Die vorliegende Abhandlung ist die erste systematische Darstellung einer wissenschaftstheoretischen Konzeption, die ich in den Jahren 1976-1978 an der Fakultat fur Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft der Universitat Biele­ feld entwickelt habe. Zweck dieser Arbeit war es, die Konstruktionsphase einer empirischen Theorie der Literatur, und damit einer empirischen Wis­ senschaft liber Literatur, von einer Reihe von Inadaquatheiten, Vorurteilen und Irrationalismen zu befreien, die nach meiner Ansicht den bekannten Grundlagenstreit der Literaturwissenschaftler belasten, aber auch in man­ chen Arbeiten zur konzeptionellen Innovation der Literaturwissenschaft (...) zu finden sind. Ich wlirde es als Erfolg ansehen, wenn es mir gelungen ware zu zeigen, daB die Entwicklung des empirischen Paradigmas der Literatur­ wissenschaft tatsachlich mit jenem "Gestalt-Switch" einhergeht, den Thomas Kuhn fur die Struktur einer die normalen Pfade wissenschaftlicher Ent­ wicklung verlassenden Forschung beschrieben hat. Das Maa an wissenschaft­ licher Toleranz, das dabei der Mehrheit der Literaturwissenschaftler abver­ langt wird, ist ohne Zweifel ganz erheblich. Der zentrale Gedanke dieser Abhandlung ist der, daB die wissenschaftstheo­ retische Rationalitat nirgends so gebraucht wird wie in den fruhen, vorpara­ digmatischen Phasen der Entwicklung einer neuen Konzeption, und daa die libliche Wissenschaftstheorie nirgends so versagt wie gerade dort. Ich ver­ suche daher, die Grundlagen einer Konzeption zu umreiBen, die ich einen "Konstruktiven Funktionalismus" nenne, und ihre Brauchbarkeit als eine intradisziplinare Wissenschaftstheorie der empirischen Literaturwissen­ schaft zu demonstrieren. Das Bild der Literaturwissenschaft, das durch die Brille dieser Konzeption sichtbar wird, ist das einer nicht unwesentlich veranderten Disziplin. (shrink)

As part of an article symposium on Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal’s “Narrow Identities”, Peter Finke offers a critical anthropological perspective on the concept of social identity and its modeling in economics.

It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink's involvement in Edmund Husserl's mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink's ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink's very specific methodological ideas was already formulated (...) in details before he has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl's own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl's discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink's involvement in the formation of Husserl's notion of philosophy. (shrink)

Distinguished by its readability and scope, Moral Reasons analyzes issues in moral and political philosophy with careful attention to the role of argumentation in the study of ethics. After a comprehensive overview of moral reasoning--including dozens of examples and exercises--Charles K. Fink guides readers through the theories and arguments of philosophers from Plato to Peter Singer, covering such diverse topics as moral skepticism, abortion, euthanasia, political authority, punishment and war. Ideal as a main text for courses on applied (...) ethics or as a supplemental text for courses on social and political philosophy, this book offers one of the most diverse investigations of moral philosophy there is to date. (shrink)

In their study of reasoning with diagrammatic and non-diagrammatic representations, Larkin and Simon (1987) are concerned with _external_ representations and explicitly avoid drawing inferences about the bearing of their work on the issue of internal, mental representations. Nonetheless, we may infer the bearing of their work on internal representations from the theories of Kosslyn, Finke and other ‘pictorialists’ who take internal representations to be importantly like external ones regarding their ‘privileged’ spatial properties of depicting and resembling their referents. Thus, Finke (...) (1990) suggests that “perceptual interpretive processes are applied to mental images in much the same way that they are applied to actual physical objects. In this sense, imagined objects can be “interpreted” much like physical objects” (1990, p. 18). Elsewhere he suggests that “The image discoveries which then ‘emerge’ resemble the way perceptual discoveries can follow the active exploration and manipulation of physical objects” (1990, p. 171). (shrink)

I intend to map the historical debates about the Husserlian notion of transcendental reflection around 1930. This notion is essential for Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology. The easiest interpretation, based on Brentano’s notion of secondary perception, is represented by Rudolf Zocher’s critique of Husserl. Zocher’s critique is attacked by Eugen Fink, Husserl’s last assistant. His defence however contains very strong claims concerning the feasibility of the transcendental reduction, and the different kind of egos it involves. I investigate, whether his (...) point of view could be attributed to Husserl. A detailed theory of transcendental reflection is found in Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, but it is possible to track down its Husserlian origins. I examine some common sense objections, as represented by a critique which originates from Roman Ingarden, Husserl’s former student. I intend to show that it is possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian approach to the problem of transcendental reflection, which is less prone to the objections that could be levelled against Fink’s exposition. (shrink)

