The idea of philosophy as a 'way of life' is not a new one. From the first recorded philosophy by Plato, there has been a tradition of thinking about philosophy as pointing us towards the good life, happiness and an ethical existence. But where does this notion that philosophy has anything to offer in terms of guiding us in how to live and live well come from? In this first ever introduction to philosophy (...) as a way of life, Matthew Sharpe and Michael Ure take us us through the history of the idea from Plato and the Buddha to Foucault, Hadot and Zizek. They examine the kinds of practical exercises each thinker recommended and practiced to transform their philosophy into manners of living and acting. Philosophy as a Way of Life also examines the recent resurgence of thinking about philosophy as a practical, lived reality and why this ancient tradition still has so much relevance and power in the contemporary world. (shrink)

In the ancient world, philosophy was understood to be a practical guide for living, or even itself a way of life. For philosophers today to ignore this dimension of philosophy is not to ignore an accidental subset of the subject that can be divorced from its essential nature - it is to ignore philosophy itself. The articulation of philosophy as a way of life and its pedagogical implementation advances the love of wisdom; it is (...) not merely an addendum to it. But how might we convey the love of wisdom as not only a body of dogmatic principles and axiomatic truths but also a lived exercise that can be practiced? This volume of essays brings historical views about philosophy as a way of life, coupled with their modern equivalents, more prevalently into the domain of the contemporary scholarly world. (shrink)

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary (...) philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives. (shrink)

The author commences with a discussion on the connection between spiritual exercises and aestheticism. Acquiring knowledge of a certain privileged sort is the key spiritual exercise is the fundamental activity in what Hadot described as a “return to the self.” The section on philosophy and therapy talks about “spiritual exercise” as a practice of discrimination which leads to a “return to the self” in the form of the self's isolation from the perceptual world. The author then discusses returning oneself (...) to the present moment based on the philosophy of Plutarch and the Buddha. With references from Santiparvan, the author explains philosophy and the ends of life, elucidating that philosophy enables us to see through the pretences of reason, making it possible for us to direct our efforts towards living of a life free of suffering. (shrink)

Philosophy is typically identified with the textual practices of reading and writing and oral dialogue. It has also claimed to be an entire way of life, an art of living dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom and thus to the practices that such pursuit should entail. This chapter probes to what extent philosophy as a practice or art of living requires a literary or more generally textual form. It also considers why it should not confine itself to (...) the limits of discourse. It argues that if philosophy requires more than words, there is a twofold challenge for philosophy as a way of life. It is not enough to compose texts and refine our language with logical and literary skill; we must also take real pains, in practicing philosophy, to give careful composition to our character, behavior, and bearing, and to refine them through harmonizing grace and attractive style. (shrink)

The idea of philosophy as a 'way of life' is not a new one. From the first recorded philosophy by Plato, there has been a tradition of thinking about philosophy as pointing us towards the good life, happiness and an ethical existence. But where does this notion that philosophy has anything to offer in terms of guiding us in how to live and live well come from? In this first ever introduction to philosophy (...) as a way of life, Matthew Sharpe and Michael Ure take us us through the history of the idea from Plato and the Buddha to Foucault, Hadot and Zizek. They examine the kinds of practical exercises each thinker recommended and practiced to transform their philosophy into manners of living and acting. Philosophy as a Way of Life also examines the recent resurgence of thinking about philosophy as a practical, lived reality and why this ancient tradition still has so much relevance and power in the contemporary world. (shrink)

Philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) places investigations of value, meaning, and the good life at the center of philosophical investigation, especially of one’s own life. This essay argues that PWOL is compatible with general introductory philosophy courses, further arguing that PWOL‐based general introductions have several philosophical and pedagogical benefits. These include the ease with which high‐impact practices, situated skill development, and students’ ability to “think like a disciplinarian” may be incorporated into such courses, (...) relative to more traditional introductory courses, as well as the demonstration of philosophy’s value to students by explicitly tying philosophical investigation to students’ own lives. (shrink)

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement (...) mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

The main concern of this essay is to make a case for the thesis that Leibniz conceived of his philosophy as a way of life in something like the sense articulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. On this view, philosophy was a type of conduct, or a mode of existing‐in‐the‐world, which had to be practised at each instant, with the goal of transforming the whole of the individual’s life. The essay also serves as an introduction (...) to some of the main themes in Hadot’s work. While it includes a brief discussion of a number of the central components of Leibniz’s philosophy conceived as a way of life, the essay does not aim to do so in great detail. Rather, it offers a manifesto and initial road map. (shrink)

This brief, accessible introduction shows that philosophy is valuable, practical, and significant for every aspect of Christian life and ministry.

