In this article, I aim to cast light on the genetic analyses of the apperception of the other that the phenomenologist Marc Richir develops in his late masterwork Phénoménologie en esquisses (2000). My reading hypothesis is that these analyses consist in the original contribution that Richir makes to the standard phenomenological account of empathy from within his overall project of a non-standard revision/refoundation of the Husserlian genetic phenomenology. To test this hypothesis, I trace Richir’s reinterpretation of two texts from Husserl’s (...) so-called phenomenology of intersubjectivity (Hua XIII, 10 and 13), in which Husserl interweaves together the questions of the I’s implication in phantasy and of the apprehension of the other’s living body by presentification. As my examination develops, I show that Richir finds in these texts the phenomenological attestation of the nomadic and presubjective phantasia that, on his reading, Husserl had discovered in his earlier 1904–05 lectures on phantasy. (shrink)

The article « La Défenestration » by Belgian philosopher Marc Richir has been translated into Russian for the first time for this issue of the “Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology.” In his early work “The Defenestration” Richir raises the question of relation between the subject and conceivable world. Here, a philosopher is pictured contemplating the world through the window of his tower. In such detachment from the world the thinker finds himself according to all Modern philosophies of consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology inherits (...) this detachment, since Husserl imposes the structure of transcendental ego as external to the world. Richir abolishes the concept of transcendental ego with the help of heideggerian Dasein, but analyzing Heidegger’s ontology he comes to the conclusion that the latter remains fixated on beings. Believing a person to live in the fundamental openness of Being, Heidegger places such a person in the secondary world of “truth.” In order to overcome the remains of traditional philosophy in Heidegger’s ontology Richir turns to Merleau-Ponty’ “cosmology of the visible.” The author takes the Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that everything visible has something fundamentally invisible in it. This allows him to discover the universe of “nothing”, which includes both the visible and what is “behind” it. As a result Richir overcomes the classical dualism of the sensual and the intelligible. The concept of defenestration places the subject and the world in the same universe. (shrink)

The poetic image results from the effort undertaken by affectivity to express itself in a language that is not originally its very own, but that holds the advantage of being communicable not only at the level of representation, but at the level of feeling as well. The image is not considered, therefore, to be a synthesis of true and false. In the process of creation, the affect is the material principle of the image as an ideal unity of syntheses. It (...) is implied here that poetic writing is not about a content of internal aiming, previously possessed by consciousness, that is made to correspond with an element of the world, even­tually represented by means of sensible intuition. In order to illustrate this, the author interprets a poem by Nadia Tueni, showing that it is essentially about its own production. (shrink)

The poetic image results from the effort undertaken by affectivity to express itself in a language that is not originally its very own, but that holds the advantage of being communicable not only at the level of representation, but at the level of feeling as well. The image is not considered, therefore, to be a synthesis of true and false. In the process of creation, the affect is the material principle of the image as an ideal unity of syntheses. It (...) is implied here that poetic writing is not about a content of internal aiming, previously possessed by consciousness, that is made to correspond with an element of the world, even­tually represented by means of sensible intuition. In order to illustrate this, the author interprets a poem by Nadia Tueni, showing that it is essentially about its own production. (shrink)

A partir de l'étude du § 8 du texte no 31 de Husserliana XV, l'A. montre que ce qui fait, hors monde, la vie de conscience universelle, c'est d'être le tenant de deux sens d'être enchevêtrés: d'une part, comme sum constituant-extatique, sens d'être se réfléchissant sans concept; et d'autre part, moi mondanéisé, pris dans le phénomène, en un avec le Leib. Confondues en un, vie psychique et vie transcendantale absolue ne peuvent cependant être absolument identiques: l'A. analyse ici, comme clignotement (...) du phénomène, la croissance transcendantale où s'opère la mondanéisation elle-même. Based on § 8 (text no 31) in Husserliana XV, this study shows that universal conscience life consists in being at the crossing-point of two intertwingled meanings of being: on one hand, as constituting and extatical ego, a meaning of being which is reflected without any concept; and on the other, worldly ego, caught within the phenomenon, one with the Leib-body. Nevertheless, psychical and transcendental life, though so united, cannot be thoroughly identical: Richir analyses here, under the name of the « sparkling » of the phenomenon, the transcendental growth unto the worldliness of the self. (shrink)