This article addresses whether Nietzsche’s naturalism is best understood as exemplifying the principles of scientific method and the spirit of Enlightenment. It does so from a standpoint inspired by Eugen Fink’s contention that Nietzsche’s endorsements of “naturalism” are best read as hyperbole. The discussion engages with Enlightenment-orientated readings (by Walter Kaufmann, Maudemarie Clark, and Brian Leiter), which hold Nietzsche’s naturalism to endorse of the spirit of empirical science, and an alternative view (provided by Richard Schacht and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter), which (...) holds Nietzsche’s “extended naturalism” to be an informing ethos of historically aware thought rather than a mere “method.” The ensuing discussion endorses the latter approach in terms that seek to take more seriously the implications of Fink’s point about the hyperbolic and figural aspects of Nietzsche’s naturalism. I argue that Nietzsche’s naturalism is indeed often hyperbolic and figural but that this exaggerated form of naturalizing thought allows insights that invite explicit theorization. Turning to an approach suggested by Adorno and Horkheimer, I argue that Nietzsche’s exaggeratedly “naturalistic” take on morality is best appreciated as a form of disturbing and disruptive political intervention in the dominant discourse of modernity in which it overtly situates itself, namely, the instrumentalizing, methodologically fixated liberal discourse of scientific Enlightenment. If we approach his thinking in this way, Nietzsche’s naturalism serves as a valuable resource for critical reflection on the hegemony of contemporary scientific culture. The context for such critical reflection is provided by Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereign power and modernity. Nietzsche’s naturalism, I argue, is foremost biopolitical in its implications. These implications invite critical reflection on aspects of Agamben’s work; they also, following Agamben’s lead, suggest that we must step beyond the fundamental concepts of liberalism. (shrink)

The early phenomenologist József Somogyi was one of, if not the first to write a monograph specifically dedicated to the _history_ of the nascent phenomenological philosophy. The two letters written by him during his stay in Freiburg in WS 1923/24, which are hereby published and discussed for the first time, are, similarly, of interest first due to the rare, valuable insight they can provide – when combined with a detailed microhistorical reconstruction of the surrounding constellation – into the elaborate structures (...) of mid-1920s Freiburg phenomenology around Edmund Husserl (directly after Martin Heidegger’s departure to Marburg). Ranging from Husserl’s teaching style to interactions between phenomenology and Catholic thought and to preconditions of the extraordinary philosophical creativity that distinguished early phenomenology, they offer a snapshot that differs significantly from the established narratives of subsequent privileged members of the Phenomenological Movement. Somogyi’s letters thus exemplify the possibility of reclaiming the plurivocity and philosophical richness of the early Phenomenological Movement by virtue of democratizing the historiography, i.e., giving voice to neglected historical actors (often originating from the peripheries). What is at stake is, however, not merely a more nuanced historical understanding of a particular epoch of early phenomenology. Quite the contrary, as I am finally going to argue on the basis of an adjacent short episode from the reception history of Husserl’s (or Eugen Fink’s) selfinterpretation, Somogyi’s case also exemplifies the possibility of a transformation in our understanding of the history of phenomenology (inspired by the methodological revolutions which took place in other compartments of the historiography of philosophy): namely to make the intricate, simultaneously conceptual and historical phenomena of the history of phenomenology a genuine subject matter of contemporary phenomenological research. (shrink)

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...) of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements. (shrink)

The period from Plato's birth to Aristotle's death (427-322 BC) is one of the most influential and formative in the history of Western philosophy. The developments of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and science in this period have been investigated, controversies have arisen and many new theories have been produced. But this is the first book to give detailed scholarly attention to the development of dialectic during this decisive period. It includes chapters on topics such as: dialectic as interpersonal debate between (...) a questioner and a respondent; dialectic and the dialogue form; dialectical methodology; the dialectical context of certain forms of arguments; the role of the respondent in guaranteeing good argument; dialectic and presentation of knowledge; the interrelations between written dialogues and spoken dialectic; and definition, induction and refutation from Plato to Aristotle. The book contributes to the history of philosophy and also to the contemporary debate about what philosophy is. (shrink)

Oswald Spenglers Kulturmorphologie diente als Ausgangspunkt einer internationalen und interdisziplinär angelegten Tagung, deren Beiträge in diesem Band vorliegen. Sie behandeln eine Vielfalt an Themen, die von der Menschwerdung, über die Kulturen des Altertums bis hin zu aktuellen politischen und sozialen Fragestellungen reichen. Schließlich sind auch Studien zur Spenglerforschung im engeren Sinne vertreten.