This book presents a history of spiritual exercises from Socrates to early Christianity, an account of their decline in modern philosophy, and a discussion of ...

This essay fills in some historical, conceptual, and pedagogical gaps that appear in the most visible and recent professional efforts to “revive” Philosophy as a Way of Life (PWOL). I present “American Philosophy and Self-Culture” as an advanced undergraduate seminar that broadens who counts in and what counts as philosophy by immersing us in the lives, writings, and practices of seven representative U.S.-American philosophers of self-culture, community-building, and world-changing: Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), Frederick Douglass (1818–1895), William Ellery (...) Channing (1780–1842), Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), Margaret Fuller (1810-1850), Henry Bugbee (1915–1999), and Gloria Anzaldúa (1942–2004). Students enter the class with preconceptions about who philosophers are, what they do, how they write, and the languages in which they write. Students walk out with new senses of self, place, and language that emerge through new ways of seeing, doing, and writing philosophy. (shrink)

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary (...) philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives. (shrink)

This paper compares Pierre Hadot’s work on the history of philosophy as a way of life to the work of Albert Camus. I will argue that in the early work of Camus, up to and including the publication of The Myth of Sisyphus, there is evidence to support the notions that, firstly, Camus also identified these historical moments as obstacles to the practice of ascesis, and secondly, that he proceeded by orienting his own work toward overcoming these obstacles, (...) and thus toward a modern rehabilitation of ascesis. Moreover, in contrast to Hadot’s Platonism, Camus located the source of this practice in the pre-philosophical stage of Athenian tragedy. This points to a further contrast between these two figures, which has historical and cultural precedents, in the distinction between this pre-Platonic form of ascesis - favoured by Camus - and the latter Christian form of asceticism - favoured by Hadot, with the status of Platonic ascesis rendered in terms of prefiguring this Christian form of asceticism. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the notion of philosophy as a way of life as a recovery pathway for individuals in addiction recovery. My hypothesis is that philosophy as a way of life can be a compelling, and legitimate recovery pathway for individuals in addiction recovery, as one of many recovery pathways. I will focus on logic-based therapy applied in the context of addiction recovery. The aim of presenting a case study is to show how a (...) client receiving LBT is provided with techniques and a worldview that can contribute to a philosophically oriented recovery program. In the case study the client was advised to apply the moral philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as an uplifting philosophical framework to counteract his unproductive worldview and fallacious thinking. Considering that there is an ostensibly low efficacy rate for the treatment of addiction, articulating the value of philosophy as a way of life as a recovery pathway provides a conceptual and methodological framework for the development of novel philosophically-based addiction treatment and recovery-oriented programs—thus expanding the treatment and recovery options available for those seeking recovery from addiction. (shrink)

Michel Foucault surveyed the history of Western philosophy in terms of the Delphic ‘Know thyself’ and the Socratic ‘care of the self’. The former generates academic philosophy as we know it today whereas the latter conceives of philosophy as a ‘way of life’. At issue are competing notions of ‘truth’ and the philosophical relevance of the discursive/nondiscursive domains. Comparing this account with a similar but distinct reading of the same Greek texts by Greco-Roman historian Pierre Hadot, (...) I underscore the ‘existentialist’ tenor of this distinction and assess the challenges and liabilities of pursuing philosophy as a ‘way of life’. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue both that philosophy as a way of life is a tradition worth reviving and that environmental philosophy is a promising branch of philosophy to enact this revival. First, I sketch what constitutes philosophy as a way of life, which includes both some conception of the good life and an array of spiritual exercises that assists one in living according to that conception. I then discuss a connection between possessing (...) virtue and leading the good life, a connection of great importance to ancient and modern practitioners of philosophy as a way of life. Next, I offer an argument for why this tradition of philosophy is worth reviving at the present time. The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring the prospects for a distinctively environmental approach to philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

