 신화를 다룬 그리스비극 및 성서텍스트가 인류학적 차원에서 중요할 뿐만 아니라, ‘주체의 발견’과 같은 인간 조건에 대한 인식에도 공헌한다고 강조하면서 불트만을 비판함으로 해석학적 철학을 재구성한 것이다. (shrink)

To introduce my case I would like to explain how it comes about that A Feminist Philosophy of Religion: The Rationality and Myths of Religious Belief is a prolegomenon to a new way of thinking, believing and feeling. To develop this case I will introduce and respond to various criticisms of my prolegomenon. This way of proceeding is consistent with my assumption that a distinctive quality of feminist philosophy is the willingness to reflect upon and respond to (...) dissenting voices. In the end the case for a feminist philosophy of religion will only be as strong as my ability to enable you to think differently and listen to voices different from what I call a 'male-neutral' philosophy. By male-neutral I mean philosophical conceptions, experiences or thoughts which are distinctively male but are presented with the pretence of sex/gender neutrality. (shrink)

In the author’s opinion there are three primary conceptions of human freedom - non-coercion, autonomy and indeterminism. He presents his thoughts to define, compare, distinguish and correlate these, not merely with regard to the freedom of the human will, but also and more generally with regard to freedom in human life and thought. The discussion is psychological, ethical and theological. Originally published in 1947.