Este artículo se basa en el texto nº1 del tomo XXIII de Husserliana, Phantasia, conciencia de imagen, recuerdo. En primer lugar entendemos que Husserl es el mayor crítico de la filosofía de la representación que ha dado el siglo XX. No sólo en punto a la percepción; también, como se verá, en punto a la phantasia. Sin embargo, por la misma razón, probablemente ha sido también el más fino analista del fenómeno de la representación entendido, ahora sí, como conciencia de (...) imagen. Husserl estudia el fenómeno de la conciencia de imagen en el texto principal de Hua XXIII, diseccionándolo, con una acribia sin precedentes, en sus componentes de soporte físico (ausente en el caso de la Imagination o la Einbildungskraft, a distinguir de la phantasia), Bildobjekt y Bildsujet. Mención especial merece el escurridizo estatuto ontológico (de innúmeras consecuencias, por ejemplo en psicopatología) del Bildobjekt que se entiende, en términos de Husserl, como Fiktum. Phantasia de un lado, imaginación y conciencia de imagen de otro, constituyen dos tipos esencialmente distintos de acto, con estructuras distintas. La phantasia es un acto tan directo e inmediato como la percepción, y carece de toda mediación por un Bildobjekt. A la luz del texto nº1 de Hua XXIII recogemos las características del no presente de la phantasia (distinto del no presente de la imaginación): la phantasia, amén de no presente, es proteiforme, intermitente y discontinua. Las paradojas relativas a los phantasmata de las apariciones de phantasia (Phantasieerscheinungen) nos conducirán a proponer una nueva interpretación de la representificación (Vergegenwärtigung) phantaseante como retemporalización en presencia (sin presente asignable). Por último analizamos el proceso de transposición arquitectónica de la phantasia en imaginación para terminar retomando la crítica, esbozada al principio del texto, de la perspectiva de las neurociencias en el análisis de la conciencia. tent and discontinuous. The paradoxes which then emerge with regard to the phantasmata of the phantasia appearances (Phantasieerscheinungen) will lead us to propose a new interpretation of the phantasizing presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) as retemporalization in praesentia (without any assignable present). Last but not least, an analysis is provided of the process of architectonical transposition of. (shrink)

Depois de mostrar que, na nossa tradição, o pintor, em última análise, pinta a sua visão das coisas, tentamos mostrar que a arte bruta não é simplesmente a arte em estado bruto, ou afastada das convenções, mas, para o psicótico, a arte de pintar o seu espírito. After having demonstrated that in our tradition the painter paints ultimately his own image on things , we attempt to show that rough art is not simply art in-the-rough on the margins of the (...) conventions, but, for the psychotic, the art to paint his spirit. (shrink)