This chapter examines the theme of “philosophy as a way of life” that has had so many effects that it has sometimes been able to hide the fact that for Pierre Hadot, philosophy is also a theoretical arrangement and a way of thinking. It is therefore worth emphasizing what, in Pierre Hadot's suggestions, resists this kind of interpretation, and this may also provide the means for inquiring about what he understands when he talks about the “reciprocal causality” (...) of philosophy and philosophical discourse, or again, when he says that they are “both inseparable and incommensurable.” The chapter analyzes the meaning of anti‐philosophy projected by various philosophers and explores whether defining philosophy as a way of life means being an antiphilosopher? Hadot's approach seems to be best described not as anti‐philosophical, but, on the contrary, as archphilosophical. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a reclusive and enigmatic philosopher, writing his most significant work off campus in remote locations. He also held a chair in the Philosophy Department at Cambridge, and is one of the university’s most recognized even if, as Ray Monk says, ‘reluctant professors’ of philosophy. Paradoxically, although Wittgenstein often showed contempt for the atmosphere at Cambridge and for academic philosophy in particular, it is hard to conceive of him making his significant contributions without considerable support (...) from his academic colleagues, his research fellowship and later teaching career at Cambridge. It is this conflicted relationship we explore, between the revolutionary thinker and his base within an educational institution. Starting from a brief biographical sketch of Wittgenstein’s academic life at Cambridge, including his involvement as a student and faculty member in the Moral Sciences Club, we look at how he reconceived the role of philosophy throughout this... (shrink)

In this wide-ranging and field-changing work Steven Collins argues that the study of Theravada Buddhism needs to separated from the rather dated and stagnant field of textual history and approached both "civilizationally" and as a "practice of the self." By civilizationally, he means that instead of seeing Buddhism as a set of "original" teachings of the so-called historical Buddha from the 5th century BC to the present, it should rather be viewed as an effort by many teachers and visionaries over (...) time to make sense of what it means to lead a worthy life. The purveyors of Buddhist philosophy did not consider themselves to be preservers of an archaic body of rules and ethical guidelines; they were designing a dynamic way of living and confronting human problems in a timeless way. Using approaches to the very idea of the self promoted by Foucault and Hadot, he compares Theravada Buddhist ways of understanding and "practicing" the self to modernist and postmodernist ideas about "philosophy as a way of life." Rather than applying positivist and historicist approaches, Buddhism should be assessed philosophically, literarily, and ethically, using its own vocabulary and rhetorical tools. Treated in this manner, Buddhist notions of the self can be applied to contemporary ideas of self-care and the promotion of human flourishing. The book covers topics such as spiritual practice, ultimate versus provisional truth, systematic versus narrative thinking, meditation versus virtue, and history versus philosophy. It is a bold and complex way of understanding the impact that Buddhist ways of knowing can have in the world today, bringing them into conversation with modern psychology, literary studies, ethics, gender and sexuality studies, and philosophy. (shrink)

What distinguishes philosophy is its attention to reality and sense as such, or what is traditionally called being and essence. As a result, philosophy as a way of life is, most fundamentally, not directly a matter of doing one kind of thing rather than another outside the classroom but instead of how we live with respect to our being. Enacting our being in one way rather than another inflects whatever it is we do. Consequently, even if we (...) only study philosophy in the conventional, apparently unlived way in the classroom, we are in active relation to our being and therefore fully living philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

The chapter presents a brief case study, in which we can observe the impact of Pierre Hadot's ideas on Martin O’Hagan, a person not far removed from us in terms of space, time, and aspirations. Hadot's concept of “Philosophy as a Way of Life (PWL)” could provide an option for a person who, excluded from and/or disillusioned by Academic philosophy, still felt the need to search for answers to a few centrally important questions that had direct impact (...) on his life. Even the characteristic that has returned like a Leitmotif throughout this chapter — analytic philosophy's tendency to ignore the so‐called Big Questions, such as that of the meaning of life — can be illuminated by means of Kuhn's theories. The author hopes that the interest in Hadot's concept of PWL will contribute to the rehabilitation of philosophy as it was before its takeover by Academic philosophy. (shrink)

