I was asked to develop a course “Philosophy and Cognitive Science” to be taught for the first time in Spring 1995 in the Philosophy Department at the University of Alberta. Since my cognitive science-related interests are focussed more towards philosophy mixed with artificial intelligence (A I) and linguistics than towards (say) neuroscience or anthropology, I decided to slant the course in t hat direction. The departmental intent was that this should be an upper-level course, but with no spe cific prerequisite (...) courses. This meant that while there was a “three previous courses in philosophy ” prerequisite, the students could not be expected to have taken any particular course, as (say) a phil osophy of mind course or a logic course. Further, I had in mind that the course would be part of an initiative to create an undergraduate program in Cognitive Science at the University of Alberta, and s o I encouraged students from linguistics, computer science, and psychology who had taken courses in their department like “Language and Mind”, “Introduction to AI”, and “Introduction to Cognit ive Science” to take this course even without the philosophy background. This resulted in the class consisting of about a quarter each philosophy, psychology and computer science majors, with the re st being drawn from linguistics, education, and anthropology. And although this distribution of stud ents arguably lessened the philosophical sophistication of both the lectures and the class discussion, I (and the students, I believe) found the perspectives brought to the topic by these other students to be fascinating and quite provocative. (shrink)

As a problem for science studies, the commercialization of scientific knowledge is characterized as whether scientific knowledge is a public good, like health care and education, or a positional good, a good whose value allows for exclusion to clients, the opposite of a public good (Callon 1994; Mirowski and Sent 2007). Mirowski and Sent (2007) have highlighted the problem of the commercialization and privatization of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Mirowski (2009) avers that the commercialization of scientific knowledge is the apotheosis of (...) a neoliberal program to promote and to construct free markets as the central condition of success of the neoliberal agenda. Mirowski argues that the problem of commercialization of scientific knowledge is that scientific knowledge is being transformed from a public good to a positional good. A further argument from Mirowski (2009b) is that science has been harmed by its commercialization. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the features of modeling-based abductive reasoning as a disciplinary practice of inquiry in the domain of earth science. The study was based on an undergraduate course of a university of education, Korea, offered for preservice elementary teachers majoring in science as their specialty. The course enrollees participated in an inquiry project in which they were asked to abductively generate models representing past geologic events in order to explain how two units in a (...) sedimentary rock outcrop had been formed. Three students were selected as major informants for the study, and multiple types of qualitative data were collected, including the students’ sketchbook records, audio-recording of whole-class presentation and discussion, and interviews with the students. The data were analyzed according to the method of analytical induction, which yielded three assertions as the findings of the study. First, while an explanatory model can be generated by combining resource models, the combination of resource models does not necessarily result in a scientifically sound explanatory model. Second, a systemic approach can help activate a critical resource model which can in turn lead to a scientifically sound explanatory model. Third, simulations with a model can enhance the plausibility of the model. Based on these findings, causal combinations of resource models, a systemic approach to earth scientific problem-solving, and simulations with a model are suggested and discussed as implications for science education and relevant research. (shrink)

Both literalism, the view that mathematical objects simply exist in the empirical world, and fictionalism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist but are rather harmless fictions, have been both ascribed to Aristotle. The ascription of literalism to Aristotle, however, commits Aristotle to the unattractive view that mathematics studies but a small fragment of the physical world; and there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the literalist position that mathematical objects are perceivable. The ascription of fictionalism also faces a (...) difficult challenge: there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the fictionalist position that mathematics is false. I argue that, in Aristotle's view, the fiction of mathematics is not to treat what does not exist as if existing but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological status they lack. This form of fictionalism is consistent with holding that mathematics is true. (shrink)

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the (...) view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t a special case of perception in Aristotle but is rather a necessary condition for any perception whatsoever: the turning of one’s attention to the affection of the sense organs. In the second part of the paper, I’ll consider the thesis that the activity of the active intellect is analogous to perceiving that we see and hear.

The encounter of Advaitins with bhakti represented a new departure, in seventeenth century India, and gave birth to a new style in philosophy. It was a time when rational inquiry emancipated itself to a certain extent from the tradition of commentaries and exegesis. But we should not confuse two different ideas of rationality. Using one’s own reason in religious matters is one thing, and this is what the new philosophers did in India; spreading the lights of Reason is another thing, (...) and this was not an issue in India. (shrink)

This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: [email protected].

"Réfléchir sur la science, mais aussi sur les relations humaines et sur des engagements politiques et militants, tout en faisant référence à des textes anciens et à des enseignements "traditionnaires", n'est-ce pas un peu provocateur? Pourtant, la présente évocation aspire à surmonter les parcellisations et l'éclatement de la pensée - telle, en particulier, que l'Occident la conçoit trop souvent - en traitant aussi bien du raisonnable que de l'affectif, du cognitif que du ressenti et de l'intime, du communautaire que du (...) politique. Il s'agit donc de trouver les voies, les canaux, d'une correspondance des singularités personnelles, visant les relations qu'elles peuvent et doivent élaborer et entretenir, afin de signifier le dégagement d'un sens : le projet d'une humanité. Expression d'une nécessité, d'une rationalité en quelque sorte et aussi, au moins, d'une expérience. Je trouve précieux et émouvant que tradition ésotérique juive et expérience militante gauchiste puissent s'apporter, s'échanger, s'entendre pour une perspective de mise en oeuvre envisageant de devenir commune, sans pour autant mélanger abusivement ce qui doit demeurer séparé, jusqu'à ce que l'alliance conclue entre des protagonistes dûment identifiés et authentifiés soit en mesure de reprendre en termes de compatibilités et de convergence ce qui s'est présenté trop souvent dans l'histoire en termes d'irréductibilités et d'aléatoire." Extrait et adapté de Francis Bailly, Avant-Propos. (shrink)

Discusses Derrida as a religious thinker, reading Dante’s Commedia and Derrida’s religious writings together.

This book contributes to the literature on the ethical use of power and political skills to lead whole system change within school districts.

This essay is an obituary notice for Elizabeth Sewell, a long-time friend of Michael Polanyi and a well-known poet, novelist and critic.

Lucidly written, this extensive and very original introduction to philosophy features over fifty brief, jargon-free essays arranged in pairs. Each pair answers one of the principal philosophical questions, such as "Does God exist?" or "Are we free?", with two opposing points of view. On the topic of relativism, for example, one essay argues that morality is created by society and relative to it, while the other claims that moral standards are absolute and universal. Each essay takes a definite stand and (...) promotes it vigorously, creating a sharp contrast between the two positions. While the essays often employ standard arguments of great philosophers, they present the ideas in contemporary language with vivid examples. The accessible style and conflicting answers engage students and promote class discussion. While other textbooks present a series of excerpts and theories without attempting to coordinate them into a larger picture, Philosophical Dilemmas encourages students in introductory philosophy courses to think for themselves and to begin constructing their own worldviews. (shrink)