The work of David R. Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, subtitled A Genealogy of Modernity, concerns essentially the status of geometry in Euclid’s Elements and in Descartes’s Geometry. It is a remarkable work, at once by the declared breadth of its ambitions and by the very great precision of its analyses, which are always supported by a prodigious philosophical culture. David Lachterman’s concern is to grasp, by way of an in-depth commentary of certain, particularly crucial passages of these two foundational (...) works, the change in geometry’s status from the one to the other, and this, as a sort of symptom of what the Moderns, since Descartes, will always experience as a necessary, inaugural rupture with regard to tradition. This change is underlaid, according to the author, by a profound change in the philosophical ethos, and in particular, in the geometer’s ethos. One must understand ethos, Lachterman explains, in the manner of Aristotle: those characteristic means that human beings have by which to act in the world or to behave in relation to one another, or to themselves. There is thus an “ethics” of geometry, namely, in the manner and the style of doing geometry, of behaving as a mathematician both toward apprentices and toward the veritable nature of the “entities” which are to be taught or learnt, and which give their discipline its name. That there is a difference of ethos between Euclid and Descartes implies, according to Lachterman, that there is also a difference in the source of intelligibility of the “mathematical,” understood in the most general sense. This in turn implies a deeper difference in the mode of being in general: it suffices to note that, in the ancient case, the source of intelligibility of the geometric figure lies in the nature of the figure itself, and that in the modern case, the same source is found in the “strategies” and “tactics” suited to bringing the figure to its visibility or to its embodiment, 315 in order to notice that this change in the mode of access to intelligibility must have had profound repercussions upon philosophical thought. It is in this sense that the author’s design is also, at the same time, not genetic, but genealogical. The break between ancient and modern mathematics pleas in favor of a consideration of the rupture of modern thought relative to ancient thought; thus, implicitly—and it is one of the great merits of this book that it shows this—against all homogenizing levelling, in Heidegger’s fashion, of the history of thought down to the history of “the” discipline of metaphysics. If there is something Heideggerian, in the best sense of the term, in Lachterman’s way of considering ethos as coextensive with modes of being, there is, on the other hand, and we ought to be very glad of it, something anti-Heideggerian in his original manner of bringing out the effective novelty of modern thought. For, according to him, modern thought is no longer to be defined, explicitly or exclusively, by the so-called “metaphysics of subjectivity.” Instead, it is defined by a self-regulated, operative, and constructive productivity of thought—and this as much with regard to itself as to its objects. To put it briefly, whereas ancient thought is rather polarized by the logico-eidetic, modern thought is polarized by a sort of methodical constructivism, the status of which is, in reality, very complex. If Descartes speaks of “the construction of a problem,” while Leibniz speaks of the “construction of an equation,” and Kant of the “construction of a concept,” everything depends—as we might guess—upon the multiple meanings that the term ‘construction’ may take on. Is it to be taken in the sense of an absolute creation, a quasi ex nihilo creation, which would render mathematics divine? Is it the creation of artefacts, or again, is it the methodical exploration of problems posed to thought by the existence of objects or corresponding ideas, themselves supposed to be somewhere in the divine understanding? We already discern the breadth and the depth of the debate, and we sense that the essential will be played out in Lachterman’s commentaries on the famous Cartesian solution of the problem of Pappus—the birth certificate, as we know, of analytic geometry. (shrink)

The remake that we have started of phenomenology since the Phenomenological Meditations (1992) has led us here to reexammine the question of transcendantal aperception and transcendental cogito such as it is known by Husserl. The problematic of phenomenalization and phenomenological schematism of phaenomena as but phaenomena leads to its decomposition in three architectonichal registers, whose common structure is each time that of a discordance into the accordance: register of off language with, its instable proto-temporalization, register of language with its temporalizations (...) in presence without a present that could be set, and utterly husserlian register of intentionnal meanings wich temporalize themselves in presents. In this context, the question of the Stiftung itself of eidetic husserlian a priori is examined. (shrink)

English summary: Schelling's Die Weltalter was frequently announced as ready for publication, but little of the book was ever written. Schelling planned Die Weltalter as a volume in three parts, describing the past, present, and future of the world; however, he began only the first part, rewriting it several times and at last keeping it unpublished. The other two parts were left only in planning. French text.French description: « Commencé seulement les Ages du monde ». Cette note que Schelling consigne (...) dans son Tagebuch à la date du 27 décembre 1810 donne le coup d'envoi d'un des projets les plus grandioses qu'un philosophe se soit proposé, retracer sur la base de concepts philosophiques les étapes de la vie divine et de la création. S'il est vrai, comme le disait Novalis, que « vouloir écrire une Bible est un penchant à la folie que tout homme doit avoir pour être complet », cette grande fresque cosmique et théologique représente la tentative la plus magistrale qu'ait menée l'idéalisme allemand pour rendre compte de la totalité de la manifestation divine et en proposer une présentation effective et complète. Or, dans la dernière version de l'ouvrage, celle-là même que Schelling fit introduire dans ses Sammtliche Werke et dont nous donnons ici une nouvelle traduction dans la continuité de celle des brouillons de 1811 et 1813, le récit et la construction spéculative cherchent encore à atteindre un point d'équilibre. Un double effort pour implanter la succession au coeur même de l'Absolu tout en équilibrant en Dieu les rapports de l'idéal et du réel prépare l'avènement d'une philosophie historique sans ue l'on débouche jamais tout à fait sur une hétérogénéité radicale de l'être et du penser. Ainsi, à travers cette description du passé le plus archaïque, Schelling met pour la première fois effectivement la philosophie en possession de ce qu'elle recherche depuis toujours : « la science, c'est-à-dire l'histoire ». (shrink)

