Do states have the right to prevent potential immigrants from crossing their borders, or should people have the freedom to migrate and settle wherever they wish? Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole develop and defend opposing answers to this timely and important question.

The mass movement of people across the globe constitutes a major feature of world politics today. -/- Whatever the cause of the movement - often war, famine, economic hardship, political repression or climate change - the governments of western capitalist states see this 'torrent of people in flight' as a serious threat to their stability and the scale of this migration indicates a need for a radical re-thinking of both political theory and practice, for the sake of political, social and (...) economic justice. -/- This book argues that there is at present a serious gap between the legal and social practices of immigration and naturalisation in liberal democratic states and any theoretical justification for such practices that can be made within the tradition of liberal political philosophy. How can liberal states develop institutions of democratic citizenship and at the same time justifiably exclude 'outsiders' from participating in those institutions? The book examines various responses to this contradiction within the liberal tradition, and finds none of them satisfactory - there are no consistently liberal justifications for immigration control and this has serious implications both for liberal practice and theory. (shrink)

Terrorism, torture, and the problems of evil -- Diabolical evil, searching for Satan -- Philosophies of evil -- Communities of fear -- The enemy within -- Bad seeds -- The character of evil -- Facing the Holocaust -- Twenty-first-century mythologies.

In this paper I re-state the egalitarian argument against the morality of immigration controls: such limits violate the central ethical commitment to moral equality. This means that immigration controls fail a fundamental moral test and represent the ethical failure of the liberal project of moral equality. I set this re-statement against recent arguments about what moral equality means, specifically Christopher Heath Wellman's use of Elizabeth Anderson's notion of relational equality. Wellman believes that Anderson's ideas seriously damage the egalitarian argument, but (...) I argue that this is a misreading of her account. I conclude that any liberal attempt to morally justify immigration controls must fail through committing the basic logical error of ‘begging the question’. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the concept of the refugee within the context of liberal political theory. The argument is that the refugee is displaced both in political practice and political theory – theory has a topology, and inside and an outside, such that even if the refugee as a concept does enter within its boundaries it does so as a marginal figure, constructed as problematic. However, liberal political also has a topography when it comes to the refugee question – (...) it is not just insider theory, but theory constructed within a particular kind of state in a particular location in the world. This means the extent to which liberal political theory can answer the refugee question is limited. The main challenge for theory, I argue, is not to come up with an answer to the refugee question, but to construct a context within which the refugee is an equal participant in the process of arriving at an answer. (shrink)

In December 2007 it was revealed that the British government is considering the exclusion of certain groups of migrants—those considered to be present “illegally”—from primary health care provided by the National Health Service. At present, practitioners have discretion to accept any individual for NHS treatment regardless of their status. A joint Home Office and Department of Health review is examining this access for foreign nationals, and the likely outcome is the restriction of access to irregular migrants, which would, according to (...) the Institute of Public Policy Research, affect around 390,000 people. In 2004 such groups were excluded from NHS secondary care, most controversially from treatment for HIV, and so the present proposal would bar them from all but emergency health treatment. (shrink)

A body of work has emerged in political philosophy which can be termed ‘the ethics of migration’. Within that literature, there has been an increased focus on issues of displacement and protection...

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;Often the relationship between freedom and social justice within liberal theory is portrayed in a predominantly negative way--freedom is a side-constraint on goals pursued in the name of social justice. I propose a more positive relationship between these two ideals. As well as being a side-constraint, freedom is also a goal which any programme of social justice should pursue--some issues of social justice are also issues of freedom. ;I criticise negative theories (...) of freedom, and theories which see social justice as after-the-event compensation for past injustice, excluding concerns for future welfare. Freedom has negative and positive conditions: the free person has the space and power to determine the shape of their life. Programmes of social justice should, amongst other things, ensure that all enjoy the positive conditions of freedom. ;The impure theory of freedom gives rise to a conception of autonomy based on the notion of the autonomous chooser. Autonomous choice requires three conditions: being left alone to choose; having the capacity to choose; and having the power to act out choices. ;This conception of autonomy leads to a conception of active citizenship: the autonomous person is an active chooser, doer and participator within their community. Therefore the community must ensure that frameworks for such citizenship are in place--Civil Liberty, defining a space in which the individual can choose; Democratic Liberty, ensuring individuals have the right to participate in community decision-making; and Social Liberty, ensuring the individual enjoys the powers and resources needed to participate. ;If all people are equally entitled to citizenship, then they are equally entitled to the conditions required for such citizenship, both negative and positive. Programmes of social justice should ensure that all have access to the resources they need in order to be equally participative citizens. (shrink)

This paper examines toleration at two levels. At the first level, liberal individualism is concerned that the individual must be as free as possible to pursue their own goals and lifestyles. At the second level, liberal political theory is concerned with the value of liberal political culture and institutions and how to maintain and protect them. I argue that we can learn a great deal about the exercise of toleration and respect at the level of the liberal polity by examining (...) them at the level of the liberal individual. Both tolerance and intolerance at the level of the polity must be principled. Principled tolerance and intolerance have the following features. First, the judgment whether to tolerate a particular belief or practice must be based on the value of toleration itself, not pragmatic political requirements. Second, it should be an issue of setting aside moral principles and convictions rather than dislikes, prejudices or fears. Third, it should respect the distinction between the public and the private, and should only recognise an issue as one of toleration if there is a public impact at stake. (shrink)

The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads to a position (...) of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community’s moral principles and boundaries of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as “outsiders”. The defence against the charge of amoralism fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are; we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller’s treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of “liberal” nationalism has a tendency to collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy. (shrink)