The focus on the moral rights of combatants in the ethics of war ignores a very important point: although morally unjust combatants cannot be considered moral equals to just combatants, especially with regard to the right to kill, there are sound moral reasons why the laws of war should accept a kind of equality between them, a concept referred to as “reduced legal equality.” Reduced legal equality is not about equal moral rights but about granting legal immunity to combatants for (...) their conduct in accordance with the laws of war. This article shows that reduced legal equality of combatants is not only the morally best legal regulation in our nonideal international world but also the correct interpretation of international law. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity is criticized due to its vagueness, but by discussing the most important schools of thought, we can identify a core meaning that is common to most understandings of human dignity: Whether we conceptualize human dignity in terms of autonomy, self‐respect, social acts, or equal status, we always refer to some kind of personal identity. This personal identity consists in those aspects that we consider to be constitutive of our individual personality. Instead of remaining within doctrinal (...) school thought, this core meaning can be taken as a common denominator for human dignity discourse. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification. According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This (...) paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something. (shrink)

This paper aims to show how elite theories do not offer a better alternative to democracy and to present the idea of a hegemonic majority that, by accounting for greater both individual and collective engagement and responsibility, breaks the exclusivity of elitism. Inspired by Gramsci’s theory, this idea reinforces the construction of the political decision-making process without developing a concept of authority based on an exclusive elite. It focuses on a specific interpretation of the role of the intellectuals as the (...) connection between the civil society and the government, fortifying or even restoring the trust between the individuals and their representatives and thereby strengthening the legitimacy of our democratic systems. (shrink)

This introductory research seeks to underline how a legal gap can be approached as an indispensable “negative moment” within the legal system. It has been supposed that this gap signals a lack in the legal system and, thereby, contributes to its improvement. The matter is much too complex to be managed in a limited space, so here it will not be given a complete explanation of the theory of legal gaps. The purpose will be rather to present a possible way (...) to tackle this issue by sketching how a legal gap could be interpreted not only as a Problem, but also as a Possibility given to a legal system to improve itself. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the (...) basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl’s specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl’s claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given. (shrink)

In his influential paper “Grasping the Third Realm,” John Bengson raises the question of how we can non-accidentally grasp abstract facts. What distinguishes successful intuition from hallucinatory intuition? Bengson answers his “non-accidental relation question” by arguing for a constitutive relationship: The intuited object is a literal constituent of the respective intuition. Now, the problem my contribution centers around is that Bengson’s answer cannot be the end of the story. This is because, as Bar Luzon and Preston Werner have recently pointed (...) out, this answer leads to the follow-up question of why certain intuitional experiences are constituted by the facts, but others are not. My objective is to answer this question by specifying precisely what is epistemically defective about intellectual hallucinations. My result is that, in stark contrast to perception, intellectual hallucinations are epistemically defective in the sense that something is overlooked. In successful intuition, by contrast, all relevant possibilities/scenarios are considered/imagined. This has crucial epistemological implications. In particular, I argue that intuitions exhibiting a certain phenomenology cannot fail to successfully grasp abstract facts. I call this the non-accidental correctness thesis, which constitutes the main thesis of this paper. (shrink)

Stimmungen bilden in der Wiener Moderne einen experimentellen Zugang zur Ich-Welt-Einheit. Sie führen Leib, Sprache und physikalische Welt in einen Zusammenhang, der sich jedoch begrifflichem Erfassen entzieht. So ist die Einheit, die Stimmungen vermitteln, paradoxerweise nur mehrdeutig sagbar. Sie drückt sich als eine bewegte Konfiguration aus Stimmung, Leib und Sprache in Texten der Wiener Moderne aus. Gisbertz' Studie fokussiert auf gemeinsame Strukturen und Funktionen von >StimmungStimmungStimmung.