John F. Kavanaugh and W. Norris Clarke, two twentieth-century Jesuits, contributed to philosophy through their development of a Thomistic and personalist view of reality emphasizing the human endowments of knowing, freely choosing, and loving. While spiritual exercises played a role in the formation of both Jesuits, the function of spiritual exercises in their own philosophy has not been explored. Recent interest in philosophy as a way of life provides a means by which this can be accomplished. (...) In their work Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot have shown how spiritual exercises function in the formation of the self and in the acquisition of a synoptic vision that allows contemplation of one’s participation in the whole. This paper shows that while Kavanaugh primarily uses spiritual exercises in his philosophy to accomplish a disciplinary/formational aim Clarke’s aim is dialogical/exploratory. A brief examination of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola reveals how these different aims in fact complement one another. (shrink)

An important idea in antiquity was that to engage in philosophy meant more than the theoretical inquiry into fundamental questions, it was also conceived of as a way of life modelled on the philosophical life of Socrates. In a recent article, John Cooper defends the thesis that, for Socrates and his all successors, the philosophical life meant to live according to reason, understood as the exercising of one’s capacity for argument and analysis in pursuit of the (...) truth – which he conceives of as wisdom. It is our contention that an inclusion and close reading of Xenophon’s testimony casts doubt on Cooper’s unified model of Socrates and his conception of philosophy as a way of life. Xenophon’s Socrates, we argue, conceived of the philosophical life as essentially the exercise of one’s capacity for self-mastery. Moreover, as we interpret Xenophon, it is this self-mastery, not wisdom, which seems to form the basis or core of Socratic ethics. We try to show that for several of Socrates’ philosophical successors living a philosophical life meant something much closer to Xenophon’s picture of that life than the one Cooper describes. (shrink)

An interfaith perspective on meditation discusses such aspects of the practice as its spiritual foundations, the benefits of energy-building exercises and affirmations, techniques for effective prayer, and ways to measure inner practice.

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement (...) mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accord- ance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) places investigations of value, meaning, and the good life at the center of philosophical investigation, especially of one’s own life. I argue PWOL is compatible with general introductory philosophy courses, further arguing that PWOL-based general introductions have several philosophical and pedagogical benefits. These include the ease with which high impact practices, situated skill development, and students’ ability to ‘think like a disciplinarian’ may be incorporated into such courses, relative (...) to more traditional introductory courses, as well as the demonstration of philosophy’s value to students by explicitly tying philosophical investigation to students own lives. (shrink)

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but (...) also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well. (shrink)

This paper examines Shaftesbury’s reflections on the nature of philosophy in his Askêmata notebooks, which draw heavily on the Roman Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In what follows, I introduce the notebooks, outline Shaftesbury’s account of philosophy therein, compare it with his discussions of the nature of philosophy in his published works, and conclude by suggesting that Pierre Hadot’s conception of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ offers a helpful framework for thinking about Shaftesbury’s account (...) of philosophy. (shrink)

This article seeks to provide an answer as to why Metaphysics, Lam ends not with the justly famous account of the divine nous with which this book of the treatise is always associated, but with an aporetic account of the living and dying of everything mortal. This surprising moment, I argue, is a manifestation of Aristotle's conviction—quite alien to the mainstream understanding of philosophy as a discipline today—that even the purest moments of theoretical speculation are the work of a (...) human soul always in touch with its materiality and its subsistence in the world. A soul that only is at all when it is at work in living well, which is to say when the soul enacts itself in praxis. This means: the best understanding of the aporetic conclusion to Metaphysics, Lam is the one that asks us to recall that Aristotle's project of first philosophy—however much its most proper subject matter is the unchanging and immaterial—proceeds as part of a human life lived a certain way, and not as part of an academic discipline. (shrink)

A long-established view has deprecated Renaissance humanists as primarily literary figures with little serious interest in philosophy. More recently it has been proposed that the idea of philosophy as a way of life offers a useful framework with which to re-assess their philosophical standing. However, this proposal has faced some criticism. By looking again at the work of three important figures from the period I defend the claim that at least some thinkers during the Renaissance did see (...) philosophy as a way of life, while also acknowledging the force of reservations made by recent critics. (shrink)