I develop Levinas’s analysis of “proximity” to explain how successful faceless class dialogues are possible despite physical social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. I first examine features of Levinas’s notion of proximity within his idiosyncratic approach to “ethics.” Second, I turn to Levinas’s examination of intentionality and questioning in relation to the hermeneutic priority of questioning. Third, I detail some successes and failures in attempts to embody Levinasian proximity in online or masked discussions with students. I draw out contrasts between (...) experiences at two different institutions as well as between curricular and extracurricular experiences. I do this to expose my own vulnerability in this essay itself. Given pandemic conditions as well as Levinas’s theory of proximity, I found that many masked or virtual class discussions—but especially extracurricular group discussions, such as a philosophy club and the Black Student Union meetings—maintained a closeness of community despite social distancing. (shrink)

The paper discusses non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as a collective form of protection that, in terms of health justice, benefits groups at risk, allowing them to engage in social life and activities during health crises. More specifically, the paper asserts that NPIs that realize social distancing are justifiable insofar as they are constitutive of a type of social protection that allows everyone, especially social disadvantaged agents, to access the public health sphere and other fundamental social spheres, such as the family and (...) civil society. (shrink)

Taking as its jumping off point recent attempts in the sciences of the mind to facilitate direct brain-to-brain communication, this article considers the challenges such a development poses to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This is examined initially through recourse to Husserl's description of the encounter with the other in the Cartesian Meditations, Levinas’ rival account in Totality and Infinity, and Derrida's contribution to this dialogue in the essay ‘Violence and Metaphysics’. All three turn around the problem of how the externality (...) and otherness that constitutes the other qua other can be presented to the I while being maintained in its very externality and otherness. The paper asks whether the prospect of fully realised telepathic communication would overcome intersubjective distance by offering a direct insight into the other's phenomenological interior, and how such a relation is to be conceived using the terms outlined in the above trio of texts. Finally, through appealing to Derrida's enigmatic essay ‘Telepathy’ and offering a close reading of his late concept of teleiopoesis we will overturn the phenomenological terms in which the discussion has so far been framed while arriving at a form of telepathy that is not reducible to the simple communication of a message between an active sender and a passive recipient, but which simultaneously maintains the distance between the actors involved. Teleiopoesis undermines the stable identity of the terms I and other and consequently the very concept of intersubjectivity is put into question. (shrink)

Il'in's classic work is the most impassioned and cogent work by a Russian jurist on the rule of law. The product of nearly four decades of labor, which could not be published in the former Soviet Union, this revised edition places the work in the context of developments since its first English translation in 2013. The text is accompanied by one of Il'in's early and influential articles on law and power, a bibliography devoted to his life and work, and (...) informed introductory essays about his contribution to the rule of law dialogue, the origins and transformations of the concept of legal consciousness and the fascinating history of his treatise on that subject. x, 403 pp. Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in (Доктор государственных наук) [1883-1954], sometime professor, Moscow Lomonosov State University, is one of the most widely-read legal philosophers of the twentieth century in post-Soviet Russia. William E. Butler is the John Edward Fowler Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson Law; Emeritus Professor of Comparative Law, University College London; and author of numerous works on post-Soviet legal systems, including Russian Law and Legal Institutions (3d ed.; 2021). Philip T. Grier, who has written extensively on Hegel and Il'in and translated Il'in's principal treatise on Hegelianism, is the Emeritus Thomas Bowman Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Paul Robinson is a professor at the University of Ottawa. (shrink)

In his book, Five Minds for the Future, Howard Gardner offers both a constructive critique of current educational practices and an alternative vision for the future of education. Gardner, best known for his seminal work on multiple intelligences, grounds his major conclusions primarily on the results of his impressive, decade-long, and massive Good Works Project. Despite my several agreements and significant overlap with Howard Gardner, I believe that there is insufficient evidence to accept fully his policy prescriptions. Gardner's selection of (...) the five minds of the future - the disciplined, synthesizing, creating, respectful, and ethical minds - is based on a set of limiting assumptions concerning globalization, good work, individuality, power and control, disciplines as value-free enterprises, ethics as the point of view of the universe, and the completeness of his list. This paper suggests that our conception of education might be dramatically expanded to include a more critical and distanced stance towards: globalization, the current goals of business, individualism, the traditional disciplines, and even ethics than Gardner currently imagines. Its aims can and should be broadened to include not only good work, but also love and play. Students must learn how to control their environments, but also how to appreciate and accept life's inevitable difficulties and limits. Ethics should certainly play a more central role in education as Gardner correctly emphasizes, but our understanding of ethics must include not only respect but also care; not only principles but also dialog. To accomplish all of this, however, requires us to think beyond Gardner's five minds to include additional "mental dispositions" like the caring, critical, intersubjective, spiritual, and joyful minds. Each of these "minds" is explored in this paper. (shrink)

Lenin's work "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," written in the spring of 1922, is justly regarded as the philosophical testament of our leader. In it, the tasks of the day were merged with the tasks of the entire epoch on the basis of a profound analysis of reality.