Eugen Fink is considered one of the clearest interpreters of phenomenology and was the preferred conversational partner of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. In Play as Symbol of the World, Fink offers an original phenomenology of play as he attempts to understand the world through the experience of play. He affirms the philosophical significance of play, why it is more than idle amusement, and reflects on the movement from "child's play" to "cosmic play." Well-known for its non-technical, literary (...) style, this skillful translation by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner invites engagement with Fink's philosophy of play and related writings on sports, festivals, and ancient cult practices. (shrink)

As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...) very small proportions. The decisions arid actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any signihczmt way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written t0 their parliamentaxy representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing thc refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At thc government level, no govcrmmcnt has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive fm: more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, B1~itain’s share of thc nonreccverabla development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,¤00. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as.. (shrink)

Quantentheorie und Relativitätstheorie haben das Weltbild der Physik revolutioniert. Beide Theorien gelten jedoch als unanschaulich und schwer verständlich. Dieses Sachbuch schafft neue Zugänge und lädt zum Mitdenken ein. Renommierte Experten aus Physik und Philosophie erläutern Grundbegriffe, Erkenntnisfortschritte und Deutungsfragen zu Raum, Zeit und Materie. Dabei kommen typische Themen aus der Philosophie der Physik zur Sprache, wie etwa die Interpretationsdebatte der Quantentheorie oder Modellbildungen in der Kosmologie. Weltbildrelevante Fragen nach dem Verhältnis von Mathematik, Empirie und Anschauung oder nach der Verlässlichkeit physikalischer (...) Erkenntnis erfordern die Verbindung von Physik und Philosophie, von fachwissenschaftlicher Grundlagenforschung und methodenkritischer Reflexion. Der thematische Bogen geht zurück auf ein hochkarätig besetztes Symposium mit populärwissenschaftlicher Ausrichtung. Das Buch enthält Beiträge von Andreas Bartels, Robert Harlander, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Gert-Ludwig Ingold, Claus Kiefer, Meinard Kuhlmann, Klaus Mainzer, Oliver Passon, Manfred Stöckler, Rüdiger Vaas und Reinhard Werner. (shrink)

Die Autorin geht der Frage nach, welche Raum- und Ortskonzeptionen in den 1990er Jahren - nach der kritischen Relektüre der Ortspezifik - in der Kunst Verwendung gefunden haben. Dabei erweist sich "The Ambient" als Schlüsselphänomen. Ursprünglich für die Musik entwickelt, ist das Konzept des "Ambient" durch die Konstruktion eines vorübergehenden, prozessualen Ortes gekennzeichnet. Hergestellt wird dieser einerseits durch künstlerische Produktionsprozesse, die in bestehende Architektur- und Landschaftsräume verändernd eingreifen. Andererseits basiert "Ambient" auf kollektiven Praktiken. Sabine Gebhardt Fink erläutert, wie die (...) ortspezifische Kunst der 1960er Jahre weiterentwickelt wurde. Sie beschreibt spezifische Formen immersiven ästhetischen Erlebens und beleuchtet den Einfluss des Ortskonzeptes von Ambient Music und Ambient Sound. Anhand künstlerischer Projekte von Ricardo Basbaum, Janet Cardiff, Alice Creischer / Andreas Siekmann / Christian von Borries, Thomas Hirschhorn, San Keller und Hendrikje Kühne / Beat Klein wird schließlich geklärt, was unter einer Ästhetik des Mit-Seins zu verstehen ist. (shrink)

This paper argues that a set of questioning attitudes are among the foundations of human and animal minds. While both verbal questioning and states of curiosity are generally explained in terms of metacognitive desires for knowledge or true belief, I argue that each is better explained by a prelinguistic sui generis type of mental attitude of questioning. I review a range of considerations in support of such a proposal and improve on previous characterizations of the nature of these attitudes. I (...) then broaden their explanatory scope to include a number of forms of exploratory search. The paper has three main goals: to characterize the nature of the questioning attitudes, outlining their causal role and type of content; to argue that they are fundamental components of the mind, being widespread among animals and not constructed during ontogeny out of other attitudes; and to suggest that they explain a great deal more behavior than one might think. (shrink)

Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this paper, I argue that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it (...) also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state. (shrink)

In recent years, the science and the philosophy of consciousness has seen growing interest in structural questions about consciousness. This is the Editorial Introduction for a special volume for Philosophy and the Mind Sciences on “Structuralism in Consciousness Studies.”.