The article presents a critical semantic analysis of the so-called analytical truths as they were discussed by R. Carnap and building on some new empirical data that are not fully satisfactorily explained by Carnap’s theory. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s theory of analytical truths is proposed. It is demonstrated how his understanding of analytical truths, as statements that are true in all possible worlds and amenable to a quite obvious definition on a par with the concepts of sense (meaning) and (...) synonymy, applies exclusively to artificial languages of logic. Therefore, Carnap’s theory remains unreachable for the well-known criticism of W. Quine, who, in turn, pointed out the difficulties in defining these concepts for natural languages. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s explication of the mentioned concepts in the theory of meaning for natural languages is carried out. The connection of Carnap’s approach with the perspective of contemporary formal semantics is established. Subsequently, problematic cases and the difficulties they pose for Carnap’s concept are examined. An explanation is proposed for analytical truths as containing in their logical form an (unpronounced) quantifier over possible worlds (situations). (shrink)

This article provides an overview of current research in the field of STS on neoliberalism. The paper discusses the major changes in science associated with the spread of neoliberalism. The following key aspects of neoliberalism influence on the development of science are discussed: the increasing commercialization of science (on the examples of commercialization of meteorology and privatization of stream restoration); an increasing influence of scientism in regulation of technology; and an increasing role of social activism in this regulation.

This article provides an overview of current research in the field of STS on neoliberalism. The paper discusses the major changes in science associated with the spread of neoliberalism. The following key aspects of neoliberalism influence on the development of science are discussed: the increasing commercialization of science (on the examples of commercialization of meteorology and privatization of stream restoration); an increasing influence of scientism in regulation of technology; and an increasing role of social activism in this regulation.

This study explores the phenomenon of the so-called “third reading” of propositional attitude reports. This reading, which was originally explored in the dissertation of J. Fodor (1973) and has since become one of the significant problems in the formal semantics of natural languages, differs from the more well-known de re and de dicto readings by being an intermediate case. If the de re interpretation can be referred to as transparent specific, and the de dicto interpretation as opaque non-specific, then the (...) third reading is transparent non-specific. Fodor's standard solution has been the subject of much discussion in the literature and has given rise to a series of widely accepted counterexamples that are thought to demonstrate the limitations of Fodor's solution. At the same time, alternative approaches to the explication of these readings also suffer from formal shortcomings (for example, some of them did not satisfy the requirement of meaning compositionality, which is a basic requirement in formal semantic literature). This study points out that the analysis of all complex cases of the third reading did not fully take into account their syntactic structure. This remained unnoticed due to the ellipsis in many of these cases. It is shown that a restoration of the ellided syntactic structure makes it possible to analyze all hard cases as basic ones using the classical standard analysis proposed by Fodor supplemented by the principles of admissibility of substitution of L-equivalent expressions in intensional contexts (known since G. Frege and R. Carnap). In the final part of the work, it is demonstrated how exactly the main complex cases of the “third reading” are explicated in terms of the standard approach. (shrink)

Philosophy is an abstract theoretical discipline. However, a new trend that develops experimental methods in philosophical research has recently been gaining popularity extending to the fields of philosophical research that have not seen experimental methods earlier. This article addresses the question of whether it is possible to investigate philosophical questions with empirical methods. Two areas of research are considered – philosophy of language and semantics and epistemology. In these subfields of philosophy, the application of experimental methods has recently lead to (...) a noticeable progress. Empirical methods are justified in those disciplines in which arguments in favor of a particular theory are based on the study of our intuitions. Experiments only serve to obtain more objective representations of our intuitions, and philosophical argumentation is built further based on these intuitions. The authors argue that the use of experimental methods in semantics is compatible with anti-psychologism about meaning. The latter point is particularly controversial because linguistic intuitions or intuitions about the meaning have often been viewed as something that speakers have clear cognitive access to. However, when experimental research (even when it is a collection of controlled judgments) shows results that are different from what the field has been previously assuming, a revision is called for. The authors review several cases of such refutations calling for further revisions and argue that such experimental work helps arguments in philosophy of language and epistemology gain more sound ground with respect to the empirical data that they build on. In philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the cases explored in this article relate to the differences between languages with and without articles and to the predictions about the availability of certain interpretations of such expressions or lack thereof. It is further shown how a similar method of identifying the existent or non-existent interpretations was used in the studies of the meaning of “most”. In epistemology, the article discusses the results of some recent experimental work relating to the knowledge ascriptions. The speakers’ intuitions about the famous Barn-examples have recently been shown to diverge from what philosophers have claimed, building their far-reaching arguments on the data that was arguably incorrect. (shrink)

This comment on E. Borisov's text deals with some technical complications that his proposed analysis faces, according to the author's opinion. The author argues that Borisov's definition of the operator O is not clear and his theory might predict nonexistent readings unless the definition is stated clearly. The author criticizes Borisov's proposal for not being compositional and outlines an alternative analysis in terms of the contemporary semantic treatments of comparative constructions and attitude reports.