Summary In the methodology of science, intersubjectivity is usually associated with replicability of experimental results. A related, judicial conception of objectivity as impartiality has it that a theory or judgment is objective if it covers all the relevant angles of the object or phenomenon in question, ensuring that the latter is not ephemeral and the concepts referring to them are valid. Based on the assumption that in the social sciences, the researcher is also a participant, an alternative view was conceived, (...) according to the notion that intersubjectivity rests on either sharing of a lifeworld and its associated practices or on empathy, or on some form of direct social cognition. My aim in this paper is to bring some elements of the Gestalt theory – and more specifically, Rudolf Arnheim’s (1988) adapted model of field dynamics – to bear on the problematic of intersubjectivity. The proposed model suggests that intersubjectivity is a dynamic phenomenon, best described as a product of two vectors: a vector describing a movement across the circumference combined with a vector describing the movement from the center to the circumference. While the first vector corresponds to impartiality, the second represents the tension between cognitive distancing and direct experience. Overall, it is argued that intersubjectivity cannot be divorced from either subjectivity or objectivity and it amounts to skillful navigation within different frames of reference. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Mencius both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value (...) could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius. (shrink)

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon calls attention to the dynamic interaction that takes place between hermeneutics and phenomenology in Ricoeur's thought. It could be said that Ricoeur's thought is placed under a twofold demand: between the rigor of the text and the requirements of the phenomenon. The rigor of the text calls for fidelity to what the text actually says, while the requirement of the phenomenon is established by the Husserlian call to return "to the (...) things themselves." These two demands are interwoven insofar as there is a hermeneutic component of the phenomenological attempt to go beyond the surface of things to their deeper meaning, just as there is a phenomenological component of the hermeneutic attempt to establish a critical distance toward the world to which we belong. For this reason, Ricoeur's thought involves a back and forth movement between the text and the phenomenon. Although this double movement was a theme of many of Ricoeur's essays in the middle of his career, the essays in this book suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology remains implicit throughout his work. The chapters aim to highlight, in much greater detail, how this back and forth movement between phenomenology and hermeneutics takes place with respect to many important philosophical themes, including the experience of the body, history, language, memory, personal identity, and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to develop the phenomenology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis by employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions. In section 1, I will show that phenomenological reduction is identical with a change of attitude and that we have to employ different kinds of phenomenological reductions in order to interpret Aristotle’s theory of phronesis phenomenologically. In section 2, employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions, I will attempt to develop the phenomenological (...) psychology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 3, employing different kinds of intersubjective reductions, I will clarify intersubjective aspects of phronesis. In section 4, adopting these insights, I will try to resolve two of the many difficulties of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 5, I will conclude with two remarks concerning the future tasks of the phenomenology of phronesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-BeingDaniel H. FrankHava Tirosh-Samuelson. Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 596. Cloth, $50.00.Franz Rosenzweig tried hard to convince the neoKantian Hermann Cohen of the merits of Zionism and the normalization it would bring to Jews and Jewish life. His attempt met with this response from Cohen: "Oho! So the (...) gang now wants to be happy, does it?" For those ignorant of the history of Jewish philosophy, one might imagine that Jewish philosophers, no less than their non-philosophical kinsmen, were so weighed down by the burdens of history and persecution that happiness could play no role in their theorizing. But happiness plays a key role in the history of Jewish moral and political philosophy, especially in the premodern period. Even Spinoza, the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns, the great critic of the rabbinic tradition and of Maimonides in particular, is concerned in his Ethics with identifying those activities that together constitute human well-being and the good life. Only lately, since the Enlightenment and Kant, has non-eudaimonism been a live option for Jewish thinkers. Only with the rise of (modern) Orthodoxy, and its predilection for construing goodness as rectitude and rule-following, has eudaimonism fallen out of favor. But with Tirosh-Samuelson's weighty volume on happiness in premodern Judaism, there can be no excuse in the future to imagine that all Jews are, or must be, closet Kantians, strict deontologists. To think otherwise seems to come close to taking on the classical (anti-Semitic) dichotomy of legalistic Judaism vs. spiritual Christianity. In it own way, Happiness in Premodern Judaism is a critique of such a one-sided, monochromatic view of Judaism, whether from the Christian or even from the Jewish side.Tirosh-Samuelson writes explicitly as an intellectual historian, rather than as a philosopher. She understands herself and her project as one that presents just the facts, without evaluating them. While one may cavil at a lost opportunity, in the present case this would be churlish, given the enormous erudition on display. After an introductory chapter outlining the foundational moral theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, the text presents the (Greek-inspired) areteic wisdom literature of the Second Temple period, the teleological theocentrism of the rabbis, the Greco-Arabic Islamicate culture that nurtured Jewish philosophers from Saadia in the tenth century to Maimonides in the twelfth, the rabbinic and kabbalistic critiques of the philosophical ideal of happiness commencing [End Page 338] with the translation (into Hebrew) of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and finally, very important and the focus of much recent scholarly work, the transformation of Jewish eudaimonism through direct contact with Christian Scholasticism and later with the humanist Renaissance. All in all, a millennium and a half of Jewish intellectual history is presented in a sober and scholarly way.Not surprisingly Maimonides plays a pivotal role in the story that Tirosh-Samuelson relates. A Janus-like figure, he represents the culmination and height of accommodation with Greek and Greco-Arabic philosophical culture. However, with the gradual worsening of the socio-economic condition of European Jewry in the thirteenth century, his accommodationism seemed traitorous, and as a result generations of thinkers, mystics and philosophers alike, strove to critically distance themselves from Maimonidean Aristotelianism. Tirosh-Samuelson is admirably clear in pointing out that such anti-Maimonidean tendencies are ill-characterized as anti-philosophical. Hasdai Crescas in the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries launched a massive critique of Maimonides' physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, but did so in as rigorous a manner as any philosopher would. The picture that enfolds over the course of the text is one of vigorous dialectic between partisans of 'alien' (Greek) wisdom and those who viewed such wisdom with considerable suspicion. Such a dialectic parallels, not surprisingly, developments in Christian philosophy.The trajectory of the story of premodern Jewish musings on happiness is from the centrality of reason and intellect, and the contemplative activity that is reason's preeminent actuality, to the primacy... (shrink)