In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are (...) typically mentioned in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This is surprising because here one can find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early modern physics was noticeably influenced by phenomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. Engaging with the phenomenological tradition is also of systematic value since it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism. (shrink)

Solar radiation management (SRM) may help to reduce the negative outcomes of climate change by minimising or reversing global warming. However, many express the worry that SRM may pose a moral hazard, i.e., that information about SRM may lead to a reduction in climate change mitigation efforts. In this paper, we report a large-scale preregistered, money-incentivised, online experiment with a representative US sample (N = 2284). We compare actual behaviour (donations to climate change charities and clicks on climate change petition (...) links) as well as stated preferences (support for a carbon tax and self-reported intentions to reduce emissions) between participants who receive information about SRM with two control groups (a salience control that includes information about climate change generally and a content control that includes information about a different topic). Behavioural choices are made with an earned real-money endowment, and stated preference responses are incentivised via the Bayesian Truth Serum. We fail to find a significant impact of receiving information about SRM and, based on equivalence tests, we provide evidence in favour of the absence of a meaningfully large effect. Our results thus provide evidence for the claim that there is no detectable moral hazard with respect to SRM. [Open access]. (shrink)

A collection of essays investigating key historical and scientific questions relating to the concept of natural purpose in Kant's philosophy of biology.

Quelle politique peut-on faire quand on est un idiot? Loin d'être saugrenue, c'est bien la question qu'on est conduit à se poser inévitablement en lisant l'oeuvre de Gilles Deleuze. L'"idiot" joue, en effet, un rôle incontournable et essentiel dans la philosophie de Deleuze. Il est le personnage conceptuel qui fait tenir cette philosophie dans sa consistance propre. Il se situe à la charnière de l'image de la pensée que le philosophe invoque et suppose plus ou moins implicitement et de la (...) création de concepts qu'il produit explicitement. Aussi, faire de la philosophie, tout comme agir et penser politiquement, c'est toujours une manière de faire l'idiot. Les conséquences de cette approche sont capitales, du fait des questions posées à la réflexion politique classique centrée sur le Droit et l'Etat, du fait aussi des problématiques qui se voient invalidées dans ce champ. La place qui revient au contrôle et au bio-pouvoir, aux zones d'indétermination et aux espaces lisses, permet de prendre une saine distance vis-à-vis de la politique "majoritaire" et de faire apparaître, comme déjà de vieux clichés, bon nombre de thèmes et de concepts revendiqués par les organisations alternatives, mondialistes et subversives récentes. C'est une tout autre idée de la politique, centrée sur les devenirs, que nous invite à méditer la politique deleuzienne de l'idiot. Elle nous ouvre à d'autres espérances, nouvelles, en lien avec un "peuple absent" qui naîtrait avec chaque devenir. (shrink)

Animal research suggests that central serotonergic neurons are involved in behavioral suppression, particularly anxiety-related inhibition. The hypothesis linking decreased serotonin transmission to reduced anxiety as the mechanism in the anxiolytic activity of benzodiazepines conflicts with most clinical observations. Serotonin antagonists show no marked capacity to alleviate anxiety. On the other hand, clinical signs of reduced serotonergic transmission (low 5-HIAA levels in the cerebrospinal fluid) are frequently associated with aggressiveness, suicide attempts, and increased anxiety. The target article attempts to reconcile such (...) human and animal findings by investigating whether anxiety reduction or increased impulsivity is more Likely to account for animal behavioral changes associated with decreased serotonergic transmission. The effects of manipulating central serotonin in experimental anxiety paradigms in animals (punishment, extinction, novelty) are reviewed and compared with the effects of antianxiety drugs. Anxiety seems neither necessary nor sufficient to induce control by serotonergic neurons on behavior. Further evidence suggests that behavioral effects of anxiolytics thought to be mediated by decreases in anxiety are not caused by the ability of these drugs to reduce serotonin transmission. Blockade of serotonin transmission, especially at the level of the substantia nigra, results in a shift of behavior toward facilitation of responding. This behavioral shift is particularly marked when there is competition between acting and restraining response tendencies and when obstacles prevent the immediate attainment of an anticipated reward. It is proposed that serotonergic neurons are involved not only in behavioral arousal but also in enabling the organism to arrange or tolerate delay before acting. Decreases in serotonin transmission seem to be associated with the increased performance of behaviors that are usually suppressed, though not necessarily because of the alleviation of anxiety, which might contribute to the suppression. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I The Extended Auction II Working in the Peep Show, Flirting in the Square III Insurance Behind a Veil of Ignorance IV Dworkin's Hybrid Scheme V Four Objections to Dworkin VI Ackerman Generalized VII Not Enough Redistribution? VIII Too Much Redistribution? Acknowledgement.