The article discusses the reasons why modern formal semantics of natural language is an integral part of a larger philosophical research program for the study of the nature of intentionality. The purpose of this article is to show how research in the field of formal semantics of natural language became the implementation of a large philosophical research program that is focused on the nature of intentional objects, which since the time of F. Brentano have been considered an integral part of (...) mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are opposed to physical phenomena due to their inherent intentionality. In modern philosophy, it is commonly considered that the comprehension of the nature of intentionality is the key to understanding the nature of consciousness, and, consequently, the nature of man. The article shows that formal semantics represents the structure of the meaning of linguistic expressions, with the help of which human thought is formed, which is one of the main objects of intentional consciousness. In formal semantics, this representation is carried out in a rigorous, systematic, and empirically verifiable way on the basis of natural languages, that is, on those symbolic systems that real people use in real practice to shape their thoughts. The research is based on the works of G. Frege, who laid the foundation for the formal-semantic methodology. Thus, the answer is given to the question of why modern formal linguistics, which originates in the analytical philosophy of the 20th century, is a philosophically significant discipline. This response is a reaction to the objections of skeptics who believe that modern analytic philosophy cannot be considered a direction that has any serious philosophical significance. (shrink)

This critical analytical review examines the ways in which realism can be justified in epistemology and philosophy of science and which are presented in the collection of papers “Perspectives of Realism in Modern Philosophy” (M., 2017). The exposition of areas in which the authors of this book study the problems of realism, as well as those arguments in its defense that they offer, is given. A criticism of these arguments is presented, according to which all of them are not able (...) to convince an antirealist to abandon their views in favor of realism. The question of whether realists and anti-realists have the same object of discussion and what could become a common ground for them is explored. The author suggests that an appeal to language can become such a common ground and reproduces Frege’s argument against skeptics and idealists as a possible methodological justification for realism. (shrink)

The paper explores the contextualist approach towards the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. The authors discuss the relevance of these studies in semantics for the major issues in virtue epistemology. It is argued that despite the advantages that contextualism has over its alternatives (in particular, relativism and subject sensitive invariablisism), it still requires a more elaborated compositional semantics that it currently has. We review several concrete contextualsit proposals to the semantics of the verb know in light of their applicability to the (...) well-known type of examples known as the fake barn example, point out some of their particular shortcomings, and propose a revision, which represents a variant of D. Lewis’s general approach to the semantics of know. (shrink)

In this article, we examine the key ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt about language and their relevance to the contemporary research in the field of linguistics. In his works, N. Chomsky describes Humboldt as a key predecessor of the generative approach. The authors discuss the concrete aspects of Humboldt’s influence on generative linguistics drawing special attention to his notion of Form. The authors also observe that Humboldt’s works also contain statements about the deep differences that exist between different languages, as (...) well as statements that different languages can form different pictures of the world. These ideas resonate with philosophical ideas about linguistic relativity (the famous Sapir – Whorf hypothesis), which are incompatible with generative linguistics. The authors try to reconcile an apparent contradiction by appealing to two different perspectives on language that they call the dynamic and the static one. They provide arguments in favor of the former and explore existing arguments against the later, which is associated with the aforementioned hypothesis. The authors conclude by pointing out that Humboldt’s legacy has so many facets that it introduces to incompatible views on language each of which had a serious impact on the studies of language in the 20th century. (shrink)

This is a review of the book by E.G. Dragalina-Chyornaya “Informal notes on logical form". The review discusses the structure and the main ideas of the book. The review focuses on the author's arguments in favor of the dynamic regulatory model of logic and provides a critical analysis of them.

The authors explore Carnap’s (1931) famous critique of Heidegger’s metaphysics and argue that, from the perspective of contemporary formal semantics of natural language, Carnap’s criticism is not convincing. Moreover, they provide direct empirical objections to Carnap’s criticism. In particular, using empirical evidence from languages like Russian that have negative concord, they show that Heidegger cannot be accused of assigning illegitimate logical forms to his sentences about Nothing because terms like “Nothing” can be used non-quantificationally and the fact that it is (...) not clear how their reference is established cannot be the reason why the corresponding sentences are ungrammatical (as Carnap seemed to suggest). The authors also critically discuss the view that natural language is insensitive to meaninglessness or contradiction. With reference to the work of J. Gajewsky, they show that this view is not true either. As a result of this investigation, they arrive at a position that an appeal to ungrammaticality like the one proposed by Carnap does not provide legitimate evidence against metaphysics. This conclusion relates to some recent criticism of the so-called non-analytical philosophers that can be traced back to Carnap’s paper. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of understanding of language expressions. We argue that understanding of language expressions can be successfully studied within a general approach of formal semantics and pragmatics. We show how three types of meanings of expressions (truth conditional meaning, presuppositional component and implicatures) contribute to our general understanding of what was said and how those meanings can be studied within the formal approach.

This article provides an overview of current research in the field of STS on neoliberalism. The paper discusses the major changes in science associated with the spread of neoliberalism. The following key aspects of neoliberalism influence on the development of science are discussed: the increasing commercialization of science (on the examples of commercialization of meteorology and privatization of stream restoration); an increasing influence of scientism in regulation of technology; and an increasing role of social activism in this regulation.