Volume 16 of Progress in Self Psychology, _How Responsive Should We Be_, illuminates the continuing tension between Kohut's emphasis on the patient's subjective experience and the post-Kohutian intersubjectivists' concern with the therapist's own subjectivity by focusing on issues of therapeutic posture and degree of therapist activity. Teicholz provides an integrative context for examining this tension by discussing affect as the common denominator underlying the analyst's empathy, subjectivity, and authenticity. Responses to the tension encompass the stance of intersubjective contextualism, advocacy of (...) "active responsiveness," and emphasis on the thorough-going bidirectionality of the analytic endeavor. Balancing these perspectives are a reprise on Kohut's concept of prolonged empathic immersion and a recasting of the issue of closeness and distance in the analytic relationship in terms of analysis of "the tie to the negative selfobject." Additional clinical contributions examine severe bulimia and suicidal rage as attempts at self-state regulation and address the self-reparative functions that inhere in the act of dreaming. Like previous volumes in the series, volume 16 demonstrates the applicability of self psychology to nonanalytic treatment modalities and clinical populations. Here, self psychology is brought to bear on psychotherapy with placed children, on work with adults with nonverbal learning disabilities, and on brief therapy. Rector's examination of twinship and religious experience, Hagman's elucidation of the creative process, and Siegel and Topel's experiment with supervision via the internet exemplify the ever-expanding explanatory range of self-psychological insights. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to study the expressive part of game performance in soccer by introducing the concept of theatricality to describe a special form of expression. The aim is to contribute to the understanding of game performance by looking into the appearance, role and value of theatricality. The main argument of the paper is that theatricality can describe an important, but rarely noticed performance aspect, as it provides a unifying concept for expressive distancing in four dimensions of (...) the players? life-worlds: the subjective, intersubjective, collective and institutional. By explicating the value of this kind of expression in soccer the paper can provide a philosophical basis for including theatricality in performance and development strategies. (shrink)

Unionization in the Academy presents an authoritative, balanced, and comprehensive treatment of academic unions—their history, purpose, and the conflicts they cause.

