In his (several times reprinted) article How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? N. Rescher aspires to clarify the long-lasting discussion on the ‘is-ought’ (‘fact-value’) gap by providing a framework in which the related arguments can be perspicuously articulated. He then argues that even if the logical gap may bereal, the transition from factual premises to value conclusions is smoothly mediated by trivially true value statements. We scrutinize Rescher’s argumentation and show defects in the presented lines of reasoning. (...) In particular, we argue that his tripartite division of statements (factual, evaluative, hybrid), as well as his emphasis on the role of evaluative truisms, introduce serious problems that escape Rescher’s attention. We thus conclude that he failed to achieve his goals. (shrink)

In the paper, Priorś well-known \'tonk\' argument is examined and taken as a basis for general considerations regarding the logical status of implicit definition, and the semantical status of the \'tonk\'-like expressions. Further, the whiff of logical vanity attendant upon Priorś conclusions is dispelled by employing a new theory of concept. In particular, the authors argue that: a) Priorś \'tonk\' argument discredits neither the concept of analytical validity nor the role of implicit definition. The arguments underlying the authors\' view draw (...) from both syntactical and semantical considerations of the alleged \'tonk\' connective. b) Decisive criticism of the very concept of implicit definition of logical connectives can be, anstead, based on Tichýś view of formal axiomatics as a case of\'the Fallacy of Subject Matter\'. c) The semantical analysis of the so-called śtrictly empty\' concepts, as introduced by Materna in his theory of concept, renders a viable account of the mysteries and confusions surrounding Priorś witty and inspiring \'tonk\' example. (shrink)