The once-lost introduction to the philosophy of science by Philipp Frank (1884-1966), a leading member of the Vienna circle of philosophers and biographer of Albert Einstein.

An introduction to semantics for the general reader. How things mean, from animal communication to music.

This chapter introduces time travel into the Star Wars lore. Time travel stories in which the past is changed are in danger of being inconsistent or plagued by paradoxes. In famous time travel stories such as Back to the Future, the protagonist travels to the past, changes the past, and then returns to a present quite different from the one they left. In contemporary philosophy of time, there are three main approaches to this question: presentism, eternalism, and the growing block (...) universe. Time travel works by entering a place, the World Between Worlds, that connects different points in time and space. In terms of modern physics, the portals in the World Between Worlds may be understood as traversable wormholes. The nature of time and the possibility of time travel have attracted and captivated humanity for centuries. (shrink)

Philipp Mayring und Norbert Rath greifen zentrale Fragen der heutigen Zeit auf: Was ist Glück? Woher kommt Glück? Wie kann man Glück erreichen? Zunächst geht es um klassische philosophische Ansätze – was verstehen antike Denker wie Demokrit, Platon, Aristoteles und Epikur sowie neuzeitliche Philosophen wie Montaigne, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud und Adorno darunter? Es zeigt sich die Historizität der Glückskonzepte und die Notwendigkeit einer Kritik am »falschen« Glück. Psychologische Konzepte von Glück sind ebenso schillernd. Sie untersuchen empirisch, wie subjektive (...) Glücksgefühle zustande kommen, welche emotionalen, kognitiven und handlungsbezogenen Prozesse ihnen zu Grunde liegen und in welchen Situationen sich Menschen glücklich fühlen. Auch hier erscheint ein kritischer Standpunkt notwendig: Kritik an unterschiedlichen Glücksdefinitionen, Kritik an Erhebungsinstrumenten und Kritik an der Instrumentalisierung und Kommerzialisierung von Forschungsergebnissen. Gerade im Blick auf eine neuerdings weit verbreitete Positive Psychologie besteht ein Ideologieverdacht: Könnte es sich hier um kaum einlösbare Versprechungen einer affirmativen psychologischen Glücksforschung handeln? Philipp Mayring und Norbert Rath gehen diesen Fragen im Dialog zwischen Philosophie und Psychologie nach. Trotz der unterschiedlichen Herangehensweisen und Perspektiven der beiden Autoren zeigen sich erstaunliche Übereinstimmungen hinsichtlich einer kritischen Theorie des Glücks. (shrink)

Peut-on définir un "sens" musical? Quelle est la part d'intuition, de spontanéité, et celle de la technique, des règles, des systèmes dans la création? Pionnier de la musique électroacoustique en temps réel, Philippe Manoury nous fait entrer au coeur du processus de composition, montrant par exemple comment faire interagir les techniques numériques et les instruments acoustiques (y compris la voix) pour créer de nouvelles formes musicales et interroger sans cesse la matière sonore elle-même."--Page 4 of cover.