In his early reflections on the French Revolution, Fichte approaches the relationship between its present meaning and its theoretical as well as politico-philosophical relevance. The French Revolution is for Fichte particularly significant, because herewith human rights and the value of the human being in general are placed into the foreground. In his opinion, they are founded on a transcendental conception of freedom, which has also to be achieved in politics. Relating to the contents, freedom, equality, and equal worthiness are asserted (...) on principle. The subjects of this process are the human beings considered as autonomous, self-thinking, and self-judging persons. To participate wittingly in the procedure of affirmation and realization of their rights, they have to become acquainted with the basic aspects of the transcendental method. On the negative side, this method makes it possible to distance oneself from empirical reality, opening the way to free reflection; on the positive side, it provides the setting up and the reviewing of norms on an autonomous, individual, and nonetheless intersubjective as well as cooperative basis. From this perspective, Fichte also reviews the legitimacy of revolutions. He makes clear that the possibility of reforms is not excluded, but it represents a preferable solution for good constitutions, and that human rights are inviolable also in case of revolution.In den frühen Reflexionen Fichtes über die Französische Revolution wird vor allen Dingen das Verhältnis zwischen ihrer Aktualität und ihrer theoretischen sowie philosophisch-politischen Bedeutung thematisiert. Die Französische Revolution erlangt für Fichte eine besondere Bedeutung, weil hiermit die Menschenrechte und der Wert des Menschen überhaupt in den Vordergrund rücken, welche seines Erachtens auf einer transzendentalen Freiheit basieren, die auch in die Politik umgesetzt werden soll. Was die Inhalte angeht, werden die Freiheit, Gleichheit und Gleichwertigkeit der Menschen untereinander prinzipiell behauptet. Die Subjekte dieses Prozesses sind die Menschen als autonome, selbstdenkende und selbst urteilende Wesen. Damit die Menschen bewusst am Verfahren der Behauptung und Verwirklichung ihrer Rechte teilnehmen, liefert Fichte die ersten Ansätze für die transzendentale Methode, welche negativ eine Abstandnahme von der empirischen Wirklichkeit ermöglicht, die die freie Reflexion einleitet, und positiv die Aufstellung von Normen sowie ihren Nachweis auf eine autonome, individuell veranlasste und dennoch intersubjektiv kooperierende Weise erzielt. Unter dieser Perspektive wird von Fichte auch die Rechtmäßigkeit der Revolution überprüft. Es wird klargestellt, dass der Weg der Reformen nicht ausgeschlossen ist, sondern eine bevorzugte Lösung für gute Verfassungen darstellt, und dass die Menschenrechte auch im Fall einer Revolution unantastbar sind. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the effects of social distancing for embodied lived experience in relation to dementia care and experiences of dementia. From a critical phenomenological perspective, I focus specifically on the safety measures of physical distancing and face-masking in pandemic times, asking whether they might risk marginalizing and disembodying people with dementia, especially in isolated healthcare settings. As much as these measures offer physical protection against spreading the virus, I consider how they might disrupt intersubjective processes (e.g., calming (...) social or therapeutic touch) and contribute to “an alienated bodily communication” (Dolezal 2020). From Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies of embodiment and enactive theories of intersubjectivity, to more recent phenomenological work on illness, many authors argue that our existential being-in-the-world is embodied in multimodal and intersubjective ways (Fuchs and De Jaeger 2009; Carel 2016; Ratcliffe 2008; Kontos 2011). For this reason, our lived bodies need to stay in touch and positively interact with other lived bodies. Based on empirical studies of multisensory and interactive therapy in nursing homes before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, I emphasize the effects of distant socializing for patients, care, and carers. My aim is to address the broader structures and discursive practices, which have undergone dramatic changes due to the spread of COVID-19. (shrink)

