Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, provides a comprehensive and accessible textbook treatment of the way decisions are made both when we have the statistical probabilities associated with uncertain future events and when we lack them. The book presents models, primarily prospect theory, that are both tractable and psychologically realistic. A method of presentation is chosen that makes the empirical meaning of each theoretical model completely transparent. Prospect theory has many applications in a wide variety of disciplines. The material in (...) the book has been carefully organized to allow readers to select pathways through the book relevant to their own interests. With numerous exercises and worked examples, the book is ideally suited to the needs of students taking courses in decision theory in economics, mathematics, finance, psychology, management science, health, computer science, Bayesian statistics, and engineering. (shrink)

In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions.’ However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments (...) and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers. (shrink)

This book offers a reassessment of the political philosophy of the British Idealists, a group of once influential and now neglected nineteenth-century Hegelian philosophers, whose work has been much misunderstood. Peter Nicholson focuses on F. H. Bradley's idea of morality and moral philosophy; T. H. Green's theory of the Common Good, of the social nature of rights, of freedom, and of state interference; and Bernard Bosanquet's notorious theory of the General Will. By examining the arguments offered by the Idealists (...) and by their critics the author is able to penetrate the deep layers of hostile comment laid down by several generations of later writers and to show that these ideas, once properly understood, are not only defensible but interesting and important. (shrink)

This book offers a reassessment of the political philosophy of the British Idealists, a group of once influential and now neglected nineteenth-century Hegelian philosophers, whose work has been much misunderstood. Peter Nicholson focuses on F. H. Bradley's idea of morality and moral philosophy; T. H. Green's theory of the Common Good, of the social nature of rights, of freedom, and of state interference; and Bernard Bosanquet's notorious theory of the General Will. By examining the arguments offered by the Idealists (...) and by their critics the author is able to penetrate the deep layers of hostile comment laid down by several generations of later writers and to show that these ideas, once properly understood, are not only defensible but interesting and important. (shrink)

The introduction of the euro gave a unique opportunity to empirically disentangle two components of utility: intrinsic value, a rational component central in economics, and the numerosity effect (going by numbers while ignoring units), a descriptive and irrational component central in prospect theory and underlying the money illusion. We measured relative risk aversion in Belgium before and after the introduction of the euro, and could consider changes in intrinsic value while keeping numbers constant, and changes in numbers while keeping intrinsic (...) value constant. Intrinsic value significantly affected risk aversion, and the numerosity effect did not. Our study is the first to confirm the classical hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion while avoiding irrational distortions due to the numerosity effect. (shrink)

Expert systems have been concerned with applications dealing with medical diagnosis, mineral exploration, and computer configuration, with some efforts relatively successful in achieving results at least as good as human experts. Today, much is being written about these systems and managerial decision-making activities in organizations and the positive impact that they can have in these situations. However, it appears that expert systems could become somewhat of a panacea for some organizational ailments as research, development, and marketing of them continues at (...) a fast pace. What may be forgotten in this technological thrust is the individual decision maker and his/her unique style of decision making which could affect acceptance and use of these systems. Another important consideration is the attitude people have toward computers and computer systems, which along with decision-making styles could certainly affect expert system effectiveness and ultimate success in organizations. This paper provides a discussion of potential problems that could occur regarding individual decision making and attitudes and their relationships to these systems. (shrink)

In spite of the recent surge of publication on Hegel’s social and political thought, the political ideas of the Phenomenology have remained relatively neglected. A volume devoted to them is thus welcome, especially from Professor Shklar, whose earlier books were exceptionally clear, able, and stimulating.

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a (...) path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean-Yves Jaffray’s ideas on ambiguity and the views underlying his ideas. His models, developed 20 years ago, provide the most tractable separation of risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs available in the literature today.

The nine papers and two comments in this collection, unobtrusively edited by Merold Westphal, were presented to the Hegel Society of America in 1978. Although they follow no overall plan, and do not cover the Phenomenology systematically or comprehensively, they raise many of the most significant questions. It is helpful to find some of these issues tackled by several of the contributors from different angles though with complementary emphases. All the papers are clearly argued, free of unexplained Hegelian terminology, commendably (...) concise, and extend our understanding of Hegel. They constitute a good collection to be warmly welcomed. (shrink)

To write any kind of commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is a daunting undertaking. Although the book’s overall plan appears to be clear in a general way, some of Hegel’s moves and conclusions are not; his philosophical premises often need to be made explicit and call for elucidation; and the development of his ideas in detail is uneven, throwing up many problems of interpretation, including passages which may easily be understood incompletely or even completely misunderstood. The result is that (...) the reader can get lost. In particular one’s attention can be distracted from Hegel’s essential point. This is one reason why anyone grappling with the Philosophy of Right will welcome the assistance to be gained from Michael Mitias. His book sets out to make visible the basic structure of the Philosophy of Right and to provide a clear guide to the main line of its argument. Mitias is largely successful. His outline and analysis help one to move about Hegel’s argument with greater confidence and to understand better its various parts both in themselves and in relation to the whole. (shrink)

Bosanquet was one of the most Hegelian of the British Idealist philosophers, and also one of the most prolific and wide ranging in his writings. This bibliography lists: I. books, pamphlets, contributions to books, articles, discussions, letters to th etc.; II. book reviews and critical notices; III. private letters which have been published; and IV. unpublished private letters. Certain other material, less easy to classify, is mentioned here.

The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”.

Whereas original prospect theory was introduced over 40 years ago, its formula for multi-outcome prospects has never yet been published, resulting in many misunderstandings. This note provides that formula.

Mario BUNGE: Ontology I . The Furniture of the World, Dordrecht: Reidel 1977 (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Vol. 3); Ontology II. A World of Systems, Dordrecht: Reidel 1979.