Die vorliegende Studie ist die erste umfassende Darstellung, die Kierkegaards Verfahren einer indirekten Mitteilung als hermeneutischen Schl ssel zu seinem Gesamtwerk entfaltet. Erkenntnisleitend ist das philosophische Interesse, die indirekte Mitteilung als Kierkegaards denkerische Methode und als das bestimmende Strukturprinzip seiner Existenzphilosophie zu begreifen. Indirekte Mitteilung meint nicht blo eine u erliche Form maieutischer und existenzieller Kommunikation, sie ist vielmehr zugleich eine Theorie ber die Grenze von Sprache und Begriff. Zudem ist die perspektivisch gebrochene, experimentalphilosophische Methode ein Gegenentwurf zur geschlossenen Form (...) des Systems. Hierin zeigt sich Kierkegaards geschichtliche Zwischenstellung in der Umbruchskonstellation von Idealismus und Moderne: Er st t sich im Ganzen vom Systemdenken Schellings und Hegels ab und weist voraus auf die Experimentalphilosophie Nietzsches und das Differenzdenken Derridas. Die Studie ist in dreierlei Hinsicht strukturiert: Systematisch wird die indirekte Methode als ein gegen sich selbst arbeitendes, prinzipiell unabgeschlossenes Verfahren bestimmt; geschichtlich wird sie vor dem Hintergrund der Tradition der Ironie und weiterer paradoxaler Begriffskonstellationen entfaltet; werkgeschichtlich-exegetisch werden Kierkegaards weit verzweigte Reflexionen ber den Begriff der indirekten Methode rekonstruiert, ihre Praxis und Durchf hrung anhand ausgew hlter Werke exemplarisch herausgearbeitet. (shrink)

This is the outline : I - Quelques étapes aux avancées significatives II - La pensée chrétienne et le hasard d’ignorance III - De quelques difficultés de raisonner sur le probable IV - Téléologie et évolutionnisme V - Où est l’« étage » qui permette de parler d’indépendance ? VI. Qu’y a-t-il à la base de nos concepts d’ordre ? VII - Quelle place pour le hasard ? VIII. Le hasard appréhendé de dos ?

Cet ouvrage s'intéresse aux lieux laissés vacants, avec le projet de débusquer le sens caché que recouvre leur mise à l'écart du jeu social. Il aborde leur "renaturation", qui leur confère une valeur mémorielle, ainsi que leur réaménagement ou leur restauration. Autrement dit, il s'essaie à décrypter le jeu subtil de l'oubli et de la mémoire qui s'y joue, entre enfouissement et résurgence. Parmi ces lieux, l'auteur examine particulièrement les friches et étudie celles-ci sous leurs multiples facettes : en référence (...) à leur statut, qu'on les qualifie de rurales, urbaines, industrielles, militaires, touristiques, même si le plus souvent elles sont tout cela à la fois ; en rapport à leur durée, variable, car il en est d'immémoriales mais aussi d'éphémères, d'involontaires et de circonstanciées ; et au regard de leur finalité, au moment où elles sont réappropriées par des activités patrimoniales, touristiques... L'idée ici soutenue serait que les espaces délaissés deviennent des lieux de mémoire par le biais de leur réappropriation patrimoniale, dès lors qu'une recherche identitaire s'accommode de leur mise en tourisme. La friche est donc présentée ici comme un fondement de l'illusion mémorielle, une nostalgie du rétro? (shrink)

In a famous manuscript addition of the Exemplaire de Bordeaux des Essaisand while he has abandoned all public ambition, Montaigne declares without appeal, "I am not a philosopher." At the same time, however, he presents himself as a new philosopher, even as a dissident in the history of philosophy: "New figure: a philosopher unpremeditated and fortuitous! Who can believe between these two Montaigne? This hesitation is symptomatic of a tormented philosophical posterity. Sometimes regarded as a full-fledged philosopher - the forerunner (...) of modernity - and sometimes as a disorganized or even incoherent thinker, Montaigne enjoyed a reception that was far from being a long calm river. This volume is specifically intended to trace the "philosophical uses" of Montaigne throughout the centuries--Translation of page 4 of cover. (shrink)