Many experienced runners consider the use of wearable devices an important element of the training process. A key techno-utopic promise of wearables lies in the use of proprietary algorithms to identify training load errors in real-time and alert users to risks of running-related injuries. Such real-time ‘knowing’ is claimed to obviate the need for athletes’ subjective judgements by telling runners how they have deviated from a desired or optimal training load or intensity. This realist-contoured perspective is, however, at odds with (...) sociological research indicating that users of wearables engage in active ‘data sense-making’ that is highly contextualised. To investigate how athletes use (or not) algorithmic analysis to understand, make sense of, and improve their performance in real-time, we undertook qualitative interviews with distance runners to explore lived experiences of running with wearables. The runners described how they actively interpreted data from wearables, drawing on their own experience, ‘somatic knowledge’, and embodied ways of knowing. This allowed them to assess the relevance and usefulness of data in relation to their own goals, intentions, and feelings. Our findings challenge the techno-utopic promises of real-time and predictive analytics. (shrink)

This article aims at introducing the matrixial theory of Bracha L. Ettinger to the field of academic teaching. As it intends to prove, feminist pedagogy would benefit from a matrix-informed approach to teaching, especially in the times of social distancing imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since of all student groups it is the university students who have been most directly affected by precarity and employment instability, they seem to be in an urgent need of openness, compassion, and understanding; the matrixial (...) theory – as this article demonstrates – responds to this necessity. Bracha L. Ettinger is a psychoanalyst, feminist, artist, and daughter of Holocaust survivors; her matrixial theory, based on the notions of the matrix and subjectivity-as-encounter, is a feminist supplement to psychoanalysis. The article begins with introducing the underpinnings of this psychoanalytical system and outlining its application in various areas, ranging from art history to trauma studies. Subsequently, the research joining Ettinger’s work and pedagogy is analysed; as it is shown, while these studies recognise the pedagogical potential of the matrixial theory, their scope is currently reduced to art-related disciplines. The next part is devoted to selected matrixial concepts that come out as especially relevant in the pedagogical context. What the article offers is a theoretical incentive to reflect on an approach to teaching based on reciprocity, responsibility, and participation despite the limit posed by the computer screen: an approach which – in the times of global precarity – can help define anew the student–teacher partnership. (shrink)

Among the first Orthodox hierarchs who bestowed the greatest benefit on the defense of the Ukrainian Church before the oppression of its Polish authorities was Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Joseph II Soltan 62. But his successes in this matter could not have a look for the further purpose, because the fate of the Orthodox Church under the Catholic power of the kings of Poland, which at the same time was the rulers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was predetermined (...) by the Catholic interests of Poland. When the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was an act of the Union of Lublin Poland incorporated into the Polish state, the implementation of the plan for the abolition of the Orthodox Church in this Catholic state was already a matter of the near-time. (shrink)

The Brest Union of 1596 is a topic that has for many centuries aroused wide discussions both in the Ukrainian environment and among those of other cultures interested in the history and modern life of Ukraine. This landmark event in Ukrainian history is assessed from different points of view: from the position of a scientist who tries to be objective and rise above the "malice of the day", a politician who cannot avoid the dictates of a congregation, a church (...) activist who upholds the purity of the faith of adherents of a particular denomination., The “average bread consumer,” who ultimately has to reap its benefits. It is no wonder, then, that the range of assessments is also extremely broad, from unconditional acceptance to the categorical denial of everything related to church union. (shrink)

The author of this article considers the Brest Union and the emergence of the Uniate Church as a kind of product of the national-cultural and religious-church processes that were experienced by Europe, and with it Ukraine in the second half of the XVII - the first half of the XVII century. The author argues that the union of the Kievan Metropolitanate with the Roman Apostolic See in 1596 fully fits into the European-wide reformational context, when the formation of (...) national local churches was a priority task. (shrink)

The Brest Union is a church-historical event in 1596 and on this basis established an understanding between the Ukrainian-Belorussian Orthodox Church and the Roman Throne: the recognition of the Roman Pope as the head of the Church with all the conclusions of this confession in matters of faith, morals and church administration, with the preservation of administrative, ritual, disciplinary and, in general, ecclesiastical and cultural autonomy within the framework of the Kyiv Metropolitanate. The Turkish captivity of the Constantinople Patriarchate, (...) the complicated cases of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the dislocation of its internal discipline, the creation of the Moscow Patriarchate, which encroached on the whole of the European East, the Protestant influences and polonization of the upper classes of Ukraine caused the Ukrainian Church in the 2nd half of the XVI century century of deep crisis. (shrink)