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Philip Reed
Canisius College
  1.  15
    How Not to Defend the Unborn.David Hershenov & Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (4):414-430.
    It is sometimes proposed that killing or harming abortion providers is the only logically consistent position available to opponents of abortion. Since lethal violence against morally responsible attackers is normally viewed as justified in order to defend innocent parties, pro-lifers should also think so in the case of the abortion doctor and so they should act to defend the unborn. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against killing abortion doctors. We argue that the pro-life view can, in (...)
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  2. What's Wrong with Monkish Virtues? Hume on the Standard of Virtue.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (1).
    How does Hume determine what qualities of the mind count as virtues and what qualities count as vices? By what standard, for example, does Hume dismiss the so-called “monkish virtues”? Hume’s commentators have proposed various possibilities for the standard of virtue, among them the general point of view and the usefulness/agreeableness of qualities. I consider the case for these standards and argue that Hume contends ultimately that consensus decides controversial questions about the status of virtues and vices. I try especially (...)
     
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  3.  50
    The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
    In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue (...)
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  4.  4
    Opioids, Double Effect, and the Prospects of Hastening Death.Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (5):505-515.
    The relevance of double effect for end-of-life decision-making has been challenged recently by a number of scholars. The principal reason is that opioids such as morphine do not usually hasten death when administered to relieve pain at the end of life; therefore, no secondary “double” effect is brought about. In my article, I argue against this view, showing how the doctrine of double effect is relevant to the administration of opioids at the end of life. I contend that the prevailing (...)
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  5.  19
    Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology.Philip A. Reed & Rico Vitz (eds.) - 2018 - London, UK: Routledge.
    Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, (...)
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  6.  19
    How to Gerrymander Intention.Philip A. Reed - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):441-460.
    Essential to the doctrine of double effect is the idea that agents are prohibited from intending evil as a means to a good end. I argue in this paper that some recent accounts of intention from proponents of double effect cannot sustain this prohibition on harmful means. I outline two ways to gerrymander intention that mark these accounts. First, intention is construed in such a way that an agent intends only those states of affairs that she cares about or finds (...)
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  7.  46
    Artifacts, Intentions, and Contraceptives: The Problem with Having a Plan B for Plan B.Philip A. Reed - 2013 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (6):jht051.
    Next SectionIt is commonly proposed that artifacts cannot be understood without reference to human intentions. This fact, I contend, has relevance to the use of artifacts in intentional action. I argue that because artifacts have intentions embedded into them antecedently, when we use artifacts we are sometimes compelled to intend descriptions of our actions that we might, for various reasons, be inclined to believe that we do not intend. I focus this argument to a specific set of artifacts, namely, medical (...)
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  8.  24
    Motivating Hume’s Natural Virtues.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):134-147.
    Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments if we want our actions to be genuinely virtuous. It is this proposal with which I take issue in this article, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of (...)
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  9.  4
    Reading Hume on the Principles of Morals Ed. By Taylor Jacqueline.Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Hume Studies 44 (2):278-280.
    Readers of this journal know that Hume regarded an Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals as his finest work. It was, Hume said, "incomparably the best." Yet, most of the scholarly work on Hume's moral philosophy in recent decades focuses on the Treatise, which Hume wrote some three decades prior to the Enquiry.There are good reasons to focus on the older work. It is much longer, so there is more to sink our scholarly teeth into. Many discussions and discursions appear (...)
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  10.  26
    Pleasing People.Philip A. Reed - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):79-96.
    This paper examines and evaluates from a Christian perspective the common Christian presumption against pleasing people, which is roughly the idea that Christians should not be motivated by or delight in the favorable opinion of others. I argue that several ways of saving the idea that Christians can blamelessly care what others think about them are misguided or insufficient. I contend that the most important way to save this idea is by drawing attention to concern for the opinions of others (...)
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  11.  16
    Character, Written by Jay R. Elliott.Philip A. Reed - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (3):383-385.
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  12.  21
    Hume on Sympathy and Agreeable Qualities.Philip A. Reed - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1136-1156.
    Hume says that sympathy is the source of our moral feeling of approval for useful qualities. But does Hume give the same psychological explanation of our approval of immediately agreeable qualities as he does to our approval of useful qualities? Does he trace our moral approbation of immediately agreeable qualities to sympathy? Some commentators, including Rachel Cohon and Don Garrett, argue that he does not. Let us call this view the ‘narrow view’ of sympathy in contrast to the ‘wide view’ (...)
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